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THE JOURNAL

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No. 1.

PARMENIDES.

By THOS. DAVIDSON.

HISTORICAL.

The Eleatic school of Philosophy is mainly represented by four names : Xenophanēs, Parmenidēs, Melissos, and Zeno. Though the first of these is universally regarded as the founder of the school, Parmenidēs is the most important figure in it, the Eleatic *par excellence*. His father's name was Pyrrhēs. He himself was a native of Elea or Velia. This city, which was of small importance politically, was founded about B. C. 540 by a colony of Phokæans. It lay on the western shore of Lucania.

The date of Parmenidēs' birth is uncertain; but we shall hardly be wrong in placing it in the last quarter of the sixth century B. C. Diogenēs Laertius says he flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad (B. C. 504–501); but this can hardly be true, if any confidence is to be placed in the statements of Plato. In the dialogue entitled *Parmenidēs* we read: "Antiphon stated on the authority of Pythodoros that Zeno and Parmenidēs once came to the greater Panathenæa, Parmenidēs being at that time quite an old man with grey hair and a handsome and noble countenance, and certainly not over sixty-five years of age; Zeno about forty years old, tall and elegant, said to have been the favorite of Parmenidēs. He mentioned also that they put up at the house of Pythodoros in the Kerameikos, outside the city walls, and that Sokratēs and many other persons visited them there, desiring to hear Zeno read his productions, which had then been brought by them for the first time, and that Sokratēs was then a very young man." In the *Sophist*, Sokratēs is made to say: "I was present when Parmenidēs uttered and discussed words of exceeding beauty, I being then a young man, and he already far advanced in years."

Again, in the Theætetos, he says: "For I was personally acquainted with the man, I being very young, and he very old." Supposing Sokratēs, who was born about B. C. 469, to have been fifteen years old when he conversed with Parmenidēs, this would place this meeting in 454 B. C., and the birth of Parmenidēs in 519. This tallies exactly with the statement of Diogenēs that Zeno, who, according to Plato, was twenty-five years younger than Parmenidēs, flourished about the seventy-ninth Olympiad, 454-451 B. C. Mr. Grote's opinion, which is not much at variance with this, is worth quoting in his own words:

"It will hardly be proper to place the conversation between Parmenidēs and Sokratēs—as Mr. Clinton places it, Fast. H. vol. ii. App. c. 21, p. 364—at a time when Sokrates was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety would not permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or civil. I cannot but think that Sokratēs must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenidēs.

"Sokratēs was born in 469 (perhaps 468) B. C.; he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449; assuming the visit of Parmenidēs to Athens to have been in 448 B. C., since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 B. C. It is objected that, if this date be admitted, Parmenidēs could not have been a pupil of Xenophanēs: we should thus be compelled to admit, which perhaps is the truth, that he learned the doctrine of Xenophanēs at second-hand."

Theophrastos informs us that Parmenidēs was a pupil of Anaximander; but this can hardly be true, if as Diogenēs asserts, on the authority of Apollodoros, Anaximander died in the fifty-eighth Olympiad (548-545 B. C.), several years before the founding of Elea. That Parmenidēs may have been acquainted with some of the teachings of Anaximander seems not unlikely. The latter had declared the Infinite to be the first principle of all things, a doctrine which it seems to be the intention of Parmenidēs pointedly to refute and disclaim when he says:

"Wherefore that that which is should be infinite, is not permitted."

It was currently reported in Aristotle's time that Parmenidēs was a pupil of Xenophanēs, and we have every reason to believe that he was. We learn also that he was intimate with several Pythagoreans, two of whom, Ameinias and Diochætēs, are mentioned. He is said to have admired them greatly, to have adopted to a considerable extent their mode of life, and to have erected a *Heroön* to the memory of Diochætēs.

Parmenidēs was no mere dreamer. Like Empedoklēs and others, he took an active part in the public affairs of his native city, and drew up a code of laws, to which the Eleans every year swore to conform. He was the friend of Empedoklēs and Leukippos, and the teacher of Melissos and Zeno. He disseminated his philosophy not only by his writings, but also, as we have seen, by public lectures and discussions. He employed in his discussions the *Dialectic* method of reasoning, which had been invented by Xenophanēs, and was afterwards so much improved and used by Zeno as to be considered his invention. We are not aware that Parmenidēs left any prose writings. Like most of the contemporary philosophers, he committed his teachings to verse, and indeed, if we may believe Proklos and Cicero, was not very successful in so doing. The former says his diction was more like prose than poetry, and the latter that his verses were inferior, but the matter of them sometimes pretty forcible; which we can believe.

The only work of Parmenidēs known to the ancients, and probably the only one he ever composed, was the poem entitled *On Nature*, whereof considerable fragments have come down to us—preserved mainly in the works of Plato, Sextus Empeiricus, Proklos, and Simplicius. The ancients regarded the poem as divided into two parts, the one *On Truth* or *On the Intelligible*, the other *On Opinion* or *On the Perceptible*. The latter is called by Plutarch a *Cosmogony*, and not without reason, for in it Parmenidēs seems to have attempted, without denying the existence of the gods, to explain them upon physical principles. In what esteem this poem was held by the ancients we may learn from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, as well as from many later productions. Much that is put into the mouth of Parmenidēs in the Platonic dialogue which bears his name, we must ascribe to Plato himself, or to whoever was the author. This dialogue, which according to Hegel contains “the sublimest dialectic that ever was,” is held by some critics not to be from the pen of Plato.

The following translation is made from the Fragments as they stand in Mullach’s *Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum*, Paris, Didot. Though I have adopted his arrangement, I have not in all cases adopted his readings, which are, in one or two instances, I think, very inconsiderate. I have used every effort to make the translation literal, and I think it will be found to be so. As to my verses, I may plead that, if Parmenidēs was unable to write his Philosophy in good Greek hexameters, I may be excused for not being able to translate them into good English ones. In the notes, I have brought together all the valuable information I have been able to find regarding the different parts of the work of Parmenidēs.

ON NATURE.

I. INTRODUCTION.¹

Soon as the coursers² that bear me and drew me as far as extendeth
 Impulse, guided me and threw me aloft in the glorious pathway,
 Up to the Goddess³ that guideth through all things man that is conscious,
 There was I carried along, for there did the coursers sagacious,
 Drawing the chariot, bear me, and virgins preceded to guide them—
 Daughters of Helios⁴ leaving behind them the mansions of darkness—
 Into the light, with their strong hands forcing asunder the night-shrouds,
 While in its sockets the axle⁵ emitted the sound of a syrinx,
 Glowing, for still it was urged by a couple of wheels well-rounded,
 One upon this side, one upon that, when it hastened its motion.
 There were the gates of the paths of the Night and the paths of the Day-time.
 Under the gates is a threshold of stone and above is a lintel.
 These too are closed in the ether with great doors guarded by Justice⁶ —
 Justice the mighty avenger, that keepeth the keys of requital.
 Her did the virgins address, and with soft words deftly persuaded,
 Swiftly for them to withdraw from the gates the bolt and its fastener.
 Opening wide, they uncovered the yawning expanse of the portal,
 Backward rolling successive the hinges of brass in their sockets,—
 Hinges constructed with nails and with clasps; then onward the virgins
 Straightway guided their steeds and their chariot over the highway.
 Then did the goddess⁷ receive me with gladness, and taking my right hand
 Into her own, thus uttered a word and kindly bespake me:

“ Youth that art mated with charioteers and companions immortal,
 Coming to us on the coursers that bear thee, to visit our mansion,
 Hail! for it is not an evil Award that hath guided thee hither,
 Into this path—for, I ween, it is far from the pathway of mortals—
 Nay, it is Justice and Right. Thou needs must have knowledge of all things,
 First⁸ of the Truth's unwavering heart that is fraught with conviction,
 Then of the notions of mortals, where no true conviction abideth,
 But thou shalt surely be taught this too, that every opinion
 Needs must pass through⁹ the ALL, and vanquish the test with approval.¹⁰

II. ON TRUTH.¹¹

“ Listen, and I will instruct thee—and thou, when thou hearest, shalt ponder—
 What are the sole two paths of research that are open to thinking.
 One path is: That Being doth be, and Non-Being is not;
 This is the way of Conviction, for Truth follows hard in her footsteps.
 Th' other path is: That Being is not, and Non-Being must be;

This one, I tell thee in truth, is an all-incredible pathway.
For thou never canst know what is not (for none can conceive it),
Nor canst thou give it expression, for one thing are Thinking and Being.

* * * * *

“And to me ’tis indifferent
Whence I begin, for thither again thou shalt find me returning.”¹²

* * * * *

Speaking and thinking must needs be existent, for is is of Being.
Nothing must needs not be; these things I enjoin thee to ponder.
Foremost of all withdraw thy mind from this path of inquiry,
Then likewise from that other, wherein men, empty of knowledge,
Wander forever uncertain, while Doubt and Perplexity guide them—
Guide in their bosoms the wandering mind; and onward they hurry,
Deaf and dumb and blind and stupid, unreasoning cattle—
Herds that are wont to think Being and Non-Being one and the self-same,¹³
Yet not one and the same; and that all things move in a circle.

* * * * *

Never I ween shalt thou learn that Being can be of what is not;
Wherefore do thou withdraw thy mind from this path of inquiry,
Neither let habit compel thee, while treading this pathway of knowledge,
Still to employ a visionless eye or an ear full of ringing,
Yea, or a clamorous tongue; but prove this vext demonstration
Uttered by me, by reason. And now there remains for discussion
One path only: That Being doth be—and on *it* there are tokens,
Many and many to show that what is is birthless and deathless,
Whole and only-begotten, and moveless and ever-enduring:
Never it was or shall be; but the ALL simultaneously now is,^{1 4}
One continuous one; for of it what birth shalt thou search for?
How and whence it hath sprung? I shall not permit thee to tell me,
Neither to think: 'Of what is not,' for none can say or imagine
How Not-Is becomes Is; or else what need should have stirred it,
After or yet before its beginning, to issue from nothing?
Thus either wholly Being must be or wholly must not be.
Never from that which is will the force of Intelligence suffer
Aught to become beyond being itself. Thence neither production
Neither destruction doth Justice permit, ne'er slackening her fetters;
But she forbids. And herein is contained the decision of these things;
Either there is or is not; but Judgment declares, as it needs must,
One of these paths to be uncomprehended and utterly nameless,
No true pathway at all, but the other to be and be real.
How can that which is now be hereafter, or how can it have been?
For if it hath been before, or shall be hereafter, it is not:

Thus generation is quenched and decay surpasseth believing.¹⁴
 Nor is there aught of distinct; for the All is self-similar alway.
 Nor is there anywhere more to debar it from being unbroken;
 Nor is there anywhere less, for the All is sated with Being;
 Wherefore the All is unbroken, and Being approacheth to Being.
 Moveless, moreover, and bounded by great chains' limits it lieth,
 Void of beginning, without any ceasing, since birth and destruction
 Both have wandered afar, driven forth by the truth of conviction.
 Same in the same and abiding, and self through itself it reposes.
 Steadfast thus it endureth, for mighty Necessity holds it—
 Holds it within the chains of her bounds and round doth secure it.
 Wherefore that that which is should be infinite is not permitted;¹⁵
 For it is lacking in naught, or else it were lacking in all things.

* * * * *

Steadfastly yet in thy spirit regard things absent as present;
 Surely thou shalt not separate Being from clinging to Being,
 Nor shalt thou find it scattered at all through the All of the Cosmos,
 Nor yet gathered together.

* * * * *

One and the same are thought and that whereby there is thinking;¹⁶
 Never apart from existence, wherein it receiveth expression,
 Shalt thou discover the action of thinking; for naught is or shall be
 Other besides or beyond the Existent; for Fate hath determined
 That to be lonely and moveless, which all things are but a name for—
 Things that men have set up for themselves, believing as real
 Birth and decay, becoming and ceasing, to be and to not-be,
 Movement from place to place, and change from color to color.
 But since the uttermost limit of Being is ended and perfect,
 Then it is like to the bulk of a sphere well-rounded on all sides,¹⁷
 Everywhere distant alike from the centre; for never there can be
 Anything greater or anything less, on this side or that side;
 Yea, there is neither a non-existent to bar it from coming
 Into equality, neither can Being be different from Being.
 More of it here, less there, for the All is inviolate ever.
 Therefore, I ween, it lies equally stretched in its limits on all sides.
 And with this will I finish the faithful discourse and the thinking
 Touching the truth, and now thou shalt learn the notions of mortals.
 Learn and list to the treach'rous array of the words I shall utter.

III. ON OPINION.¹⁸

“Men have set up for themselves twin shapes to be named by Opinion,
 (One they cannot set up, and herein do they wander in error.)
 And they have made them distinct in their nature, and marked them with tokens,

Opposite each unto each—the one, flame's fire of the ether,
Gentle, exceedingly thin, and everywhere one and the self-same,
But not the same with the other; the other, self-similar likewise,
Standing opposed by itself, brute might, dense nature and heavy.
All the apparent system of these will I open before thee,
So that not any opinion of mortals shall ever elude thee.

* * * * *

All things now being marked with the names of light and of darkness,
Yea, set apart by the various powers of the one or the other,
Surely the All is at once full of light and invisible darkness,
Both being equal, and naught being common to one with the other.

* * * * *

For out of formless fire are woven the narrower circlets,^{1 9}
Those over these out of night; but a portion of flame shooteth through them.
And in the centre of all is the Goddess that governeth all things:
She unto all is the author of loathsome birth and coition,
Causing the female to mix with the male, and by mutual impulse
Likewise the male with the female.

* * * * *

Foremost of gods, she gave birth unto Love; yea, foremost of all gods.^{2 0}

* * * * *

Then thou shalt know the ethereal nature and each of its tokens—
Each of the signs in the ether, and all the invisible workings
Wrought by the blemishless sun's pure lamp, and whence they have risen,
Then thou shalt hear of the orb-eyed moon's circumambient workings,
And of her nature, and likewise discern the heaven that surrounds them,
Whence it arose, and how by her sway Necessity bound it,
Firm, to encircle the bounds of the stars.

* * * * *

. . . “How the earth and the sun, and the moon, and the ether
Common to all, and the milk of the sky, and the peak of Olympus,
Yea, and the fervent might of the stars, were impelled into being.

* * * * *

Circling the earth, with its wanderings, a borrowed, a night-gleaming splendor.

* * * * *

Wisfully watching forever, with gaze turned towards the sun-light.

* * * * *

Even as in each one of men is a union of limbs many-jointed,
So there is also in each one a mind; for one and the same are
That which is wise and the nature generic of members in mortals,
Yea, unto each and to all; for that which prevaieth is thinking.^{2 1}

* * * * *

Here on the right hand the youths, and there on the left hand the maidens.²²

* * * * *

Thus by the strength of opinion were these created and now are,
Yea, and will perish hereafter, as soon as they grow unto ripeness;
Men have imposed upon each one of these a name as a token."

NOTES.

1. This introduction has generally been looked upon as allegorical. In one sense it is so; at the same time we must not forget that what in its own day was the soberest statement of facts that could be made, frequently appears to succeeding ages as allegorical. Primitive peoples found it far easier to embody new thoughts and feelings in the concrete forms of their mythology, with which they were familiar, than to describe them in abstract terms. If we find Parmenidēs saying that he was borne aloft by horses to the presence of the Goddess who governs all things, we must not forget that our own language is not altogether free from allegory, when we say that he "rose to higher regions of thought." Parmenidēs did not mean to make an allegory; he simply gave an account of his mental progress in the ordinary mythological dialect of his time, and that, from our point of view, seems allegorical.

2. If we compare the opening of this with a passage in the fifth book of the *Iliad*, where Heré and Athené visit Zeus in their chariot, we cannot fail to be struck with the similarity of the two. "And Heré touched the steeds sharply with the whip, and, of their own accord, the gates of the sky, kept by the *Horæ*, to whom are entrusted the wide sky, and Olympus, to fold back the dense cloud, and to replace it, burst open. And through these they guided their goaded steeds, and found the son of Kronos sitting afar from the other gods on the summit of many-peaked Olympus." We need not be very anxious to determine precisely what Parmenidēs meant by *coursers* or by *chariot*. Imaginations capable of furnishing the sun with a chariot for his daily course might surely be pardoned for giving the soul one, when it ascends into the pure ether of thought, without our supposing that it must represent the appetites or anything else in particular. A chariot was the recognized means of rising aloft, not only among the Greeks but also among the ancient Indians, the Hebrews (witness the story of Elijah), and other nations. That Parmenidēs, when his mind was expanding, and, as it were, grasping the whole Universe in one thought, should have felt that he was coming into the region of the gods, and pictured himself as furnished with their means of locomotion, one can readily believe. If this is once admitted, we need not spend much labor in attempting to interpret minute points about the

chariot or its axles. Sextus Empeiricus, in whose work *Adversus Mathematicos* this introduction is for the most part preserved, makes a comment upon it, which we must take for what it is worth. Sextus lived at a time when philosophers were finding allegories in everything ancient; witness his contemporary Porphyry's *Cave of the Nymphs*. His views of what Parmenidēs may have thought, and his ideas concerning the imagery likely to have suggested itself to Parmenidēs, can have no authority whatever. He says: "In these lines, Parmenidēs says he is borne by coursers—that is, the irrational impulses and appetites of the soul—along the noble and glorious pathway of a goddess—that is, the path of contemplation based on philosophic reason. For reason, like a guiding deity, conducts to the knowledge of all things. And her daughters go before—namely, the senses. He refers to the ears when he says: 'It was urged by a couple of wheels well-rounded' by the wheels (circles), that is, of the ears, through which they receive sound. Intuitions he calls 'daughters of the Sun,' who leave the 'mansions of darkness,' and move [their veils] toward the light, because without light there would be no use for them. He says he came to *Diké* or avenging Justice, 'who keepeth the keys of requital,' that is, to thought, which has the sure and steadfast comprehensions of things. She, having received him, promises to teach him two things,

'First of the Truth's unwavering heart that is fraught with persuasion,'

that is, the unswerving step of science ;

'Then of the notions of mortals, where no true conviction abideth,'

that is, whatever is matter of opinion, as being, for that reason, uncertain. In the end she makes the clear declaration, that the senses are not to be trusted, but only the reason. She says:

'Neither let habit compel thee, while treading this pathway of knowledge,
Still to employ a visionless eye, or an ear full of ringing,
Yea, or a clamorous tongue; but try this vext demonstration
Uttered by me, by Reason.'

From this it is plain that he (Parmenidēs) also, in pronouncing the scientific reason to be the canon of truth in regard to the things that are (in matters of ontology), revolted against the authority of the senses."

3. (See note 7.)

4. The daughters of the Sun, in the mythological account, were *Æglé*, *Lampetié*, and *Phaëthousa*—Radiance, Sheen, and Gleam. The allegory here is very simple. Pindar calls the sun's ray the "Far-seeing mother of the eyes," and the sun himself the "Birth-giving father of the sharp rays," and the "Lord of the fire-breathing steeds." Preller, in his *Griechische Mythologie*, says: "From his radiant light

Helios is called Phaëthon, and also the glittering eye of Heaven or of Zeus; because the eye is the light of the body, and has therefore, in all times, been used as an expression for all the radiant and gleaming phenomena of the sky. For the same reason Helios is the all-seeing (πανόπτης), all-observing, all-investigating, the general spy of gods and men, to whom nothing is hidden or secret. * * * He is likewise a god of the truth of all that is concealed, a god who was wont to be invoked in oaths and by oppressed innocence. From this, the further transition to the principle of wisdom and cognition was easy; and, in this sense, Parmenidēs, in the opening of his philosophico-didactic poem, tells us that he rose to the heights of knowledge riding *in the chariot of the sun*, and guided by the daughters of Helios; while Pindar, in a very beautiful poem, composed on the occasion of a solar eclipse, had called the ray of the sun the “mother of the eyes, and the fountain of wisdom.” Passages might be quoted from the tragedians to show that the sun was considered the source of sight and blindness, e.g. Eurip. *Hekabē*, 1066–8; Soph. O. C. 869.

5. The chariot of the sun is not mentioned in Homer. It is first noticed in the so-called Homeric Hymn to Helios. No particular meaning is to be attached to the axles or wheels; they are mentioned simply to show the ease and rapidity of the motion.

6. In the passage quoted from Homer in note 2, we learn that the gates of the sky were kept by the *Horæ*. The names of these, according to Hesiod, are Eunomia, *Diké*, and Eirené—Order, *Justice*, and Peace. Thus Parmenidēs, in making Justice the guardian of the gates of the sky, adheres to the ordinary mythology. We learn also from Hesiod—*Works and Days*, 254 sq.—that Justice was greatly revered by the Olympian gods, standing in very close relation to Zeus, and keeping watch for him over the transgressions of men. The *Horæ*, it must be remembered, are the daughters of Zeus and Themis (Right). We need not be astonished at the materials of which the gates are said to be made. Even Homer speaks of the heaven as “brazen,” “all-brazen,” and “iron.”

7. The Goddess (Θεά) here meant is evidently the same as the one referred to in line 3, and there called *Δαίμων*. Ritter, in his *History of Philosophy*, misled perhaps by Sextus Empiricus, supposes *Diké* to be meant. But this is evidently wrong; for *Diké* is merely the gate-keeper in the mansion of a higher power. Mullach sees this and corrects Ritter, but is nearly as far wrong himself when he affirms that the goddess meant is Wisdom. There are two things particularly to be remarked in regard to the personages mentioned in this poem;—first, their names are always significant; second, not one of them is a personification made by the poet himself, but all are taken from the

already existing mythology. There is no mention of Zeus, or Athené, or Apollo, or any of the Olympians, neither do we meet with any mere abstract term personified. I cannot find any proof that the Greeks ever personified Wisdom. Pindar, indeed, in his poem *On a Solar Eclipse*, speaks of "the path of Wisdom," and I doubt not but similar expressions might be found elsewhere; still this does not amount to a personification of Wisdom. If we observe carefully, we shall, I think, be able to discover the name of the goddess meant. In lines 26, 27, we are informed that it was not an evil fate (*Μοῖρα*) that had brought the philosopher to the goddess, but that it was Justice and Right (Themis). Now we know already what part Justice (Diké) has taken in bringing him thither; but, so far as we know, Themis has done nothing towards it. Now we know in regard to Themis that she stood in very close relation to Zeus (Odyssey II. 68); that she was by some held to be the eldest of the gods; that Æschylus considered her identical with Gaia (Earth); that she was the goddess of law and order; that she was endowed with knowledge of the future, and that the Delphic oracle belonged to her before it passed over to Apollo. Pindar tells us, that "First the Fates bore the well-counselled, celestial Themis in their golden chariot from the springs of Ocean to the awful slope of Olympus, along the shining path, to be the time-honored spouse of Zeus the Saviour." The Fates, who led Themis to Olympus, are daughters of Night, whereas the guides of Parmenidēs are the daughters of the Sun; this fact would almost seem to throw light upon line 7. However this may be, if we consider all the attributes and the lofty position of Themis, we shall probably be convinced that she is the goddess referred to by Parmenidēs. If this be true, Parmenidēs may be supposed to have meant that insight led him to justice or right action, from which he passed to the mother or source of justice, which explained everything to him.

8. The goddess here mentions two paths, and, a few lines farther on, adds that they are the only ones open to thinking. In line 45, she mentions another path, which however is not open to thinking, being trod only by "unreasoning cattle."

9. This line I have translated in a manner entirely different from that of any of the editors of the Fragments. In doing so, I have rejected Mullach's entirely unauthorized reading, and retained that of one of the best MSS. I understand the line to mean, that every concept which sets itself up as the first principle must be tested by being made universal. If it can stand without any presuppositions, then it is the "True First Principle"; if it does not, it must be rejected. (See *Jour. of Spec. Phil.*, Vol. III., No. 3, p. 288.)

10. Some space has been devoted to elucidating this Introduction,

because the interpretation put upon it by Sextus Empeiricus has generally been accepted as the true one.

11. The goddess now begins her discourse on Truth, the burden of which is that *is* is the universal predicate, and that there is no *not-is*. She warns her hearer to avoid believing the opposite doctrine. She sustains the true one by the argument that nothing can be thought or affirmed of that which has no being, and thence arrives at the famous conclusion that being and thinking are identical. Plotinus remarks upon this passage: "Previously (to Plato) Parmenidēs likewise touched upon this view, inasmuch as he reduced Being and mind to the same thing, and affirmed that mind did not lie in the objects of sensation. For when he says that to think and to be are the same thing, he says that this is immovable, and, although he attributes to it the power of thinking, he deprives it of all corporeal movement in order that it may remain unchanged, and likens it to the bulk of a sphere because it holds and comprehends everything, and because thinking is not outside but inside of itself." (Enneads, V. 1, 8.)

12. Proklos's interpretation of these lines runs thus: "For Parmenidēs saw Being itself (as has been said before), that which is abstracted from all things, and the highest of things that are, that wherein the existent was primarily manifested: not that he ignored the multiplicity of objects of intelligence; for it was he who said, 'For Being approaches to Being'; and again,

‘To me ’tis indifferent

Whence I begin, for thither again thou shalt find me returning;

and elsewhere,

‘Everywhere distant alike from the centre’ (line 103).

By all these expressions he shows that he considers that the objects of intelligence are many, and that there is a hierarchy among them of first, and middle, and second, and an ineffable union; thus not ignoring the multiplicity of the things that are, but seeing that the whole of this multiplicity has proceeded from the one Being. For *there* is the fountain of Being, and the home thereof, and the hidden Being from which the things that are draw their unity."

13. Plato, in a connection similar to this, says: "For these things are mere word-puzzles, and it is impossible to affirm in thought whether Being, or Non-Being, or both, or neither, belongs to any one of them." (Rep. V. 479, C.) Neither Parmenidēs nor Plato had an opportunity of reading Hegel's *Logie*, in which it is expressly affirmed that pure Being and pure Nothing are the same.

14. Plato says: "For the *was* and the *shall be* are generated forms of time, although we inadvertently and wrongly apply them to the

eternal essence. For we say that it was, is, and shall be; yet the is only belongs to it truly, whereas WAS and SHALL BE are properly predicated of that generation which goes forward in time." (Tim. 37, E.) Compare *The Sentences of Porphyry*, Jour. of Spec. Phil., Vol. III., No. 1. The whole of this fragment bears a striking resemblance to one of the hymns in the tenth book of the Rig-Veda. The following translation of it is taken from Max Müller's *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 546 :

"Nor aught nor naught existed; yon bright sky
Was not, nor heaven's broad woof outstretched above.
What covered all? what sheltered? what concealed?
Was it the water's fathomless abyss?
There was not death—hence was there naught immortal,
There was no confine betwixt day and night;
The only One breathed breathless in itself,
Other than it there nothing since has been.
Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled
In gloom profound—an ocean without light.
The germ that still lay covered in the husk
Burst forth, one nature, from the fervent heat.
Then first came Love upon it, the new spring
Of mind; yea, poets in their hearts discerned,
Pondering, this bond between created things
And uncreated. Comes this spark from earth,
Piercing and all-pervading, or from heaven?
Then seeds were sown and mighty power arose—
Nature below, and Power and Will above.
Who knows the secret? who proclaimed it here,
Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang?—
The gods themselves came later into being.—
Who knows from whence this great creation sprang?—
He from whom all this great creation came,
Whether his will created or was mute,
The Most High Seer that is in highest heaven,
He knows it—or, perchance, e'en he knows not."

15. Aristotle seems to have this passage in view, when he says: "Parmenidēs seems to hold to the One of reason, and Melissos to the One of matter. Accordingly the former affirms that the One is finite, the latter that it is infinite." Simplicius put the argument of Parmenidēs in a syllogistic form. "If Being is, and not Non-Being, it must be free from deficiency: but, being free from deficiency, it is perfect; and being perfect, it must have an end, and is therefore not endless. Having an end, it has a limit and a boundary." It is impossible to render into English the word-quibble on τέλος and τέλειον to which Simplicius here condescends.

16. This is a very clear statement of the doctrine promulgated by Spinoza—the Parmenidēs of modern philosophy. Hegel (*History of*

Philosophy, Vol. III., p. 372) says: "The simple thought of the idealism of Spinoza is: what is true is simply and solely the one substance whose attributes are thinking and extension (Nature): and this absolute unity alone is actual, is the actuality—it alone is God" (p. 376). "This, in general terms, is the Spinozan idea. It is the same as the *ὅν* of the Eleatics. It is the oriental view, which Spinoza was the first to utter in the West. In general, we may remark that thought had of necessity to occupy the standpoint of Spinozism; that is the true beginning of all philosophy. If one begins to philosophize, he must begin by being a Spinozist. The soul must bathe in this ether of the one substance, wherein all that was held to be true has vanished. It is to this negation of all particularity that every philosopher must come: it is the freeing of the spirit, and forms its absolute basis. The difference between the latter and the Eleatic philosophy is simply this, that, owing to the influence of Christianity in the modern world, there is present in the mind generally a more concrete individuality. Notwithstanding this infinite demand for the wholly concrete, however, substance is not defined as concrete in itself. Inasmuch, therefore, as the concrete does not lie in the content of substance, it must fall back upon the reflective thinking, and then it is only from the infinite antitheses of the latter that the unity results. Of substance as such nothing more can be predicated; we can speak only of philosophizing concerning it, and of the antitheses cancelled in it. All distinction depends simply upon the nature of the antitheses that are cancelled in it. Spinoza has been very far from demonstrating this as clearly as the ancients took the trouble to do." The two following propositions from Spinoza's *Ethics* will illustrate this:

BOOK I. PROP. XIV. *Besides God no substance can be or be conceived.*
 DEMONSTRATION. Since God is an absolutely infinite Being, of which no attribute expressing the essence of substance can be denied, and he exists of necessity; if there were any substance besides God, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances having the same attribute would exist, which is absurd. Wherefore there can be no substance besides God, and hence none such can be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily be conceived as existing, and this, according to the former part of this demonstration, is absurd. Wherefore, besides God, &c. Q. E. D.

BOOK II. PROP. I. *Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.*

17. Simplicius, in commenting upon this passage, says: "We need not wonder if he says that the one Being is 'like to the bulk of a well-rounded sphere'; for by this figure he merely aims at a sort of mythological image."

18. Aristotle, *Metaph.* I. 5, says: "Parmenidēs seems to speak more circumspectly. For laying down Being, and considering Not-Being to be nothing, he of necessity thinks Being to be one, and nothing else. * * * But being compelled to follow the phenomena, and assuming that the One is according to reason, and plurality according to sense, he again lays down the two causes and two first principles, hot and cold—meaning, for example, fire and earth. The former of these, the hot, he arranges on the side of Being, the other on that of Non-Being." In the extant fragments of Parmenidēs there is no mention of heat or cold, but only of light and darkness.

19. The word for circlets does not occur in the original, but Cicero (*De Naturā Deorum* I. 11) tells us: "Parmenidēs makes a sort of fiction in the likeness of a crown. He gives it the name of *στεφάνη*, as encircling with a glow of light the sphere which surrounds the heaven, and which he calls God, wherein no one can perceive either divine figure or sense." One is almost tempted, in reading this fragment, to believe that, according to the view of Parmenidēs, the sun occupied the centre of the material universe, and that the *Anima Mundi*, or Power that governed all things, was situated in the centre of the sun. There is extant a hymn of Proklos *To the Sun*, of which the opening lines may be translated thus:

"Give ear, O king of intellectual light;
Gold-reinèd Titan, light's Dispenser, hear!
O king, that holdest in thy hands the key
Of life's sustaining fount, and from above
Dost lead throughout the wide material worlds,
In streams, the brimming fount of harmony,
Give ear; for, seated on the central throne
Above the ether, in the fulgent orb,
The Universe's heart, thou fillest all
With thine own spirit-waking forward thought.
The planets, life-lit at thy fadeless torch,
Forever in their ceaseless and unwearied rounds
Send life-engendering beams to all on earth,
While underneath thine ever-circling car,
By firm decree, the sister seasons spring.
The din of clashing elements was staid
When thou appear'd'st, sprung from a nameless sire.
To thee the Fates' unvanquished band gave way,
And backward twist the thread of destiny
At thy behest; for thou art mightier far,
And rulest mightily with royal power."

There are many points of resemblance between this poem and the fragments of Parmenidēs, and, as Proklos was well acquainted with the work of the latter, we may with some probability suppose that he adopted his cosmological views. Erdmann, in his *Grundriss der Ge-*

schichte der Philosophie, says: "Parmenidēs' ideas of the construction of the Universe are either incorrectly handed down, or are unintelligible from their peculiarity of expression. They did not prevent him from having, for his time, important astronomical information." This is clear from lines 143-4, which evidently refer to the moon.

20. This agrees somewhat with Hesiod's statement that Eros (Love) was the child of Chaos and Earth. (*Theogony*, 121.) Compare also note 14, and Preller's *Griechische Mythologie*, Vol. I., p. 393. We know also from Aristotle that Parmenidēs made Love one of the prime movers. The other of the two primal causes (*αἰτίαι*), mentioned by Aristotle, was doubtless Hate, as indeed we are told by Cicero. This, again, brings us very close to the doctrine of Empedoklēs, whose two great physical principles are Friendship (*φιλότης*) and Strife (*ὑστρίχος*), or, as we should say in modern times, attraction and repulsion.

21. Theophrastos's note on this passage is: "Since there are two elements, the cognition is according to the one that prevails; for, according as the hot or the cold has the upper hand, the thought will differ."

22. The following Latin version of a passage of Parmenidēs, probably connected with this, but no longer extant, occurs in Caelius Aurelianus *De Morb. Chron.* IV. 9:

"Femina virque simul veneris quum semina miscent
Venis, informans diverso ex sanguine virtus,
Temperiem servans, bene condita corpora fingit;
At si virtutes permixto semine pugnent
Nec faciant unam, permixto in corpore diræ
Nascentem gemino vexabunt semine sexum."

MEDITATIONS

CONCERNING THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY,

*In which are clearly proved the Existence of God, and the
real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man.*

Translated from the French of Descartes, by WM. R. WALKER.

FIRST MEDITATION.

ON THE THINGS WHICH MAY BE CALLED IN QUESTION.

It is not now that I have discovered that, from my earliest years, I have received many false opinions as true, and that what I have since built on foundations so insecure can be but very doubtful and uncertain; and from that time I have

judged it well that I should seriously undertake, once in my life, to rid myself of all the opinions I have hitherto received into my belief, and to begin anew from the foundations if I would establish anything firm and constant in the sciences. But, this undertaking appearing to me to be very great, I waited until I should attain an age so mature that I could not hope for another after it in which I should be more fit to carry out the undertaking; which has made me defer so long that I should henceforth believe myself blameworthy if I longer employed in deliberation the time which remains to me for action. Having therefore, this day, in accordance with this design, freed my mind from all manner of cares, and happily feeling myself agitated by no passion, and having gained for myself an assured repose in a peaceful solitude, I shall apply myself seriously and freely to destroy generally all my old opinions. But, for this purpose, it will be unnecessary for me to show that they are all false, a process of which perhaps I might never see the end; but since reason already persuades me that I ought not less carefully to guard against giving credence to things which are not entirely certain and indubitable than to those which manifestly appear to me to be false, it will be sufficient for me, in order to reject them all, if I can find in each some reason for doubt. And to that end it will be unnecessary for me to examine each one in particular, which would be an endless labor; but, because the destruction of the foundations necessarily draws with it all the rest of the edifice, I shall first attack the principles on which my old opinions were based.

All that I have hitherto received as true and assured I have learned of the senses or by the senses; but I have sometimes experienced that the senses are deceptive; and it is prudent never to trust ourselves entirely to what has once deceived us.

But perhaps, although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things that are in a very small measure perceptible and things that are very remote, there are nevertheless many others of which we cannot reasonably doubt, notwithstanding that we have known them through the medium of the senses: for example, that I am here, seated by the fire, in my dressing-gown, with this paper in my hand, and so forth. And how is it that I cannot deny that these hands and this

body are mine, unless I would compare myself to certain madmen whose brains are so confused and darkened by atrabilious vapors, that they constantly affirm that they are kings, when in fact they are very poor; that they are clothed in gold and purple, when in fact they are entirely naked; or who imagine themselves to be pitchers, or to have a glass body? But, what! these are fools, and I should not be less extravagant were I to be guided by their example.

However, I have here to consider that I am a man, and consequently that I am accustomed to sleep, and to represent to myself in my dreams the same things, or sometimes things less probable than these madmen do in their waking hours. How often has it happened to me to dream by night that I was in this place, that I was dressed, that I was near the fire, although I was quite naked in bed! It certainly seems to me at present that it is not with sleeping eyes that I look at this paper; that this head which I shake is not slumbering; that it is with design and deliberate purpose that I extend this hand and that I feel it: what happens in sleep does not seem so clear or distinct as all this. But, in considering this matter carefully, I call to mind that I have often been deceived in my sleep by similar illusions, and, in halting at this thought, I see so manifestly that there are not here any certain marks by which waking can be clearly distinguished from sleep, that I am fairly astonished; and my astonishment is such that I might almost be persuaded that I am asleep.

Let us suppose, then, that we are asleep, and that all these particulars—namely, that we open our eyes, shake our heads, stretch out our hands, and similar things—are but false illusions; and let us think that neither our hands nor our whole body are such as we see them. Yet it is necessary, at least, to avow that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like pictures and paintings, which can be formed only from resemblance to something real and veritable, and that therefore, at least, these general things—namely, eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body—are not imaginary things, but things real and existing. For painters, even when they endeavor with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by fantastic and extraordinary figures, cannot however give them forms and natures entirely new, but make only a certain

mixture and composition of the members of divers animals; or if, perhaps, their imagination is extravagant enough to invent something so new that nothing has ever been seen resembling it—and that therefore their work represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false—the colors, at all events, in which they paint them must be actual.

And, for the same reason, while these general things—namely, a body, eyes, a head, hands, and other such things—may be imaginary, yet we must necessarily allow that there are at least some other things yet more simple and more universal which are true and existing, from the mixture of which, precisely as from that of certain actual colors, all these images of things which reside in our thought, be they true and real, or fictitious and fantastic, are formed.

Of this kind of things is corporeal nature in general and its extension; together with the figure of things extended, their quantity or size, and their number, as also the place where they are, the time which measures their duration, and so forth. Hence we might perhaps not conclude amiss if we say that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all the other sciences which depend on the consideration of compound things, are very doubtful and uncertain; but that arithmetic, geometry, and the other sciences of that nature which treat only of things very simple and general, without much reference to whether they are in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable: for, whether I wake or sleep, two and three added together always make five, and the square will never have more than four sides; and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity or uncertainty.

Yet I have long had in my mind a certain opinion that there is a God who can do everything, and by whom I have been made and created what I am. Now, how do I know but that he has ordained that there should be no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless I should have the feeling of all these things, and that all these should not seem to me to exist otherwise than as I see them? And, verily, as I sometimes judge that others are deceived in the things which they think they best know, how do I know but that he has ordained that I should be deceived every time

I make the addition of two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of something still more easy, if anything more easy than that can be imagined? But it may be that God has not willed that I should be thus deceived, for he is called supremely good. Yet if it was contrary to his goodness to have so made me that I should always be deceived, it would also seem contrary to his goodness to permit me sometimes to be deceived, and yet I cannot question but that he does permit it. There are, perhaps, persons here who would rather deny the existence of a God so powerful than believe that all other things are uncertain. But let us not oppose them for the present, and let us admit in their favor that all that is said here of a God is a fable: still, in whatever fashion they suppose I attained to the state and being which I possess, whether they attribute it to some destiny or fatality, or refer it to chance, or will have it to be by a continual sequence and connection of things, or, finally, in any other manner; since to fail and be deceived is an imperfection, the less powerful the author is to whom they assign my origin, the more probable will it be that I am so imperfect as always to deceive myself. To which reasons I have certainly nothing to answer; but after all I am constrained to acknowledge that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true of which I cannot in some fashion doubt; and that not through rashness or levity, but for very strong and maturely considered reasons; so that henceforth I must not less carefully guard myself against giving credence thereto than to what is manifestly false, if I wish to find anything certain and assured in the sciences.

But it is not enough to have made these remarks, I must be careful to bear them in mind; for these old and customary opinions still often recur to my mind, the long and familiar intimacy they have had with me giving them a right to occupy my mind against my will and to make themselves almost masters of my belief; and I shall never lose the habit of deferring to them and of having confidence in them so long as I shall consider them such as they really are, namely, in some fashion doubtful, as I shall presently show, and yet very probable, so that we have more reason to believe than to deny them. This is why I think I shall not do amiss, if, deliber-

ately assuming a contrary proposition, *I deceive myself*, and if I feign for some time that all these opinions are false and imaginary; until at last having so balanced my old and my new prejudices that they cannot weigh down my opinion more to one side than to another, my judgment will be henceforth no more mastered by bad habits and turned from the right road which can conduct it to the knowledge of truth. For I am assured that, nevertheless, there is neither danger nor error in this way, and that I cannot to-day too much indulge my distrust, since it is not now a question of acting, but only of meditating and knowing.

I shall suppose, then, not that God, who is very good and the sovereign source of truth, but that a certain evil spirit, not less cunning and deceitful than powerful, has employed all his industry to deceive me; I shall think that sky, air, earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all other external things, are nothing but illusions and idle fancies, of which he makes use to lay snares for my credulity; I shall consider myself as not having hands, or eyes, or flesh, or blood—as not having any senses, but falsely believing myself to have all these things; I shall remain obstinately attached to this thought; and if, by these means, it is not in my power to come to the knowledge of any truth, at least it is in my power to suspend my judgment. For this reason I shall guard carefully against receiving into my belief any falsity, and shall prepare my mind so well against all the wiles of this great deceiver, that, however powerful and cunning he is, he will never be able in any degree to impose upon me.

But this design is painful and laborious, and a kind of idleness draws me insensibly into the train of my ordinary life; and just as a slave, who has been enjoying in his sleep an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that his liberty is but a dream, fears to awake, and conspires with these agreeable illusions in order to be a long time deceived by them, even so do I fall back, insensibly to myself, into my old opinions, and I fear to awake from this slumbering condition lest the laborious watchings which would have to succeed the tranquillity of this repose, in place of bringing me some light and some knowledge in the understanding of the truth, should not be sufficient to clear away all the darkness of the difficulties which have just been stirred.

SECOND MEDITATION.

ON THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND, AND THAT IT IS MORE EASILY KNOWN THAN THE BODY.

My yesterday's meditation has filled my mind with so many doubts that henceforth it is no more in my power to forget them. And, nevertheless, I do not see in what way I can resolve them; and as if I were suddenly thrown into very deep water, I am so surprised that I can neither secure a footing in the bottom, nor swim, in order to keep myself above water. I shall make the effort, however, and again follow the same path which I yesterday entered on when I withdrew from everything concerning which I could imagine the smallest doubt, just as if I knew that it was absolutely false; and I shall still continue in this path until I have encountered something certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing certain in the world. Archimedes, in order to draw the terrestrial globe from its position and to transport it to another place, asked for nothing but for a point which should be firm and immovable; so I should have a right to entertain high hopes if I am happy enough to find only one thing which is certain and indubitable.

I suppose, then, that all the things I see are false; I persuade myself that all that my memory, filled with illusions, represents to me, has never existed; I think that I have no senses; I believe that body, figure, extension, motion, and place, are but fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed real? Perhaps nothing besides this, that there is nothing certain in the world.

But how do I know whether there is not some other thing different from those which I have just judged as uncertain, and of which we cannot have the least doubt? Is there not some God or other power which puts these thoughts into my mind? That is not necessary, for perhaps I am of myself capable of producing them. I then, at least, am something, am I not? But I have already denied that I had any senses or any body: I nevertheless hesitate, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that I cannot exist without them? But I am persuaded that there is nothing whatever in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no

bodies; have I not, then, persuaded myself that I am not? Far from it; without doubt I am, whether I persuade myself, or if I have merely thought something. But there is a kind of deceiver, very powerful and very cunning, who uses all his industry always to deceive me. There is not, then, any doubt but that I am, if he deceives me; and, deceive me as much as he will, he can never bring it about that I should be nothing so long as I shall think I am something. So that, after much reflection and after having carefully examined all things, we must at last conclude and hold as constant, that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true every time I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind.

But I do not yet know with sufficient clearness what I am, I who am certain that I am; so that henceforth it will be necessary for me to guard carefully against imprudently taking anything else for me, and thus not to be mistaken in this knowledge which I assert to be more certain and more evident than all that I have hitherto had. For this reason I shall now consider anew what I believed to exist before entering into these last thoughts; and from my old opinions I shall cut off all that more or less can be combatted by the reasons which I have just advanced, so that there shall only remain precisely what is entirely certain and indubitable. What, then, did I heretofore believe myself to be? Manifestly, I thought I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I say he is a reasonable animal? Certainly not; for it would be necessary for me afterwards to discover what an animal is and what reasonable is, and thus from a single question I should insensibly fall into an infinity of others more difficult and more complicated; and I would not waste the little time and leisure which remain to me in unravelling such difficulties. But I shall rather stop here and consider the thoughts which heretofore sprung up of themselves in my mind, and which were prompted by my own nature alone when I applied myself to the consideration of my being. I considered myself first as having a face, hands, arms, and all that machine composed of bone and flesh such as we see in a corpse, which machine I designated by the name of body. I considered besides that I fed, that I walked, that I felt, and that I thought, and I referred all these actions to the soul; but I did not stop to consider what this soul was;

or else, if I did stop, I imagined it was something extremely rare and subtile, like a wind, or a flame, or a very thin air, which was insinuated into and spread through my grosser parts. As to the body, I nowise doubted of its nature; but thought I knew it very distinctly, and if I had wished to explain it according to the notions I then had of it, I should have described it thus: By the body, I understand all that can be limited by any form; which can be contained in any place, and fill a space in such sort that every other body shall be excluded from it; which can be felt either by touch, or by sight, or by hearing, or by taste, or by smell; which can be moved in several ways, not in truth of itself, but by something extraneous to it by which it is touched and from which it receives the impulse: for to have the power of self-motion, as also of feeling or thinking, was something I did not at all believe to belong to the nature of the body; on the contrary, I was rather astonished to see that such faculties should meet in any.

But who am I, now that I suppose there is a certain spirit extremely ingenious, and, if I may venture to say so, malicious and cunning, who employs all his power and industry to deceive me? Can I affirm that I have the least of all those things which I have just said pertain to the nature of the body? I stop to consider the matter attentively, I turn all these things over and over in my mind, and I cannot discover any that I can say is in me. There is no need for my stopping to enumerate them. Let us pass, then, to the attributes of the soul, and see whether there be any one of them in me. The first are feeding and walking; but if it be true that I have no body, it is also true that I cannot walk or feed myself. Another is feeling; but one cannot feel without a body;—although, indeed, I have imagined that formerly I felt many things during sleep which I knew on awaking I had not really felt. Another is thinking, and I find here that thought is an attribute which belongs to me: it alone cannot be detached from me. I am, I exist; that is certain: but how long? As long as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should totally cease to think, that I should at the same time entirely cease to be. I am now admitting nothing which is not necessarily true; I am, then, speaking in precise terms, only a thing

which thinks—that is to say, a mind, an understanding, or a reason, terms whose signification was to me formerly unknown. Now, I am a real thing and really existing; but what thing? As I have already said: a thing which thinks. And what more? I will stir up my imagination in order to see whether I am not something more. I am not that assemblage of members which we call the human body; I am not a thin and penetrating air spread through all its members; I am not a wind, a breath, a vapor, or anything at all which I can feign or imagine, since I have supposed that all that was nothing, and since, without changing this supposition, I find that I never fail to be certain that I am something.

But perhaps it is true that these very things which I suppose not to be because they are unknown to me, are not really different from me, whom I do know. I cannot say; I do not now dispute concerning that, I can give my judgment only on things known to me: I know that I exist and I am trying to find what I am, I whom I know to be. Now it is very certain that the knowledge of my being, thus precisely understood, does not depend on things whose existence is yet unknown to me; consequently, it does not depend on any of those which I can by my imagination feign. And even these terms *feign* and *imagine* warn me of my error; for I should really feign if I imagined myself to be something, since to imagine is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing: but I already know for certain that I am, and that, in a word, it may be that all these images, and generally all that pertains to the nature of the body, are but dreams or chimeras. Hence I see clearly that there was as little reason in my saying I will stir up my imagination in order more distinctly to know what I am, as if I said: I am now awake, and I perceive something real and veritable; but, because I do not yet perceive it with sufficient clearness, I shall go to sleep on purpose, that my dreams may represent to me this matter with more truth and clearness. And yet I manifestly know that nothing of all that I can comprehend by means of the imagination pertains to this knowledge which have of myself, and that it is necessary to recall and turn away one's mind from this mode of conceiving in order that it may know more distinctly its nature.

But what am I then? A thing that thinks. What is a thing that thinks? It is a thing that doubts, that understands, that conceives, that affirms, that denies, that wills, that wills not, that also imagines and feels. Certainly, these are not a few if they all pertain to my nature. But why should not they pertain to it? Am I not that very person who now doubts almost everything, who nevertheless understands and conceives certain things, who asserts and affirms these alone to be true, who denies all others, who wishes and desires to know more, who wishes not to be deceived, who imagines many things, even sometimes in spite of himself, and who also feels many things, as by the mediation of the organs of the body? Is there anything of all that which is not as real as the certitude that I am, and that I exist even though I should always be asleep, and though he who has given me my existence should use all his industry to mislead me? Is there, therefore, any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thought, or which can be said to be separate from myself? For it is of itself so evident that it is I who doubt, who understand and desire, that there is no need that I should here add anything by way of explanation. And I have certainly also the power to imagine; for though it might happen (as I have before supposed) that the things which I imagine may not be true, yet this power of imagination does not cease to be really in me, but forms part of my thought. In short, I am the very thing which thinks—that is, which perceives certain things as by the organs of the senses, since in fact I see light, hear sound, feel heat. But it may be said that these appearances are false, and that I am asleep. Be it so: yet, at least, it is certain that it appears to me that I see light, hear sound, and feel heat; that cannot be false, and this is properly what in me is called feeling, which again is precisely thinking. From this I begin to know what I am a little more clearly and distinctly than before.

But notwithstanding it still seems to me, and I cannot divest myself of the belief, that the corporeal things whose images are formed by thinking, which fall under the senses, and which the senses themselves examine, are not more distinctly known than this unknown part of me which does not fall under the imagination; although, in truth, it is very strange to say that

I should know and comprehend more distinctly things whose existence appears to me doubtful, which are unknown to me, and which do not pertain to me, than those of whose truth I am persuaded, which are known to me, and which pertain to my proper nature, and, in one word, than myself. But I see clearly that this is the explanation: my mind is a vagabond who delights to stray, and who cannot yet brook being kept within the just limits of truth. Let us, then, once more loosen the bridle, and giving the mind every manner of liberty, permit it to examine the objects which appear to it outside, in order that, happening hereafter to withdraw it gently and opportunely, and to steadily fix it on the consideration of its being and the things which it finds within it, it may after that be more easily regulated and conducted.

Let us then now consider the things which are commonly esteemed to be the most easily known of all, and which are also believed to be the most distinctly known, namely, the bodies which we touch and which we see: not, indeed, bodies in general, for these general notions are ordinarily a little more confused; but let us consider one in particular. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax: it has just been taken fresh from the hive, it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey which it contained, it yet retains something of the odor of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, its shape, its size, are apparent; it is hard, cold, pliable, and if you strike it, it will emit a sound. In a word, all things which can distinctly cause a body to be known are found in it. But while I am speaking it is brought to the fire: what remained in it of flavor is exhaled, the odor evaporates, its color changes, its shape is lost, its size enlarged, it becomes liquid, it is warm, one can scarcely touch it, and although it is struck it no more emits any sound. Does the same wax still remain after this change? We must admit that it does; no one doubts of it or judges otherwise. What is it, then, which we knew in this piece of wax with so much distinctness? It certainly cannot be anything of all that I observed by the mediation of the senses, since all the things which fell under taste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing, are changed, and still the same wax remains. Perhaps it was what I now think, namely, that this wax was not this sweetness of honey, or this agreeable odor

of flowers, or this whiteness, or this shape, or this sound; but only a body which a little before appeared to me sensible under these forms, and which now makes itself felt under others. But what is it, speaking precisely, that I imagine when I conceive it in this way? Let us consider it attentively, and, cutting off all the things which do not pertain to the wax, let us see what remains. There certainly only remains something extended, flexible, and changeable. But what is it to be flexible and changeable? Is it not that I imagine that this wax, being round, is capable of becoming square, and of passing from the square into a triangular shape? Certainly not; it is not that, since I conceive it capable of receiving an infinitude of such changes; and yet I cannot run through this infinitude by my imagination, and consequently this conception that I have of the wax has not its source in the faculty of imagination. What, now, is this extension? Is it not also unknown? for it becomes larger when the wax is melting, larger when it boils, and still larger when the heat increases; and I should not conceive clearly and according to truth what wax is, if I did not think that this wax which we are considering is capable of receiving more varieties in the way of extension than I ever imagined. It is necessary, therefore, to admit that I cannot even comprehend by the imagination what this piece of wax is, and that it is my understanding alone that comprehends it. I say this piece of wax in particular; for as regards wax in general the thing is still more evident. But what is this piece of wax which can be comprehended only by the understanding or the mind? Certainly it is the same object which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and, in a word, what I have always from the beginning believed it to be. But what is here particularly to be remarked, is that my perception is not a vision, or a touch, or an imagination, and never has been, although it formerly seemed so, but only an examination by the mind, an examination which may be imperfect and confused as it was before, or else clear and distinct as it now is, according as my attention is more or less directed to the things which are in it and of which it is composed.

Yet I cannot express my astonishment when I consider how much weakness and tendency towards being insensibly carried into error there are in my mind. For while without

speaking I consider all this within myself, yet the words make me pause, and I am nearly deceived by the terms of common language; for we say that we see the same wax if it is before us, and not that we judge it to be the same from its having the same color and the same shape: from which I should almost conclude that we know the wax by the sight of the eyes, and not by the sole examination of the mind; if by chance I observed from a window some men passing in the street, I should, so viewing them, at once say that I see men, just as I say that I see the wax; and yet what do I see from this window but some hats and cloaks, which might cover artificial machines moved merely by springs? But I judge that they are men, and thus I comprehend by the sole power of judgment which resides in my mind what I believed I saw with my eyes.

A man who seeks to raise his knowledge above the common ought to be ashamed to draw occasions of doubt from the forms of speech invented by the vulgar: I prefer to go further, and to consider if I conceived with more evidence and perfection what this wax was when I first perceived it and when I believed I knew it by means of the external senses, or at least by common sense, as it is called—that is to say, by the imaginative faculty—than I now conceive it after having carefully examined what it is and in what fashion it can be known. It would certainly be ridiculous to call this in question. For what was there in this first perception that was distinct? what was there which did not appear capable of falling in the same way under the senses of the smallest of animals? But when I distinguish between the wax and its external forms, and when, just as if I had removed from it its dress, I consider it in its entire nakedness, it is certain, although there may yet be some error found in my judgment, that I cannot conceive it in this way without a human mind.

But after all, what shall I say of this mind, that is to say, of myself? for hitherto I have not admitted anything in me but mind. What then? I who appear to conceive with so much clearness and distinctness this piece of wax, do I not know myself, not only with much more verity and certainty, but also with much more distinctness and clearness? for if I judge that the wax is or exists from the fact that I see it, it

certainly follows more evidently that I am, or that I myself exist from the same fact that I see it: for it may turn out that what I see is not really wax; it may also turn out that I have not even eyes to see anything: but it cannot be that when I see, or (I do not distinguish between the two) when I think I see, I who think am not something. In the same way, if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same thing will again follow, namely, that I am; and if I judge it from the fact that my imagination, or whatever other cause it may be, persuades me of it, I shall always come to the same conclusion. And what I have here remarked of the wax may be applied to all other things which are external to me and which are to be found outside of me. And, moreover, if the notion or perception of the wax seemed to me clearer and more distinct after not only sight or touch, but also many other causes rendered it more manifest to me, with how much more evidence, distinctness and clearness must I admit that I now know myself, since all the reasons which enable me to know and conceive the nature of wax, or whatever other body it may be, prove much better the nature of my mind; and there are to be found, besides, so many other things in the mind itself which can contribute to the elucidation of its nature, that those which depend on the body, as these do, are scarcely worthy of being taken into account!

But at last I have insensibly arrived at my destination; for since there is one thing which is now manifest to me, that bodies themselves are not properly known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding alone, and that they are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched, but only from the fact that they are understood, or else comprehended by the thought, I see clearly that there is nothing which it is easier for me to know than the nature of my own mind. But because it is difficult to get rid thus readily of an opinion to which one has long been habituated, it will be well for me to stop for a little at this place, in order that by prolonging my meditation I may impress more deeply in my memory this new knowledge.

RHYMED SAYINGS OF THE CHERUBINIC WANDERER.

Translated from the German of Johann Scheffler, otherwise called Angelus Silesius, a Poet of the seventeenth century, by A. E. KROEGER.

That which is fine, remaineth.

Hard as a precious stone, clear as the purest gold,
And as a crystal pure thy soul thou oughtest to hold.

We know not what we are.

I know not what I am; I am not what I know;
A thing and not a thing, a point and circle's flow.

I am as God, and God is as I.

I am as great as God, as I so small is He;
He cannot over me, I not below Him, be.

God lives not without me.

I know without me God cannot a moment live;
If I to naught should turn, He too would death receive.

A Christian as rich as God.

I am as rich as God; there can no dust-speck be
Which I hold not with Him in common property.

The Overgodhead.

What has been said of God sufficeth me not yet;
The overgodhead is my life, my light, my mate.

Eternal Death.

That death from which again doth not a new life soar,
Is that death which my soul of all deaths doth abhor.

We must be quite godly.

Lord, it suffices not angel-like to adore Thee,
And in the full perfection of gods to bloom before Thee;
'Tis far too small for me, for my soul much too low;
Who wants to serve Thee right must more than godlike grow.

No death is without a life.

I say, naught dieth e'er; 'tis but another life,
Though 't be a painful one, which rises from death's strife.

God knows no beginning for Himself.

Thou ask'st me to report how long since God has been;
Be still! it is so long, himself knows not it e'en.

How do we become like God?

Who wants to be like God, must unlike all else grow,
Get rid of his own self and of all selfish woe.

The Rose.

The rose, which here thine eye externally doth see,
Hath bloomed thus in God from all eternity.

*The Cherubic Wanderer.**The Godhead is a Naught.*

The tender Godhead is a naught and over-naught:
 Who seeth naught in all, seeth alone, I wot.

The spirit remains at all times free.

Bind me close as thou wilt in thousand irons fast,
 I yet shall be unchained and free unto the last.

How doth God rest in me?

Thou must be and remain quite pure in mind and breast
 If God in thee Himself shall see and gently rest.

In truth all is one.

They speak of time and space, now and eternity;
 What then is time and space, now and eternity?

Man maketh time.

Thyself maketh the time, its works thy senses be;
 But check'st thou their unrest, then thou from time art free.

Equality.

I know not what to do; all things in me do chime—
 Space, unspace, joy and pain, eternity and time.

God external to all creatures.

Go where thou canst not go, see where thou seest not,
 Hear where naught rings or sounds; then art thou near God brought.

Always the same.

What I was I became, what I've been I endure,
 And evermore shall be when soul and flesh find cure.

God-imbued.

God is my soul, my flesh, my sinews, and my blood:
 How, then, should I not now throughout be god-imbued?

Beauty.

Yea, beauty is a light: the more thou lack'st of light,
 More horrible thou'lt be in flesh and soul, poor wight!

Calm Beauty.

Ah me! why scorn to learn from the flowrets of the plain
 How to please God and yet be beautiful, O men!

Without a why.

The rose ne'er had a why; she blooms because she does;
 Worshippeth not herself; cares not whether she shows.

To stand still is to go back.

Who in the ways of God should venture to stand still,
 Would go back in his ways and into lasting ill.

Love is better than Fear.

To fear God is good, yet better love, I think;
 And best, through boundless love, your soul in Him to sink.

God loves himself alone.

It is not surely true, God loves himself alone,
And who His other He can be in His beloved Son.

God is, He does not live.

God only IS, my friend; He does not love or live
As we to thee and me those words applied receive.

The essential man.

Faith! an essential man is like eternity,
Which all externalness keeps from all changes free.

The best is to be still.

To be employed is good, yet better 'tis to pray;
Still better dumb and still before the Lord to stay.

Secludedness.

Secludedness is good; keep from the common free,
And thou canst everywhere in lonely desert be.

The eternal selection of Grace.

O doubt not; if thy soul but out of God is born,
Thou art selected then th' eternal life t' adorn.

Five tablets are in God.

Five tablets are in God—friend, servant, son, bride, spouse;
Who further goes, confuses and no more number knows.

Eternity.

If longer seems to thee eternity than time,
Then speakest thou of pain and not of bliss sublime.

To the Virgin Mary.

Tell me, O worthy lady, was humbleness most rare
Not the sole cause that thou wast chosen God to bear?
Tell me if 'tis not so, that also I, on earth,
May be His maid and bride, and unto God give birth.

God-consecrated Humility.

Think what 'tis to be humble, see what simplicity does:
The shepherds were the first ones on whose sight God arose.
He sees God nevermore, nor here on earth nor there,
Whose only wish is not that he a shepherd were.

Desire to Kiss.

O my sweet child, my God! let me here at Thy feet
The smallest nail with kiss but one small moment greet.
I know that if I be but merely touched by Thee,
Quickly will vanish all mine and Thine agony.

The Greatest Wonder.

O wonder, that God's Son has been for e'er and aye,
And yet his mother first has brought him forth to day.

*The Cherubic Wanderer.**The Secret Rose.*

The rose, friend, is my soul; the thorn, my body's lust;
 The spring-time God's sweet grace, His anger cold and frost:
 Her bloom is to do good—not mind her thorn, the flesh—
 T'adorn the soul with good and keep for heaven fresh.
 If she guards well her time and in the spring-time blows,
 She'll be for e'er and aye God's own selected rose.

The Greatest Sanctuary.

No greater sanctuary on earth has ever been
 Than a chaste body and a soul devoid of sin.

To the Sinner.

The richest devil has not e'en a pebble; see!
 Thou'rt slave of the most poor: can aught yet poorer be?

The Way to Holiness.

To holiness the road that is most near and sure
 Is humbleness, upon the path of all that's pure.

The Dawn and the Soul.

Beautiful is the dawn, still more so is the soul
 Which God's beams light up in its body's lowest goal.

Concerning St. Ignatius.

You ask why those wild beasts St. Ignace did devour?
 He was a grain of wheat, God ground him into flour.

The Godhead.

The Godhead is a well, from it all things e'er flow,
 And yet again return: hence is't a sea also.

The Birth of the Pearl.

The pearl is by the dew engendered, born, and loved,
 In the cavern of a shell; and this is quickly proved,
 If thou believ'st it not: the dew God's spirit is,
 The pearl is Jesus Christ, the shell my soul's abyss.

The End of the Year.

The old year, which now closes, in drawing to its end,
 Is held as if 'twere past; and this is true, my friend,
 Provided thou in God a new man didst unfold:
 If not, then truly dost thou still live in the old.

Transformation.

Thy body thou in spirit, thy spirit in God place,
 Then canst thou, as thou lik'st, live in full bliss and grace.

The Paradise on Earth.

Thou seek'st the paradise, and wishest to get there,
 Where thou may'st be relieved from all unpeace and care;
 Then do content thy heart, and make it pure and wise:
 Thus shalt thou be e'en here that self-same paradise.

Sin.

Sin is no other thing than that a man from God
Turneth his face away and seeketh death's abode.

Man.

Yea, still the greatest wonder is man alone; for he
Can e'en, as are his works, or god or devil be.

The best Friend and Enemy.

My body, my best friend, is my worst enemy;
He ties and checks me ever, though good his meaning be.
I hate and love him too, and when we two shall part
I'll leave him with a glad and yet a woeful heart.

Concerning the Lilies.

As oft as I see lilies I feel within me pain,
And yet am filled with joy immediately again.
The pain cometh because I've lost that beauty rare,
Which I from the beginning in paradise did wear;
The joy cometh because Jesus is born to me,
And now anew stirs up my soul with heavenly glee.

Death.

Yea, even death is good; if a hell-hound Death could have,
He'd wish this very moment to be put into the grave.

The Mirror.

The mirror showeth thee but thine external face;
Ah, if it could reveal thee thine internal grace!

The Sea in a droplet.

Tell me, how happens it that in a droplet—yea,
In me—the whole sea (God) flows wholly, utterly.

God still creates the World.

God still creates the world; does this to thee seem strange?
Know, then, with Him is no after, before, or change.

What poorness of spirit is.

The poorness of spirit lies in intensity,
Wherein from outside things and e'en self to get free.

The poorest is the freest.

The property of poorness is freedom, chief of all,
Hence no man is so free as he in spirit small.

Poorness is the essence of all virtues.

Vice is chained all round, the Virtues all pass free;
Say, then, if poorness not their common essence be?

Whoever serves God is highly noble.

Me serves the whole world. But I the majesty
Of God on high alone. How noble I must be!

*The Cherubic Wanderer.**All must return into One.*

All cometh from the one and in the one must be,
Or 'twill be dualized and multiplicity.

Sin alone is Evil.

No evil is but sin; and if no sin there were
In all eternity, you'd find no evil e'er.

Many gods and only One. (1 Cor. 8: 5.)

A single God and many, how does this chime, my son?
Right well, because they all in one exist as one.

One cannot without the other.

Two must be to achieve 't: I cannot without God,
And God not without me, keep me from death's abode.

The noblest Wisdom.

Imagine not too much, and never too high rise;
The highest wisdom is to be not overwise.

We serve ourselves, not God.

Thou dost not serve thy God when thou dost fast, pray, wake;
Thou rather serv'st thyself for thee 'twill holy make.

As his associates, so the man.

Whoe'er thou livest with makes thy essence, good or evil;
With God thou wilt be god, and with the devil, devil.

Thou must acquire it here.

'Tis here it must be done; I never shall believe
That who no empire wins, shall there a realm receive.

Christ did not die on the cross for the first time.

Not for the first time has God on the cross been nailed;
For, look, in Abel he was murd'rously assailed.

Christ was before he was.

That Christ had lived long ere he ever was is sure,
Because men ate and drank Him for their inner cure.

Heaven can be stolen.

Who secretly does good, and all his money shares,
Hath stolen the heavenly kingdom masterly unawares.

Not every good is good.

Not every good is good; oh, be convinced, poor wight,
What in love-oil not burneth is but a cheating light.

Simile of the Holy Trinity.

God Father is the well, the spring is His own Son,
The Holy Ghost the river that from the well hath run.

The World's doing is a Tragedy.

Friend, envy not the world; true, she has her own way,
And yet her doing is naught but a tragic play.

The rich man is truly poor.

When the rich man speaks much about his poverty,
Believe him readily; he lies not, suredly.

All virtues are one virtue.

Look! all the virtues are, without distinction, one.
You wish to know the name? Justice 'tis called, my son.

Conscience is a sign-board.

If e'er thou goest astray, quick ask thy conscience, man,
And thou wilt recognize at once the pathway then.

The new and old Love.

Love when it is quite new doth like to young wine foam;
The more 't grows old and clear, the quieter 'twill become.

Seraphic Love.

That love which seraphic we oft are wont to name
Can scarce externally be known, it is so tame.

Everything is subjected to Love.

Love governs everything; even the Trinity
Has been subject to it from all eternity.

The nearest road to God.

The nearest road to God is through the door of love;
The way which Science takes, a tedious one will prove.

Wherein the Peace of the Soul consists.

The quiet of the soul consists in this alone,
That it is perfectly with God as one with one.

The Mask-Man.

That man who, like the beasts, in lust doth live and rot,
Is but a human mask; he seems, and yet is not.

By avoiding we overcome.

Avoid, friend, what thou lov'st, and what thou long'st for, flee,
Else wilt thou nevermore content and sated be.
Many ere now had reached eternal happiness,
Had they not temporal enticements sought amiss.

The World must be laughed at and wept over.

Truly, who of this world would take a view aright
Must now Democritus and now be Heraclite.

Conclusion.

Friend, it is now enough. If more thou fain wouldst read,
Go and become these rhymes, and what they mean in deed.

THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS, MORALS, AND RELIGION.

Translated from the "Philosophische Propädeutik" of G. W. F. HEGEL.

[The notes in small type are by the translator.]

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The object of this science is the human Will in its relations as particular will to the universal will [to the will which is right and just, or in accordance with Reason]. As Will, the spirit stands in a practical relation to itself. The *practical* procedure through which it brings determination into its indeterminateness, or posits other determinations of its own in the place of those already existing in it without its coöperation, is to be distinguished from its *theoretical* procedure.

"Determinations"—modifications, changes, characteristics, &c. To determine = to give characteristics to anything. It is a very important technical expression in Hegel: "*Bestimmen*" is the German. "Indeterminateness"—lack of characteristics. "Determination" is what distinguishes one thing from another—that by which one somewhat differs from another—that by which it is what it is.

"Posits"—"sets up" or "establishes"; "places."

§ 2. Consciousness as such is the relation of the Ego to an object; this object may be internal or external. Our Knowing contains objects, some of which we obtain a knowledge of through sensuous perception—others, however, which have their origin in the mind itself. The former, taken together, constitute the *sensuous* world; the latter, the *intelligible* world. Judicial [*rechtlichen*=legal], ethical and religious conceptions belong to the latter.

"*Rechtlichen*," here translated "judicial" and "legal," is a difficult word to translate exactly into English. One is tempted to render "*Rechts*" by "Jurisprudence" instead of "Rights." But "*Rechts*" seems to have a wider meaning. In English we have two sets of words: one, the common, colloquial, social words, derived from the Saxon; the other, the technical, scientific, precise vocabulary derived from Latin. In Germany, the former vocabulary has been elevated also into the latter, and is hence more comprehensible to the individual not classically educated.

§ 3. In the relation of the Ego and object to each other, the Ego is (1) *passive*, in which case the object is regarded as the cause of the determinations in the Ego, and the particular ideas [*Vorstellungen*] which the Ego has, are attributed to the impression made upon it by the immediate objects before it. This is the THEORETICAL consciousness. Whether it be in

the form of *perception*, or of *imagination*, or of the *thinking activity*, its content is always a given and extant somewhat—a content having existence independent of the Ego. (2) On the contrary, the Ego manifests itself as PRACTICAL consciousness when its determinations are not mere “ideas” and thoughts, but issue forth into external existence. In this process the Ego determines the given things [or objects, so that the former is active and the latter passive]; i. e. the Ego is the cause of changes in the given objects.

“*Vorstellungen*.” The common expression for this word in English is “ideas.” “Representations in the mind” is the exact signification. In using the term “idea” to render *Vorstellung*, I have borrowed a term which stands for the highest in Hegel’s Philosophy. It will not, however, produce confusion here as I have always taken care to use it in the plural, or else to modify it by some appellation in such a way as to leave no doubt what is meant. (See Hegel’s First Principle, Jour. Sp. Phil. Vol. III. pp. 350 & 369.)

§ 4. The practical power, as such, determines itself from within, i. e. through itself. The content of its determinations belongs to it and it recognizes that content for its own. These determinations, however, are at first only internal, and for this reason separated from the external reality, but they are to become external and be realized; this is done through the [conscious] ACT. By such ACT, internal practical determinations receive externality, i. e. external Being. Conversely, this process may be regarded as the cancelling of an extant externality and the bringing of the same into harmony with the internal determination.

“Content”=“that which is contained”; nearly the same use of the word that was somewhat in vogue in King James’ time. It saves a troublesome circumlocution.

“Conscious Act”=“*Handeln*” or “*Handlung*”: an act that contains exactly what was intended by the person who willed it. In § 9 the distinction is drawn between “That” (from “*Thun*=to do) or “Deed” and “*Handlung*”=intentional or voluntary act.

§ 5. The internal determination of the practical consciousness is either *impulse* or *will* proper. Impulse is a natural self-determination which rests upon circumscribed feelings, and has a limited finite end in view which it cannot transcend; in other words, it is the not-free, immediately determined, *lower Appetite*, according to which man ranks as a creature of nature. Through *Reflection* he transcends Impulse and its limitations, and compares it not only with the means of its

gratification, but he also compares these means one with another and the impulses one with another, and both of these with the object and end of his own existence. He then yields to the decision of Reflection and gratifies the impulse, or else represses it and renounces it.

A very important distinction drawn between man as ruled by Impulse or Appetite and the same as possessed of the power of Reflection. In the former case he acts through immediate constraint, i. e. he is fixed or determined—controlled—by his nature or constitution. In the latter case he exercises the power to arrest these glib impulses and summon them into court, and weigh them (1) one with another; (2) each of them with the means of its gratification; (3) both of these—impulse and means—with what he considers the object and end of his existence independent of all these impulses. Thus it happens that by Reflection man exercises “free moral agency” and becomes in this exercise a truly free being when he learns how to act so as not to contradict by one act the next one; i. e. how to act consistently or universally.

§ 6. The real will, or the *higher faculty of appetite*, is (1) pure indeterminateness of the Ego, which as such has no limitation nor a content which is immediately extant through nature, but it is indifferent toward any and every determinateness; (2) the Ego can at the same time pass over to a determinateness and make choice of some one or other, and then actualize it.

The “pure indeterminateness” here spoken of is the existence of the Ego as the *possibility* of resolution, the possibility of annulling any given state or activity and assuming another. It has no “fixed constitution or nature.”

§ 7. The abstract freedom of the Will consists in this very indeterminateness or identity of the Ego with itself, wherein a determination occurs only in so far as the Ego makes it its own [assimilates it] or posits it within itself; and yet in this act remains self-identical and retains the power to abstract again from each and every determination. There may be presented to the Will, from without, a great variety of incitements, motives, and laws; but man, in following the same, does this only in so far as the Will itself makes these its own determinations, and resolves to actualize them. This, too, is the case with the determinations of the *lower* appetites, or with what proceeds from *natural* impulses and inclinations.

“Abstract freedom of the Will”—“abstract” because this is freedom only of form. The freedom to do as one pleases,—such freedom is caprice or arbitrariness, and quickly gets entangled by its own inconsistent acts. The content of its doing and acting is not self-consistent, i. e. universal, and hence its freedom is only turned against itself—a freedom that enslaves itself. (See § 11.)

Yet even in following impulses, or motives, there is *formal* freedom; there is self-determination. For the external determination is *never* an internal one except through the activity within. If the Ego does not determine himself, the *motive* can never exist, even, for him; still less can it *do* anything in him. The Ego must actualize the motive or else it remains forever a mere potentiality.

This is a very important consideration: *Motives* are mere *potentialities* seen by the Mind. If the thing is already done, it excites no impulse to do it again. It is not done and yet *ought* to be done: the Mind alone can see an "ought"—and how? Manifestly by annulling the limits of the thing actually before it and thus creating an abstraction—a possibility,—a new synthesis. The new synthesis hovers before it and interprets its impulse. No impulse can express itself to the Will directly. The Will must by abstraction and synthesis discover what change will relieve its blind, painful feeling which the mere impulse by itself is—and nothing more.

To say that a "motive constrains the Will" is to say that an abstraction—a product of the Will—constrains that which creates it; in other words, that something acts before it exists.

§ 8. The Will has *moral responsibility* in so far as (1) its determination is made its own *solely by its own act*, or by its resolve: i. e. the Ego wills it; (2) in so far as a will is *conscious* of the determinations which are produced through its act as they lie in its resolve, or are necessarily and immediately involved in its consequences.

§ 9. A Deed ("*That*") is, as such, the produced change and determination of a Being. To an act ("*Handlung*"), however, belongs only what lay in the resolve or was in the consciousness—hence what the will acknowledges as its own.

§ 10. The free Will, as free, is moreover not limited to the determinateness and individuality through which one individual is distinguished from another; but it is universal will, and the individual is, as regards his pure will, a universal essence.

"Universal will" is the pure will—"pure" because self-related. "Self-related" is a term of great significance in Hegel's Philosophy. Nothing seems more absurd to the novice than the idea of a self-relation; and yet all strict philosophical thought leads in a few steps to self-relation as the basis of all. Anything related to another—for that reason belongs to a whole of which it forms only an element, and of which the "other" is likewise an element. The "whole" is, however, self-related, and upon careful consideration so too are the parts, considered truly; for their *relation* is only through and by means of the *whole* which dwells in them; hence the relation of each is to its true Self, though not to its phenomenal Self. The phenomenal Self is a part seized by itself and not in the whole as it really and truly exists. (See § 12.)

§ 11. The Will can in various ways take up into itself external content—i. e. content which does not proceed from its own (the will's) nature—and make this content its own. In this kind of activity the Will remains self-identical only *in*

form; namely, it is conscious of its power to abstract from each and every content and recover its pure form, but it does not remain self-identical as regards its content and essence. It is, in so far as it is such a will, mere CAPRICE (arbitrariness).

§ 12. But that the Will may be *truly* and *absolutely* free, it is requisite that what it wills—or its content—be naught else than the will itself [i. e. the pure self-determination or the act that is in harmony with itself]. It is requisite that it will only in itself and have itself for its object. The pure Will, therefore, does not will some special content or other on account of its specialty, but *in order that the will as such may be free in its deed and freely actualized*; in other words, that the universal Will may be done.

That caprice is not true freedom has been stated, and the reasons why this is so. That “the Will must be its own content” in order to be free—what is stated in this paragraph may become clearer from the following considerations: If the Will have any other content than itself, it is determined from without; it *conditions* itself; *limits* or *restrains*,—*negates* itself. It opposes to itself something alien, and thus in so far annihilates itself, or at least paralyzes itself. But if the Will have for its content that which is in the form of self-determination, it then *affirms* itself by realizing it. To act for the purpose of realizing the possibility of the Rational is the highest activity, for it creates itself by its own act.

What this “Rational content” is, which is said to be a content of itself, is to be seen in this science of Rights which we are now to enter upon. Those deeds of the Will that reenforce it and affirm it, rather than paralyze it and annul it, are universal, and, as forms, are called habits, usages, conventionalities, moral laws, ethical observances, and, finally, CIVIL LAWS or POSITIVE RIGHTS set up and preserved by the STATE.

The more detailed statement and development of these general principles concerning the Will, belong to the Science of “Rights, Duties, and Religion.”

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING MATTER EXPLANATORY OF THE INTRODUCTION.

[The following explanatory remarks by Hegel were intended by him to initiate his pupils into the meaning of his various technical expressions. They are familiar in style and lead gradually up to the ideas underlying the Philosophy of Rights. In many places the reader will notice that they take the form of mere notes or heads of discourse, which were to be expanded orally in the presence of his class. —TRANSLATOR.]

§ 1.* Objects are *particular* somewhats through their DETERMINATION: a sensuous object, for example, through its

* These paragraphs are numbered without reference to the numbers of the preceding paragraphs.

shape, size, weight, color—through the more or less firm combination of its parts—through the purpose for which it is used, &c., &c. If one takes away determinations of an object in his conception of it, this process is called *abstraction*. There remains after the process a *less determined* object, i. e. an *abstract object*. If, however, I conceive only one of these determinations, this is called an *abstract conception* [or idea]. The object left in its completeness of determination is called a *concrete object*. When I abstract *all* the determinations, I have *left* only the conception of the absolutely abstract object. When one says “thing,” though he may *mean* something quite definite, he *says* only something quite indefinite, since our thought reduces an actual somewhat to this abstraction of mere “thing.”

Sensuous perception is in part external, in part internal. Through external perception we perceive things which are outside us in time and space—things which we distinguish from ourselves. Through the internal sensuous perception we take note of the states and conditions which belong in part to our bodies and in part to our souls. One part of the sensuous world contains such objects and their determinations, as, e. g., colors—objects that have a sensuous basis and have received a mental form. If I say, “This table is black,” I speak in the first place of this single concrete object; but, secondly, the predicate *black* which I affirm of it is a general [quality] which belongs not merely to this single object but to several objects. *Black* is a simple idea. We cognize a real concrete object *immediately*. This act of immediate apprehension is called *intuition*. A general abstract idea is therefore a *mediated* idea, for the reason that I know it by means of another, i. e. by means of abstraction, or the omission of other determinations which are found united in the concrete object. A concrete idea is said to be analyzed when the determinations which are united in it as concrete are separated. The intelligible world receives its content from Spirit [i. e. from the activity of the Mind], and this content consists of pure general ideas—such, for example, as Being, Naught, Attribute, Essence, &c.

§ 2. The first source of our knowledge is called *Experience*. To experience belongs this important feature: that we *our-*

selves have perceived it. A distinction must, however, be drawn between Perception and Experience. Perception, namely, has for its object only a single somewhat, which is determined in one way this moment and in another way the next moment. Now if I *repeat* the perception, and in the repeated perceptions take note of what remains the same and hold it fast, *this* operation is properly termed Experience. Experience contains, for the most part, *laws*, i. e. such a connection of two phenomena, that, if one is extant, the other one must result from it in all cases. But Experience contains only the mere generality of such a phenomenon, and not the necessity of the connection. Experience teaches only that things are or happen thus and so, but not the reasons—the “why” thereof.

Since there are a multitude of objects, concerning which we can have no experience (such, for example, as the *past*), we are obliged to have recourse to the *authority* of others. Moreover, those objects which we hold for true upon the testimony of others are objects of Experience (i. e. empirical objects). We *believe* that upon the authority of others which is *probable*. We often hold for probable that which is really improbable, and what is improbable often turns out to be the truth. (An event receives its confirmation chiefly through its results and through the manifold circumstances connected with our experience of it. Those who narrate to us an event must be *trustworthy*; that is, they must have been in a position where it was possible for them to have knowledge of it. We draw conclusions from the tone and manner in which they relate the event, in regard to their degree of earnestness or the selfish purpose subserved by it. When writers under the reign of a tyrant are lavish in his praises, we at once pronounce them to be flatterers. But if one makes special mention of a good quality or deed of his enemy, we are the more ready to believe his statements.)

Experience, therefore, teaches only how objects *are* constituted, and not how they *must* be, nor how they *ought* to be. This latter knowledge comes only from a comprehension of the essence or ideal of the object [a knowledge of it as a whole]. But the latter knowledge alone is true knowledge. Since we must learn the grounds of an object from its comprehension

[a knowledge of it in its entire compass], so too if we would learn the character of the Lawful, Moral, and Religious, we must have recourse to the concepts or comprehensions thereof.

In considering the determinations of the Good and Right, we may at first hold to experience, and that too of the most external kind, namely, the way of the world. We can see what passes for right and good, or what proves itself to be right and good. Upon this phase it is to be remarked: (1) that in order to know what deeds are right or good, and what are wrong or wicked, one presupposes himself to be in possession of the concept of the Right and Good; (2) if any one chose to hold to that which the way of the world showed to be current as right and good, he would not arrive at anything definite. All would depend upon the view with which he undertook the investigation. In the course of the world wherein there occurs such a variety of events, each one can find his own particular view justified be it ever so peculiar.

But there is, secondly, an internal experience concerning the Right, Good, and Religious. We decide through our disposition or feeling that a deed of this or that character is good or bad; moreover, we have a feeling of Religion; we are affected religiously. What feeling says of the deed by way of approval or disapproval, contains merely the immediate expression, or the mere assurance that something is so or is not so. Feeling gives no reasons for its decision, nor does it decide with reference to reasons. What kind of feeling we have, whether of approval or of disapproval, we learn through a simple act of experience; we have the disposition, that is all. Feeling is, however, inconstant and changeable. It is at one time in one state and at another in a different one. Feeling is, in short, something *subjective*. An object of feeling is my object as a particular individual. If I say: "I feel thus about it," or "It is my disposition toward it," I then say only what belongs to me as an individual. I leave undecided whether it is also the same in other persons. When I, upon any occasion, appeal simply to my feeling, I do not desire to enter upon the reasons, consequently not upon general relations. I withdraw myself within myself, and express only what concerns me, and not what is in and for itself objective and general. The *objective* or the general is the Intelligible or the Comprehension.

If one wishes to know, in truth, what a rose, or a pink, or an oak, is—i. e. if he wishes to know it in its Comprehension (or idea), he must in the first place seize the higher concept which lies at its basis, namely, that of Plant in general; and again, in order to comprehend the Plant, he must ascend to the idea upon which that of Plant depends, and this is the idea of an organic body. In order to have the conception of bodies, surfaces, lines, and points, one must have recourse to the notion of space, since space is the Generic thereof; hence bodies, surfaces, &c., are only particular determinations of space. In the same manner, the present, past, and future, presuppose Time as their generic ground. And so it is with Rights, Duties, and Religion; they are merely particular determinations of Consciousness, which is their generic ground.

§ 3. In the stage of *consciousness* we commonly have the object before us, i. e. we know only the object, and not ourselves. But in these things the Ego is essentially present. In so far as we form a notion of an object alone, we are conscious, of course, of an object; but in so far as we form a notion of *consciousness* we are conscious of our consciousness [i. e. we are *self-conscious*.] In our ordinary life we *have* a consciousness, but we are not conscious that we *are* consciousness; we *have* much also that is devoid of consciousness, the corporeal, for example; the vital functions which minister to our self-preservation, we *possess* without having a definite consciousness of their structure; this latter we learn through science. Moreover, in a spiritual way we *are* much which we do not *know*. The *external* objects of our consciousness are such as we distinguish from ourselves and to which we ascribe an independent existence. *Internal* objects, therefore, are determinations or faculties—powers of the Ego. They do not subsist apart from, but only *in* the Ego. Consciousness appears either in a theoretical or in a practical function.

§ 4. *Theoretical* consciousness considers that which is, and leaves it as it is. *Practical* consciousness, on the contrary, is the active consciousness which does not leave what is as it is, but produces changes therein, and begets from itself determinations and objects. In consciousness, therefore, there is a twofold determination extant—that of the Ego through the object, and that of the object through the Ego. In the former kind, the Ego is theoretical; it takes up the determinations

of the object as they are. The Ego leaves the object as it is, and seeks to make its notions of it conform to it. The Ego has determinations in itself, and the object has likewise determinations within itself. The content of the ideas of the Ego ought to be determined so as to correspond to the object. The determinations of the object in itself are rules for the Ego. The truth of the ideas of the Ego consists in this, that they harmonize with the constitution and the determinations of the object. The law for our consciousness, in so far as the latter is theoretical, is—not that it must be perfectly passive but—that all its activity be directed to the reception of the object. A thing can be an object for our perception without on this account, our being conscious of it, i. e. in the case where we do not direct our activity to it. This activity in reception is called *Attention*.

§ 5. The ideas which we gain through attention we excite in ourselves through the power of IMAGINATION (phantasy), whose activity consists in this, that it calls up in connection with the intuition of one object the image of another in some way connected with the former. It is not necessary that the object to which the imagination connects the image of another be present—it may be present only in idea. The most extensive work of the imagination (phantasy) is LANGUAGE. Language consists in external signs and tones, through which one makes known what he thinks, feels, or has a sensation of. Language consists in words, which are nothing else than signs of thoughts. For these signs there are again found in the art of Writing other signs called letters. They make known our thoughts without our having to speak them. The hieroglyphic style is distinguished from the alphabetic by its presenting entire thoughts immediately [by each character]. In speech tones are used, and these tones are the directly perceived objects. But we do not stop at the mere sound which makes an impression on our sense of hearing, but our imagination (phantasy) connects with it the idea of an absent object. There is thus here present a twofold object—a sensuous impression and an idea joined to it by imagination. The idea passes solely for the essence, and as the signification of that which is sensuously present (the tones), and the latter consequently becomes a mere sign. The *given* content thus stands opposed to a content which is *produced* by us.

§ 6. In common life, the expressions "to think" and "to have an idea" [Germ. *Vorstellen* as opposed to *Denken*] are used interchangeably, and we thus dignify with the name of *thought* what is only an image of the phantasy. In "ideas" of this sort [*Vorstellungen*] we have an object before us in its external and unessential existence. In Thinking, on the contrary, we separate from the object its external, merely unessential side, and consider the object merely in its essence. Thinking penetrates through the external phenomenon to the internal nature of the thing and makes it its object. It leaves the contingent side of the thing out of consideration. It takes up a subject not as it is as immediate appearance, but it severs the unessential from the essential and thus abstracts from it. In intuition we have individual objects before us. Thinking brings the same into relation with each other, or *compares* them. In the comparison it singles out what they have in *common* with each other and omits that by which they differ, and thus it retains only general ideas. The general idea contains less determinateness than the individual object which belongs under this general idea—since one arrives at the general idea only by leaving out something from the individual thing; on the other hand, the General includes more under it, or it has a greater extension. In so far as Thinking produces a general object, the activity of abstracting belongs to it, and hence it has the *form* of the Generic (as, for example, in the general object "Man"). But the *content* of the general object does not belong to it as an activity of abstracting, but is *given* to the Thinking and is independent of it and extant by itself.

To the Thinking there belong manifold determinations which express a connection between the manifold phenomena that is universal and necessary. The connection as it exists in the sensuous intuition is merely an external or contingent one, which may be or also may not be in any particular form. A stone, for example, makes by its fall an impression upon a yielding mass. In the sensuous intuition is contained the fact of the falling of the stone, and the fact of an impression made in the yielding mass where the stone touched it. These two phenomena—the falling of the stone and the impression on the yielding mass—have a succession in time. But this connection contains as yet no necessity: on the contrary, it is possible—for all that is therein stated—that the one might

have happened under the same conditions without the other's following it. When, on the contrary, the relation of these two phenomena to each other is determined as cause and effect, or as the relation of Causality, then this connection is a necessary one or a connection of the Understanding. This involves that, under the same conditions, if one happens, the other is contained in it.

These determinations are the forms of Thinking. The Mind posits them solely through its own activity, but they are at the same time determinations of existing things. We come first through reflection to distinguish what is Ground and Sequence, Internal and External, Essential and Unessential. The Mind is not at first conscious that it posits these determinations by its own free-will, but thinks that it expresses in them something which is extant without its assistance.

§ 7. Whenever we speak of the Ego or the Mind as receiving determinations, we presuppose its previous indeterminateness. The determinations of the Mind always belong to the Mind even though it has received them from other objects. Although something may be in the Mind which came from without, as a content not dependent upon the Mind, yet the *form* always belongs to the latter; e. g. in the imagination: although the material be derived from sensuous intuition, the form consists in the method in which this material is combined in a different manner from that present in the original intuition. In a pure concept, e. g. that of *animal*, the particular content belongs to Experience, but the general element in it, is the form which comes from the Mind.

This form is thus of the Mind's own determining. The essential difference between the theoretical and the practical functions of the Mind consists in this, that the *form* alone is determined by the Mind in the theoretical, while, on the other hand, in the practical function the *content* also proceeds from the mind. In Rights, for example, the content is personal freedom. This belongs to the Mind. The practical function recognizes determinations as its own in so far as it wills them. Even if they are alien determinations, or given from without, they must cease to be alien in so far as the Ego wills them: I [the Ego] change the content into mine and posit it through myself.

§ 8. The theoretic activity begins with a determinate Being, an extant somewhat external to it, and makes of it a concept. The practical activity, on the contrary, begins with an internal determination; and this is called *resolution*, intention, direction, and makes the Internal actually external and gives to it existence. This transition from an internal determination to externality is called an act [*Handlung*=voluntary act or dealing].

§ 9. The *voluntary act* is, in general terms, a union of the Internal and External. The internal determination with which it begins has to be cancelled and made external as far as its form is concerned, which is that of a mere Internal; the content of this determination is still to remain [after negation of the form]; e.g. the intention to build a house is an internal determination whose form consists in this: that it is only an intention at first; the content includes the plan of the house. If the form is here now cancelled, the content will still remain. The house which, according to the intention, is to be built, and that which is built according to the plan, are the same house.

Conversely, the deed is likewise a cancelling of the External as it is extant in its immediateness; e.g. the building of a house necessitates a change of the ground, the building-stone, the wood, and the other materials, in a variety of ways. The shape of the external is changed: it is brought into quite other combinations than existed before. These changes happen in conformity to a purpose—to wit, the plan of the house, with which internal somewhat the external is to be made to harmonize.

§ 10. Animals, too, stand in a practical relation to that which is external to them. They act from instinct, with designs and purposes to realize, and thus rationally. Since they do this unconsciously, however, we cannot properly speak of them as authors of voluntary acts. They have *desires* and *impulses*, but no rational *will*. In speaking of man's impulses and desires, it is usual to include the will. But, more accurately speaking, the will is to be distinguished from the desires; the will, in distinction from the real desire, is in that case called the "higher Appetite." With animals, instinct is also to be distinguished from their impulses and desires, for

though instinct is an acting from impulse and desire, it however does not terminate with its immediate externalization, but has a further (for the animal likewise necessary) result. It is an acting in which there is involved also a relation to something else; e. g. the hoarding up of grain by many animals. This act is not yet quite properly to be called a voluntary one, but it contains a design in it, namely, provision for the future.

Impulse is, in the first place, something internal, something which begins a movement from itself, or produces a change by its own power. Impulse proceeds from itself. Although it may be awakened by external circumstances, yet it existed already without regard to them; it is not *produced* by them. Mechanical causes produce mere external or mechanical effects, which are completely determined through their causes, in which therefore nothing is contained which is not already present in the cause; e. g. if I give motion to a body, the motion imparted to it is all that it has; or if I paint a body, it has nothing else than the color imparted to it. On the contrary, if I work upon a living creature, my influence upon it becomes something quite different from what it was in me. The activity of the living creature is aroused by my act, and it exhibits its own peculiarity in reacting against it.

In the second place, impulse is (1) limited in respect to content; (2) contingent as regards the side of its gratification since it is dependent upon external circumstances. Impulse does not transcend the narrow sphere of its object and end, and is therefore spoken of as "blind." It gratifies itself, let the consequences be what they may.

Man does not make his own impulses, he simply *has* them; in other words, they belong to his nature. Nature however is under the rule of necessity, because everything in Nature is limited, relative, or exists only in relation to something else. But what exists only in relation to something else, is not "for itself" but dependent upon others. It has its ground in that, and is a necessitated Being. In so far as man has immediately determined impulses he is subjected to Nature, and conducts himself as a necessitated and not-free Being.

§ 11. But man can as a thinking Being REFLECT upon his impulses which have in themselves necessity for him. Reflec-

tion signifies, in general, the cutting off from or reduction of the Immediate. Reflection (spoken of light) consists in this, that its beams which for themselves ray forth in straight lines are bent back from this direction. Mind has reflection. It is not confined to the Immediate, but may transcend it and proceed to something else; e. g. from the event before it, it may proceed to form an idea of its consequences, or of a similar event, or also of its causes. When the mind goes out from something immediate, it has removed the same from itself. It has reflected itself into itself—*has gone into itself*. It has recognized the Immediate as a Conditioned or Limited inasmuch as it is opposed to it as another. It is, therefore a very great difference whether one *is* or *has* somewhat, and whether he *knows* that he is or has it; e. g. ignorance or rudeness, of the sentiments or behavior, are limitations which one may have without knowing it. In so far as one reflects or knows of them, he must know of their opposite. Reflection upon them is already a first step beyond them.

Impulses as natural determinations are limitations. Through reflection upon them man begins to transcend them. The first reflection concerns the means, whether they are commensurate with the impulse, whether the impulse will be gratified through the means; whether, in the second place, the means are not too important to be sacrificed for this impulse.

Reflection compares the different impulses and their objects with the fundamental object and purpose of Being. The objects of the special impulses are limited, but they contribute each in its own way to the attainment of the fundamental purpose. Some, however, are better adapted for this than others are. Hence reflection has to compare impulses, and ascertain which are more closely allied to the fundamental purpose and are best adapted to aid its realization by their gratification. In reflection begins the transition from lower forms of appetite to the higher. Man is in Reflection no longer a mere natural Being, and stands no longer in the sphere of necessity. Something is necessary when only this and not something else can happen. Before Reflection, however, there stands (for its choice) not only the one immediate object, but also another or its opposite.

§ 12. This reflection just described is, however, a merely

relative affair. Although it transcends the Finite, yet it always arrives again at the Finite; e. g. when we exceed the limits of one place in space, there rises before us another portion of space greater than before, but it is always only a finite space that thus arises, *ad infinitum*. Likewise when we go back in time beyond the present into the past, we can represent to our minds a period of ten thousand or thirty thousand years. Though such reflection proceeds from one particular point in space or time to another, yet it never gets beyond space or time. Such is also the case in the practical relative-reflection. It leaves some one immediate inclination, desire or impulse, and proceeds to another one, and in the end abandons this one also. In so far as it is relative, it ever anew falls again into an impulse, moves round and round in a circle of appetites, and does not elevate itself above this sphere of impulses as a whole.

The practical *Absolute* reflection, however, does elevate itself above this entire sphere of the Finite; in other words, it abandons the sphere of the lower appetites, in which man is determined through nature and dependent on the Without. Finitude consists, on the whole, in this, that somewhat has a limit, i. e. that here its non-being is posited, or that here it ceases, that it relates to another through this limit. *Infinite* reflection consists, however, in this, that the Ego is no longer related to another, but is related to itself; in other words, is its own object. This pure relation to itself is the Ego, the root of the infinite Essence itself. It is the perfect abstraction from all that is finite. The Ego as such has no content which is immediate, i. e. given to it by nature, but its sole content is itself. This pure form is, at the same time, its own content. (1) Every content given by nature is something limited: but the Ego is unlimited; (2) the content given by nature is immediate: the pure Ego, however, has no immediate content for the reason that the pure Ego *is*, only, by means of the complete abstraction from everything else.

§ 13. In the first place, the Ego is the pure Undetermined. It is able however, by means of reflection, to pass over from indeterminateness to determinateness, e. g. to seeing, hearing, &c. In this state of determinateness it has become non-self-identical, but it has still retained its indeterminateness

also; i. e. it is able at will, also, to withdraw into itself again. At this place enters the act of Resolving, for reflection precedes it, and consists in this, that the Ego has before it several determinations indefinite as to number, and yet each of these must be in one of two predicaments: it necessarily *is* or *is not* a determination of the somewhat under consideration. The act of resolution cancels that of reflection—the process to and fro, from one to the other—and fixes one determinateness and makes it his own. The fundamental condition necessary to the act of resolving (volition), the possibility of making up one's mind to do something, or even of reflecting previous to an act, is the absolute indeterminateness of the Ego.

§ 14. The freedom of the will is freedom in general, and all other freedoms are mere species thereof. When the expression "freedom of the Will" is used, it is not meant that there is a force, or property, or faculty of the will which possesses freedom; just as when the omnipotence of God is spoken of, it is not understood that there are still other Beings besides Him who possess omnipotence. There is also civil freedom, freedom of the press, political and religious freedom. These species of freedom belong to the general concept of freedom in so far as it stands in relation to special objects. Religious freedom consists in this, that religious notions, religious deeds, be not forced upon any one, i. e. that there be in them only such determinations as he recognizes as his own, and makes his own. A religion which is forced upon one, or in relation to which he cannot act as a free Being, is not his own, but remains alien to him. The political freedom of a people consists in this, that they form for themselves their own state, and decide what is to be valid as the national will, and that this be done either through the whole people themselves, or through those who belong to the people, and who, since every other citizen has the same rights as themselves, can be acknowledged by the people as their own.

§ 15. Such expressions as these are often used: "My will was determined by these *motives, circumstances, incitements, or inducements.*" This expression involves, first, that the Ego stood in a passive relation. In truth, however, the Ego did not stand in a merely passive relation, but was essentially active therein. The will, namely, took up these circumstances as

motives and allowed them validity as motives. The causal relation has here no force. The circumstances do not stand in the relation of cause nor the Will in that of effect. In the causal relation, the effect follows necessarily when the cause is given. As reflection, however, the Ego can transcend each and every determination which is posited through the circumstances. In so far as a man pleads in his defence that he was led astray through circumstances, incitements, &c., wishing by this plea to rid himself of the consequences of his deed, he lowers himself in this plea to a not-free, natural Being, while, in truth, his deed is always his own and not that of another, not the effect of something outside himself. Circumstances or motives have only so much control over man as he himself gives to them.

The determinations of the lower appetites are natural determinations. In so far, it seems to be neither necessary nor possible for man to make them his own (determinations). But as natural determinations, they do not belong to his will or to his freedom, for the essence of his will is that nothing be in it which it (the will) has not made its own. He may, therefore, regard what belongs to his nature as something alien, so that it consequently is only in him, only belongs to him in so far as he makes it his own, or follows with his volition his natural impulses.

§ 16. To hold a man responsible for a deed, this is to attribute or impute to him guilt or innocence. Children who are still in a state of nature are not held responsible for their deeds; neither are crazy or idiotic people.

§ 17. In the distinction of deed from act [*That* and *Handlung*] lies the distinction between the ideas of moral responsibility as they come up in the tragedies of the ancients, and those current in our own time. In the former (among the ancients), "deed" (*That*) is applied in its entire extent to human actions. He had to do penance for the entire compass of his actions, and no distinction was made if he was conscious of only one side of his act and unconscious of the other. He (man) was considered as having absolute knowledge, and not as a relative and contingent subject, but whatever he did was considered as *his own* deed. There was no part of him referred to another Being; e. g. Ajax, when he slew the oxen and sheep of the Greeks, in a state of insanity and rage caused by his

not receiving the arms of Achilles, did not attribute his crime to his madness—as though he were in another being while insane—but he took the whole deed upon himself as its author, and slew himself for shame.

§ 18. If the will were not a Universal there could be, properly speaking, no laws, nothing which could be imposed as obligatory upon all. Each one might act according to his own pleasure, and would not respect the pleasure of others. That the will is universal, flows from the idea of its freedom. Men, considered as they are in the world, show themselves very different in character, customs, inclinations, and particular dispositions, i. e. they differ in their will. They are by this, different individuals, and differ by nature from each other. Each one has natural abilities and determinations which others lack. These differences between individuals do not concern the Will in itself, for it is free. Freedom consists precisely in the indeterminateness of the Will, or in the fact that it has no determined nature in it. The Will by itself is thus a universal Will. The particularity or individuality of man does not stand in the way of the universality of the Will, but is subordinated to it. A deed which is good legally or morally, although done by some one individual, is assented to by all others. They recognize thus themselves or their own wills in it. It is the same case here as with works of art. Even those who could never produce such a work, find expressed in it their own nature. Such a work shows itself, therefore, as truly universal. It receives the greater applause, the less it exhibits the idiosyncrasy of its author.

It may happen that one is unconscious of his universal will. He may believe, indeed, that it is directly opposed to his will even though it is his [true] will. The criminal who is punished, may wish, of course, that the punishment be warded off; but the universal will brings with it the decree that the criminal shall be punished. It must be assumed that the absolute will of the criminal demands that he shall be punished. In so far as he is punished, the demand is made that he shall see that he is justly punished; and if he sees this, although he may wish to be freed from the punishment as an external suffering, yet in so far as he concedes that he is justly punished, his Universal will approves of the punishment.

§ 19. Arbitrariness (caprice) is freedom, but only *formal*

freedom, or freedom in so far as one's will relates to something limited. Two sides must here be distinguished: (1) in how far the will does not remain identical with itself in it, and (2) in how far it does remain so.

(1) In so far as the Will wills *something*, it has a determined, limited content. It is in so far, non-identical with itself, because it is here actually determined, although in and for itself it is undetermined. The limited content which it has taken up is therefore something else than it itself; e. g. if I will to go or to see, I become a going or a seeing one. I thus enter a relation not identical to myself, since the going and seeing is something limited and not identical with the Ego.

(2) But in *form* I stand in identity with myself, or am free still, since I all the while distinguish this state of determination from myself as something alien, for the acts of going and seeing are not posited in me by nature, but by myself in my own will. In so far as this is the case it is evidently no alien affair, because it is made my own and I have my own will in it.

This freedom is a formal freedom because together with my self-identity there is present also at the same time non-identity with myself; or, in other words, there is a *limited* content in the Ego. When we in common life speak of freedom, we ordinarily understand under the expression, caprice or *relative freedom*: liberty to do, or to refrain from doing, something or other. In the limited will we can have *formal* freedom in so far as we distinguish the particular content of our will from ourselves, or reflect upon it, i. e. in so far as we are also beyond and above it. If we are in a passion, or if we act through a natural impulse, we have no formal freedom. Since our Ego, in this emotion, gives itself up wholly, it (the emotion) seems to us to be something *unlimited* (or infinite). Our Ego is not out of it and does not separate itself from it.

§ 20. The absolute free will distinguishes itself from the relatively free will or caprice (arbitrariness) through this: the absolute will has only itself for object, while the relative will has something limited. With the relative will—with the appetite, for example—the object of that will [its content] is all that concerns it. But the absolute (will) must be carefully distinguished from wilfulness. The latter has this in common with the absolute will: that it does not merely concern itself

with the object but also with the will as will, insisting that its will as such shall be respected. A distinction is here to be made: the stubborn (wilful) man insists on his will simply because it is his will, without offering a rational ground for it, i. e. without showing his will to have general validity. While strength of will is necessary—such as holds unwaveringly by a rational purpose—on the other hand, mere stubbornness, such as arises from idiosyncrasy and is repulsive toward others, is to be detested. The true free will has no contingent content. It alone is not contingent.

§ 21. The pure will has nothing to do with particularity. In so far as the latter comes into the Will, so far is it mere caprice, for caprice has a limited interest and takes its determinations from natural impulses and inclinations. Such a content is a given one and is not posited absolutely through the Will. The fundamental principle of the Will is therefore that its freedom be established and preserved. Besides this, it has indeed many different kinds of determinations: it has a variety of definite aims, regulations, conditions, &c., but these are not aims of the Will *in and for itself*; still they are aims, for the reason that they are *means* and *conditions* for the realization of the freedom of the Will, which demands regulations and laws for the purpose of restraining caprice and inclination or mere “good pleasure”—in a word, the impulses and appetites which relate to mere natural ends; e. g. *Education* has for its end the elevation of man to an independent state of existence, i. e. to that existence wherein he is a free will. To this view many restraints are imposed upon the desires and likings of children. They must learn to obey, and consequently to annul their mere individual or particular will, and moreover their sensuous inclinations and appetites, to the end that by this means their will may become free.

§ 22. *First.* Man is a free Being. This constitutes the fundamental characteristic of his nature. Nevertheless, besides freedom he has other necessary wants, special aims, and impulses, e. g. the impulse for knowledge, for the preservation of his life, health, &c. In these special determinations, Justice has not man as such for its object. It has not the design to further him in the pursuit of the same, or to afford him special help therein.

Secondly. Justice and Right do not depend upon one's mo-

tives. One may do something with the best of intentions, and yet the deed be not right and just for all this, but wrong. On the other hand, an act—for example, the maintenance of my property—may be perfectly right, and yet I have a bad motive; since I may have sought not what was just and right, but the injury of another. Upon the right as such, the intention or motive has no influence.

Thirdly. It is not a matter that depends upon conviction that what I perform is right or wrong. This holds in particular with regard to punishment. Although an effort is made to convince the criminal that he has violated what is right, yet his conviction or non-conviction has no influence on the justice that is meted out to him.

Finally. Justice and Right pay no regard to the disposition or sentiment under whose influence anything is done. It very often happens that one does what is right merely through fear of punishment or fear of unpleasant consequences—such, for instance, as the loss of reputation or credit. Or, it happens that one does right from the conviction that he will be rewarded in another life. Right, however, as such is independent of these sentiments and convictions.

§ 23. Justice and Right must be distinguished from Morality. Something may be well enough from a legal point of view, which is not allowable from a moral point of view. The law grants me the disposition of my property without determining how I shall dispose of it, but Morality contains determinations which restrain me in this respect. It may seem as though Morality permitted many things which the law does not; but Morality demands not merely the observance of justice towards others, but requires also that the *disposition* to do right shall be present, that the Right shall be respected as Right. Morality demands, first, that the legal Right shall be obeyed; and where it ceases, come in moral determinations.

In order that a deed may have moral value, insight is necessary into its nature, whether it be right or wrong, good or evil. What one terms the innocence of children or of uncivilized nations is not yet Morality. Children or such uncivilized nations escape the commission of a multitude of bad acts because they have no ideas of them, i. e. because the essential relations are not yet extant under which alone such deeds are possible; such non-committal of evil deeds has no moral

value. But they *do* perform acts which are not in accordance with Morality, and yet for the reason that no insight exists into their nature (whether they are good or bad), they are not strictly moral acts.

Private conviction stands opposed to the mere faith in the authority of another. If my deed is to have moral value, my conviction must enter into the act. The act must be mine in a whole sense. If I act on the authority of another, my act is not perfectly my own; somebody else's conviction is doing the act.

There are, however, relations in which the moral side consists precisely in being obedient and acting according to the authority of another. Originally, man followed his natural inclinations without reflection; or else with reflections that were one-sided, wrong, unjust, and under the dominion of the senses. In this condition, the best thing for him was to learn to obey, for the reason that his will was not yet the rational one. Through this obedience the negative advantage is gained that he learns to renounce his sensuous appetites; and only through such obedience can Man attain to independence and freedom. In this sphere he always follows another, whether it be his own will still immersed in the senses, or whether it be the will of another. As *natural* creature, he stands under the dominion of external things, and his inclinations and appetites are something immediate—not free, or something alien to his true will. The one who is obedient to the law of Reason is obedient from the point of view of his *unessential* nature only, which stands under the dominion of that which is alien to him. But, on the other hand [i. e. *essentially*], he is independent self-determination (when obedient to reason), for this law (of reason) has its root in his essence.

The disposition [the “*animus*”] is thus, in the moral realm, an essential element. It consists in this: that one does his duty for its own sake. It is, therefore, an immoral motive to do anything out of fear of punishment, or in order to preserve another's good opinion. This is a heterogeneous motive, for it is not from the nature of the thing itself; in such a case one does not consider the Right as something in and for itself, but as dependent upon external determinations.

Yet the consideration whether an action is to be punished

or rewarded (although the consequences do not constitute the value of a deed), is of importance. The consequences of a good act may sometimes involve much that is evil, and, on the contrary, an evil act involve much good. The thinking upon the consequences of a deed is important, for the reason that one does not remain standing by an immediate point of view, but proceeds beyond it. Through its manifold consideration, one is led to the nature of deeds.

§ 24. According to the stand-point of Rights, man is his own object as an absolutely free existence; according to the moral stand-point, on the contrary, he is self-object, as an individual in his special existence, as member of the family, as friend, as a particular character, &c. If the external circumstances in which one man stands with another are so situated that he fulfills his vocation [destination], that is his happiness. This well-being depends partly on his own will and partly upon external circumstances and other men. Morality has, also, the particular existence or well-being of man for its object, and demands not only that man be left in his abstract freedom, but that his happiness be promoted. Well-being, as the adaptation of the External to our internal Being, we call comfort and pleasure. HAPPINESS is not a mere individual pleasure, but an enduring condition: in part of the actual pleasure itself; in part, also, of the circumstances and means through which one always has the ability to create a state of comfort and pleasure for himself at will. The latter form is the pleasure of the mind. In happiness, however, as in pleasure, there lies the idea of good fortune [good luck]: that it is an accidental matter whether or no the external circumstances agree with the internal determinations of the desires. BLESSEDNESS, on the contrary, consists in this: that no fortune (luck) pertains to it, i. e. that in it the agreement of the external Being with the internal desire is not accidental. Blessedness can be predicated only of God, in whom wish, and accomplishment of his absolute power is the same. For man, however, is the harmony of the External with his Internal limited and contingent. In this he is dependent.

§ 25. The moral will, in regard to its disposition and conviction, is imperfect. It is a will which aims at perfection, but: (1) is driven towards the attainment of the same through

the impulses of sensuousness and individuality; (2) it has not the adequate means in its power, and is, therefore, limited to bringing about the good of others. In RELIGION, on the contrary, the Divine essence is regarded in itself as the perfection of the Will, according to its two sides, namely: (*a*) according to the perfection of the internal disposition [the "Heart"] which has no longer any alien impulses in itself, and (*b*) according to the perfection of power to attain the holy purposes.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF TRENTOWSKI.

TREATING OF GOD, IMMORTALITY, AND THE IMMEDIATE EYE
FOR THE DIVINE WORLD.

"*Cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberos faciet vos.*"—Johann. viii. 32.

Translated from the Polish by Professor PODBIELSKI, (Havana College, Cuba).

Any thinker among my countrymen meditating with an unprejudiced eye upon the wide fields of human cognition, and considering with any depth the present state of European philosophy—having pledged no fealty to any received system, even the all-pervading one of Hegel—must have arrived at the conviction that metaphysical science has hitherto been, and is still engaged in, examining and cultivating two worlds standing in *direct* opposition to each other. These worlds are Materialism and Spiritualism, Realism and Idealism, Empiricism and Speculation, Physics and Metaphysics,—in a word, the External and Internal of the Created. I call attention to the word Created, because their creative, transcendental or divine germ has been hitherto ignored and unknown. Under these two cardinal worlds all the smaller ones subordinated to them are ranged, for instance: Understanding and Reason, Rationalism and Mysticism, Naturalism and Supernaturalism, Practice and Theory—the Prose and Poetry in every doctrine.

It may be remarked that, in general, the Indo-Romanic race pays homage to the first of these cardinal worlds, Realism or Materialism; while the Indo-Teutonic inclines to the second, Idealism, Spiritualism, Theory. There are, indeed, Empiricists

in every country who rely for knowledge only on actual experiment; there are also Idealists, who regard thought alone as the Castalian Fount of truth and knowledge. Even where the general thought has not yet been developed to this point, yet the savants and practitioners are preparing carefully for the coming combat. In all tuition we have real and ideal schools. This Dualism was and is everywhere. Forcing its way through the boundaries of science, it has entered the holy fields of Religion, revealing itself in the adherents of the past—the churchmen and traditionists; or in the free-thinkers and skeptics of every possible shade. It is now taking its place in the arena of political life, where it may be studied as Conservatism, or Radicalism.

The author, having long since devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and familiar with it in its multifarious forms, was struck with this scientific, all-pervading, and everywhere visible Dualism. He thanks God that he was born a Polander, since had he been an Indo-Roman he would have seen truth only in the sphere of facts, empiricism, and regarded speculation and theory as vain illusions of the fancy; or, had he been an Indo-Teuton, he would have looked for truth only in the world of pure ideas, and considered nature and the entire realm of the senses as mere phenomenal appearances, and thus not being able to comprehend the Essence of this scientific Dualism he could never have arrived at its analysis. But by the grace of the Creator of nations, the intelligent Giver of various natural abilities, he was born a Polander, and thus endowed in like proportion with the natural and spiritual eye—received the impression because it was possible for him so to do. He knows that the Frenchman, when he hears of our scientific Dualism, will shrug his shoulders, and call it the baseless production of the Slavonic soul, fecundated into dreams by German Mysticism; and the German, in the arrogance of his metaphysical pride, will say it is the system of a Slave not yet free from sensuousness, and so perceiving in the phenomenal world of the senses knowledge capable of equilibrating itself with the reason *a priori*; and my countrymen, as they may in spirit have become French or German, will range themselves with the accordant nationality. None of them will be able at first to perceive the Actuality of the new philosophy. Nor is

this to be wondered at. Not having lain in the grave of suffering, they have not the eye of the Polander, nor do they conceive that God created the Indo-Sclavonic race for important uses; that he destined it to look into a *new world* unknown until now, thus rendering itself illustrious, and augmenting the accumulated stores of European wisdom with an original and extensive "Third Division."

Investigating the nature of this everywhere predominating Dualism, the author found in it the most complete antinomy—faces and their reverses, polar oppositions. The antagonisms of this antinomy proved to him extremities and fractionalities, hence half truths and half falsehoods. Being convinced that the full essential truth cannot lie in polar extremities or margins, not in the theses or antitheses, but in their *reciprocal penetration*—that is, in the *synthesis*—he endeavored to fuse these faces and reverses, these oppositions, into a scientific Totality. This is the first movement in, and the first key to, his philosophy. The experimentalist has been hitherto engaged in testing the realities offered him solely by changing Phenomena, while the metaphysician spun ever new webs of ideality from the involutions of his own brain; neither taking any true interest in the labor of the other, nor caring to inquire into anything foreign to his own sphere, nor deigning to examine the realm of opposite and almost despised subjects. The author was the first to prove that investigation (empiricism) is the one, and idealism (metaphysics) the other AXIAL POLE of Science; that both are equally necessary to, and equally privileged by, Eternal Truth; that both having thoroughly interpenetrated each other as soul and body, constitute the total, organic, living, equatorial science or philosophy. Thus hand in hand with phenomenal investigation or empiricism and metaphysics, stands Philosophy as the third science; spontaneous, yet with its two old predecessors as its necessary workmen, presenting itself in an entirely new form, with inner powers and meanings never before divined. Reality fuses with Ideality, and glows into *Actuality*; Practice unites with Theory, and grows green in the union. The External and the Internal transmute themselves into the Totality; Experience embraces pure Thought, and becomes true Cognition; *A Posteriori* and *A Priori* combine, and appear in *A*

Totali. The two worlds of the Material and Ideal prove to be but abstractions of the human brain, bearing the real existence in neither, while united they stand as the third living world; *actual* in all its categories, it absorbs them in its own life. Then universal Trinity takes the place of universal Duality, and an original, great and magnificent view opens upon us. The Universe looms upon us neither as solely an Empirical whole, nor only a Speculative Ideal Unity, but becomes the philosophical *Totality* of both, that is, organic Life. In this illimitable sphere, man is represented *in potentia*; in it Matter wedds Spirit, brings forth individualities, and multiplies into myriads. Each individuality, a single copy, although it is a totality in a single drop, appears and disappears, but the totality itself lasts eternally. Discovering this third world, the world of Actuality, the author endeavored to describe it faithfully in his first work. He published it in German indeed, but he wrote of a world, my countrymen, discovered by the eye of a Polander, of which neither Latin nor Teuton had as yet heard.

While endeavoring to represent this third world in his work, the author became convinced that the Totality of the Actuality, fusing in itself the entirety of the Real and the unity of the Ideal, that is, the All-matter and all-pervading spirit, the sublime circle of the universe, overpowering, as it does, the most vigorous imagination with its immensity, living and illimitable as it is—could not be the Creator—but, with all its marvels, was only the creation: such a creation, with its entire majesty of Divinity, is but of a *derivative* nature; it is the revealed eternity, but not the Eternity itself; it is only time, without the beginning or the end, working itself out in immeasurable space, continually germinating with new life. ITS PRINCIPLE IS A CREATOR. The question then arose: What is God? If the Totality of the Actuality, filled with the all-matter and penetrated with the all-pervading spirit, in its derivative eternity, is not God, but only His matchless work, His wondrous universe,—if God is not, and cannot be it, then He must differ from it. To unite Him as one with it, Holothemism, would be but Pantheism. Thus it was finally demonstrated that God is the principal, unconditional, holy, *individual Totality* of the universe, who, having breathed existence

from Himself, or spoken the Omnipotent WORD, surrounded Himself, the Sun of suns, with infinite radiant glory: that is, He created the Totality of the Actuality (all real existence), and at last created a being in His own image, a relative totality, limited but *individual*, called man, upon this earth. As man is made in the image of God, so in God exists a likeness of man; and thus the beginning and close (end) of the existing universe is the INDIVIDUAL TOTALITY. As is man, so is God, a *personal, individual* Being; but the first is relative and creative; the second, Substantial, Self-existent, Creative. An Absolute is not a generality, as has been hitherto erroneously conceived, but the Great Individuality, creating all generalities and particularities, and finally that resembling Itself in its singleness, man. Thus, only at the beginning and at the end of the axis of the universe, stands the individual—God, the Creator, and man, the self-conscious created. Between these margins lie but marvellous fragments and pieces.

A true Individual, Person, has consciousness of himself, reason and free will; as a totality, is centred in himself, is the focus and heart of his own entirety. In God, the universe reflects itself on the breast of Eternity; in man, on the bosom of Time. The world is not conscious of itself, but God in Heaven knows it, and man on earth. Man is a transition, rather the returning of the world into God, a marvellous link between earth and Heaven. The essence of everything is the Word of God; the essence of man is the Breath of God: that is, the free, self-conscious, derivative divinity, the selfhood, the personal I. This *I-hood* (so to name the self-conscious personality) is neither in nature nor in spirit; it is only in God and man. The Word of God takes its place in nature and in spirit, lying there dead like the letter in the Book, until sounding on through time and becoming the word of man, it arrives at its heavenly conception, and presents itself as our true cognition in philosophy. Reality and Ideality are both in God, and constitute in Him the transcendental Identity, the creative Actuality. Beyond the Essence of God, they interpenetrate reciprocally and shine continually as the created Actuality. The difference between them exists only in the human brain, equally connected with the regions of the natural and spiritual. Their identity is found in the trans-

cedential Word of God, which is the object of philosophy, and breathed through it in time. They are manifested in man as body and soul, and arrive at their identity in his transcendental I-hood. The human I-hood is neither the body nor the spirit, but something very different from either; and yet again, it is both body and spirit, speaking transcendently. It is the Real-Ideal, or the actual divinity, which, having robed itself in worldly matter, becomes the body; and having breathed with the worldly spirit, if I may so express myself, makes itself the soul. The I-hood constitutes in us the third divine world; its manifestation is neither the physical spirit or force, nor the metaphysical movement or thought; it is the will, enterprise, moral action, energy of character, love of truth, beauty, virtue, holiness, religion; it is capacity for government, ability for sacrifice, self-abnegation for good. As the human I-hood differs both from the body and the soul, or from its own outward and inward world, so God differs from spirit and nature, or from the universe, which is His work. As the I-hood of man rules over his body and soul, so God, the cardinal, central I of the totality, the all, governs the universe.

Thus, the third world, which is the totality of the actuality, perceives itself in its holy and eternal germ. Matter and spirit become but its temporal workmen, its subdivisions, its categories, while it reveals its own sempiternity, robing itself in transitory form. God in Heaven, the Word of God on earth, and the I-hood in man, are the constituents of this third world. Realism and Spiritualism, Empiricism and Speculation, lose their rainbow but illusive glitter when it is discovered that they are only occupied with external and internal temporalities; when philosophy is convinced that its proper object is the germinating, *living*, fundamental Transcendentality, the eternal source of every temporality, or the third divine world. The *individual* Totality demonstrates itself to be the *alpha* and *omega* of the universe—the entirety of creation. The Breath of the first *individual* Totality awakens, warms and glows in the flame of its consciousness thrown on the breast of Time, in the being of the last, created, individual totality. But between the individual Totality, God, and the individual totality, man, an *infinite* difference intervenes, not-

withstanding the reciprocal image. The first is without conditions, seated upon the throne of the *Sempiternity*; the second is limited, lives, indeed, eternally, but in the eternity of time, that is, in the pre-existent, in the present, and in the future world. Between the marginal totality and the universal Whole a great difference also intervenes, but there is no antinomy, no polar opposition, because in all three, however different, the antinomical, polar, oppositional faces and reverses, Reality and Ideality, fuse and form the *actuality*. Thus is the third world transformed into the divine transcendental world. As matter and spirit are in the eternally temporal world a balloon in which to mount to Heaven—the spirit, like a buoyant gas, filling and floating the aerial vessel—so the Divine again becomes the eternal earth-bearing Atlas in the world. Neither the Roman nor the German races have acknowledged this world of God, because the Roman races have ever mingled and confused Divinity with Reality, and the German, confounded it with Ideality; as Christianity itself in their hands becomes warped and one-sided, seeing God only in the spirit; the Latin finding spirituality only in the church, and the Teuton deeming that his own spirituality, his own idea, his human spirit is a true transcendentality;—therefore as our third world in its purity, originality and spontaneity was known to neither Roman nor Teuton, we may believe that God reveals it to-day for the progress and consolation of the Slaves; among whom we do not class the Moscovites, nor aught that proceeds from the Golden Horde, the Mongols of Karan, Astracan, &c. This philosophy, therefore, showing for the first time the third world, and calling upon Theology no longer to conceive Christianity on its spiritual side alone, but to regard it from its transcendental stand-point, its individual, conscious, responsible I-hood, is necessarily Slavonian and revealed for the enlightenment of Poland to-day. Thus Bohwie calls our third world a revelation from God, and Wronski names it the *Achromatia*, both acknowledging its essential truth, and declaring it capable of satisfying the religious as well as the philosophic.

Religiosity is a characteristic and historic trait of the Poles, differing both in degree and kind from that of any other Christian people. This peculiar religiosity of the past was

the forefeeling and unconscious adoration of the divine world now coming to its own consciousness, capable of breathing new life, force and energy into my oppressed nation, and able to elevate the philosophical enlightenment of Europe into the highest, truly heavenly sphere. These reasons induce the author to call his philosophy, already developed in his work on education and in various other writings, the National Wisdom.

That the third divine world is equally extensive and quite as capable of generating philosophical systems as the worlds of the Real and Ideal, that it is an important discovery, impressing new forms on the development of human knowledge and wisdom, that it leads Christianity to recognize in the Holy Spirit (which it carefully differentiates from the spirit of the world), Divinity or I-hood, to recognize itself in the germ of its own essence, and aid it to still further triumphs—it may be permitted us here to mention. Every man is great in so far as he can unite his will with the will of God, or in so much as he may become a worker of God's will; as the Scripture says, "an instrument." Nor does our freedom suffer here, for it depends on ourselves to will to follow the divine will which we perceive, or not.

Bohwie and Wronski, and in part, also, Cieskowski, sought the reconciliation of the antinomy, and looked for the eternal synthesis. The author can truly say that Poland is full of young life and healthful vigor; that, in spite of long and cruel torture, a splendid future is still in store for her; her knowledge of the divine world will enable her to surpass western Europe with the magnanimity of spirit therefrom resulting.

The philosophy of the middle ages—the scholastic—placed God without or beyond the world. He reigned somewhere far off in Heaven, while the Pope, the Ruler in the Roman Church, whose wisdom in dogmas was to be considered infallible, governed the earth. Spinoza transferred God from His place without the world, into it, having made Him universal Extension, the union of thought and matter. This Extension revived in the Absolute of Schelling, and in the Idea of Hegel. God was the eternal existence of the world, the universe itself, and thus Pantheism again ruled in Philosophy. Feuerbach transferred God from the universe into humanity, he saw

Him in the human spirit—the most *fashionable Absolute*! He set his foot upon the most cherished idea of his master, exclaiming: “The unconditioned Spirit is still the spirit of the middle ages, the theological Spirit of the dead; it knocks like a midnight spectre in the speculations of Hegel.”

There are, as demonstrated in this logic (Myslini), three luminaries of truth: God, the universe, and the humanity; or to speak technically: the Essence, (Transcendentality, extra-mundanity) the Existence, and the Existing Essence. In the Christian world, God appeared as these three suns of truth, as the Essence, the Existence, and the Existing Essence.

The author sees God himself without or beyond the world, or in the Essence; in the Existence, he recognizes the Word; and in the Existing Essence, the Breath of God. It is God Creator, and the two-fold unconscious, also conscious of itself created Divinity. God is the holy source of every Transcendentality; the Word of God is the Transcendentality immersed in the universe and constituting its eternal germ of Actuality, and the Breath of God (the Holy Spirit) is the Transcendentality coming in the world to its own consciousness, and through that, becoming the image of the original Transcendentality. These three species of Transcendentality create the divine world, or the only eternal Actuality.

Thus the national philosophy neither expels the Divinity from the bosom of humanity, nor from the spinal marrow of the universe; it can discern the true in all religions, most fully in the God of the Christians; and uniting the three old partialities, fractions, it obtains an impartiality, harmony. Modern philosophy has only been able to attain to created divinity, whether in the universe or in humanity. Not relinquishing the splendid prize already won by the race, but restoring to it its true meaning, not returning into the Past of the middle ages, the national philosophy demonstrates, in accordance with the desire and need of every human heart, the non-created and creative Divinity, the true, *individual*, self-conscious Deity—in a word, the Christian God.

The author, an ardent adherent of spontaneous search, avers that none of the ancient philosophers, nor Leibnitz, nor Jacobi, have set forth principles or bases more thoroughly Christian than those lying in the depths of his doctrines. Even the scho-

lastic philosophy was less Christian, since, notwithstanding its intuitive sense of the true God, it did not dream of the created divinity in the world and in humanity, which is indeed only coming to the full consciousness of its own greatness, and must yet battle long and bravely for its rights. Scholasticism never succeeded in probing the essential truths of Christianity, nor in bringing its marvels to the light; it was but a simple exegesis, in philosophical form, of the Church doctrines of the times. Having no conception of scientific spontaneity, she stands like a fair slave with her eyes closely bandaged, and does not deserve, in the bright blaze of the nineteenth century, the revered name of philosophy. In the "being for itself," the "being for other objects," the "in selfhood and for selfhood," "the idea in itself or in its other being, in the triumph over it and the return to itself," in fine, Hegel's Logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit are only the before-world, the world, and the after-world; only the world *in potentia*, *in actu*, *in aeterno*; only the existing future, present, and the past; consequently, we have in general nothing more than the temporality: of this there can be now no doubt. Hegel never knew the conscious of Himself, Individual, and true God; he only knew the created divinity in the three divisions of temporality, only God's Word in its manifestation. His entire philosophy is but one division of our national philosophy, that is, the philosophy of the world. His logic is not Logic proper; it is but the philosophy of the before-world, that is, pure ontology *a priori*.

It is a very sad thing that Hegel, whose system has exercised so deep an influence over cultivated humanity, should have thus entirely lost the Transcendentality, because in him the far-famed German philosophy, having reached the apex of its development, tottered to its fall, having thus solemnly manifested and recorded that it had never been able to find, prove, or know the true God. This was unavoidable, for no simple Spiritualism, pure Idealism, however deep and genial it may be, as it is but the second subdivision of the transitory scientific antinomy, the equally privileged partial and fractional rival of materialism, and neither of them knowing anything of the third world, will ever be able to pass the limits of the temporality, or be capable of seizing upon the sempiternity. The .

end of all its seeking must ever be the mere soul of humanity; its highest word, "My spirit is God!" Such a shipwreck of the great German flag of philosophy filled the friends of spontaneous inquiry with grief, its enemies with joy. The scientific Philisters, or rather the mere parrots of predominating public opinion, triumphantly doubt the power of all philosophical thought; and the reactionists and traditionalists, believing that the greatest earthly goddess lies a putrid corpse before them, sing, in bitter irony over the prostrate form of Philosophy, a perpetual "*Requiescat in aeterna pace.*"

Such results are truly disastrous. Men, in despair of the power of reason, throw themselves into the depths of mysticism, and only in the miraculous, perceive the redemption of the present world. Supernaturalism rears again its head; its currents run in numberless directions. The great Schelling gives himself up to the sophistry of the Gnostics: the world rushes suddenly back through fifteen centuries of progress! The clergy of the churches clap their hands, praise the scholastic as the only perfect philosophy, call Descartes, Bacon, and their followers, teachers of error and revivers of paganism. More and more audacious, they at last deem it possible to restore entire the Middle Ages!

Nor is this philosophical earthquake confined to Germany. France declaims against philosophy, stamps it as materialism, and can see spirituality only in blind belief. Our own Witwicki having no understanding of philosophy, yet mounts it as if riding the little wooden horses of the Carrusel, and our gifted Mickiewicz, exalting feeling to the skies, preaches strange things of an unknown Messianism. Thus is our proverb verified: "Woe to him who stumbles, for even the goats mount the bent tree."

The author here presents the third divine, transcendental world, permeating all with its own eternity, delivering philosophy from its present perilous position, again restoring to it its old and hardly-won dignity, and laying once more at its feet its sceptre over the thought of humanity. By this means he tears asunder the finely spun webs of multifarious bats and owls, working to obstruct the light, striving to fetter human inquiry, endeavoring to seize the triumphal car of the world in the name of Hell, baptized by them Heaven, that they may

thus again assume their Middle-Age importance. It is easy to conceive this has drawn thunderbolts of vengeance upon his head. He can endure the battle, and with heavenly Truth standing at his side, he smiles at all the enemies of human progress. He even hopes he may be able to transfer spontaneous philosophy from Germany into Poland, and with this crown make her what she has long deserved to be, the actual queen of Slavonia.

After the finding of the true God, immortality is the most precious thing to the human heart. With the sad fall of German philosophy, the certainty of eternal life seemed lost or dim. An erroneous belief was widely spread that the Spirit of Humanity constitutes the *individual* man, or that the Spirit of the Species is the substance and actuality of the individual. This doctrine is utterly debasing to our divine origin, to our derivative divinity, and has no meaning except in the kingdom of the brute creation, where it may, perchance, apply. In the sable, the turtle, the mole, the bird, the crab, the worm, &c., &c., the species to which a certain creature belongs is its eternal axis, its fixed conception, its principle of motion, the model of its copy. But each man is *himself*, to himself, and for himself; he is an independent, and, if I may so speak, an *individual species*. We have in all beavers the same manifestation, but the will of God is revealed quite differently through Paul and Peter. Every swallow cements its nest as all swallows have done for centuries, but every man may become creative and original, whether for good or evil. If man did not possess, even in this life, his own separate being, his own responsible, derivative and heavenly selfhood, and had only the common spirit of humanity, the light of generality for his existence, how could he hope for individual, personal, and true life, after death? Springing forth from generality, he is properly but a generality; consequently he must return to the bosom of the generality. Thus they argue that *individual* existence is but the vain dream of the egotist! Nay, so great is the scientific uncertainty of our eternal life, that Kerning* ventures publicly to say that our immortality has but two proofs, viz.: "intercourse with the dead, and the opening of the prophetic eye in our interior."

* A noted Spiritualist of Paris.

The author demonstrates that the I-hood of man is an eternal divinity living in the pre-existent world, before born upon earth, and in the after-world after death, with entire life as in this world; that the before-world, the present world, and the after world, the past, present, and future, are only relative subdivisions of one and the same unconditional life; that individuality, personality and consciousness are eternally attached to every divinity made in the image and likeness of God, as they are to God Himself. Thus is preserved the old scientific *certainly* of man's immortality, while it is supported with new, undeniable, and immediate proof. What divinity, indeed, does not feel divinity directly in and through itself? that is, does not feel its eternal, immortal, imperishable being? Thus, the dubious intercourse with the dead, the opening of the miraculous prophetic eye, and all similar *morbid* and *sickly* illusions become unnecessary, and *demonstrated, scientific* Truth seats herself upon her car of triumph.

Kerning also teaches without evasion that not every man will rejoice in immortality, but only those who can work it out by their own strength; that a certain supernatural power exists in us to see the dead, to prophesy, and work miracles, but we must gain the force necessary for spontaneous awakening from the sleep of material death by hard and protracted effort; that prayer and fasting kindle in us the flame of eternal life, which, when attained, permeates to the end of the fingers, and heals the sick through the power of Christ.

Our own Wronski also demands a reform in Christianity. He is opposed to its solemn promise of eternal life to all men, and advocates a dogma which shall make immortality consequent upon morality, as effect is upon cause. He says eternal life is the harvest, morality the seed; and he only who has sowed the seed can reap the harvest. The author, however, recognizing in the human I-hood the eternal derivative divinity, in accordance with the teachings of Christ, acknowledges every man to be immortal. This divinity, however, exists long only *in potentia*. It comes from the before-world, that it may become a divinity *in actu*. Its duty during its presence here is to develope from itself the God's thought placed within it; to work itself out from the state *in potentia* into that of *in actu*; to transform itself spontaneously into the divinity it

was intended to be. In exact proportion to the extent of this transformation, to the development of its holy selfhood, will be its state *in sempiterno*. So that every one is immortal, but the state of his eternal life is moulded by his own will, and is thus passed, in accordance with his merit, in Heaven or Hell. Not our *immortality*, but our *salvation* or *damnation*, is bound with our morality, as effect with cause. Christianity here needs no reform; it has revealed to us the perfect truth. Wronski was in error, mistaking salvation or damnation for immortality itself. Kerning fell into a like error, and prowled through the pathways of the wolf. It is true that supernatural power is in every man, for he is a divinity *in potentia*. It is true we can develope this power, only by our own force, for we are to transform ourselves spontaneously into the divinity *in actu*. But these things are entirely natural, and should never drown us in the depths of mysticism; nor do they lead us to prophecy, to the working of miracles, or to dubious intercourse with the dead. Virtue is the highway to eternal salvation; vice leads to eternal damnation. What is virtue? The human *I* must live and act worthily of itself, that is, as a divinity from Heaven. Live, O man, so that thou mayest never stain in aught that divinity which is the Breath of God within thy breast! Act as the God-man! Suffer thyself to be nailed to the cross for truth, beauty, holiness, freedom, virtue, religion, light, political progress, law, science, country, and humanity! Sacrifice and self-devotion are thy duty; but know well what it truly is for which thou art willing to give up life, lest thou shouldst become, not a God-man, but a madman—a fool, worthy only of pity! Fear not death; for the *I* within thee, the divinity from Heaven, can never die! A thousand early deaths were better for thee than the eternal debasement of the divinity within thee by crime, unholiness, self-seeking, or voluntary slavery!

This doctrine is all-important for humanity, now so gravely sick, corrupted by gold, palsied by infernal egotism: may it bear consolation to my people who have so long and eagerly looked for a better future, to secure which, they may be called upon to face death, to offer up bitter sacrifice.

God is the Central, Transcendental Heart in the universe; the *I*-hood is a like transcendentality in man. As eternity is

attached to God, so is immortality to the human I. Eternity, sempiternity and immortality belong also to the subdivisions, categories of the transcendentality, for they are its attributes. The third, then, all-important thing in philosophy is the discovery of the source of cognition for this transcendentality, or the demonstration that man has for it, the *immediate eye*. If philosophy does not demonstrate it, sophists will declare all transcendentality to be but the skeleton spectre of a heated brain, and become impious or infidel, or finally throw themselves into the arms of blind belief and grow mad with irrational bigotry.

The Greek philosophers long sought the immediate eye for transcendentality, but without success. The Christian Church proclaimed its wisdom to men in rebellion against God's light and love, but announced as dogma that the transcendentality is only the object of faith. Such were the final results on the fields of the past. In the middle ages men persistently, humbly and blindly believed in the dogmas of the Church. But at last, doubt was awakened, and grew into utterance. Men said: "Christianity commands us to believe in the Transcendentality, but does not open in us the immediate eye for its perception. If it is impossible for man to perceive it, how can the Church know anything about it? How can a rational man believe that which transcends the reason of humanity? If our reason is not high enough to conceive or know essential truth, how can we possibly be certain that the doctrines of the Church are true?" Thus doubt commenced to sit in judgment on the dogmas of faith; change and transition began under the standard of the rebellious reason, and the middle ages passed away in universal struggle. Modern history began. Reason seized upon the sceptre of the world, and faith was trampled underfoot. It broke forth in the Roman races, especially the French. Descartes was the patriarch of the present philosophy; Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Encyclopædists of the last century, prepared the celebrated, terrible French revolution, pregnant with the future, and already rich in important results.

The Teutonic races, particularly the Germans, took a route directly opposite: they made the ideal reason (*a priori*) the monarch of modern humanity. This Reason (*a priori*) called

forth the Reformation, and finally developed itself in splendid metaphysical speculations, such as had never been on earth before.

At the present hour, the Reason (*a posteriori*) of the Roman race has attained its full development; its fruits are St. Simonism, Socialism, and Communism. The German Reason (*a priori*) is also mature; its fruits are the speculations of Hegel, the Critique of Christianity by Bruno Bauer, and the philosophy of Feuerbach. The thinkers of the world have examined these results, and what do they find demonstrated? The reason *a posteriori* has proved, through all its works, that it has only attained empirical nature. It has created Realism and Materialism. What is it in its primitive being? Nothing more than the highly cultivated and science-crowned *Sense*. Can the senses give us the immediate eye for the transcendentality, for the world of God? Not in the least; they only possess the immediate eye for the visible exterior of nature. Thus the understanding, the reason *a posteriori*, has proved itself incapable in regard to the cognition of God, or the immortality of man.

The reason *a priori* has, on the other hand, fully proved through all its creations, that it is only of a speculative nature. Its creations are Idealism and Spiritualism. What is the essence of these scientific forms? The speculations of Hegel on Will and Knowledge convinced the world that Idealism and Spiritualism utterly fail to obtain the Transcendentality; that they only arrive at the metaphysics of the soul of the finality, or the abstract spirit of nature; that thus they, too, are only occupied with temporality, becoming quite invisible when they rise above that realm, bringing *nothing* to the man of experience, while they are to the people utter *Nihilism*. What is the ideal reason in its primeval being? Nothing but poetical, radical license, supported by the judgment and science-crowned fancy, that is, fantasy. And is the faculty which sees Giants, Demigods, Sylphs, Gnomes, and Centaurs, the eye to see into the abyss of the divine world? Not at all. It is only the immediate eye for the invisible inwardness of existence, for the Psyche of the great Isis.

As the sense is the bodily eye for bodies in general, so is the reason *a priori* the incorporeal eye, or the eye of the mind

for spiritual ideas; but neither the one nor the other is the eye of the I-hood, the eye of the created divinity for God and the divine. Thus the reason *a priori* has also proved itself incapable of attaining to supernatural truth. The impotence of the reason *a posteriori*, and of the reason *a priori*, with regard to the cognition of the transcendentality, has destroyed all confidence in philosophy. Men, in despair of human inquiry, have returned and are still returning into the middle ages, exclaiming: "Faith is the only apostle from God; from her alone can we learn of the divine, of immortality; she is the highest, surest wisdom." To fall back into and to hide oneself amidst crumbling ruins is easy enough, but brings no honor to the routed heroes. It is true, the Roman and German philosophies are both bankrupt; but it is certain that retrogression is and ever has been against the will of God, and as in the middle ages, so again will blind belief lead on to Revolution and Reformation. It is insufficient as base for the universal satisfaction and repose of man; it does not give the immediate eye for the transcendentality, but only a goodly trust in the tradition of what had once been seen by such an eye. As the present miserable and insupportable state of skepticism seems to have grown out of Christianity, we hear it asserted in almost every country that the Church is worn out; that the world stands in need of a new revelation. Many desire decisive reforms in Christianity itself. Everywhere is sought the immediate eye for the transcendentality. It is remembered that in the primitive world men saw, talked with, and received orders, directly from God; and it is asked, why is it not so also to-day? We are answered: because man sinned and fell; that, having stained his innocence with materialism, he is no longer worthy to hold converse with his Maker; that he has become blind in his personality, and is no longer able to see miracles. Traditions are everywhere scattered that humanity met with some fearful loss, and for centuries past the world has been in search of some philosopher's Stone of Wisdom. What can have been this dreadful loss? What is this unknown Stone of Wisdom? Nothing but the immediate eye for God! Of old, men were gifted with celestial power, such as Samson, David, Moses; and God gave to them a measure of His Omnipotence, and

they routed the hosts of their enemies with a handful of men. And of old were the prophets, holy men gifted by God with supernatural wisdom and a certain measure of Omniscience; but they are no more on earth. Men to-day call these things fables. We have the Holy Books proceeding from the men of God, containing for us the words of transcendental wisdom, but we cannot understand them. Original sin robbed us of the immediate cognition of all transcendental truth. What is then our duty? To pray day and night until our very bones learn the Lord's prayer, and can recite it like our lips; to fast and abstain from food, and strive in every way to obtain the pardon of God. When He shall find us pure, He will tear from our eyeballs the cataract woven of guilt, and we shall again see Him in His glory. And thus the old Thibetan life of asceticism begins anew in the Christian world. Men are now heard proclaiming to the superstitious crowd, that the inner eye for God has been opened in them; they present themselves with their assumed supernatural wisdom, and assail Christianity itself. What is this inner eye they claim, this wisdom? In their language it is styled "Clairvoyance"! They have given learned theories to the world by which such gifts may be obtained. From this source spring the numerous thaumaturgists now travelling through all countries, working miracles, conversing with the dead, and uttering false prophecies. This pseudo-heaven proved favorable also to the Polanders; did it not send them Towianski?

The author, looking into these foolish fancies, these conscious or unconscious charlatanries, considered how the evil might be remedied. Without vain repetitions of prayers, without fastings or anchoretic ascetism, but having, by the grace of God, made an entirely natural step in advance in philosophy, he discovered in the very essence of man the everywhere looked for and expected power and vision, the immediate eye for the transcendentality. He has aimed in his works to make it clear to his countrymen. This is the old Polish eye, "*oko*," now first coming to its own consciousness, conception, and name, having no appellation in any foreign language, "*mysl*,"* the reason *a totali*, the eternal source and holy principle not

* A word of varied meanings: thought, feeling, resolve, &c.

only of the reason *a posteriori*, but of the reason *a priori*. The empiric I-hood, seated in the body and transfusing itself through it, has the eye for its own, as well as for foreign bodily substance, for matter. The metaphysical I-hood, constituting the spirit, has the eye for its own, and for foreign spirituality, or for spirit. This eye sees immediately the inwardness of the world, and is called the reason *a priori*. Finally, the transcendental or proper I-hood, the root of the empirical and metaphysical I-hood, being itself in the image of God, a derivative divinity, has the eye for its own, for the foreign divinity, for God. This eye sees immediately the divinity of the world, that is, the Word and the Breath of God (Holy Spirit). It sees the pre-eternal source of this Divinity, that is, God Himself; sees the Essence in the Existence, and beyond, without the existence, and its appellation, as we already know, is the reason *a totali*. As the sense has the immediate perception of matter (sensuousness), and as the reason *a priori* perceives immediately spirit (thought, or rationality), so in man, who is himself a derivative divinity, the reason *a totali* (soul) perceives immediately God and the entire divine world, or divinity. This divine I-hood signifies the power of seeing the transcendentality, as the *Aeromatia* of Wronski. Thus the Polish reason *a totali*, though without the whip once wielded by Christ, can yet disperse the false prophets and miracle-workers. Coming to the aid of philosophy and true Christianity, it opens fertile fields for the Slaves for future culture, rich in scientific glory and full of promise for the religious and political progress of all the nations of the earth.

The author then gives to his countrymen the true, Christian God as a truth not based on religious faith alone, but proved by rational conviction, and *demonstrated by exact science*. These proofs lie within the reach of all minds, and are easily found. He offers to their contemplation that God who is manifesting Himself more clearly from day to day in His own existence, in His word, and in His Breath, or in the entire third divine world; he gives them the individual I-hood and proof of immortality; also, as an emanation from their divine nature, a new, heroic, and heavenly morality; he gives them the reason *a totali*, or the immediate eye for the transcendentality, the eternal actual truth.

He has felt himself called upon to write thus at length in his Introduction, that he might elucidate his theme more fully for superficial critics, as well as for the Polish emigrants, who, robbed, banished, and sick at heart, are obsessed by the Satans of Towianski, and have fallen into the delusions of Messianism, among whom is to be reckoned our great poet Mickiewicz, worthy of a better fate!

That the discovery of this third divine world and the immediate eye for it, the reason *a totali*; the transformation from root to flower of the present Roman and Teuton systems into a Slavonian philosophy; the raising of the seeds of transcendental truths which the Roman understanding *a posteriori*, and the Teuton reason *a priori*, mixing with temporary chaff, dropped into the abyss of nothingness,—that all these things should work great changes in the universally accepted Logic is natural and necessary. The old Logic was the product of the real and ideal thought; the national Logic bases these two systems on transcendental reasoning. The two earthly systems are fused into truth and unity in the sphere of divine thinking, in that of the reason *a totali*. Dualism, Dichotomy, passes into Trinity, Trichotomy, increased through its various relative categories. The new Logic, based in the depths of ontology, or in the philosophy of the Before-world—that is, in the region of the Fervers of Zoroaster, the primitive God-ideas of Plato—takes another form, another significance; many original things are added, and the Whole becomes a *living Organism*. The reader may readily convince himself of this by referring to the Dialectics and Methods, or to the second and third parts of the national Logic, in which the old Logic is transformed. This Logic was only the given-thing, the empirical facts which it was necessary to found on a true philosophical basis, worthy of our time and the Polish nationality. This necessity called forth Part I. of our Logic, the Analytic, containing the logical Analysis of Truth, Knowledge, and Conviction. The substance of this first volume, the topics considered in it, induced Kant of old to write his “Critique of Pure Reason,” Fichte to publish his “Fundamental Principles of Scientific Doctrine,” and Hegel to present the “Phenomenology of the Mind.” These are the most renowned creations of

German philosophy. Herein is found the scientific foundation of spontaneous cognition, therefore the corner-stone of all true philosophy. If this work, the Analysis, were found worthy to occupy the same place in Slavonian philosophy occupied by Kant's Critique in the German, the most ardent wish of the author would be satisfied. That the entire Polish system of the Sciences and Phenomenology of the Mind, original national works developing the third or divine world, corresponding to the above-mentioned German works, may soon appear, is also greatly to be desired.

The author has seen and read the most contradictory opinions with regard to his work on education, *Howanna*. Among other criticisms, he has seen that his style is too popular; that the philosopher has nothing to do with the people in general, but only with the more advanced thinkers. He hopes his present Logic will gratify such critics. It is destined for all who appreciate true science; for the intellectual among the young men of our unhappy country, who, even in the midst of gloom and oppression, still seek mental progress and enlightenment; yet it endeavors not to write above the People, the author considering Clearness the natural quality of every *true* light. If the "too popular" work on Education was not understood by many noisy sophists, why should he have labored to make his Logic more unintelligible?

Perhaps this introduction may appear to some presumptuous, or even full of egotistic vanity, yet the spirit in which it was written was one of modesty, nay, of deep humility. The author pretends to no prophetic powers, as Towianski; brings no new Koran, appeals to no fanaticism, demands no blind belief, conquers not the free will without convincing the intellect, nor desires to entangle human spirits in skilfully disposed nets of logic. He offers his work to his country, only desirous of awakening the spirit of the Polish People, for whose ability, vigor, and originality, he entertains the highest esteem. He has not the least desire to be known as the creator of a new school, a sect, a class of partisans; his aim is only to cultivate the spontaneity and freedom of the national thought of Poland. This is the first wish of his heart. He asks not for disciples and confessors, but generous co-workers in the higher sciences, collaborators for the same holy end. He

knows that without the hearty aid of his fellow-men, his efforts will be of no avail. Should he fail in obtaining such assistance, he will be convinced that his nation is not yet sufficiently mature to welcome the philosophy of the third divine world.

He affectionately entreats his countrymen to aid him to combat all obscurantism and ignorance, and solemnly makes his parting appeal to them: "Polish sages! Seize the pen and work steadily for the beloved nation; a fearful responsibility rests upon you. Open to her the great gates of the future! Take the old bandage from her eyes, that she may perceive through the gloom so closely surrounding her, the resplendent sun of her future mission, her coming destiny. Enlighten her, that she may remember what she once was, what she now is, and what she is yet to be. Prepare her for *sacrifice*; teach her that spiritual night is the only true death! Tell her with every hour that the great, glorious, eternal divinity constitutes her I-hood; that it will not and cannot die; that there is no death possible for it unless *it wills* to destroy its own immortality through lack of reason, moral torpor, want of self-consciousness, cowardice, inability for God-like sacrifice, groveling and base actions!

"Teach her, sages of Poland, the highest path of thought, that so the nightmare forced upon her by the damned, may cease to obsess her; teach her to know herself that she may feel her own dignity, nor lay her noble brow in the dust before degraded splendor, haughty titles, human favor, or imperial despotism! Teach her to think justly, that she may feel nobly, for thought precedes effort, and glorious intellect will lead to magnanimous actions. Patriots, throng to the aid of the Sages of Poland; never before was self-sacrificing wisdom so necessary for the redemption of our crushed Father-land. When light shall be diffused through all her borders, the great moral day of national salvation will dawn upon the earth. The genius of our country will feel her supernatural power, and God Himself will be with her!"

Happy New Year, dear brethren and countrymen!

AUTHOR.

Freiburg in Brisgovia, January 1st, 1844.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

By ERNST KAPP.

In the present work,* which very modestly calls itself "An Attempt at a Theory of the Universe" [*Weltanschauung*], a decided step has been taken towards an entirely new "*Weltanschauung*" by the introduction of the Unconscious as a principle into philosophy. This "Unconscious" itself, however, is not anything new; rather is it the oldest, that which is more or less known and current throughout the world; it is the primeval ground of all the change in the universe, the only possible and authentic beginning to a systematic philosophy. From the earliest times, in the scattered appearances of it, a subject of wonder, of observation, and, to some extent, of philosophical investigation, it had hitherto—notwithstanding that our knowledge of it was continually becoming more adequate—withdrawn itself under numerous veils from thoughtful consideration, as a connected whole. The development of organic structures, the instinct of animals, the law that prevails in the formation of political communities, the spontaneous healing of social and physical crimes, the rise of languages, the native talent for art and science, the fixed rule governing the recurrence of crimes, births, deaths and suicides in human society; these, and many other phenomena, have in all times occupied the attention of natural investigators, historians, philologists, educators, physiologists, statisticians, and philosophers. These, however, have placed the Unconscious which reveals itself in such phenomena, in opposition to a conscious as a Natural opposed to a Spiritual. At the same time there were not lacking monistic views of the subject. For example, the Platonic philosophy had represented the acquiring of knowledge as a Reminiscence, having reference to an unconscious and mysterious origin, and had pointed to this as the ground from which knowledge springs. So also, in very recent times, a comprehensive work ("*Psyche—A Contribution to the History of the Development of the Soul*") has been devoted to the demonstration of the proposition, that the key to the knowledge of the essence of the conscious life of

* Philosophie des Unbewussten: Versuch einer Weltanschauung, von E. v. Hartmann. Berlin, 1868.

the soul lies in the region of the Unconscious. This work can properly lay claim to have furnished a new basis for this special philosophic province, and to have elevated into prominence a new principle for philosophy in general. The non-exact sciences, as a rule, have all occupied themselves in manifold ways with the Unconscious,—indeed with striking, and frequently with *hostile*, irrelevancy. The astonishment which Von Hartmann's work has caused them is all the greater, inasmuch as the process by which he brings the apparently Heterogeneous into unconstrained harmony is so simple. He draws the Unconscious out of its hitherto isolated consideration—pulls it with one genial grasp (or, so to speak, with one stroke) at once into systematic order, and lights up the path upon which the edifice of a new philosophy of the Present (for which the inductive science of nature has prepared the material) is possible. A similar astonishment had been caused in the first half of the century in a much more tangible region—that, namely, of productive industry. Was not steam as it was set free—sometimes by cosmical changes of temperature on the surface, sometimes by volcanic activity in the interior of the earth, sometimes simply by boilers in different forms—although it was known, and, so to speak, intelligible to every body, uncomprehended for long centuries? Suddenly, with the knowledge and the appliance of its elastic force, it comes forward as a mighty power into the region of human activity, to raise it to a new and higher plane. In this case, as in the other, the old—that which has been from the beginning and has been known by man—has become something new. But this has happened not without a large number of previous attempts, many of them very discouraging.

Let us now attempt to give the readers of this journal an idea of the rich contents of the book itself.

After an introduction, in which the author opens with general remarks in regard to his problem, method and predecessors, and answers the question how we come to the assumption of design in nature, the subject is discussed according to its internal self-divisions and genetic order, in three sections, as follows:

- (1) The Unconscious in the physical organism.
- (2) The Unconscious in the mind.
- (3) The Metaphysics of the Unconscious.

The proposition of the Kantian Anthropology, that we have ideas without being conscious of them, forms the starting-point of the introduction. For the reason that it is otherwise impossible to explain certain phenomena in the region of spirit, it is necessary to go back to the existence of unconscious ideas as their cause.

"To combine all these phenomena, and in each separate case to make probable the existence of unconscious ideas and unconscious will, and by their sum to raise the principle in which they all agree to a height bordering upon certainty, is the task of the first two divisions of this work."

Thus the antitheses and contradictions of former systems are resolved in the principle of the Unconscious, which here becomes a united whole [*All-Einheit*] and embraces the universe.

"At last it reveals itself suddenly as that which has formed the kernel of all great philosophies—Spinoza's substance, Fichte's absolute Ego, Schelling's absolute subject-object, Plato's and Hegel's absolute Idea, Schopenhauer's Will, &c."

With a view to a critical examination of the methods of scientific cognition, the author was obliged to decide in favor of Induction for his investigations. Setting aside altogether the dialectic method, he justifies the exclusion of it by reference to a particular work published by him ("On the Dialectic Method," Berlin, 1868). According to our view, also, induction is in all cases a necessity where there is any question about the ascertainment and establishment of definite results, and their final unification into one general product. Whether it will suffice when it comes to be a question of working out in the form of an encyclopædia, such a final result, as a new principle in all directions, will be seen in the near future. After this, the author brings forward his views on the relation and difference of the inductive and deductive methods, by the side of which we know of nothing that has equal worth, as far as clearness and depth are concerned. Free from all one-sidedness, he gives full recognition to both methods, and as he demands that they shall mutually supplement each other, he considers every speculation false which contradicts the clear results of empirical investigation; and, on the other hand, he designates every view and interpretation of empirical facts as

false which contradicts the strict results of a purely logical speculation.

Of his predecessors Von Hartmann gives prominence, in the region of modern philosophy, in the first place, to Leibnitz. To that philosopher he attributes the discovery of unconscious ideas, and he gladly confesses that by the study of his works he was first incited to his own investigations. Kant appears to him to have got a little way beyond the standpoint of Leibnitz. On the other hand, he finds in Schelling the idea of the Unconscious in full purity, clearness, and depth. It appears less distinctly in Hegel. Schopenhauer's "Will" falls partly in the sphere of the Unconscious. From the more recent natural science, in which the idea of the Unconscious has hitherto found little admission, he brings forward as praiseworthy exceptions, C. G. Carus's *Psyche and Physis*, with special recognition. Finally, the philosophy of Herbart passes under review with special reference to the ideas under the threshold of consciousness, which, however, do not stand on the ground of the truly Unconscious. At the end of his introduction the author declares the hypothetical solution given by him of the question how we come to the admission of design in nature, not only to be new, but to be the only possible one. When, however, he expresses his opinion that the chapters of the first two divisions of the work, collectively and individually, prove the existence of the Unconscious, and that their intelligibility and power of carrying conviction mutually support and strengthen each other, he can scarcely have meant by this to ward off the reproach that might be made, of Mosaic construction. For the manner and mode of the internal development of his investigations corresponds essentially with the inductive procedure, which his free movement cannot allow to be cramped by a strictly systematic handling of the subject. On the other hand, it is, in the highest degree, calculated permanently to captivate a public which for a considerable time has been devoting itself to investigations in natural science, and, specially favoring these, has shrunk with distrust from philosophic works. It must immediately awaken in every one who takes up the book the agreeable conviction that it reads pleasantly; that he (the reader) is equal to the task of understanding it; nay, more, that philosophy is not, after all, such

an abstract bugbear as people try to persuade each other; it is, rather, attractive in the highest degree—a charming study. Alongside of the remarkable applause which the philosophy of the Unconscious has already won in public criticisms, the author may feel himself rewarded for the care spent upon a profound and elegant presentation of the subject, by the applause which has been enthusiastically accorded to him in domestic circles by thoughtful women, to whom a theory of the universe which morally refreshes the whole of society, and glorifies life, is a desire and necessity.

As to the chief subject of the book itself, its compass and wealth of matter admits only of limited notice. The first topic extends to the phenomena of the unconscious will, in the independent functions of the spinal marrow and ganglia, and, setting out from the assumption of a merely gradual and not essential difference between man and animals, shows that the same thing which we find in our consciousness as the cause of our actions, and call will, also lives in the consciousness of the animals as a causal moment of their action, and must be called also will; that, moreover, for the presence of will there is absolutely no brain necessary; that man therefore, as well as the brainless animal, has his ganglionic will. And that the will, whether it has gone through the cerebral consciousness and become volition, or not, remains in its essence unchanged. The *unconscious idea in the production of voluntary movement* leads to the consideration of the *unconscious idea in instinct*, which constitutes, both in form and matter, one of the brilliant passages of the book; and closes with these recapitulatory words:

“Instinct is not the result of conscious reflection, not the mere consequence of physical organization, not the result of a mechanism lying in the organization of a brain, not the result of a dead mechanism attached to the mind externally, and foreign to its inmost essence, but it is the peculiar self-production of the individual, springing from his inmost life and character.”

If the author is unable, in considering this instinctive action, to avoid the assumption of an (unconscious) clairvoyance, yet he has not by any means (as he has been reproached for doing) put one enigma in place of another; but facts of empiri-

cism have been used solely in order to arrive at further mutual explanation and confirmation. The limit of the union between will and idea is carried far beyond the halfness of Schopenhauer's philosophy, so that every unconscious will that really exists must be united with unconscious ideas. Moreover also the reflex actions are not to be considered as produced by the unconscious thinking of the nerve centres, but they are the instinctive actions of the subordinate nerve centres, it being demonstrated that instincts and reflex actions in individuals of the same species of animals, caused by similar excitements and motives, show essentially similar reaction. The whole doctrine of the Unconscious may be considered a refutation of the so-called "coarse" or radical materialism—in so far as it proves the existence of an immaterial principle standing above the material controlling laws of the nerve-currents. In particular, however, the chapter on *The Unconscious in the Healing Power of Nature* contains an abundance of physiological proof so adapted to carry conviction in favor of the existence of an ideal moment in nature, that without it the striking phenomena of healing power would be altogether inexplicable. The dead causality of material events, the general physical and chemical laws come into effect according to those unconscious ideas which reveal themselves as the healing power of nature, and are designated by the author as *Individual Providence*. Hereupon, after a preliminary consideration of the indirect influence of the *conscious activity of the soul on organic functions*, he closes this first division with an exposition of the unconscious inorganic structures, alluding first to the design apparent in organic structures, and then showing how by gradual succession it unites itself with the previously considered modes in which the Unconscious expresses itself. Schopenhauer's words: "Thus, empirically even, every being stands before us as its own work," form the transition to the following division.

The content of it, namely: "The Unconscious in the mind," is by far more familiar to the present time than the region above traversed, which comprehends mainly the series of organic formations below man. That region has only, in very recent times, been so far elaborated by natural science as to emit quite new flashes of light which illuminate important

subjects in human physiology. The merits of our author lie mainly in the independent philosophical elaboration of the appearance of the Unconscious in the physical system. For in the doctrine of the Unconscious in the mind, he might have moved upon beaten paths, where there was rich material awaiting him, more or less arranged, and accessible. In the first chapter, *Instinct in the Human Mind*, he treats of those human instincts which are more closely connected with the physical system, and to which, therefore, the name of instinct is usually more particularly given. The hollow conceit which prevails regarding human dignity, often refuses to admit the word instinct in the expressions of the Unconscious which are farther removed from the physical system although in other respects they are entirely similar. It refuses to admit this word because there seems to adhere to it something animal.

After this he develops in the following chapters: *The Unconscious in Sexual Love, in Feeling, in Character and Morality, in the Æsthetic Judgment and the Productions of Art, in the Rise of Language, in Thinking, in the Rise of Sensuous Perception, in Mysticism, in History*; and, at the close, compares *the Unconscious and the Conscious as regards their value for human life*.

The task which was here before the author—that, namely, of laying bare the roots of spiritual life—was, notwithstanding that much valuable preliminary work had been done, by no means an easy one. The principal difficulty lay, not so much in the sifting out of what he could render available for his purposes from the great mass of spiritual-philosophical material, as in fructifying with new germs a field that from time immemorial had been exhausted by the same uniform wearisome rotation of crops. A philosophy of spirit suitable for a soil reclaimed from empiricism by careful fostering, contains within it from the first the revolutionary forces of the Kantian philosophy, and is directly calculated to lead the individual sciences into new paths. The way, however, in which those branches of science that have hitherto been included in the spheres of the subjective, the objective, and the absolute spirit, may be rejuvenated, has been pointed out by the author in more than one place; in this connection special

attention is given to the state, art, religion, and history ; while, at the same time, medical science and social communism are not sent empty away. In this we may find indications of an encyclopædic treatment, which must come sooner or later ; that is, if the new theory of the universe is going to face, with worthy weapons, the inevitable combat against the attacks of partly obsolete, partly unripe knowledge, and of blind faith. For the fact that philosophy henceforth can victoriously penetrate into all the spheres of life only in encyclopædic completeness and on a large scale, and not in the disconnected form of brilliant essays, is a point in regard to which all persons capable of forming a judgment are agreed. The author takes leave of this division with the confession :

“ Finally, we ought to keep continually before our own eyes and those of others, everything that we owe to the Unconscious as a counterpoise to the advantages possessed by conscious reason, in order that the spring of all the true and beautiful, already half exhausted, may not entirely run dry, and humanity arrive at a premature old age. The idea of pointing to this need was one of the powerful motives impelling me to work out in a written form the thoughts laid down in this work.”

In the third and last division, the *Metaphysics of the Unconscious*, as is observed in the introduction : “ The principle of the Unconscious extends itself unobserved beyond the physiological and physical spheres to questions, and solutions of questions, which in common language would be spoken of as belonging to the region of metaphysics ; and these results spin themselves out so simply and naturally from considerations of natural science and physiology, that one would not at all observe the transition to another sphere, if the subject of these questions were not otherwise known to him.”

Nevertheless, the different determinations of concepts belonging to the *conscious and unconscious action of Mind* are taken up, their difference shown, and proof adduced to demonstrate that every unconscious idea is connected with unconscious will, and that both, therefore, existing in direct unity, form a common ground ; while, at the same time, a view is opened up to us at the close, how consciousness, which means the emancipation of the idea from the will (that is, from affection and interest) attains its gradual extension, until it is subjected to the sway of the conscious reason. At

the same time, throughout the whole series of investigations extending from the beginning to the end of this division, proof is continually adduced to show that the conscious reason which displays such admirable administrative power, never shows itself creatively productive, and would, if allowed full sway, degenerate into the merest dry system of circles of universal and particular, inclosing each other and inclosed by each other, if man did not continually bathe afresh in the real spring of his life, the Unconscious, and draw from it rejuvenated powers for new activity. Here, therefore, we are introduced to a series of most pregnant considerations, which develop themselves gradually, and progressively. Among other things, the author takes into closer view *the Brain and Ganglia as the Condition of Animal Consciousness*, and gives a physiology of the brain and its functions; the *Origin of Consciousness* affords him an opportunity of examining the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness; *the Unconscious and Conscious in the Vegetable World* leads him to disclose the relation existing between plants and animals, and, inasmuch as the plant, as well as the animal, is credited with a consciousness, to assume that the vegetable and animal kingdoms are on the whole less subordinate than we are in the habit of thinking them. In the chapter, *Matter as Will and Idea*, he devotes himself to considerations on the origin of matter, and tries his hand at the mystery of the atomic theory. He then crosses the bridge of *the Idea of Individuality*, and, after having established the relation between individual and genus, demands a separation between spiritual and material individuals, and that a distinction be made between consciously spiritual and unconsciously spiritual individuals, thus coming nearer to the *All-Unity of the Unconscious*. The Unconscious preserves its Monism by being the universal condition of the manifoldness of phenomena, without this Monism's interfering with the right of individual feeling of self. The question that connects itself with this, as to whence the manifoldness of phenomenal individuals comes, whence the individuality of each, why it exists, and how it is possible, touches the essence of *Individuation*, which is afterwards discussed, and much light is thus thrown especially upon Schopenhauer's doctrine.

From the stand-point of the All-Unity of the Unconscious, the author takes up the *Nature of Production*, and in this respect, likewise, occupies the ground of the latest natural science, which in this very direction has been enriched with so many new discoveries, and has been almost proved to a demonstration. In his treatment of the *Ascending Development of Organic Life on the Earth*, he occupies the scene of the clearing made by Darwin in the darkness of the primeval world, and shows himself very much at home in it, although by subjecting the Darwinian doctrine to the test of the principle of the Unconscious, he does not hesitate to show its deficiencies. The closing considerations on the *All-Wisdom of the Unconscious*, and on *The World as the Best Possible*, as well as on the *Unreason of Volition and the Misery of Existence*, cover what we are accustomed to understand by the terms Optimism and Pessimism. Behind the former we find the unconscious, behind the latter, the conscious will, a difference which can be reconciled only by the aims of the Unconscious becoming the aims of consciousness. This is the goal of the philosophy of the Unconscious. With this work in his hand, it well becomes the author to announce, as he has elsewhere done, that he is far from wishing to make mankind weary of the world, but that he believes he is setting forth more powerful motives than ever any one has done before him, to make them glad in the world.

What we have said in regard to Von Hartmann's work is intended less as a criticism than as a concise exposition, to gain readers for the work in circles where it may not yet be known. The majority of those who give it more than a passing glance, will feel themselves constrained to submit it to a more serious study. Thorough-going criticisms will then be forthcoming in abundance. Like all books that mark an era, it will, no doubt, call into existence a number of defenses and attacks, and will have to brave the purgatory of criticism. The author may fairly desire the application of such a clearing-process to his views, as he will hardly for any length of time be able to set aside the demand that will be made upon him to aid in drawing the consequences of his own scientific act. We speak of the development of these *Prolegomena* to a new comprehension of things, into the "imposing rotundity" of a system. It may be further remarked, that to the

author, his task and its position, considered with reference to the great philosophies of recent times, are perfectly transparent. The consciousness of the genetic justification of his stand-point lends him everywhere coolness and certainty of judgment in general, but more particularly in his polemics, where these, as belonging to the subject, cannot be avoided: the same consciousness adorns his style with that dignity and gentlemanly deference whose absence is so much to be regretted in the author of "The World as Will and Idea," as well as in others. Von Hartmann, in his criticism of the dialectic method, closes the preface to his Monograph on that subject with the noble words: "that we know no other duty to the heroes of science than that of examining their productions with more care than those of other persons, and in these words we have the ground tone of his whole polemical career—and no less in the Philosophy of the Unconscious."

Thus the public possesses in this book a thoughtful and vigorous account of the development of the Unconscious from its first presentiment up to the gorgeous edifice of human society under the sway of conscious reason, which continually seeks for self-invigoration and new birth in the Unconscious.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.*

"Although Philosophy can bake no bread, yet she can procure for us God, Freedom, and Immortality." This often quoted saying of Novalis sounds strangely from the mouth of one living in the age immediately succeeding Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and reminds one of the "*Naturam expellas, etc.*" Those three great ideas will never let man rest until he has found a tenable theory of them for himself. No philosophy, whether positive or negative, skeptical or dogmatic, can set the matter at rest so that speculation shall cease. For the essential part of it is that each individual be clear in himself on these points; he is therefore obliged to think out the solution for himself before it becomes *his* solution.

Of these three gifts of philosophy, the second is of first interest to the Anglo-Saxon intellect. To speculate on the Freedom of the Will is the most natural philosophic activity for

* "*Two Letters on Causation and Freedom in Willing*, addressed to John Stuart Mill, with an Appendix on the Existence of Matter and our Notions of Infinite Space." By Rowland G. Hazard. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1869.

"*Freedom of Mind in Willing*, or Everything that Wills a Creative First Cause." By same author. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

a people whose national characteristic is the practical will-power and its realization in forms of political freedom. The Anglo-Saxon does not create any great systems of Ontology, but he labors at empirical psychology. Empirical science of whatever kind arises solely from the substitution of the Will or practical faculty for the Reason or theoretic faculty: what objects my practical will finds, these shall be counted as *known*, and not any others.

I. The first step in a discussion of the Freedom of the Will, is to clear up the question of free or spontaneous activity in general. Until it is settled that free being is possible in idea, no subsumption can be made of the individual under it as predicate. From this cause arises the interminableness of the usual argumentation on the subject: One man tries to convince another that the Will is free—*causa sui*, self-determined—when the other is utterly unable to grasp the idea of *self-determined*, or *free*, in itself. It is of no use to pursue a man with appeals to consciousness, when he conceives all Being under the form of dependent or finite Being—the form of Being as determined or conditioned *ab extra*.

Mr. Hazard, in the books before us, has taken the right course in first discussing at length the idea of causation. Efficient cause is *causa sui*, or primary source of motion, and one must grasp the whole of that thought before he can proceed to discuss the Will.

The Kantian Critique has already been referred to. The Third Antinomy is supposed by Kant and the Kantians to prove that all attempts to comprehend Freedom are impossible. It sets up a *Thesis*: "That a causality of freedom is necessary to account fully for the phenomena of the world," and after proving it, establishes by other arguments the *antithesis*: "There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens according to the laws of Nature."

In these antithetic arguments Kant has well exhibited the *Maya* or delusion of untutored Reflection; it moves round and round in a circle, because it thinks only one side at a time, and does not find itself strong enough to grasp both sides together, and thus rise to a comprehension.* A brief consideration of the Antinomy may be pertinent in the present connection.

The chief point in the Thesis may be stated as follows: 1. If everything that happens presupposes a previous condition, (which the law of causality states), 2. this previous condition cannot be a permanent (or have been always in existence); for, if so, its consequence, or the effect, would have always existed. Thus the previous condition must be a thing which has happened. 3. With this the whole law of causality collapses; for (a) since each cause is an effect, (b) its determining power

* See Jour. Speculative Phil., Vol. I., pp. 18, 19; Vol. III., pp. 275, 276.

escapes into a higher member of the series, and, (c) unless the law changes, which it vanishes; there results an indefinite series of effects with no cause; each member of the series is a dependent, has its being in another, which again has its being in another and hence cannot support the subsequent term.

Hence it is evident that this Antinomy consists, first: in the setting up of the law of causality as having absolute validity, which is the antithesis. Secondly, the experience is made that such absolute law of causality is a self-nugatory one, and thus it is to be inferred that causality, to be at all, presupposes an origination in a "self-moved," as Plato calls it.

The Antinomy reduced to its simplest statement gives:

(a) Thesis: Self-determination must lie at the basis of all causality, otherwise causality cannot be at all.

(b) Antithesis: If there is self-determination, "the unity of experience (which leads us to look for a cause) is destroyed, and hence no such case could arise in experience."

In comparing the two proofs it is at once seen that they are of different degrees of universality. The argument of the Thesis is based upon the nature of the thing itself, i. e. a pure thought; while that of the Antithesis loses sight of the idea of "efficient" cause, and seeks mere continuity in the sequence of time. The Thesis, properly stated, is a true universal, and exhibits its own truth, as that upon which the law of causality rests; and hence the antithesis itself—less universal—resting upon the law of causality, is based upon the Thesis. Moreover, the Thesis does not deny an infinite succession in time and space; it only states that there must be an efficient cause—just what the law of causality states, but shows, in addition, that this efficient cause must be a "self-determined."

A general investigation into the nature of the conditions, limits, or determinations of any being, considered as a whole, will result, if strictly pursued, in the conclusion that all determination is self-determination, i. e. originates in a spontaneous will.*

II. After the first point has been cleared up, it still remains to show the relation of the human will to the free will which is shown to be the actual basis of existences. This involves a treatment of man psychologically as an individual, and ethically as existing substantially in the institutions which he creates, not as an individual but as a race: the Family, Society, and the State. The consideration of the latter or ethical phase falls in the Philosophy of Rights. The former phase involves the discussion of such subjects as *motives, choice, appetites, foreknowledge, &c.*

Mr. Hazard has treated these themes with great acuteness, and has always kept in view the great central light, the thought of CAUSA SUI.

* Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. I., pp. 20, 119, and 187.

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THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

The question of Immortality involves the question of Substance. What is Substantial? If a being can be proved to be substance, it is of course permanent, and cannot be destroyed. Is the soul substance?

I. The substance of that which can be destroyed must necessarily possess other potentialities than the one realized. The destructible thing is not substance, but a mere phase of it. Substance contains in itself the entire round of possibilities or potentialities; its actuality and potentiality are one.

Illustrations.—An individual thing—a stone—may be crumbled to dust; the dust may be pulverized in water, or chemically changed, and its being mingled with a score of substances, in which all of its original identity is lost.

A plant grows and possesses individuality; it may be cut down and rot, and mingle with the atmosphere and soil, or be burnt up and its elements unite with others.

A chemical element even, (e. g. a quantity of oxygen,) will, if set free, seek some other elements, with which it soon combines and loses all its former shape and properties.

A piece of iron rusts or oxydizes until it is a piece of iron no longer. Water is potentially ice or vapor when it is liquid, or when it is ice it is potentially vapor or liquid. Any individual form of water may be destroyed at once, by realizing either of its potentialities.

II. Thus so long as a being has potentialities which depend upon beings other than itself, it is destructible. Allow

a change in the totality of the conditions which surround it, and you change it.

III. A destructible being, therefore, is limited from without and finds itself conditioned by others. If there is an indestructible being or a true Substance, it must be such a being as has its limits or determinations within and through its own act.

IV. A self-determined being is therefore the only immortal being. It alone possesses individuality independent of other beings. Alteration is a process of "othering." If a self-determined being alters, it must be through its own act. It is its own other, its own limit, its own means, and its own end. All its activity moves in a circle, and has itself for a result. It is thus a unity and a duality.

V. It is therefore true that no substance can exist except a self-determined one.

To define more clearly what a self-determined substance is, we must consider it in each of its functions:—(a) It is that which determines, and (b) that which is determined.

(a) As the determiner, the pure active, it is not in anywise limited, and has no constitution or nature which characterizes it. It is pure potentiality. (b) But as determined it is the pure passive, the constituted, the nature, and is that which characterizes.

The determiner is not a being in time and space, but is the Ego of a conscious being. The act of this Ego results as "the determined" in a "character."

VI. The self-determined being is, as such, only in the form of Consciousness.

Thus we have found the substantial, and can say that it is conscious being.

VII. Conscious Being, which is determiner and determined, active and passive, subject and object, is in the form of a process of self-identification; this is an eternal process, for the reason that this activity creates its own object, a circle whose end is its beginning.

It develops through the continual approximation of its passivity to its activity, through its dissolving of its objectivity into subjectivity. This development therefore, instead of destroying individuality as change does, is a process of self-

identification, the very essence of consciousness itself. IT IS
WORLD HISTORY.

HISTORICAL.

(*A Fantasia on Hegel's Philosophy of History.*)

Human history divides into three great epochs, when considered according to its theory of the nature of the soul. In the earliest stage—what may be called the foetal life and infancy thereof—we find no developed conceptions on this subject. In the second epoch the soul is regarded as a product of Nature and subordinate thereto. In the third epoch man comes to assign to his soul the rank of self-existence, and accordingly he subordinates all else to himself.

These three epochs may be again classified as the periods of dominion (*a*) of the senses—with fancy and imagination; (*b*) of the Understanding—with reflection and abstraction; (*c*) of the Reason—with insight and concreteness of comprehension.

I. The simple sensuous knowing does not make distinction among the objects of time and space, separating the dependent from the independent. Everything to it is an immediate existence; and since immediate existence must be *causa sui* or self-determined, the infant is prone to regard all immediate things as possessed of intelligence and will, so far as these attributes are implied in *arbitrariness*. The South Sea savages thought that fire (when Captain Cook first kindled it on their island) was a malignant demon that fed on dry wood, and bit any one that touched it. Like the South Sea Islanders, almost the whole of Africa south of the Great Desert is peopled with human infants. The light of the sun of the physical world glares upon them with unparalleled splendor; but the light of inner consciousness shines as yet only with feeble rays. They do not possess any knowledge of themselves as universal beings. Hence, the soul is to them a mere embodiment of caprice and arbitrariness.

What we find existing in Africa at the present day, we find to have been the primeval condition of mankind in general if we correctly infer from such data as are given us.

All historic certainty ceases when we trace back the annals of any nation for a comparatively short period. Beyond this

lies the realm of tradition and mythology, in which the typical and historical are confounded. Back of this we are able to trace still a few steps further by means of the data derived from natural science. We can, for instance, in the Swiss lakes—in the cypress forests sunk below New Orleans—in the deep mud along the Nile—in the remains of human art there found—we can trace an approximate chronology that extends some thousands of years beyond the written records. The geologist—considering the rates of deposit of deltas and of the growth and decay of forests—affirms the existence of the human race in the Mississippi valley nearly 50,000 years before our time. Baron Bunsen finds the Egyptians advanced in civilization far enough to manufacture pottery, from seven to nine thousand years before our era. How ancient were the dwellers on the Swiss lakes, we shall not inquire. The pre-historic human being seems to have been substantially the same as the unhistoric human being of the present. Absorbed in the dreamy life of the senses, he lived, and died, and made no sign. The absence of objects upon which he has impressed his rational will is proof conclusive that he had not attained to that degree of self-knowledge which characterizes humanity when advanced beyond sensuousness.

Man as an individual, immediate existence—as a sensuous object—stands over against all that is in time and space as a pure other or opposite. The Reason within him which is as yet potential (undeveloped) can transcend all bounds in space. It can invent Mathematics, and thereby pronounce the necessary conditions of all immediate being in the universe, throughout all time. But when man is in the savage state, he has not yet gained possession of this universal attribute of his, and therefore is no master over Nature. Nature is to him an overpowering necessity and he yields to external circumstances. Of course, his idea of immortality is very vague. He believes in spectres and ghosts, and tries by spells to raise or allay the demonic power of departed spirits. He is as yet unborn from the dominion of Nature into self-determination (the realm of Spirit), and may therefore be said to be *en rapport* with Nature. Somnambulists feel their separation as *individuals* from their bodies; the phenomena akin to animal magnetism are most frequent among the lowest ranks

of humanity. Hence, although they hold to the separate existence of the soul after death, yet as they merely exist under the control of natural powers in life, so in death the soul is not conceived as anything more than a natural existence—a ghost—a body which has lost some very important attributes and gained nothing of advantage thereby. Life's functions all gone, it can eat no more and drink no more—no more enjoy the delights of the body.

II. In the second epoch of History man ascends into a conscious separation of the individual from the generic entity. Man as universal is contrasted with man as individual. This epoch is transitional. Here belong China, India and the Buddhist civilizations, with the Persian, Phœnician, and Egyptian, in which the principle is modified. In one simple word, we name this phase the Oriental. The Universal is distinguished from the Particular; but the Universal is identified as the negative might of Nature, and man is the Particular which is ever annulled by it. The Brahmin can only save himself from external annihilation and absorption into Brahm by performing the act of absorption himself, through abstraction; when he becomes giddy with self-contemplation, and loses all special consciousness like the dreamer and the mesmeric subject, then he is Brahm and superlatively blest. Holding as he does this absolute abstraction to be the Highest Truth, it is consistent that he should despise all that is distinctively human. He builds asylums for old cows and monkeys, but leaves sick humanity to perish miserably. The animal in general is the appearance of Brahm even more than the man, for the latter has consciousness, which diffracts prismatically into multiplicity of individuals, while the brute instinct remains still in implicit unity.

This stage is properly to be called the Pantheistic stage. All is God and God is one. All multiplicity, therefore, is only *Maya* or delusion. There is and can be only One, the negative unity that absorbs all into it, the Saturn that devours all children of Time. The varieties of this fundamental doctrine of the Orient may be briefly characterized as follows: they are stages of ascent towards a recognition of the soul as independent of Nature.

(a) First, there is China with its one substance upon which all depends. The emperor is the visible embodiment of it—the patriarchal principle, in which the individual is the merest organ of the unity that articulates the whole as patriarch and monarch. Note, that in the savage races there was resemblance to the vegetable organism—each part a separate individual, and no real individuality anywhere—all was particularity. In China there is one organism like that of the lowest animal—the polyp, which can feel only. Feeling is the reference of the whole to a central point—the central self being at home in the members. The plant cannot feel, for each of its members is a separate individual, and thus there is no return into one centre. In China we have what corresponds to feeling.

(b) India seizes this substantial unity as articulated into members (castes), and we thus attain one degree more of distinctness. These articulations constitute the basis of Castes. The spiritual substance is rigid and allows no transitions: the chandâlas are lowest, and cannot ascend to the next step; they must forever remain distinct, in their marriages and associations, from all others. So, too, the other castes, each exists in isolation from the rest. Thus, in recognizing the Brahmin as descended from the Head of Brahmâ, and as thereby possessing in himself the possibility of realizing Brahm in himself, the East Indian idea at the same time places the Universal as a rigid wall—a law of Nature—around humanity, leaving the individual no freedom at all.

(c) The next higher realization is the Buddhistic. In the Lama worship all are, or may become, priests—no rigid caste system restrains—and in each one of these priests is the possibility of becoming the Grand Lama. But when we come to the Persian and Zend ideas we note the advent of a new element of Consciousness. The extreme East—China, India, and Thibet—have seized true Being as one (as completely abstract) and have regarded this as positive, letting all multiplicity stand as a mere delusion. They do not make any account of the negative by itself. But the Persian seizes the negative, and attributes validity to it as the opposite of the positive. He makes two principles: a positive and negative;

and has broken the abstract unity of the more eastern nations. He has in this seized the nature of spirit more profoundly, for he recognizes in it the importance of the negative, which is the source of all particular existence. Of course, the negative is as substantial as the positive—the Particular is as substantial as the Universal.

(d) The Persian does not seize this thought in all its bearings, but lets it abide in its most obvious realization in nature—that of *light* and *darkness*. The substance of the remoter East is related to the particularity of man, as a negative of it. The realization of the substance destroys man's consciousness, and he perishes as an individual. But Nature has a dualism and the Persian has discovered it.

The light now comes in through openings at the top of this cave, and we are in a fair way to escape into the free air of spirit. With dualism arises the principle of activity, and the contrast of the negative with the positive leads to a unity quite concrete, as the substance of all.

(e) This leads to the Phœnician conception, wherein the same idea is more developed. Pain is the chief element in this mode of worship. Pain is the feeling of subjectivity. The particularity or Finite is itself negative, and in pain feels itself negated. Of course, in pain there is a synthesis of the finite subject with what limits it, and hence where pain is, there is a transcending of mere finitude. To make this an object of consciousness in Religion shows the further elaboration of the new principle which came in with the Persians. The Negative as darkness is at first seized as coördinate with the Positive as light, and in this the Particular is seized as an essential phase. The Phœnicians in their Adonis-worship seize the Negative as related to the Positive in the form of Pain, and thus develop a deeper insight into the nature of spirit. Hercules is the chief deity of the Phœnicians; he ascends from the human by his own deeds and becomes divine, i.e. he negates his negativity, or cancels his finitude; by renouncing his ease and comfort—denying (negating) himself as a natural being—undergoing his "labors" (types of the labors of humanity)—he determines himself.

Of this transitional phase presented in the Western-Oriental History, Egypt is the culmination. Hitherto the Natural has been the Substantial, and spirit, or the soul of Man—his consciousness—merely the product of Nature, a phase merely, and no substantial mode. All the Orient, it is true, believes in the existence of the individual after death—the lowest savages do that. But they believe it in the form of demonology and popular superstition, and all their thought upon the nature of the Substantial contradicts the popular belief.

(*f*) In Egypt this contradiction culminates, and we have the perpetual recurrence of natural types with a half symbolic meaning peering through. This combination constitutes a riddle: a problem to be solved. Isis is Nature, and the Earth, and the remains of the Oriental unity. Osiris is the Nile, and the Sun, and Life. The Nile had its cycle of rise and fall, and of giving fertility to the land. The sun came and went in closest connection with it. The seed had a period of being buried in the mud and then of growth, and then appeared as seed again. Life seems a circle of birth, growth, decay, and death. All nature is this circle. It arises and departs—the Particular has no abiding, but the process itself seems to be eternal.

This problem fashioned itself in sharpest outlines in the Sphinx: a rude rock beneath, a lion's body, a human head: the whole range of nature from the lowest inorganic to the highest organic. It asked the question: what then? What then? Does the circle close upon itself, or does it develop spirally? How large a cycle does man embrace? If man becomes a fish and rock, in his transmigration he loses consciousness of personal identity, and his immortality does not mean anything? If he is a mere wave of the universal substance, he will undoubtedly be again swallowed up, and naught will remain of him. With the belief in Brahm, man in this life *is* swallowed up in Brahm, and has no separate determination. By death he cannot escape the same thing.

The Egyptians made the soul's cycle complete itself in three thousand years and return to the human form again. But in its symbols it half expressed a profounder insight into the nature of spirit, and again was piqued by this very expression

to endeavor to seize the meaning. Thus it alternately repeated the symbol and strove to seize the truth symbolized ; and thus ends the Oriental or Pantheistic stage of the doctrines regarding the nature of the soul.

III. When we find a theory that makes consciousness the permanent characteristic of the entire cycle of the Soul, we have ascended above the Orient and taken the true spiritual point of view—and this begins with Greece.

It is the Greek who answers the Sphinx riddle—a riddle asking for the cycle that remains self-identical in all its phases. Man is the “solvent word”: “know thyself” the destiny, final aim, of spirit. The beginning of this (the final period of history) presents us with an undeveloped and incomplete form. The Greek has found the human soul as a conscious being to be the substantial essence of the world. It places its ideals as fair divinities on Olympus, and its mythology tells us how Spirit in the form of self-determining individuality has overcome the forces of Nature and the primordial forms of the same—the Titans together with the elder dynasty of gods. In its assertion of the Substantial as a concrete individual it has neglected the depths of the human spirit ; we may say, therefore, that the Greek merely asserts in a general or vague manner the substantiality of the soul.

It is the Roman who seizes more centrally the human spirit. He seizes the *realized Will*, wherein the *character* or *abiding individuality* is displayed. What I am through general habits, or through blindly following the conventionalities of society, is not my own individuality in so high a sense as what I am through strength of will long directed to the realization of rational deeds. The will, energizing, makes for itself certain forms, and these when stated are codes of laws. The Roman laws are the rational forms in which all modern peoples have secured at least the first stages of their freedom.

But this development of spirit, although more central in its apprehension of the true essence, is still partial. The Will, although self-determination, is only an undeveloped form of it. It always presupposes something opposed to it which needs its action and modification. Thus its act extends beyond itself, and does not strictly return into itself. Its cycle, therefore, is not perfect. It involves an uncanceled external-

ity. In the struggle of the Roman consciousness to complete the will to a pure self-determining Being, it widens its scope, and, through its external conquests becoming more and more a totality and a resistless might to the without-lying territory, it dirempts itself and becomes despotic (i.e. not finding the external limit strong enough to try the strength of its political will, it wrecks the surplus upon its own subjects). Its will reacts upon itself, and slavery and oppression follow. As soon as antithesis of this kind develops, the rational basis of the will disappears and arbitrariness takes its place. For the opposing parties do not find their limits in the Reasonable—or the Universal—but each is restrained only through the opposing will of the other party.

IV. Under these circumstances, the entire civilized world of that time lets go its hold of the Substantial which has been embodied for it in the state. In this utter ruin of its temporal substance, it turns within to find the deepest of all reconciliations. At this point the Christian principle enters as the fulfilment of the desire of the world. Man as man (all men) are in essence the same. The Internal, which is the True, can only be realized through the renunciation of all naturalness; naturalness is the form of dependence, or of being determined from without. Hence in this new stand-point we have arrived at the complete annulment of Nature as the substantial. We are now to regard the soul as the final cause of the world, and as eternal through the fact that it produces its own reconciliation by voluntary renunciation of all that is alien to it. Only that which is able to pass through this infinite negation can be considered as abiding. Paradox as it may sound: the product of its own negation is the only product that can survive the mutations of time. This is the relation of the Christian idea to the world into which it came and took root.

All institutions gradually took on a form in accordance with it. All conventionalities and laws and institutions of modern times are direct outgrowths of the doctrine regarding the soul which we have enunciated. Were we to set up as a principle the denial of man's immortality and draw logical results, we should annihilate all that is regarded as rational by the modern world, whether in society or the state, in Art, Religion or Philosophy.

To sum up this historic view :

The first epoch, (the unhistorical period) of the race, while it holds to the existence of the soul after death, does not really grant any validity to the soul as a substantial existence, but seizes only its idiosyncrasies. It believes in sorcery.

The second epoch grants also the individual existence after death, but comes in conflict with its theoretic tenets concerning the nature of substantial existence. It holds consciousness to be incompatible with Absolute Being. This is the Pantheistic view, and the common form of statement is this: The soul is not an essence; it is a product of Nature, and returns back at death or ultimately into Nature again. It is a wave in the ocean of Being, and ultimately is swallowed up, and never succeeds in attaining to true individuality.

The third epoch, which culminates with Christianity, is that in which Nature is subordinated to spirit. The latter is seized as the true universal essence whose form is individuality; while Nature is, on the contrary, held to be the estrangement of spirit from itself, and thus a mere becoming of spirit, and consequently as without essence when regarded by itself.

All Christian dogmas contain as innermost kernel the true speculative doctrine of the soul, no matter how unmeaning some of those doctrines are to the sensuous form of thinking. Take, for example, that of total depravity, a doctrine growing unpopular in some directions because of its too narrow interpretation: it states that man by nature is totally depraved; that by nature there is no good thing in him. That this is the deepest truth with reference to spirit, all will bear witness who reflect that Nature is regarded as that which is made what it is by an external power; that it is that which is extended in Space and Time. Now every one considers that human being as the lowest who has not anything but natural or brute impulses, and who has not subdued them and reformed his character. Everybody despises as idiotic him who has not thought out anything for himself, but who takes everything from others through imitation. But even imitation is impossible without partial self-determination; without a partial cancelling of one's own naturalness, of course one could never put on the semblance of another. Spirit cannot grow by accretion. No man can give another one a truth except

on condition that the latter receive it by thinking it over, and thus being creatively active. Thus, in the doctrine of total depravity is stated the great principle that Spirit is a self-activity, and is nothing except through its own mediation.

In conclusion, we may briefly state the grounds of the doctrine of Immortality freed from historical wrappage. There are now, as in all times, three views extant: the view originating from sensuous, thinking the view originating from the reflective intellect, and, thirdly, that taken by the Rational or Speculative intellect.

To the senses, immortality cannot be much more than a mere fancy. To the reflective intellect, now very active in the direction of natural science, it must grow ever more uncertain the more it ponders the problem. But as doubt is diffused by natural science, a correction will always come in through the manifestations of the natural side of spirit as exhibited in the phenomena of instinct, somnambulism, &c. For the atomistic reflection, while demanding a substrate for its hypothetical faculties and forces, will become so completely abstract and mechanical that the magical side of spirit must reassert itself again and again.

To the speculative insight, however, immortality is ever a clear result.

The possibility of death can only belong to a being which is not self-limited. A being limited through another may perish through the removal of the limit. A body always has external limits, and the removal of these, causes the destruction of its individuality. The permanent abiding cannot find a lodgement in any particular body for the mentioned reason. Wherever bodies are concerned, a *process* is the only permanent thing involved. The Permanent must have within itself its determining limits; in other words, it must be that which forms or builds its own character. But to be this, it must exist as a *pure Negative* related to itself. To think this, requires the thought of an activity without a substrate, which is a difficult thought. But Schelling says that whoever cannot think action or antithesis without a substrate cannot philosophize at all. This pure negative relation to itself is exactly what calls itself "I"—the Ego or subject of all consciousness. To be able to think itself under the form of

"I am," a being must be generic and individual at the same time. But a generic individual is not capable of being destroyed by change, for all change only affects it unessentially. It is the *summum genus*, and there is no transcending it. This constitutes what we call personal identity. In self-consciousness, subject and object are the same. In life simply—as it appears in animals—instinct takes the place of the Ego, and when this is the case the genus is sundered into male and female individuals (sex = sect = sundered), so that neither is complete, and both are perishable in consequence. This was well understood even by Plato, who states the division of the individual into an antithesis as the characteristic of all the realms of Nature.

In the final epoch of History alone does man recognize fully his own essence. All the movements of civilization are the unfolding into actual realization of his infinite ideal.

CONCLUSION.

The Speculative Insight into Immortality—Its Outline.

- 1st Position.*—All being is either dependent or independent; if the former, then it is a part of the latter.
- 2d Position.*—Independent being is either determined (made what it is) by itself, or by somewhat else; but since determination by another would make it dependent, it follows that all Independent Being is self-determined.
- 3d Position.*—Self-determined Being is a subject and object in one—determiner and determined. It is Self-conscious Being. (See Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. I. p. 119.)
- 4th Position.*—Original or Independent Being—called God in Religion—is Pure Self-consciousness, and this is the Activity which makes itself its own object.
- 5th Position.*—But this implies the externality of Himself to Himself, and this is Space; and since knowing is a reducing of externality to internality, time is present as the cancelling of space. Hence, too, arise the kingdoms of Nature—a series of ascending degrees which reflect God more and more as they ascend in the series, by being more self-determined.
- 6th Position.*—This series must end in a being which is God's image or self-object—his thought of himself—and this Being must realize in himself the complete ascent beyond Time

and Space. And were this not so, there could be no Absolute self-determined Being and no God—no substance, and consequently no finite or changing being.

7th Position.—Man is such a being as ends the series of Nature; for if we suppose a higher than man created, were he a fixed being, man being a progressive being would transcend him; or if that being were a progressive being, he would only be identical in nature with man after all.

The demand that the reflection into Himself shall be complete—that God's Image shall actually exist—can only be fulfilled by a Being that can cut loose entirely from Nature or externality and still preserve individual characteristics—can be fulfilled, in short, only by immortal beings. The self-identity whose characteristics are through and by means of self-determination, is permanent self-identity, whereas that identity which consists in external marks—conferred by existences alien to the subject marked—is perishable and is destroyed the moment the externalities are removed, like individual waves in the ocean.

The necessity of the existence of immortal beings is not a constraint (or external limit) to the Absolute, but is only His logical necessity or self-determination.

The doctrine of future existence may be held (as it is by Oriental peoples) independent of the doctrine of Immortality. All proofs of Immortality must ground ultimately in the one here given, namely: that the series of nature must end in a Being which has permanent identity, one in whom generic and individual are one, one whose character is self-made. Man claims the position, not as an animal, but only as a thinking being.

Thus reversing the seven positions above stated: If there is no immortal individual being that ascends from Nature, then the Absolute which nature reflects is nowhere reflected as a Permanent, and hence his determination does not return to himself; hence He is finite and no Absolute, and thus He sinks into the rank of other natural beings. Thus there can be no self-determined beings and no totalities; hence everywhere only dependence and partialness; and this dependence depends not on itself, for that would contradict its dependent

nature; nor on the Independent, for that cannot exist under this hypothesis. Therefore, no determination, whether through itself or through others, can exist, but *each is naught, all is naught*.

But if anything is, then there must exist the Absolute and its reflection; and its reflection implies immortal beings. And man fulfils as subject-object (conscious Ego) the conditions, and is therefore immortal.

THE SETTLEMENT FOR ALL POSSIBLE PHILOSOPHICAL DISPUTES.

By A. E. KROEGER.

It certainly is not likely that two persons will ever fall into a dispute about any proposition, unless they either hold each a different interpretation of one of the words contained in that proposition, or unless that proposition is the assertion of some empirical fact. We, of course, can and will ever continue to dispute about the latter sort of assertions, as, for instance, by whom powder was first invented; how far the sun is distant from the earth, &c.; or rather we will not dispute, but simply disagree on those matters, leaving, by mutual consent, the questions open to future empirical rectification. But that we can ever dispute about propositions of not an empirical character, provided we have precisely the same definition of every word in a proposition, seems to be utterly impossible; since every such proposition ought apparently to be reducible to $A = A$, or $\neg A \text{ not} = A$. For a non-empirical proposition involves a conception, and the assertion of a predicate as belonging to it. Now, if I do not agree to the predicate as a component of the conception, then the difficulty is simply that I have not defined that conception as my opponent wants it defined, and we are involved in a word dispute as to whether in ordinary language the conception named by him is used as involving such a component or not. One of us will then have to choose a different, or coin a new, word, and by so doing our whole dispute will have been settled.

Hence real disputes would seem to be impossible, provided all propositions of a non-empirical character are in fact reducible to $A = A$, or are, as the technical phrase is, *analytic judgments*; and the question remains simply whether another kind of judgments or propositions, that is to say, whether synthetic judgments are possible, and since all empirical propositions upon which, as before said, we may disagree but cannot dispute, are synthetic, — whether synthetic propositions *a priori* are possible?

This, it will be remembered, is the famous question which KANT put at the head of his *Critic of Pure Reason*. That they are possible is evident from the fact that every rational being makes use of them. Apart from the Science of Mathematics, the whole Science of Physics, in its fundamental principles, is nothing but a series of synthetical propositions. This is evident, for no empirical observation can produce in me the conception of, for instance, Cause; and yet it is said that every change must have a cause. I observe only the *change*; and yet here arises the conception of *Causality* in my mind, and of itself joins that conception of change. How is this arising at all possible? Hume's solution, that it is a matter of habit, solves nothing. Infinite repetition changes not a change into causality; and thus Hume falls simply into the old sophistical error of thinking he has solved something by squeezing in between the problem and the solution the infinite divisibility of time and space. At every moment and repetition the question still recurs: When does the conception of change turn into that of causality; when does the judgment cease to be analytic and become synthetic? To postpone the time does not make the matter easier. Now if synthetical judgments are possible, and if we can therefore utter of a subject more predicates than its own conception offers, the problem arises:

Can we find a rule by which to go on thus adding predicates, or is that adding an arbitrary matter? If we can find a rule, then all disputes on this field, and with it all disputes whatever, are forever cut off; if no such rule can be discovered, then propositions on any subject not empirical ought to be removed from all controversy, since they cannot be decided.

The rule here demanded was first discovered by Kant; it is singular that it was never before thought of, and that indeed

the whole problem, the solution whereof settles all disputes, was never clearly conceived before him. This rule is:

If in thinking a subject you cannot think it, or think at all, indeed, without thinking something else not contained in the subject, and in so far its opposite, then you can and must add this other additional predicate to the subject in a synthetic judgment.

Now since the thinking of any *particular* subject is empirical, as being this or that, the problem can be reduced to this: What must I think or add synthetically when I think a subject generally? Or, if I, as the thinking, think a subject generally, what additional thoughts or predicates are involved in such thinking? The answer to this question gives rise to the Science of Knowledge, and settles all possible disputes. Discovered by Kant, this answer is framed by Fichte as follows:

The thinking power, Ego, cannot think itself without a Non-Ego from which to distinguish itself, nor a Non-Ego without thinking itself as not the Non-Ego; hence, with the conception of the one, that of the opposite thereof necessarily arises; with the conception of both, that of their mutual relation; with the conception of their mutual relation, 1st, that of a relation wherein the Ego is dependent, (causality-relation); 2d, that of a relation wherein the Non-Ego is dependent (substantiality-relation), and thus of a conflict of opposite directions in the Ego, which again cannot be thought without an infinite activity of the Ego checked and thus thrown back and again reproduced and cast out (space, matter, and time; powers of contemplation and sensation); which infinite activity can again not be thought as thus checked unless it is also thought as actually infinite and not checked, as which, it is called Infinite tendency to determine, Moral Law, &c., wherein the whole problem of synthetical development comes to an end because the starting point has been returned to.

Thus it appears that all disputes may be settled, namely:

All empirical propositions are simply to be determined by empirical proof, and may therefore be disagreed about, but can never be truly disputed; using the word "disputed" as implying a *compulsion* on the part of the disputant to agree.

All analytic propositions are not disputable, since any disagreement upon them can arise only from a misunderstanding as to the words employed.

No synthetical propositions *a priori* are disputable, since each such proposition must bring the proof that the mind cannot think anything at all without thinking it; a proof that is complete and sufficient.

Only so long as the latter fact is not recognized, as Kant or Fichte's Science of Reason is not accepted or a similar one made, will synthetical propositions be the cause of those endless, empty disputes that have disgraced theology and philosophy for so many ages, and upon which mankind has wasted such vast energies.

Is it so very difficult to understand this, so very difficult to put, once for all, a stop to the stale and unprofitable speculations that pass for philosophical or metaphysical, and are as much chimeras as the nonsense uttered about square circles and circular squares?

BOOK CLASSIFICATION.

Whoever has had occasion to consult the classified catalogues of Libraries in this country, or in Europe, has no doubt experienced the difficulty met with in determining what classes he shall search in order to find books treating on the topics of his investigation. The difficulty experienced by the investigator is still more troublesome to the corps of librarians. To determine the exact class to which the book belongs, to place it where it can be found again at once when inquired for, to open to the scholar seeking information the entire resources of the library on a special theme,—these are constant duties of the librarian that imply a good system of classification. Every scheme of classification rests upon some philosophical system as its basis. The writer of this article having had to devote considerable time to the subject with a view to the preparation of a library catalogue,* has brought forward his results with the hope that they may prove useful not only to librarians, but especially to philosophical students who desire to look over the whole range of human intelligence as

* That of the Public School Library of St. Louis. The scheme here given has been adopted in its substantial details for that institution, and the forthcoming catalogue will be based on it.

realized in books. The scheme is given in detail at the close of this article.

THE SCHEME.

It uses Bacon's fundamental distinction (developed in the *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, Book II. chap. I.) of the different faculties of the soul into MEMORY, IMAGINATION, and REASON, from which proceed the three grand departments of human learning, to wit: History, Poetry, and Philosophy. Without particularly intending to classify *books* as such, Lord Bacon attempted rather to map out "human learning," as he called it, and show its unity and the principle of development in the same. But his deep glance seized the formative idea which distinguishes different species of books.

The *content*—or what books treat of—is not a sufficient basis of distinction to ground a classification on. For any class of books may treat of two or more phases of the content at once. Since Nature and Mind never exist isolatedly, but always in some degree of synthesis, it follows that nearly all books treat of both, and hence will prove hybrids in such a classification. It may be here remarked that the chief reason for the signal failure of the attempts at classification made by distinguished philosophers and literary men is this: they have conceived that the classifications of science would answer equally well for the classification of the books of a library; and whereas science has for its domain all existence, and to some degree can be classified by its object-matter, they have sought to divide books on the same plan. Notable among the impractical systems of this order is that of Ampère,* which divides "Noölogically" and "Cosmologically" according to a schematizing formalism as strict and stiff as mathematics. Coleridge, in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, has given another example of the same error, though in a more genial shape. Coleridge was a poet, as well as philosopher strongly influenced by the ideas of Schelling. Inasmuch as Schelling philosophized with the "Ideal and the Real" and their "Union"—making the *Ideal* the "pole" of pure thought or Philosophy, and the *Real* the "pole" of Nature, and Art the union of the two, or the "Absolute Indifference"—Coleridge likewise set out with "Pure Sciences" as the first divi-

* See Appendix to Devey's Logic, Bohn's Library.

sion, placed "History, Biography and Geography" as the third, and for the middle or connecting link "Mixed and Applied Sciences." As results thereof we find the whole realm of Poetry crowded into a minute subdivision coördinate with "Numismatics"; it is the sixth section of the third class of the second division of the whole! Its subdivisions are entirely omitted, while minute subdivisions are given to "Astronomy" and to "Invertebrals"! It is evident that Coleridge had in view only the requirements of a Cyclopædia.*

* Edwards in his "Memoirs of Libraries" gives Coleridge's classification differently. He has taken a modified form of it made for the purpose of adapting it to a library; hence he places "Literature and Philology" under a fourth general head.

In the work of Edwards here cited, thirty-two celebrated schemes of classification are given, thirteen of which are designated as "more or less dependent on, or illustrative of, systems of Metaphysics"; the others are "directed more or less specifically to the practical arrangement of books."

The most general divisions of some of the former schemes are as follows: that of

Prosper Marchand (A. D. 1704): Class I. Philosophy, II. Theology, III. History, IV. *Appendix*—Polygraphy.

System of Girard (1748): Class I. Theology, II. Nomology, III. Historiography, IV. Philosophy, V. Philology, VI. Technology.

System of Girault: Class I. Preliminary Instruction, II. Cosmography, III. History, IV. Legislation, V. Natural History, VI. Sciences and Arts.

System of Bentham: Class I. Ontology, II. Pneumatology (such subelasses are found in this system as "Idioscopic Ontology," "Poioscopic Somatics," "Nooscopic Pneumatology," "Polioscopic Ethics," &c.)

System of M. Albert (1847): Class I. Polylogy, II. Cosmology, III. Andrology, IV. Theology.

Of the practical schemes mentioned, the following are notable:

System of Aldus Manutius (1498): Class I. Grammar, II. Poetry, III. Logic, IV. Philosophy, V. Holy Scripture.

System of Johannes Rhodius (1631): Class I. Theology, II. Jurisprudence, III. Medicine, IV. Philosophy, V. History, VI. Poetry, VII. Oratory, VIII. Rhetoric, IX. Logic, X. Philology, XI. Criticism, XII. Grammar.

System of Bouillaud (1678): called the "French System," and used with slight modifications by Martin (1740), Debure (1768), and by Brunet in his well-known "Manuel du Libraire": Class I. Theology, II. Jurisprudence, III. Sciences and Arts, IV. Polite Literature, V. History.

System of Leibnitz (1700): Class I. Theology, II. Jurisprudence, III. Medicine, IV. Intellectual Philosophy, V. Mathematics, VI. Physics, VII. Civil History, VIII. Literary History and Bibliography, IX. Polygraphy and Miscellanies.

System of St. Petersburg Imperial Library (1808): Class I. Sciences, II. Arts, III. Philology.

System of Middleton (1775): Class I. Theology, II. Profane History, III. Civil Law, IV. Philosophy, V. Mathematics, VI. Natural History, VII. Medicine, VIII. Polite Literature.

System of Schleiermacher (1847): Class I. Encyclopædias, Literary History and Bibliography, II. Polygraphy, III. Philology, IV. Greek and Latin Literature, V. Modern Polite Literature, VI. Fine Arts, VII. Historical Sciences, VIII. Mathematical and Physical Sciences, IX. Natural History, X. Medicine, XI. Industrial and

Brunet's system is the most popular of the unphilosophical order, and is somewhat practical—after one has learned it; for it requires the memory exclusively, no aid being given the librarian by any intimation of a scientific justification at its base. It is needless to say that it coördinates classes with subclasses and confounds genera with species, and yet has no practical reason therefor, inasmuch as some subdivisions have (in an ordinary library) ten times the number of books that may be found under some one general class; take, for example, a subdivision of “*Belles-Lettres*” and compare it with the whole division of “*Jurisprudence*” or that of “*Theology*.” It is clear that Brunet's Catalogue was made rather for the bookseller in Paris than for the librarian.

In the classification based on the three faculties—Memory, Imagination, Reason—whence we have History, Poetry, and Philosophy, the distinction according to *form* makes its appearance, and is of some use in the classification of books. Lord Bacon, however, did not have in view any such use of his distinction, nor did he develop it in a proper shape to be of such use. Nor, finally, was it possible for him at that time to do this work, had he contemplated it; for the sciences had scarcely begun to unfold in his time sufficiently to give him a hint as to what form they would assume. He evidently thought that they would take a historical form, and therefore placed what has proved the most important branch under the division of “*History*.” It is for this reason that he names his third division “*Philosophy*”—excluding its more obvious forms—the Sciences—from his mind in naming it. In his time, Prose Fiction had developed very little, and the novelists hitherto known had scarcely availed to advance any species of Prose to the dignity of Art; hence Bacon chose the name “*Poetry*” for the whole domain. In our time, the realm of Reflection and Speculation (Understanding and Reason) is called SCIENCE, Philosophy being merely one of its forms, while the realm of Phantasy or Productive Imagination is called ART or ÆSTHETICS. The derivation of the word Poet-

Economical Sciences, XII. Philosophy, XIII. Theology, XIV. Jurisprudence and Politics.

There is a tendency to the use of new-coined words in many of these schemes. It is of the utmost importance in a practical scheme to avoid pedantry of this sort.

ry, Poieo (*Ποίω*, from *Ποτός* = *quale*; hence *ποιεῖν* = to give determinations to something = to shape, i. e. to create by giving determination) containing creative significance, admirably adapted it to name the works of the Productive Imagination.

An outline of Bacon's system, as further elaborated in the nine books of the Advancement of Learning (*De Aug. Sci.*), is as follows:

HISTORY.

A. NATURAL HISTORY.

a. Generations [i. e. producing regularly].

1. *Celestial bodies.*
2. *Meteors and Comets.* [?]
3. *Earth, Air, Fire, and Water, or the Elements.*
4. *Species of Bodies.* [?]

b. Præter-generations.

c. Arts.

B. CIVIL HISTORY.

a. Civil History Proper.

- (unfinished) 1. *Memoirs.* (a) Commentaries. (b) Registers. (1) Calendars. (2) Jour-
(defaced) 2. *Antiquities* (sources). [nals.
(finished) 3. *Perfect History.* (1) Chronicles. (2) Biographies. (3) Special Histories
4. *Cosmographical.* [or Narratives.]

b. Ecclesiastical History.

1. *History of Church.*
2. *History of Prophecy.*
3. *History of Providence.*

c. Literary History.

C. APPENDIX TO HISTORY.

- a. Speeches.
- b. Letters.
- c. Apothegms.

POETRY.

A. "NARRATIVE OR HEROIC" [Epic and Lyric].

B. DRAMATIC.

C. ALLEGORICAL. Fables, Mythologies, &c.

PHILOSOPHY.

A. THEOLOGY or Divine Philosophy.

B. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

a. Speculative.

1. *Physics.* (a) Principles of things. (b) Structure of things. (c) Varieties of things. (1) Concretes. Subdivided like Natural History into "celestial, terrestrial," &c. (2) Abstract. a. Properties of matter. b. Motions.
2. *Metaphysics.* (a) Essential forms. (b) Final causes.

b. Practical.

1. *Mechanics.*

2. *Magic* [i. e. application of the discoveries of Science to practical uses—

c. Appendix. Mathematics.

[Telegraph].

1. *Pure Mathematics.* a. Geometry (continued Quantity).

b. Arithmetic (discrete Quantity).

2. *Mixed Mathematics.* (a) Perspective. (b) Music. (c) Astronomy.

(d) Cosmography (Geography).

(e) Architecture. (f) Mechanics.

C. PHILOSOPHY OF MAN.

a. Human Philosophy.

1. *The Body* (Somatology?) (a) Medicinal Art. (1) Hygienic. (2) Curative.
(3) To prolong life.
(b) Cosmetic. (c) Athletic.
(d) Voluptuary (Liberal) Arts. (1) Painting.
(2) Music.
2. *Soul and Body related.* (a) Indications. (1) Physiognomy.
(2) Interpretation of dreams.
(b) Impressions upon the soul through the body.
3. *Soul.* (a) Rational soul. (1) Faculties. (a) Logic. Arts of—I. Invention;
II. Judgment; III. Memory;
IV. Tradition.
(b) Ethics. I. Models. II. Culture of mind; &c.

The general unfitness of this system for the classification of books is apparent; it was not intended for it. But its principle of division is of great value. To be applied to the use of a library, it is necessary to seize and not lose sight of its spirit, in the details which Bacon gives. It will be found that in minor divisions and sections the *content* exercises a predominating influence on the classification, while in the principal divisions the *form* is the guiding principle.

Inverting the order in which Bacon considers the system, *Science* should come first on account of its furnishing the method and principles for what follows:

- I. SCIENCE gives the department of books in which *conscious system* prevails.
- II. ART (Æsthetics) gives the department in which “organic unity” or unconscious system prevails.
- III. HISTORY gives the department in which the system is determined by accidental relations, such as time and place.

The distinction of form must not be allowed to prevail throughout, but must be met and modified by the principle of *subject-matter* in all minor respects. It needs careful deliberation to unite these two principles so as to retain the highest degree of simplicity in arrangement; and this is the main point to be borne in mind: that the principle of classification is not a simple one, like that used by the classifiers of sciences—Coleridge, Ampère, Comte, and Aristotle—but a compound one, in which form and content mutually limit each the other.

This compound principle, which is a concrete and practical one, gives for our guidance a series of rules like the following:

I. *Main Divisions*.—(a) Commence the system with the division that realizes in the highest degree the characteristic principle of the general class, and proceed from the fullest realization to the incomplete one which marks the transition to the following class; (b) commence the *following* class with those subjects most closely allied to what precedes, and then, *secondly*, take the type of the class, and proceed, *thirdly*, to the transition to the next.

Illustration.—"Philosophy" is the highest type of Science, and hence begins the catalogue.

Science ends with the Useful Arts, which form a transition to the division of Æsthetic Art, and this should commence with the "Fine Arts" and be followed by Poetry.

Geography and Travels are placed before History proper, because under this head are included works of a freer and more literary character than Civil History as such; for the traveller is governed mainly by subjective caprice, and is not limited to a definite subject-matter like the historian or biographer.

II. *Subdivisions*.—(a) In the minor classifications, *General Treatises* should come first, and these should include *Compendis* and so-called "Philosophies" of the subject (these being for the most part *mere* compends). Secondly should come the chief and important example of the general class, and then should follow its less important realizations. (b) But in science this principle is modified by that of the order of scientific development, giving the abstract first, and the complex and concrete later.

Illustration.—1. Compendis, &c., of History. 2. Histories of Nations: this being the normal type of History. 3. Historical Miscellany, including fragments of History.

III. *Appendices*.—Collections and miscellaneous works should be placed like compends under the general head. Complete works of individuals, and certain complete collections which it is desirable to keep together, should be considered in respect to the compass of the subjects treated of, and placed under the most special head that will contain them.

Illustration.—Medical Encyclopædias would fall under the class of Medicine and not under General Cyclopædias (99) in the Appendix, nor among general works in Natural Science.

IV. *Hybrids*.—Any work not exactly falling under any

one section, or including two or more heterogeneous subjects which do not unite in some general head, must be classified according to the predominant one, or according to the obvious purpose of the book, "cross-references" being made in the catalogue.

Illustration.—1. Books on Architecture may fall under Mechanic Arts, or under Fine Arts, according to the point of view taken by the author in composing the work. 2. The "Art of Literary Composition" may fall under "Rhetoric," or under "Philology," according as Grammar or Rhetoric predominates therein. 3. "Engraving" may fall under "Mechanic Art," or if a Treatise on Pictures produced by the engraver, under "Fine Arts." 4. Natural History: although some of its treatises are merely descriptive, yet, since their object is scientific, they all fall under Science. 5. Juvenile Literature treats of Science, Travels, History, Fiction, &c.; yet, since the entire form of treatment is modified so as to *interest and amuse* youth while instructing them, all these books resemble novels and romances, which likewise may have scientific or historic content; they are, therefore, kept together and under the class of "Prose Fiction." 6. "Ecclesiastical History" (usually made a division under History) is so nearly allied to the treatment of Dogmatic Theology that it is important to keep the two together. The same principle applies to histories of other specialties. 7. "Theology" itself cannot be separated from "Religion," and hence the latter finds its works—Holy Scriptures, Liturgies, Church History, and other non-scientific works—under Science, for the reason that they are all tributary to Theology, which *is* a science; with the development of humanity they become more and more taken up into scientific forms. 8. "Jurisprudence" likewise is for the most part not a collection of scientific works at all, but the record of the realizations of the Practical Will in the shape of laws and usages. Its books, however, are used essentially for scientific and not for æsthetical or historical purposes. 9. "Essays" and "Criticisms" are not works of Art according to form, but are, strictly speaking, scientific, and would fall under Philosophy, or some other department of Science. Since, however, their content is some form of Art or Literature, they are useful solely to æsthetic students, and are classified under Art.

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With these guiding principles before us, our system develops as follows:

SCIENCE unfolds into

- I. Philosophy, or the most general principles, the forms and archetypes of all the rest. It has the strictest, most systematic method, and is the source of all system to the other sciences.
- II. Theology—the science of the Absolute, just as Philosophy is the science of Science.
- III. Social and Political Sciences, including the treatises upon the institutions which relate man to his fellow-men in society and the state. His essential life as a spiritual being is conditioned upon his ascent above his merely natural, individual condition, by means of combination in the social organism.

These are—

1. Jurisprudence (in which the social organism appears as a constraining necessity acting upon the individual from without).
2. Politics (in which the individual reacts against this constraint, and exhibits himself as the free producer of the Universal, which is placed over him in the shape of Law).
3. Social science. (Social science as Political Economy, exhibits the principles of combination, by means of division of labor, and how this results in the conquest of nature and the dedication of it to the service of man. As Education, it exhibits the process of initiating the individual into the conventionalities of the social organism—man's apprenticeship in acquiring the use of the tools of intelligence.)
4. Philology. (Philology is placed in the division of the Social and Political Sciences, because, as Science of Language, it is the science of the instrument that lies at the basis of all combination or organization. Language (The Word) is the image of Reason, and is not a natural product, but the invention of self-conscious thought; it is not *found*, but *made*—partly by the poetic phantasy, and partly by the reflective understanding. For the reason that Mind becomes, as it

were, crystallized or *fixed* in Language, we place Philology as a connecting link between the Spiritual and the Natural. The language of a people embalms all the achievements of that people acting as a social, political, or spiritual organization.)

These latter four sciences treat of the means through which man arrives at a comprehension of the necessity of the social organism, and through which the constraint becomes internal, and hence becomes freedom.

IV. Natural Sciences and Useful Arts: the former unfold the laws of Nature, the latter apply them to social uses. The transition is formed by Medicine, which is partly science, partly art.

1. Mathematics is the science of the pure forms of Nature —time and space.
2. Physics is Nature treated dynamically, and hence quantitatively or mathematically.
3. Natural History is Nature organically considered, hence qualitatively and descriptively. Chemistry forms the transition from quantitative to qualitative; it is the realm where quantity constitutes qualitative difference. Astronomy is a hybrid, belonging to Mathematics and Natural History.

In Natural History we commence with the Mineral or Earth-organism, and ascend through the Plant and Animal to Man as a merely natural being (Ethnology).

4. Medicine is closely allied to Natural History, and its subjects take up in a new form the same content.
5. The Useful Arts and Trades start from Natural Science and proceed to unite with it a purely empirical element.

ART unfolds

- I. The Fine Arts.
- II. Poetry.
- III. Prose Fiction.
- IV. Literary Miscellany, comprising rhetorical works (orations) and literary essays which have either an Art

form more or less impure, or are so related to works of Art in their subject-matter as not to be separated from this class.

HISTORY—

- I. Geography and Travels form the first or most external class under History.
- II. Civil History is the normal type of this division.
- III. Biography and Correspondence. Heraldry and Genealogy also fall properly under this head.

An APPENDIX is subjoined for certain works, or collections of works, which treat of topics belonging to each of the three general divisions.

Minute Subdivisions.—Caution should be taken with regard to such works as do not fall readily into a special class under the general number of the section; they should be left without special letters, until, by the addition of similar works, they become too numerous, when a special subclass may be made, giving it a letter.

Numbering.—Instead of the inconvenient method of marking the classification of books by indicating all the grades (e.g. Hygiene = Sci. X. 5. c), it is better to have the classes numbered from 1 to 100, so as to have only two figures for most classes, and to add letters for subclasses as they arise. In this way the general numbering need not change, although new subclasses may be made frequently. The books on the shelves should be alphabetically arranged within the subclasses (e.g. those of Hygiene numbered “57. c” should be alphabetically arranged) according to the name of the chief author (i. e. the most distinguished name, when there are several authors’ or editors’ names in the title). This name and the subclass number should be written plainly on the book-label, so that the dullest library-boy can put any book in its exact place on the shelves, or find it instantly when he has obtained its classification from the catalogue. This system of numbering is one of the most practical and valuable features of the system here described.

Small Libraries.—Private libraries, which are usually special in their character, need only the XIX general divisions, and a few subdivisions under one or more heads.

OUTLINES OF THE CLASSIFICATION.

(A) SCIENCE.	{	SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES.	PHILOSOPHY.	I.
			THEOLOGY.	II.
			JURISPRUDENCE.	III.
			POLITICS.	IV.
			SOCIAL SCIENCE.	V.
	{	NATURAL SCIENCES AND USEFUL ARTS.	PHILOLOGY.	VI.
			MATHEMATICS.	VII.
			PHYSICS.	VIII.
			NATURAL HISTORY.	IX.
			MEDICINE.	X.
			USEFUL ARTS.	XI.
(B) ART.	{	FINE ARTS.	XII.
			POETRY.	XIII.
			PROSE FICTION.	XIV.
			LITERARY MISCELLANY.	XV.
(C) HISTORY.	{	GEOGRAPHY AND TRAVELS.	XVI.
			CIVIL HISTORY.	XVII.
			BIOGRAPHY.	XVIII.
(D) APPENDIX.....			APPENDIX—MISCELLANY.	XIX.

SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION.

1. (A) SCIENCE.

2. I. PHILOSOPHY.		f. Natural Theology.
3. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and Compends.		g. Religious Fiction.
4. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.	12.	ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY— General.
a. Anthropology (Animal Magnetism, &c.)		a. History of the Church.
b. Psychology.		b. Acts of Councils and Syn- ods.
c. Logic.		c. Missions.
d. Metaphysics.		d. Biography (Lives of Christ, Saints, Martyrs, &c.)
5. MORAL PHILOSOPHY.		
6. II. THEOLOGY.	13.	SPECIAL SYSTEMS—Christian and others.
7. BIBLE (Original and Transla- tions.)		a. Swedenborgians.
8. COMMENTARIES.		b. Mystics.
9. LITURGIES (and Histories of Prayer, &c.)		c. Quakers.
10. CHRISTIAN FATHERS.		d. Spiritualists.
11. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.		e. Mormons.
a. Doctrinal.		f. Superstitions and Delu- sions.
b. Hortatory.	14.	JUDAISM.
c. Controversial.	15.	GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOL- OGY.
d. Sermons.		
e. Evidences.		

16. ORIENTAL AND PAGAN RELIGIONS.
 - a. Mohammedanism.
 - b. Buddhism.
 - c. Brahminism.
 - d. Fetichism.
17. Social & Political Sciences.
18. III. JURISPRUDENCE.
19. GENERAL TREATISES.
20. NATURAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.
21. ANCIENT FEUDAL AND CIVIL LAW.
22. (a) COMMON LAW, (b) CANON LAW, and (c) EQUITY.
23. ORGANIC AND STATUTE LAW.
 - a. Federal Government.
 - b. Particular States.
 - c. Cities and Corporations.
 - d. Foreign Countries.
24. REPORTS OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
 - a. American.
 - b. Foreign.
 - c. Digests.
25. SPECIAL TREATISES.
 - a. Criminal Law.
 - b. Martial Law.
 - c. Commercial Law.
 - d. Medical Jurisprudence.
26. IV. POLITICS.
27. LEGISLATIVE ANNALS.
 - a. Federal Government.
 - b. Particular States of the Union.
 - c. Foreign Countries.
28. POLITICAL CONTROVERSY.
 - a. Federal Government.
 - b. Particular States of the Union.
 - c. Slavery Question.
 - d. Foreign Countries.
29. V. SOCIAL SCIENCE.
30. POLITICAL ECONOMY.
 - a. Statistics (Census, &c.)
 - b. Commerce & Navigation.
 - c. Population and Production.
 - d. Finance, Banking, &c.
31. EDUCATION.
 - a. Special Treatises.
 - b. Educational Journals.
 - c. School Reports.
 - d. Reports of Special Educational Institutions.
 - e. Elementary Text Books.
 - (1) *Reading, Writing, and Spelling.*
 - (2) *Arithmetic.*
 - (3) *Geography.*
 - (4) *History.*
 - (5) *Grammar.*
 - (6) *Ancient and Modern Languages.*
32. VI. PHILOLOGY (General and Comparative).
33. GRAMMARS.
 - a. English.
 - b. Latin.
 - c. Greek.
 - d. French.
 - e. German.
34. DICTIONARIES.
 - a. English.
 - b. Latin and Greek.
 - c. French.
 - d. German.
35. Natural Sciences and Useful Arts.
36. VII. MATHEMATICS.
37. ARITHMETIC (and Numerical Tables).
38. GEOMETRY, TRIGONOMETRY (and Compendis).
 - a. Plane and Spherical Geometry.
 - b. Plane and Spherical Trigonometry.
 - c. Conic Sections.
39. ALGEBRA AND HIGHER ANALYSIS (and Compendis).
 - a. Algebra.
 - b. Analytical Geometry.
 - c. Calculus.
40. ENGINEERING (General Treatises, Table Books, &c.)
 - a. Civil (Public Works).
 - b. Mechanical (Machinery & Mill Work).
 - c. Topographical (Surveying, &c.)

- d.* Military (Fortifications & Artillery).
- e.* Navigation.
- 41. VIII. PHYSICS.
- 42. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.
 - a.* Special Branches.
- 43. ELECTRICITY AND MAGNETISM
 - a.* Electricity.
 - b.* Magnetism.
 - c.* Electro-Magnetism.
- 44. CHEMISTRY.
 - a.* Inorganic.
 - b.* Organic.
- 45. ASTRONOMY.
- 46. IX. NATURAL HISTORY.
 - a.* Physical Geography. (Compends.)
- 47. METEOROLOGY, &c.
- 48. GEOLOGY AND MINERALOGY.
 - a.* Geology.
 - b.* Geological Surveys.
 - c.* Mineralogy.
- 49. BOTANY.
- 50. ZOOLOGY.
- 51. ETHNOLOGY.
- 52. X. MEDICINE.
- 53. COMPENDS & GENERAL TREATISES.
 - a.* Histories of Medicine.
 - b.* Dictionaries and Cyclopædias.
 - c.* Medical Journals.
- 54. ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY.
 - a.* Physiology.
 - b.* Anatomy.
- 55. MATERIA MEDICA AND PHARMACY.
- 56. SURGERY AND OBSTETRICS.
 - a.* Special {
 - Obstetrics.
 - Ophthalmology.
 - Dentistry, &c.

64. (B) ART.

- 57. PATHOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS.
 - a.* {
 - Special } Nosology.
 - Branches } Diagnosis.
 - b.* Particular and Local Diseases.
 - c.* Hygiene.
 - d.* Recreative Arts.
 - e.* Homœopathy.
 - f.* Veterinary Art.
- 58. EMPIRICAL & SUPERSTITIOUS MEDICINE.
- 59. XI. USEFUL ARTS AND TRADES.
- 60. MILITARY ART.
 - a.* Arms—Manufacture and Use.
 - b.* Infantry.
 - c.* Artillery.
 - d.* Cavalry.
 - e.* Naval Warfare.
- 61. MECHANICAL ARTS & TRADES.
 - a.* Machinery and Mill Work.
 - b.* Building and Furnishing (Houses, Ships, &c.)
 - c.* Manufactures (Hardware, Textile Fabrics, &c.)
- 62. COMMERCIAL ARTS.
 - a.* Book-keeping and Trade.
 - b.* Communicative Arts.
 - c.* Transportation.
- 63. PRODUCTIVE ARTS.
 - a.* Mining and Metallurgy.
 - b.* Agriculture.
 - c.* Horticulture.
 - d.* Stock-Raising.
 - e.* Preparation of Food.
 - f.* Hunting and Fishing.

66. XIII. POETRY.

- 67. ENGLISH COLLECTIONS.
 - a.* British Authors (collections).
 - b.* American Authors.
 - c.* Ballads.
 - d.* Dramatists.

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| <p>68. FOREIGN AND ORIENTAL POETRY.</p> <p><i>a.</i> German.</p> <p><i>b.</i> Danish and Scandinavian.</p> <p><i>c.</i> Slavonic.</p> <p><i>d.</i> Greek.</p> <p><i>e.</i> Latin.</p> <p><i>f.</i> Italian.</p> <p><i>g.</i> Spanish and Portuguese.</p> <p><i>h.</i> French.</p> <p><i>i.</i> Oriental.</p> <p>69. XIV. PROSE FICTION.</p> <p><i>a.</i> Histories of Fiction.</p> <p><i>b.</i> English Fiction & Translations.</p> <p><i>c.</i> Foreign (untranslated).</p> <p><i>d.</i> Ancient and Mediæval Romances.</p> <p>70. JUVENILE LITERATURE.</p> <p><i>a.</i> Travels and Adventures.</p> <p><i>b.</i> Histories.</p> <p><i>c.</i> Biographies.</p> <p><i>d.</i> Scientific.</p> <p><i>e.</i> Games and Sports.</p> <p><i>f.</i> Fiction.</p> | <p><i>g.</i> Religions.</p> <p><i>h.</i> Foreign (untranslated).</p> <p>71. XV. LITERARY MISCELLANY.</p> <p>72. (<i>a</i>) ANECDOTES. (<i>b</i>) FACETLE.</p> <p>(<i>c</i>) FABLES. (<i>d</i>) APOTHEGMS.</p> <p>73. RHETORIC, ELOCUTION, AND SELECTIONS.</p> <p>74. COLLECTIONS OF ORATORY AND SPEECHES.</p> <p><i>a.</i> British.</p> <p><i>b.</i> American.</p> <p>75. ESSAYS AND CRITICISMS.</p> <p><i>a.</i> British.</p> <p><i>b.</i> American.</p> <p><i>c.</i> Foreign and Translations.</p> <p>76. COLLECTED LITERARY WORKS OF INDIVIDUALS (Prose and Poetry).</p> <p><i>a.</i> British.</p> <p><i>b.</i> American.</p> <p><i>c.</i> Foreign and Translations.</p> <p>77. LITERARY HISTORY.</p> <p>78. BIBLIOGRAPHY.</p> <p><i>a.</i> Catalogues of Libraries.</p> <p><i>b.</i> Catalogues of Sale.</p> <p><i>c.</i> General Catalogues.</p> |
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79. (C) HISTORY.
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MEDITATIONS

CONCERNING THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY,

In which are clearly proved the Existence of God, and the real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man.

Translated from the French of Descartes, by WM. R. WALKER.

THIRD MEDITATION.

ON GOD: THAT HE EXISTS.

I shall now close my eyes, stop my ears, divert all my senses,—I shall even efface from my thought all the images of corporeal things, or, at least, since one can scarcely do that, I shall reckon them as vain and false; and thus holding converse only with myself, and examining my inner man, I shall attempt gradually to make myself more known and more familiar to myself. I am a thing that thinks—that is, that doubts, that affirms, that denies, that knows few things, that is ignorant of many things, that loves, that hates, that wills, that wills not, that imagines also, and that feels; for, as I have

formerly remarked, although the things which I feel and imagine may perhaps be nothing at all outside of me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that those forms of thought which I call feelings and imaginations, in so far only as they are forms of thought certainly reside and meet within me. And in the little that I have just said, I believe I have collected all that I really know, or, at least, all that till now I have observed that I knew. Now, that I may attempt to extend my knowledge further, I shall act circumspectly and consider with care whether I cannot yet discover in me any other things that I have not up to this time perceived. I am assured that I am a thing that thinks; but do I not then also know what is requisite in order to make me certain of anything? Indeed, in this first knowledge, there is nothing that assures me of the truth but the clear and distinct perception of what I say, which indeed would not be sufficient to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived thus clearly and distinctly should prove to be false: and therefore it seems to me, that already I can establish as a general rule that all the things which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are true.

Yet I formerly received and admitted many things as very certain and very manifest, which nevertheless I afterwards discovered to be doubtful and uncertain. What, then, were those things? They were the earth, the sky, the stars, and all the other things which I perceived by means of my senses. Now what is it that I conceived clearly and distinctly in them? Nothing, in truth, but that the ideas of the thoughts of those things presented themselves to my mind. And yet at present I do not deny that these ideas meet within me. But there was yet another thing that I asserted, and which, by reason of the habit I had of believing it, I thought I could perceive very clearly, although in reality I did not perceive it at all, namely, that there were things outside of me from which these ideas proceeded, and which they entirely resembled, and it was in that that I deceived myself; or if, perhaps, I did judge according to the truth, it was not any knowledge that I had that was the cause of the truth of my judgment.

But when I considered something very simple and easy relating to arithmetic and geometry—for example, that two and

three added together make five, and other things similar—did I not conceive them at least with sufficient clearness to assert that they were true? If I have, indeed, since judged that one may doubt of these things, it has been for no other reason than that it occurred to me that perhaps some god might have given me such a nature that I should deceive myself as regards the things which seem to me the most manifest. Now every time that this previously conceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to admit that it is easy for him, if he so wishes, to bring it about that I should be mistaken even in the things which I believe I know by the very strongest evidence; and, on the other hand, every time that I turn toward the things which I think I conceive most clearly, I am so persuaded by them that I cannot avoid giving expression to these words: Deceive me who may, he can never bring it to pass that I should be nothing while I think myself to be something; or that some day it should be true that I have never been, it being true that I now am; or that two and three added together should make either more or less than five; or similar things which I see clearly cannot be in another fashion than I conceive them.

And, indeed, inasmuch as I have no reason for believing that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet considered the reasons which prove that there is a God, the grounds for doubting which depend only on this opinion, are very trivial, and, so to speak, metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to remove this opinion, I ought to examine whether there is a God since the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is one, I ought also to examine whether he can be a deceiver: for without the knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything. And in order that I may have the opportunity of examining this without interrupting the line of meditation which I have laid out, which is to pass by degrees from the notions which I shall find foremost in my mind to those which I may thereafter find, I must here divide all my thoughts into certain classes, and consider in which of these classes there is properly truth or error.

Among my thoughts, some are like the images of things, and it is to these alone that the name *idea* properly belongs: as when I represent to myself a man or a chimera, or the sky,

or an angel, or God himself. The others, have, in addition, some other forms : as when I wish, fear, affirm or deny, I then, it is true, conceive something as the subject of my mind's action, but I also add some other thing by this action to the idea I had of the thing ; and of this class of thoughts, some are called volitions or affections, and the others judgments.

Now, as far as ideas are concerned, if we consider them only in themselves and not as derived from something else, they cannot, properly speaking, be false ; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than it is that I imagine the other. Nor need we be afraid of meeting falsity in the affections or volitions ; for although I can desire evil things, or even things which never were, still it is not on that account less true that I desire them. There thus remain only the judgments, in which I ought to guard carefully against being deceived. But the chief and most common error which can be here met with, consists in judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to things which are without me : for certainly if I considered ideas only as certain modes or fashions of my thought, without wishing to derive them from any other external thing, they could scarcely cause me to err.

Now among these ideas, some seem to me to have been born with me, others to be foreign and to come from without, and others to be made and invented by myself. For as I have the faculty of conceiving what is generally called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, it seems to me that I possess that not otherwise than of my own nature ; but if I now hear any sound, if I see the sun, if I feel heat, up to this time I have judged that these feelings proceeded from certain things which existed outside of me, and, in short, it seems to me that the sirens, the hippogriffs, and all other similar chimeras, are fictions and inventions of my mind. But perhaps I can also persuade myself that all these ideas are of the class of those which I call foreign and which come from without, or else that they were all born with me, or that they have all been begotten by me : for I have not yet clearly discovered their true origin. And what I have chiefly to do in this place is to consider, concerning those which seem to me to come from certain objects outside of me, what are the reasons which compel me to believe them similar to these objects.

The first of these reasons is that it seems to me to be taught me by nature ; and, second, that I have an inward consciousness that these ideas do not depend on my will : for they often present themselves in spite of me, as at this moment, whether I will or not, I feel heat, and I am thereby persuaded that this feeling or rather this idea of heat is produced in me by a thing different from me, namely, by the heat of the fire by which I am seated. And I see nothing which appears to me more reasonable than to judge that this foreign thing emits and impresses upon me its resemblance rather than anything else.

Now it is necessary for me to see whether these reasons are sufficiently strong and convincing. When I say it seems to me that that is taught me by nature, I understand by the word *nature* only a certain inclination which induces me to believe it, not a natural light which makes known to me that it is true. But these two forms of expression differ widely from each other : for I cannot call in question anything that this natural light reveals to me as true, as, for example, it just now revealed to me that, from the fact that I doubted, I could conclude that I was : the rather that I have not in me any other faculty or power to distinguish the true from the false, which could teach me that what this light shows me as true is not, and on which I could so much rely. But as regards the inclinations which also seem to me to be natural, I have often remarked, when it has been a question of making choice between virtues and vices, that they have not carried me less to the evil than to the good ; and therefore I have not occasion to follow them any more as regards the true and the false. And for the other reason, that these ideas should come otherwise since they do not depend on my will, I do not find it more convincing. For in the same way that those inclinations of which I have just now spoken are found in me, notwithstanding that they do not always agree with my will, so perhaps there may be in me some faculty or power fit to produce those ideas without the aid of anything external, although it be not yet known to me ; as in fact it has always till now seemed to me that when I sleep, those ideas are thus formed in me without the aid of the objects which they represent. And, in short, although I might agree that they are caused by these objects, it is not a necessary consequence that they should be similar to these objects. On the contrary, I have often re-

marked in many instances that there was a great difference between the object and its idea: as, for example, I find in me two altogether diverse ideas of the sun; the one derives its origin from the senses, and should be placed in the class of those which I have already said come from without, by which it appears to me extremely small; the other is derived from astronomical reasons, that is to say, from certain notions born with me; or, finally, it is formed by myself in some way or another, by which it appears to me many times larger than the whole earth. Indeed, those two ideas which I conceive of the sun cannot both be similar to the same sun; and reason compels me to believe that the one which comes immediately from its appearance, is the one which is most dissimilar to it. All this makes me sufficiently recognize the fact that till this hour it has not been by a certain and premeditated judgment, but only by a blind and rash impulse, that I believed that there were things outside of me, and different from my being, which, by the organs of my senses, or by some other means, whatever they were, conveyed into me their ideas or images, and there imprinted their resemblance.

But still another way presents itself of investigating whether, among the things of which I have in me the ideas, there are any which exist outside of me, namely: if these ideas are taken in so far only as they are certain modes of thinking, I do not recognize any difference or inequality among them, and all seem to me to proceed from myself in the same fashion; but considering them as images, of which some represent one thing and the others another, it is evident that they are very different from one another. For, in fact, those which represent to me substances are without doubt something besides, and contain in themselves, so to speak, more of objective reality, that is to say, participate by representation in more degrees of being or perfection than those which represent to me only modes or accidents. Besides, that idea by which I conceive a God, sovereign, eternal, infinite, unchangeable, all-knowing, all-powerful, and universal Creator of all the things which are outside of himself; that, I say, has certainly in itself more objective reality than those by which finite substances are represented to me.

Now it is a thing manifest by the natural light that there should be at least as much reality in the efficient and total

cause as in its effect: for whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? and how can this cause communicate it, if it has it not in itself? And thence it follows, not only that nothing cannot produce anything, but also that what is more perfect, that is, which contains in itself more reality, cannot be a consequence of and depend upon the less perfect; and this truth is not only clear and evident in the effects which have that reality which philosophers call actual or formal,* but also in the ideas in which are considered only the reality which they call objective: for example, the stone which has not yet been, not only cannot now begin to be if it is not produced by something possessing in itself formally and eminently all that enters into the composition of the stone, that is, containing in itself the very things, or others more excellent, which are in the stone; and heat cannot be produced in a subject which was before devoid of it, except by something of an order, of a degree, or of a kind, at least, as perfect as heat; and so of other things. But again, besides this, the idea of heat, or of the stone, cannot be in me, unless put there by some cause which contains in itself at least as much reality as I conceive in the heat or in the stone; for although this cause does not transmit into my idea anything of its actual or formal reality, we ought not therefore to imagine that this cause should be less real; but we should learn that every idea being a work of the mind, its nature is such that it does not demand of itself any other formal reality than that which it receives and borrows from the thought or the mind, of which it is only a mode, that is, a manner or fashion of thinking. But, in order that an idea should contain one such objective reality rather than another, it must unquestionably derive this from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as that idea contains of objective reality; for if we suppose that there is in an idea anything that is not in its cause, it necessarily follows that that is derived from nothingness. But however im-

* The following passage from Royer Collard's *Œuvres de Reid*, illustrative of the sense in which Descartes uses the words *formel*, *éminent*, and *objectif*, is given in *Fleming's Vocabul. of Phil. (sub voc. Virtual)*:—"A letter of credit does not in *reality* contain the sum which it represents: that sum is only *really* in the coffer of the banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain sense, since it holds its place. This sum is still in another sense contained; it is *virtually* in the credit of the banker who subscribes the letter. To express these differences in the language of Descartes, the sum is contained *formally* in the coffer of the banker; *objectively*, in the letter which he subscribed; *eminently*, in the credit which enabled him to subscribe; and thus the coffer contains the reality *formal* of the sum, the letter the reality *objective*, and the credit of the banker the reality *éminent*."

perfect this mode of being may be by which a thing is objectively or by representation in the understanding by its idea, still one cannot say that this mode and manner of being is nothing, or consequently that this idea derives its origin from nothing. And I ought not, therefore, to imagine that because the reality which I consider in my ideas is only objective, it is not necessary that the same reality should be formally or actually in the causes of those ideas, but that it is enough that it should be also objectively in them: for, just as this manner of being objectively belongs to the ideas by their own nature, even so the manner or fashion of being formally belongs to the causes of those ideas (at least to the first and principal) by their own nature. And although it may happen that one idea gives birth to another, yet that cannot go on infinitely; but it must at last reach a primary idea, whose cause is, as it were, a pattern or original in which all the reality or perfection is contained formally and actually which occurs only objectively or representatively in those ideas. Hence the natural light makes evidently known to me that ideas are in me like pictures or images which can in truth easily fall from the perfection of the things from which they were drawn, but which can never contain anything greater or more perfect.

And the longer and the more carefully I examine all these things, the more clearly and distinctly I know them to be true. But, after all, what conclusion shall I draw from all this? This, namely, that if the objective reality or perfection of any one of my ideas is such that I know clearly that this same reality or perfection is not in me, either formally or eminently, and that, consequently, I cannot myself be the cause of it, it necessarily follows that I am not alone in the world, but that there is something else which exists and which is the cause of this idea; whereas if there does not occur in me any such idea, I shall have no arguments sufficient to convince me and to render me certain of the existence of anything but myself; for I have carefully investigated them all, and I have not succeeded in finding another up to this time.

Now, among all those ideas within me, besides that which represents me to myself, as to which there cannot here be any difficulty, there is another which represents to me a God; others, things corporeal and inanimate; others, angels; others,

animals, and others, finally, which represent to me men like myself. But as regards the ideas which represent to me other men, or animals, or angels, I easily conceive that they might be formed by the mixture and composition of other ideas which I have of things corporeal and of God, although outside of me there should be no other men in the world, neither any animals, nor any angels. And as regards the ideas of things corporeal, I do not recognize in them anything so great or excellent, that might not, as it seems to me, come from myself; for if I consider them more closely and examine them in the same fashion in which I yesterday examined the idea of the wax, I find that there occur but very few things which I conceive clearly and distinctly—namely, magnitude, or rather extension in length, breadth, and depth, the figure which results from the termination of this extension, the situation which variously shaped bodies maintain among themselves, and the movement or change of this situation, to which may be added substance, duration, and number. As to the other things, such as light, colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, cold, and the other qualities which fall under touch, they occur in my thought with so much obscurity and confusion, that I do not even know whether they are true or false; that is to say, whether the ideas which I conceive of those qualities are indeed the ideas of certain real things, or rather whether they represent to me only chimerical entities which can have no existence. For, although I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that true and formal falsity can occur, there may nevertheless be found in ideas a certain material falsity, namely, when they represent what is nothing as if it were something. For example, the ideas which I have of cold and of heat are so vague and indistinct, that they cannot teach me whether cold is only a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold; or whether or not they are both real qualities: and inasmuch as, ideas being like images, there cannot be any of them which does not seem to us to represent something; if it is proper to say that cold is nothing but a privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive will not inappropriately be called false, and so with others. But, truth to say, it is not necessary that I should attribute to them any other author than myself: for if they are false, that is, if they represent things which are not, the natural

light reveals to me that they proceed from nothing—that is, that they are in me only because there is something wanting in my nature and because it is not wholly perfect; and if these ideas are true, nevertheless, because they disclose to me so little reality that I can not even distinguish the thing represented from non-being, I do not see wherefore I might not be their author.

As for the clear and distinct ideas which I have of corporeal things, there are some which seem to me might have been derived from the idea which I have of myself, like those which I have of substance, of duration, of number, and of other similar things. For when I think that stone is a substance, or rather a thing which of itself is capable of existing, and that I myself am also a substance, although I indeed conceive that I am a thing that thinks and is not extended, and that the stone is, on the contrary, a thing extended and which does not think; and that there is thus between these two conceptions a notable difference: yet they seem to agree in this point, that they both represent substances. Similarly, when I think that I now am, and remember besides that I formerly was, and that I conceive many diverse thoughts whose number I know, then I acquire in me the ideas of duration and number, which thereafter I can transfer to all other things as I wish. As regards the other qualities of which the ideas of corporeal things are composed, namely, extension, shape, situation and motion, it is true they are not formally in me, since I am only a thing that thinks; but because these are only certain modes of substance, and I myself am a substance, it seems to me that they might be contained in me eminently.

Wherefore there remains only the idea of God, as to which it is necessary to consider whether there is anything in it which could come from myself. By the term “God,” I understand a substance infinite, eternal, immovable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which myself and all other things that are (if it be true that there are any that exist) were created and produced. But these prerogatives are so great and exalted, that the more attentively I consider them the less am I persuaded that the idea I have of them can derive its origin from myself alone. And, consequently, the necessary conclusion from all that I have before said is that God exists: for although the idea of substance is in me from

the very fact that I am a substance, I, who am a finite being, should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, if it had not been put within me by some really infinite substance.

And I ought not to imagine that I do not conceive the infinite by a real idea, but only by the negation of what is finite, just as I comprehend rest and darkness by the negation of motion and light; since, on the contrary, I see manifestly that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and consequently that I have in some fashion within me the notion of the infinite rather than of the finite, that is, of God rather than of myself; for how is it possible that I can know that I doubt and that I desire, that is, that something is wanting to me, and that I am not altogether perfect, if I had not in me any idea of a being more perfect than my own, by the comparison with which I may know the defects of my nature?

And it cannot be said that perhaps this idea of God is materially false, and consequently that I could derive it from nothing; that is, that it might be in me by reason of my defect, as I have just said of the ideas of heat and cold and other like things; for, on the contrary, this idea being very clear and distinct, and containing in itself more objective reality than any other, there is nothing which of itself is more true, or which can be less suspected of error and falsity.

This idea, I say, of a Being sovereignly perfect and infinite is very true; for although, perhaps, one might pretend that such a Being does not exist, it can not however be pretended that the idea of him does not represent something real, as I have just said of the idea of cold. It is also very clear and distinct, since all that my mind conceives clearly and distinctly as real and true, and which contains in itself any perfection, is entirely contained and included in this idea. And this remains none the less true because I do not comprehend the infinite, and there are in God an infinitude of things which I cannot comprehend, or perhaps even reach by any stretch of the mind; for it is of the nature of the infinite that I, who am finite and limited, cannot comprehend it; and it is enough that I understand this, and judge that all the things which I conceive clearly, and in which I know there is some perfection, and perhaps also an infinitude of others of which I am ignorant, are in God formally or eminently, in order that the idea

which I have of them may be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct of all those that are in my mind.

But it may also be that I am something more than I imagine, and that all the perfections I attribute to the nature of a God are in some fashion potentially in me, although they are not yet brought forth and are not made apparent by their actions. Indeed, I already experience that by degrees my knowledge is increasing and being perfected; and I see nothing which could prevent its being thus more and more increased to infinity; or why, being thus increased and perfected, I should not be able to acquire in this way all the other perfections of the divine nature; or, finally, why the power which I have for the acquisition of these perfections, if it be true that this power is now in me, should not be sufficient to produce the ideas of them. However, regarding the matter a little more closely, I discover that this cannot be; for, in the first place, although it were true that my knowledge every day acquires new degrees of perfection, and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not actually there, yet all these advantages do not belong to or approach in any sort the idea I have of the Divinity, in which there is nothing that is only potential, but everything is there actually and in reality. And indeed is it not an infallible and very certain argument for the imperfection of my knowledge, that it grows gradually and increases by degrees? Moreover, although my knowledge should grow from more to more, yet I ought not therefore to conceive that it could be actually infinite, since it would never reach a point of perfection so high that it would not be still capable of acquiring a much larger increase. But I conceive God actually infinite in so high a degree, that nothing can be added to the sovereign perfection which he possesses. And finally, I comprehend clearly that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being which exists only potentially; which, properly speaking, is nothing, but only by a formal or actual being.

And, truly, I see nothing in what I have just said which, to all who will consider it carefully, is not very easy to be known by the natural light; but when I relax my attention somewhat, my mind, finding itself darkened and almost blinded by the images of sensible things, does not easily recall the reason why the idea I have of a being more perfect than my own

must necessarily have been put within me by a being really more perfect. I, therefore, wish to go further, and consider if I, who have this idea of God, could exist in case there were no God. And I ask, from whom shall I have my existence? Perhaps from myself, or from my parents, or else from some other cause less perfect than God: for nothing more perfect can be imagined, or even equal to him. But, if I were independent of every other, and were myself the author of my being, I should not doubt anything. I should conceive no desires, and, in short, no perfection would be wanting to me; for I should have given myself all those of which I have in me any idea, and thus I should be God. And I ought not to imagine that the things which are wanting to me are perhaps more difficult to acquire than those of which I am already in possession; for, on the contrary, it is very certain that it was much more difficult for me, a thing or substance that thinks, to have sprung from nothing, than it would be for me to acquire the insight into and cognizance of many things which I do not know, and which are only accidents of that substance; and certainly if I had given myself these further attributes which I have just mentioned, that is, if I were the author of my own being, I should not at least have denied myself the things which could be had with most facility, as are an infinitude of cognitions of which my nature feels destitute: I should not even have denied myself any of the things which I see contained in the idea of God, because there are none which seem to me more difficult to get or acquire; and if there were any one of these more difficult, it would certainly appear to me such (supposing I had with me all the other things I possess), because I should therein see in that my power limited. And although I might suppose that perhaps I have always been as I now am, I could not thereby evade the force of this reasoning, or fail to recognize that God is necessarily the author of my existence. For my whole lifetime might be divided into an infinitude of parts, each of which depends in no way on the others; and thus from the fact that a little while ago I was, it does not follow that I ought to be now, unless at this moment some cause produces me and creates me, so to speak, anew—that is, preserves me. Indeed, it is very clear and evident to all who will consider attentively the nature of time, that a substance, in order to be preserved each moment of its dura-

tion, requires the same power and the same action which would be necessary to create it anew if it did not yet exist; so that it is a thing which the natural light makes clearly apparent that preservation and creation are different only as regards our mode of thinking, and not in reality. It is only therefore necessary, in this place, that I should interrogate myself and consult with myself in order that I may see whether I have in me any power and any virtue by means of which I can bring it about that I, who now am, may a moment after still be; for since I am only a thing that thinks (or, at least, since there has not been up to this time any rigorous question except as to that part of me); if such a power really resided in me, I ought at the very least to think it, and to have cognizance of it; but I feel nothing of it in me, and therefore I know manifestly that I depend on some being different from myself.

But perhaps this being on whom I depend is not God, and I may have been produced either by my parents, or by some other cause less perfect than he. Far from it—that cannot be; for, as I have already said, it is very evident that there should be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and consequently, since I am a thing that thinks and that has in itself some idea of God, whatever may be the cause of my being, it must be admitted that this cause is also a thing that thinks and that it was in itself the idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God. Then we may investigate anew whether this cause derives its origin and existence from itself or from anything. For if it derives its origin from itself, it follows from the reasons I have before advanced, that this cause is God; since, having the virtue of being and of existing by itself, it must unquestionably have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has in itself the ideas, that is to say, all those that I conceive to be in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, it will be asked once more, for the same reason, as to this second cause, whether it exists of itself or is from another cause, until step by step we arrive at length at a final cause, which will be found to be God. And it is very manifest that in this there cannot be progress to the infinite, since the question here is not so much as to the cause which before produced me as to that which now preserves me.

Further, it must not be imagined that perhaps several causes

have concurred, each in part, in my production, and that from one I have received the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God, and from another the idea of another, in such a manner that all those perfections are to be found truly enough somewhere in the universe, but are not to be found all joined and assembled in one, who is God; for, on the contrary, the unity, the simplicity, or the inseparability of all the things which are in God is one of the principal perfections that I conceive to be in him: and indeed the idea of this unity of all the perfections of God could not have been put in me by any cause from which I had not also received the ideas of all the other perfections; for it could not have made me comprehend them all joined together and inseparable, without at the same time giving me to understand what they were, and to know them all in some fashion.

Finally, as regards my parents, from whom it seems I derived my birth: although all that I have been able to believe concerning them were true, it would not however follow that it is they who preserve me, or even that they have made and produced me, in so far as I am a thing that thinks, there being no relation between the corporeal action by which, as I have been accustomed to believe, they engendered me, and the production of such a substance; but what at most they have contributed to my birth is that they have put certain dispositions into this matter in which I have judged until now that I, that is, my mind, which alone I now take to be myself, is enclosed; and therefore, there is here, in this respect, no difficulty; but I must conclude that, from the mere fact that I exist, and that the idea of a Being sovereignly perfect, that is to say, of God, is in me, the existence of God is very evidently demonstrated.

It only remains for me to examine in what way I have acquired this idea: for I have not received it by the senses, and it is never presented to me unexpectedly, as is generally the case with the ideas of sensible things when these things are presented or seem to be presented to the external organs of sense; neither is it a pure production or fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to diminish it or to add anything to it; and consequently nothing remains to be said but that this idea was born and produced in me from the time of my creation, as was the idea of myself. And truly it need not be

deemed a strange thing that God, in creating me, should have put within me this idea as the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and it is not necessary that this mark should be something different from the work itself; but from the single fact that God created me, it is very credible that he produced me, in some fashion, in his own image and likeness, and that I conceive this resemblance, in which the idea of God is found contained, by the same faculty by which I conceive myself; that is to say, that, when I reflect on myself, I not only know that I am a thing imperfect, incomplete and dependent on others, that tends and aspires incessantly to something better and greater than I am; but I know also at the same time, that he on whom I depend possesses in himself all the great things to which I aspire, and of which I find in me the ideas, not indefinitely and only potentially, but that he enjoys them in reality, actually and infinitely, and therefore that he is God. And the whole force of the argument which I have here used to prove the existence of God consists in this, that I recognize that it would be impossible for my nature to be such as it is, that is, for me to have in me the idea of a God, if God did not actually exist; this same God, I say, of whom the idea is in me, that is to say, who possesses all those high perfections of which our minds can have but a faint idea, without however having the power of comprehending them — who is not subject to any defects, and who has none of those things which denote imperfection: whence it is evident enough that he cannot be a deceiver, since the natural light teaches us that deception necessarily arises from some defect.

But, before examining this more carefully, and passing to the consideration of other truths which may be collected, it seems to me appropriate to stop some time for the contemplation of this all-perfect God, to ponder at leisure his marvellous attributes; to consider, to admire, and to adore, the incomparable beauty of this immense light, so far at least as the strength of my mind, that remains in some sort dazzled by it, will permit me. For as faith teaches us that the sovereign felicity of the other life consists only in this contemplation of the divine majesty, so let us henceforth experience that a like meditation, though incomparably less perfect, makes us enjoy the greatest delight which we are capable of experiencing in this life.

GÖTHE'S SOCIAL ROMANCES.

Translated from the German of KARL ROSENKRANZ by THOS. DAVIDSON.

THE JOURNEYMANSHIP.

In the *Elective Affinities*, everything warns us to give good heed to the smallest, as well as to the greatest matters in the domain of Ethics. A look, a pressure of the hand, a word, a kiss, a sigh, a yea, a nay, a remaining or going—everything, in short, is shown to be fraught with incalculable possible consequences. Everything warns us to give implicit obedience to reason, freedom, God, unless we are willing by fastidious, eudemonic irrationality to involve ourselves in a fate, and weave the fatalistic net, which shall at last completely and hopelessly entangle us. Altogether different is the *Journeyman-ship*. It conducts us into the labyrinthine, wide, wide world, and lays bare to us the treasures which it conceals, to enable us to rise above our fate. Here we see things the most distant come together, things in closest proximity part asunder, a way open out of the most desperate positions, and the power which the spirit has of maintaining itself in contradiction, work its unfathomable miracles. The *Journeyman-ship*, as Göthe himself has remarked, is not all of one piece, but is certainly all of one purpose. It has neither the progressive gradation of the *Apprenticeship*, nor the novel-like, rounded plan of the *Elective Affinities*. It is a real epic, unfolding before us the infinity of historic *Becoming*: making incident grow out of incident, and event cross event, breaking off the thread, taking it up again, bringing persons together with persons, and still combining into internal union the whole of this medley, through the higher intention which is ever directed to the conquest over Fate. No wonder if the author, in view of the superabundance of the multifarious, pressing matter which he has to handle, makes himself out as merely the editor of papers committed to his charge. "Editor" here means nothing more than Rhapsode.

In the *Journeyman-ship* we find at once two distinct masses. The one is that of the novelettes, the other the pædagogical. The former contains a series of ethical collisions, e.g. *The foolish Pilgrim*, *The nut-brown Maid*, *Not too far*, *The dangerous Bet*, *Who is the Traitor?* *The Man of fifty years*, &c.

They bear, in general, the coloring of the *Elective Affinities*, only with this difference, that their termination does not fall into the tragic, but solves the collision serenely either by abnegation or travel. The pædagogical side of the romance has been designated by Goethe himself as Utopian. It has given great offence to æsthetic exquisites, by affording almost no food for their romantic cravings and habits, but rather setting them to reflect earnestly upon the most important of concerns. It is incredible how prone man is to recognize only that which he already knows. One cannot, after all, but rejoice that Goethe in his educational views departs from the ordinary grounds taken; nevertheless, it is precisely his novelty that has been taken most serious exception to. And inasmuch as he modestly presents his educational maxims and institutions simply as problems, this fact has been at once set down as a self-condemnation. But how far we have learnt in recent times to look upon works which were once decried as Utopias, as thoughtful anticipations of the future; for example, Plato's *Republic*, Campanella's *Civitas Solis*, More's *Utopia*, Morely's *Basiliade*, Mercier's *Year 2240*, and so forth! Goethe's *Journeyman'ship* has its place among Social Romances. It sets aside the formalism of diplomatic politics, which costs nations so much time and money, and tries to show how much individuals can do for the happiness and moral improvement of men, in free association based upon the principle of individuality. All religions and forms of government are to be respected. People must not assume a revolutionary attitude towards them, but rather apply their powers to positive improvements. Morality must be regarded with strictness, but without pedantry.

The foundation of the social structure he considers to be the family organization; the summit, the free world-association of operatives. Carl Grün, in the work to which we have already several times referred, asserts that Goethe, in the *Journeyman'ship*, considers the family to be a yoke of slavery which the progressive spirit must throw off. He, therefore, appeals to the old uncle who represents Americanism, and, with his peculiar humor, pictures the inconvenience of a distracted and, of course, slow family table, that inexorably collects around it always the same persons at the same hours. The uncle, for this reason, has introduced into his family the fash-

ion of dining *à la carte*. Now, is it true that this manifestly one-sided view of the family table is necessarily such as would destroy family-life? This excellent old gentleman is also anxious that the women and children may enjoy everywhere and at cheap rates the fruit of which they are so fond, and has therefore made arrangements with female carriers who bring cherries, apples, plums and pears out into the smallest valleys among the mountains. He is also greatly interested in the cultivation of turnips and cabbages, as an offset against the unhealthy use of potatoes. How practical this is has been shown of late years, since the failure of this one product has placed the subsistence of millions of human beings in a critical position—an unequivocal proof that we ought to cultivate a greater variety of fruits, and this altogether apart from the fact that man, being omnivorous, must, by absolute uniformity of food, approximate to the lower animals, which are frequently incapable of eating more than one kind of food. But now, how absurd would be the conclusion that Göthe would not have potatoes cultivated at all! And so, within the family, he desires, it is true, in all indifferent things the greatest possible amount of liberty for the individual; but upon marriage and upon the family he does insist. How carefully, in the *Journeymanship*, are the preparations for a marriage contract carried on—how plainly do even Philina and Frederick, Lucy and Montan, and so on, everywhere do homage to the principle of the family—a principle which in Macaria assumes an almost sublime personal expression! It is particularly worthy of note that Göthe has placed at the very beginning the charming story of Joseph and Mary, that exquisite family idyl which reminds us that, throughout Christendom, the family, woman, and labor, are sacred—the Redeemer of the world himself having been born of a woman, having sprung from the bosom of a carpenter's family. Even in the *Elective Affinities* Göthe takes care to give prominence to building, as that which, more than anything else, distinguishes man from the lower animals, which, at best, make themselves nests.

Education must lead to thoughtfulness. Göthe presents this under the form of the closest attention paid to time, which, according to him, is far too little valued by most men, although it is our most precious possession. Each moment comes but once. If it is not bought up, it is lost forever

Goethe, therefore, insists upon the greatest possible multiplication of chronometric instruments, in order that the value of time may ever be present before our eyes. Then we must accustom ourselves to moderation in that which is arbitrary, and assiduity in that which is necessary. But the *sine quâ non* for labor is, that we bring ourselves to perfection in some branch of knowledge, and in some faculty, so that we may venture with confidence to affirm that we understand something thoroughly. Such perfection in any one art or science is a guarantee of the possibility of arriving at perfection in other branches also. In that one we learn to understand all; it becomes to us implicitly the likeness of the rest. Without this one-sidedness we cannot arrive at many-sidedness, far less at harmony: inasmuch as without it we lack the consciousness of true solidity, of an objective faculty.

All persons are brought up through three kinds of reverence to a fourth, viz., reverence for themselves. In the first place, the infant, with its hands clasped on its breast and eyes upturned to heaven, must learn reverence for that which is above us, for the Divine, which we must ever adore as the fountain of all good. Secondly, he has to learn, with his arms crossed on his back and with down-turned eyes, reverence for that which is under us. For the earth—Nature—albeit she affords us unspeakable pleasures, is nevertheless capable, if disregarded, of involving us, in an instant, in the most poignant and enduring sufferings. From this stage, the man passes, with his arms stretched out straight sideways, to reverence for his fellow, to associate himself with his comrade; for even the bravest cannot do much alone: he must join with his companions. These three kinds of reverence at last unite in reverence for ourselves, which is after all their source. This reverence, in which we become conscious of ourselves as the highest that God, Nature and History have been able to attain in the sphere of actuality, takes all darkness from us and fills us with the purest earnestness.

Every one is reared in accordance with his individuality in the pædagogic province, which is so arranged, that every one, although isolated for his peculiar activity, can easily pass to other activities as soon as he is ripe for them. The order of Apprentice, Journeyman, and Master, is strictly observed. The arts are divided into strict and free, and the expression

“handicraft” is set aside, because it has so often been connected with an unreasonable depreciation of the useful arts. The strictest of all the arts is architecture. In sculpture, painting, and music, a mistake is to be tolerated more readily: form, color, sound, do however make an impression. But mistakes must not be built. Theatrical art is not cultivated. It presupposes a mean, snobbish public. A crowd fond of sight-seeing, trying to get rid of *ennui*. But such a crowd has no existence whatever in Goethe’s active and highly educated social world. Moreover, such an art is not without danger for the development of the character, inasmuch as it inevitably leads to the simulation of pain and pleasure. It is also particularly injurious to the other arts, which it uses to add to its own glitter, and misleads into false tendencies. Goethe compares it to a light-headed brother or sister, who wastes the property of the other brothers and sisters for the display of the moment. Should any one happen to show a decided talent for mimicry, manifesting itself at an early age in the imitation of other people, the heads of the pædagogic province would stand in connection with the directors of the theatre, and would send the pupil to them in order that, like a duck in a pond, he might devote himself to his life-waddle and life-quack. To music, on the other hand, and particularly to vocal music, he assigns a very high position, and considers it capable of exercising the happiest influence in imparting moral elevation to the emotional nature.

The Christian religion, in its general outlines, is the one supposed to prevail in this social world. At the same time there is the utmost freedom of worship, and the religious creed is accepted simply as an expression of the obligation of persons to belong to each other in life and in death. At the same time, Christianity is strongly emphasized. Jews are excluded from the social state; because, in his view, by adhering to an exclusive nationality, they do not recognize the principle of humanity. The Apostles’ Creed is declared to be the most rational of all, inasmuch as it finds, more or less, an echo in every other creed. According to Goethe, the first article is ethnical and belongs to all nations; the second, Christian, intended for those who combat with suffering, and through suffering are perfected; the third inculcates an enthusiastic communion of the saints, that is, of those who are supremely good and

wise. The three divine persons, in whose likeness and name such convictions and promises are uttered, are therefore with propriety considered as the highest unit. Göthe develops the concept of religion in analogy with the system of the three kinds of reverence. The religion which worships the divine above us, he calls the *ethnic*, and includes within it not only what are usually termed the Pagan religions, but also the Jewish religion. In opposition to these natural, child-like religions, he places the philosophic religion, which teaches men how to equalize themselves with the Universe, to seize everything foreign as if it were themselves, and which draws the higher down to them, and the lower up to them. According to Göthe, Christ in his life was a true philosopher, inasmuch as he annihilated the common by miracles, and by parables brought the uncommon more within the reach of ordinary minds. By his death as a criminal, he became the Founder of the third religion—the Religion of Pain, which teaches us to embrace in the arms of love that which is under us—the low, the despised, the repulsive, the hostile, yea, even in sin and ignominy to behold not obstacles but advantages to our higher life. The only way, however, for man into this depth of pain is through the preparatory stages of those other religions. It is a piece of impudence, worthy of all reprobation, to profane the image of the Holy One in the act of dying out of love for love, by exposing it everywhere to vulgar gaze. In the temple of the pædagogic province, it is concealed in the shrine as the Holiest of Holies, rarely accessible, and only to the assembled congregation. Round it there runs a gallery with *symphronistic* companion pictures taken from the ethnic religions, and representing the development of the same event in each; for example, the sacrifice of Iphigenia by Agamemnon, and of Isaac by Abraham. The true and *absolute* religion is the union of these three—the worship of the Higher, conciliation with the world, and the consecration of evil, pain, and sin. It is devotion, reason, and self-conquest, in living unity. Worship, as we have seen, is left entirely free. We find, however, a peculiar Sunday-celebration. As the termination of the week, it is made to afford every person an opportunity of turning over an entirely new leaf, and of beginning a fresh week with gladness. In cases of doubt with regard to justice or public economy, direct recourse is to be had to the

heads of the community. Economical questions have a deeper hold upon the moral life than might be at first supposed. Moral aberrations of a more delicate nature may be discussed by each individual with the person in whom he has most confidence. Only, every one must be made to consider it his duty to enter upon each new week with a cool, collected mind, a reinvigorated will, and an unburdened heart. The dull conscience must be excited, the excited conscience calmed down by force of reason.

All goods are to be considered as *possession* and *common property*. These two words are posted up and present themselves most frequently to the eye, in order forcibly to remind every one that he must have as if he had not; that he must consider all other persons as sharers in his property, and deal with his private property as if he were merely its manager. Goethe does not wish to see inequality of possession and enjoyment annihilated by any revolution like communism, but would have it removed by a change of feeling working from within outwards, and by a new mode of regarding the nature of property, viz., as possession and common property. With such a view, and with the Sunday's property-confession, which puts everything to rights in the practical life, it is taken for granted that there will be no lawsuits, and hence that a judicial bench will be unnecessary. Justice is maintained by the clearness of the practical reason, working itself out with unabating originality, from its abundant source. All difference in regard to the interpretation of the letter of the law disappears. On the other hand, great weight is laid upon an effective police-system, whose duty it is to remove all troublesome things and persons. It is backed up by the regulation that every one who has reached the years of discretion shall have the right at once to rebuke wrong, impropriety, and wickedness. The power of reprimanding and punishing, however, is to be invested in the Elders. Three police directors are to be on duty in every district, and to be changed every eight hours. Where they are unable to perform their duty successfully, where the complication is too great, they have the right to call for a jury immediately to decide the case. The sale of spirituous liquors, which leads to so much strife and misery, is to be prohibited. Circulating libraries, likewise, which deprive reading (which is so powerful an agent in education) of

its value, and offer so much of a premium for mediocre and common literature, are not permitted. Finally, there is no standing army, that being the source of such a host of immoralities, and being obliged, in times of peace, to occupy itself solely with vain and disgusting display on the parade; on the contrary, all must learn to fence, shoot, march, and manœuvre. Lothario is quite at home in this, and, in particular, exercises a kind of field-mancœuvre.

There are no bells or drums. All signals are given by means of wind-instruments. A capital will probably be formed in this social world; indeed, one can see the point at which it might arise, but every effort will be made to retard, as long as possible, an institution which is so prejudicial to individuality. In this Göthe agrees entirely with modern socialism, which is strongly opposed to cities being too large or too small, the former on account of their corruption, the latter on account of their old-foginess.

Those persons who are temporarily compelled to abnegation or to travel, not as a consequence of moral collisions, may connect themselves with the universal league, which manages everything connected with emigration (which must be distinguished from travel)—a point on which Odoardo's speech expatiates with the utmost perspicuity. Emigration is considered unavoidable, when the competition between machinery and hand-labor brings about a dangerous crisis, and exhibits the difference between movable and landed property in the most glaring light. Of those who, sooner or later, will from increase of pressure have to make up their minds to emigrate, Göthe takes particular notice of the weavers and spinners. They are treated of in Leonardo's diary, where the business of weaving in its fullest extent, and the circumspect activity of Susanna, the *zālē zai āγathē*, are handled in charming detail. Those who cannot find Herrnhuth or America everywhere in themselves, who find America only in America, sing to us:

Keep not standing fixed and rooted,
Briskly venture, briskly roam!
Head and hand, where'er thou foot it,
And stout heart are still at home;
In each land the sun does visit,
We are gay whate'er betide,
To give space for wandering is it
That the world was made so wide!*

* Carlyle's translation.

PHILOSOPHEMES.

I. Philosophy is the search for a distinction which will hold. Before its analysis, all other determinations fall away, one after another, as secondary and dependent, leaving only the distinction of individuality, which is THOUGHT OR SELF-DISTINCTION. The distinction *of the self from the self* is the distinction of self-determination, and is therefore independent and ultimate because it is a whole in itself.

II. Certainty should be discriminated from Truth. * We are immediately certain of sensuous things, and likewise of the Ego—but not of the Truth. The problem of the science called “Phenomenology of Spirit” is to pass from certainty to Truth. What I am certain of is the Immediate, but the True is the *Absolute Mediation*.

III. The introduction of Time into a Cosmogony destroys it. Thus the “Development Theory” is a running down with no winding up. The crudest misapprehension of a system of Pure Science is that which looks upon the final, concrete categories as chronologically later in realization than the abstract ones at the beginning. Such misapprehension always arrives at Pantheism, and sets up an abstract Universal in place of a concrete one.

IV. Dogmatic *vs.* Speculative Philosophy. Ask, What is essence, active or rigid? If the former, the system is *speculative*; if the latter, *dogmatic*.

V. Bravery is the ascent of the individual into the generic, so that the particular self is ignored. The possibility of suicide rests on the same basis. Hence it is a proof of immortality; for that the individual can consciously rise into the *genus* implies that there can be no death to it, since death occurs only when the individual cannot endure subsumption under the universal.

VI. The Negative, traced out, arrives at the negation of negation as the total. *Proof*: The Negative is in opposition or relation—it is the *negative of somewhat*; hence the somewhat is also in opposition (or negative) to somewhat else (the Negative of it); hence the Negative was, in the first place, only the Negative of the Negative; *q. e. d.* This thought is that of the Universal or Totality.

VII. Not the Particular, but the Universal (or Generic) exists. *Proof:* The Particular is always in transition; its being is a relation to what is beyond it; hence it (the Particular) is a part of a totality which transcends and includes it. Hence its exhaustive concept (*Begriff* or Comprehension), its Ideal, is that which includes itself and its other-being, and this is the Universal and the Constant under the Variable.

VIII. Why must one begin with the Abstract in a system of Philosophy? Because, in seeking the clear and simple, he must first rid himself of the given content in his mind; i. e. the opinions and prejudices and ready-made thoughts derived from external sources. He must first find himself before he can philosophize; and he does this by divesting himself of the alien contents of his thought, and seizing his own negative activity in the form of a universal abstraction.

IX. Identity and Difference of Being and Thought. In imagination or fancy, or impure thinking in general, thought seizes only one side of the totality. But Pure Thinking takes the whole, and seizes the part as part. Thus, in the former thinking the thought is inadequate to being, while in the latter the two are commensurate and identical.

X. The object of Philosophy is to clear the mind of spectacles and abstractions. If metaphysics deals only with abstractions, then metaphysics is only a partial (though necessary) phase of Philosophy, and as such should be surmounted as expeditiously as possible. Such abstract metaphysical categories (as Philosophy should enable one to get rid of) are *matter, force, atoms, simple substances, &c.*

XI. Part-ness or Partiality is the disease, and the cure is the DIALECTIC, which restores the wholeness or universality. The Dialectic is the soul of the whole, revealing itself in the part.

XII. Experience is a process of correcting partial impressions, and hence it is an *a posteriori* dialectic. We transcend the Particular continually, and ascend to larger and larger syntheses in our search for the totality of conditions.

XIII. The Correlationists have lost their senses. They announce as supreme truth the utter negation of all the data derived from sensation. The abstract force which abides in the transition of one force to another is not a particular, real force, nor is any particular force identical with any object of the senses. The objects of the senses are transitory phases

of particular forces, and these particular forces are vanishing forms of the one abiding abstract force. All trace of sensuous content is lost in passing to this idea of abstract force.

OUTLINES OF
THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS, MORALS, AND RELIGION.

Translated from the "Philosophische Propädeutik" of G. W. F. HEGEL.

Part First.

SCIENCE OF RIGHTS.

§ 1. The Right or Just must be considered (1) in its essence; (2) in its actual existence in political society.

CHAPTER I.

The Right (or Just).

§ 2. According to the principle of Rights [or abstract Justice] the universal Will should have full sway without regard to what may be the motive or conviction of the individual. Rights, or Justice, have application to man, only in so far as he is a free being in general.

Note by Translator.—"Das Recht," translated "Rights," is to be taken not so much in a moral as in a legal sense, and hence more nearly signifies "the Just." I have sometimes used the word "Right" in the singular number in this translation, but it must always be understood to refer to legal Right.

§ 3. Right [Justice] consists in this: that each individual be treated and respected by the others as a free being; for only under this condition can the free Will have itself as object and content, in another.

Explanatory.—The freedom of the individual lies at the basis of rights, and the Right consists in this: that I treat others as free beings. Reason demands a just treatment of others. Essentially, every man is a free being. Men differ from each other in their special conditions and peculiarities, but this difference does not concern the abstract will as such. In the abstract will all are identical, and when one man re-

spects another, he respects himself. It follows that the violation of the rights of one individual is the violation of the rights of all. This participation with others is quite a different thing from the sympathy which one feels at the sight of another's misfortunes. For although (1) the injury or privation which a man suffers in gifts of fortune (which gifts though desirable are not essential) concerns me, yet I cannot say that it absolutely ought not to have happened; (2) such conditions (of fortune) belong to the particularity of man. In all interest and sympathy we separate the misfortunes from ourselves, (not identifying them with our own essential interests,) and look upon them as something foreign [another's affair]. On the contrary, at the infringement of another's rights, each one feels himself attacked, because Right is something universal. Hence a violation of rights cannot be looked upon as anything foreign [*alienum*]. We ourselves feel such an infringement all the more when it is directed toward another, for the principle of rights is a necessary one.

§ 4. In so far as each man is recognized and acknowledged as a free being, he is a PERSON. The principle of rights is therefore to be expressed thus: *Each should be treated by the other as a person.*

Explanatory.—The Idea (Comprehension) of personality includes in itself the selfhood or individuality which is free or universal. Man has, through his spiritual nature, personality.

§ 5. It follows, hence, that no man can justly be compelled except for the purpose of annulling the constraint which he has placed upon others.

Explanatory.—There are limitations of freedom, and laws which consent that men shall be treated not as persons but as chattels; e.g. the laws which permit slavery. These are, however, opposed to Reason or Absolute Right.

§ 6. That act which limits the freedom of another, or does not acknowledge him as a free will and give him free sway as such, is unjust.

Explanatory.—In an absolute sense, no constraint is possible against man, for the reason that he is essentially free, and can assert his will against necessity, and give up all that belongs to his particular existence. External constraint takes place when some condition is connected with the external

existence of man in such a way, that, if he would realize the latter, he must submit to the former. Since man's external existence is dependent upon external objects, on that side he is liable to foreign interference. Man is externally constrained only when he wills something which involves another; it depends upon his will whether he will have one and with it the other, or neither of them. The external constraint, of course, depends upon his will—in how far he places himself under it. Hence the external constraint is only *relative*. It is a *legal* constraint when it is exercised for the purpose of enforcing justice against the individual. This species of constraint has a side according to which it is not a constraint, and does not contradict the dignity of a free being, for the reason that the will in and for itself is also the absolute will of each individual. Freedom is found, not where the arbitrary will or caprice of the individual, but where *law*, prevails.

§ 7. *Permitted*, but not for this reason *commanded*, is the legal aspect of all actions that do not limit the freedom of another, or annul another's act.

Explanatory.—The legal Right contains properly only prohibitions and no commandments; what is not expressly forbidden is allowed. Of course, legal prohibitions can be expressed as positive commands, as for instance: "Thou shalt keep thy contracts." The general legal principle, of which all others are only special applications, reads thus: "Thou shalt leave undisturbed the property of another." This does not require anything positive to be done—no change in circumstances to be produced—but requires only the abstaining from the violation of the right of property. Therefore, whenever the legal principles are expressed positively, a form of expression is used which always contains at bottom a mere prohibition.

§ 8. The will whenever it subsumes a thing under itself, makes it its own. Ownership or possession is the condition of a thing as subsumed under the will.

Explanatory.—To the subsumption of a somewhat, there belong two parts, one universal, and the other individual. I subsume something individual when I add to it a general determination. This subsumption occurs in the act of judgment. In the judgment, that which subsumes is the predicate, and

that which is subsumed, the subject. The act of taking possession is the expression of the judgment that a thing becomes *mine*. My will is here that which subsumes. I give to the thing the predicate to be "mine." The will is the subsuming activity for all external things, for the reason that it [the will] is in itself the universal Essence. All things, however, which are not self-related are only necessitated things and not free. This fact gives man the right to take possession of all external things, and to make of them something different from what they are. It deals with them only in conformity with their essence [i.e. the will finds the things determined from without—necessitated—and it treats them accordingly. It determines them externally itself].

Note by Translator.—"The will is the subsuming activity for all external things for the reason that it is in itself the universal Essence." The form of all Being considered as a totality is that of self-determination. Hence any externally determined somewhat must be a mere dependent element of such self-determined totality; in other words, "all external things" are "subsumed" under a self-determined, i.e. under a Will. Hence follows the next paragraph, § 9: One will cannot invade the province of another. Each is a totality, and legally must not attempt to reduce the other to a mere dependent element.

§ 9. (1) The thing which one takes possession of for the first time must be *res nullius*, i.e. not already subsumed under another will.

Explanatory.—A thing which already belongs to another cannot be taken possession of by me [i.e. by right of *original acquisition*], not for the reason that it is not a chattel, but because it is *his* chattel. For were I to take possession of the chattel, I should then annul its predicate to be *his*, and thereby negate his *will*. The will is absolute, and I may not treat it negatively [i.e. annul it].

§ 10. (2) Property must be openly taken possession of—i.e. it must be made known to others that I will to subsume this object under my will, be it through corporeal occupancy or through transformation [or improvement], or at least through setting a mark on the object.

Explanatory.—The external occupancy must be preceded by the internal act of the will which expresses that the thing is mine. The act of original acquisition is that of corporeal occupancy. It has this defect, that the objects thus seized must be so constituted that I can take possession of them with

the hand, or cover them with the body, and furthermore that they are not of long duration. The second, more perfect, mode is that of improvement—that I give shape to a thing, e. g. build upon a lot, make gold into a cup. In this case the *form* is mine, and immediately united to the object in such a way as to serve as a mark or token that the material even belongs to me. To the improvement [title by “accession”] belongs, among other things, also planting of trees, taming and feeding of animals. An imperfect form of property in land is the use of a territory without its cultivation: e. g. when nomadic peoples use a province for pasturage; hunters for hunting grounds; fishermen, for their purposes, the coast of a sea or river. Such a possession is still superficial, because the actual use is only a temporary one, not a permanent form of possession closely attached to the object. The act of taking possession through the mere marking an object is imperfect. That mark which does not (like the marks created by improvements) constitute the essential part of the thing, is a mere external affair; what meaning it has is more or less foreign to the purpose. Moreover, its meaning is peculiar to itself, and this meaning disconnects it from that of the thing of which it is the mark. The mark is thus arbitrary. It is more or less a matter of convenience what the mark of a thing shall be.

§ 11. A possession becomes *property* (or a *legal* possession) when it is acknowledged by all others that the thing which I have made mine is mine, just as I acknowledge the property of others as theirs. My possession is *acknowledged* for the reason that it is an act of the free will, which is something absolute in itself, and contains universality in the sense, namely, that I regard the activity of another’s will as something absolute.

Explanatory.—Possession and property are two different determinations. It is not necessary that possession and property be always connected. It is possible for me to have property without having possession of it. When, for example, I lend something to another, the property still remains mine though I part with the possession of it. Possession and property involve the idea that I have “*dominium*” [i. e. control or dominion] over something. *Property* is the legal side of the

"*dominium*" [or mastery], and possession is the mere external side—that something is in my power. The legal right is that side of my absolute free will which has declared something to be its own. This will must be acknowledged by others for the reason that it is in and for itself, and in so far as the already adduced conditions have been observed. Property has, therefore, an internal and an external side. The latter for itself is the taking possession; the former, the act of the will, which must be acknowledged as such. It seems accidental or arbitrary that the acknowledgment of others should be added to the fact of taking possession. This is necessary however, for it lies in the nature of the thing. Acknowledgment has not the ground of reciprocity in it. I do not acknowledge your rights for the reason that you acknowledge mine, nor *vice versa*, but the ground of this reciprocal acknowledgment is the nature of the thing itself. I acknowledge the will of others because the nature of the thing demands my acknowledgment [i. e. recognition and assent].

§ 12. I can *dispose of* [i. e. by sale or gift—"alienate"] my property, and thus it may become the property of another through an act of my free will.

Explanatory.—My powers and abilities are my property in the most peculiar sense, but they have also an external side. Abstractly, they are external in so far as I [the Ego] can distinguish them from myself, the simple Ego. Besides this, however, powers and abilities are by nature limited and individual, such as do not constitute my essence. My essence—the in itself Universal—is distinct from these special determinations. Moreover, they are external in their *use*. In the act of using my power, I reduce it to an external form, and the product is some external Being or other. Power, as such, does not lie in the use thereof; but it preserves itself notwithstanding it is externalized, and this, its externalization, has made it a separate existence. This externalization of power is in so far an externality as it is a limited and finite somewhat. In so far as something is my property, I have connected it with my will; but this connection is no absolute affair. For were it so, my will must essentially enter the chattel. But I have in this case only specialized my will, and can, for the reason that it is free, again cancel this specialization.

§ 13. Those possessions are inalienable which are not so much property as they are constituent elements of my innermost personality or essence; such, for example, as the freedom of the will, ethical laws, religion, &c.

Explanatory.—Only those possessions are alienable which are of an external character. Personality, for example, cannot be viewed as external to me, for in so far as a man has given up his personality he has reduced himself to a chattel. But such an alienating would be null and void. One for instance, would alienate his ethical principles were he to bind himself to another to perform all manner of acts—crimes as well as indifferent acts. But such a bond would have no binding force because it alienates the freedom of the will; and in the latter, each one must stand for himself—[i. e. each man who commits a deed is directly responsible for it, and cannot escape its consequences by alleging the commands of another whom he serves under contract]. Right or wrong deeds belong to the one who commits them; and, for the reason that they possess a moral character, I cannot alienate them. Religion, too, cannot be alienated. If a church, or an individual, leaves it for a third party to determine what shall constitute its faith, such a bond of obligation would exist as could be cancelled at will by either party. No wrong at least could be done to the party with whom the agreement had been made, for the reason that he never could own as property any such privilege as that specified.

§ 14. On the other hand, I *can* alienate the definite, specified *use* of my mental and bodily energies as well as the chattels which I may possess.

Explanatory.—One can alienate only a *limited* use of his powers, for the reason that this use, or the circumscribed effect, is distinct from the power itself. But the *constant* use, or the effect in its entire extent, cannot be separated from the power itself. The power is the *Internal*, or *General*, as opposed to its utterance [realization]. The utterances [or realizations—effects] are particular existences limited in Time and Space. The power in itself is not exhausted in such an individual existence [as one of its effects], and is, moreover, not confined in scope to one of its contingent effects. But, secondly, the power must act a *little* [externalize] itself, otherwise

it were no power. Thirdly, the entire extent of its effects constitutes the power itself, for the entire extent of its externalization is again the General [Generic], which is the power itself; on this account man cannot alienate the entire use of his powers; he would in so doing alienate his personality.

§ 15. To an act of alienating property to another belongs, first, *my consent* to resign the property to him, and, secondly, *his consent* to take it. This twofold consent, in so far as it is reciprocally declared and expressed as valid, is called CONTRACT (*pactum*).

Explanatory.—Contract is a special mode by which one becomes the owner of property which has already belonged to another. The mode, already explained, of coming into possession was that of “original acquisition”—the acquiring of a thing that was “*res nullius*.” (1) The simplest form of contract is the gift-contract; in this, only one of the parties gives and one receives, no equivalent being returned. A valid gift is a contract for the reason that the wills of both parties must act in the premises: the one must will to resign the property to the other without receiving an equivalent therefor, and the other must will to receive the property on those conditions. (2) The exchange-contract, Barter [*Tauschvertrag*], consists in this: I resign something to another under the condition that he gives me an equivalent therefor. To this belongs the twofold consent on the part of each—to give something to, and to receive something from, the other. (3) Bargain and sale is a particular species of exchange—that of goods for money. Money is the universal form of goods; hence, as abstract value, it cannot be itself used for the purpose of satisfying a particular want [i.e. one cannot eat or drink it, &c.] It is only the *general means* by which to obtain special means of gratifying want. The use of money is only a mediated one [only useful in getting something else]. A material is not in and for itself money—i.e. money because it possesses such and such qualities; but it becomes money only by general agreement [conventional usage]. (4) *Tenure* consists in this, that I grant to any one my possession, or the use of my property, while I reserve the ownership to myself. There are two cases: it may happen that the one to whom I have leased something is bound to return the same identical thing; or

that I have reserved a right to property identical in kind and amount, or of equal value.

§ 16. The declaration of will contained in the contract is not sufficient to complete the transfer of my property or labor to another; the transfer is effected by delivery, in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Explanatory.—My promise in the contract contains the acknowledgment on my part that I have parted with the title to the property, and that the other party has acquired title to the same. The piece of property becomes immediately the property of another through the contract in so far as it had its ground in my will. But if I do not also place the other party in possession in accordance with the contract, to that extent I despoil him of his property. I am bound by the contract to give possession also. (Treat here of acquisition by testament.)

§ 17. An encroachment [trespass] upon the sphere of my freedom by another may occur (1) through his having my property in his possession *as his own*, i. e. through his claiming it on the ground that he has the right to it, and acknowledging at the same time that if I, instead of himself, had the right to it, he would surrender it to me. In this he respects right as such, and only asserts that in this instance it is on his side. (2) The trespass may occur through an act wherein the actor ignores my will as such, and consequently violates right as right.

Explanatory.—The ideas which we have been considering contain the *nature* of Rights, its *laws*, and its *necessity*. But Rights are not “necessary” in the sense that necessity is used when speaking of physical nature, e. g. the necessity which holds the sun in its place. A flower must grow in conformity to its own nature. If it, e. g., does not complete its growth, it must be from the intervention of some external influence. Mind, on the contrary, by reason of its freedom, can act against laws, and hence against the Right itself. A distinction must here be made between (1) the universal Right, right *as right*, (2) particular right as it relates to the rights of an individual person or thing. The universal right is that through which everybody, independent of his or her property, is a legal person. A trespass against rights may take

the shape of a mere refusal to concede to an individual some particular right, or some particular piece of property. In this case, the universal right is not violated. One stands in relation to his opponent as a legal person. Such a "judgment" can be regarded as a merely negative one wherein the particular is denied in the predicate, as, e.g., when I assert, "This stone is not green," I negate merely the predicate of greenness, but not thereby all predicates. In the second case of trespass against the rights of others, I assert not only that a particular thing is not the property of another, but I deny also that he is a person possessing rights at all. I do not treat him as a person. I do not lay claim to something on the ground that I have a right to it, or believe that I have; I violate the right *as* right. Such a predication belongs to the species of judgments called "infinite." The infinite judgment negates by its predicate not only the particular but also the general; e.g. This stove is not a whale," or "The stove is not memory." For the reason that not only the Particular but also the General is denied in the predicate, nothing remains of the subject. Such judgments are therefore absurd, though correct in form. So likewise the violation of rights *as* rights is something possible and indeed frequently happens, but it is absurd and self-contradictory. The cases of the first kind belong to the CIVIL CODE, those of the second to the CRIMINAL (PENAL) CODE.

Note by Translator.—The reader unacquainted with the Third Part of Hegel's Logic will find this allusion to the forms of "judgments" at this place quite unexpected. On page 344 *et seq.* of vol. iii. of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, I have attempted an outline of the dialectic by which Hegel proves that the "adequate form of True Being" is the "Comprehension," i.e. a self-determined totality. It (True Being) is a process of subsumption of itself under itself. An expression of each of the different degrees of perfection in this subsumption is found in the series of forms of Judgments and Syllogisms. The perfectly adequate subsumption is called the Idea (*Idee*). The Idea should be a complete reflection of itself (God and Creation, or God and Nature), or, what is the same, a complete *subsumption* of itself—a totality as subject and totality as predicate—which can only happen in case subject and predicate are identical, subject and object the same. Those forms of judgments or syllogisms in which the form (subject in the former and major premise in the latter) does not agree with its content (predicate and minor premise) are imperfect and correspond to things that perish. A changeable somewhat, e.g., is a somewhat whose potentiality (ideal totality or "Universal") is more extensive than its realized shape (particularity), and hence its potentiality continually gets realized at the expense of whatever actual shape the somewhat may have at the time; in short, its particu-

larity is subsumed under its universality and perishes, its content is not adequate to its form and therefore it changes.

Let me apply these remarks to the passage in the text:

Judgments of inherence are *positive*, *negative*, and *infinite*, and neither subject nor predicate is taken as a totality. Hence a twofold inadequacy arises, which is partially corrected (*a*) by the negative judgment in which the individual is said to be *not* merely a universal and not merely a particular: the *rose* has other qualities besides "red," and *red* belongs to other objects besides "rose"; (*b*) by the infinite judgment in which the individual is said to be *not* any particular determinateness whatever: "the rose is not a whale" not only denies the relation of the given subject to the given predicate, but it does not even imply any relation. When we say "the rose is not red," we imply that it has color nevertheless; when we say that "it is not a whale," we do not imply any determinateness.

The distinction between negative and infinite judgments, therefore, finds illustration in the sphere of Rights in the discrimination between the civil and criminal code. To the civil code belong those cases wherein an appeal is made to the validity of the law, or general right against a particular right: not this particular one is right, but some other one is right. The trespass is claimed on each side as committed by the opposite party. Each party acknowledges the right as such and bases himself on it. Hence such cases have the form of the negative judgment inasmuch as they recognize the relation between the subject and predicate—individual and right—and only negate the particular: "the piece of property is not his but mine." To the criminal code belong those cases wherein no appeal is made to the universal right as valid against a particular right, but where all right is set at defiance. In the form of a judgment it denies all relation of subject and predicate. Crime denies all subsumption and hence contradicts the fundamental form of spirit. Crime consists in acts which if made universal would immediately contradict themselves. Kant's rule, "Do only such deeds as would not prove self-contradictory if made universal," is founded on this idea. When an act cannot bear subsumption under itself as a rule, it has the form of an infinite judgment and is a crime. Theft, for example, as a particular act, would not be productive of any gain whatever to the individual if everybody were to steal, for in that case the thief would lose his property as fast as he stole it, and the direct result would be the utter annihilation of every species of ownership. Thus by theft the realization of the will of man is rendered impossible, and man reduced from a free to a necessary being. There would be no property to steal. Hence an act of theft implies a denial of all universal right, and hence denies itself directly. (See pp. 354-56, vol. iii. Jour. Spec. Phil.)

§ 18. In the first case [civil code], the mere explication of the legal grounds is all that is necessary to show to whom the contested particular right belongs. But for the decision of the case between the two conflicting parties a third party is necessary, one who is free from all interest in the matter, except to see pure justice done.

Explanatory.—Under the first case come, therefore, civil controversies. In these the rights of another are called in question, but on principles of justice. The two contending parties agree in this, that they recognize the validity of right

as right. The possession is to be given only to that one who is right, and not to the one who has influence, power, or merit of his own. The parties differ only in regard to the subsumption of the particular or of the general. It follows hence that no personal retribution is sought against the judge by a party who is not satisfied with the decision, or by the judge against the party whom he pronounces to be in the wrong. For the reason that no trespass is here made against the personality, it follows that the party who has trespassed in an illegal manner upon the property of the other is not punished.

§ 19. The second case [criminal code], on the other hand, concerns the violation of external personal freedom, of life and limb, or of property, by force.

Explanatory.—First, there is the unjust robbery of my freedom through duress or slavery. It is the deprivation of the natural, external freedom, the liberty to go where one will, &c. Moreover, there belongs here the violation of life and limb. This is much more significant than the taking of property. Although life and limb are something external, like property, yet my personality suffers by this violation because I have my immediate feeling of self in my body.

§ 20. The constraint which is effected through such an act must not only be annulled, i. e. the internal nugatoriness of such an act be exhibited negatively, but there must be a positive restitution made. (The form of rationality must be made valid against it, the universality or equality restored.) Since, namely, the actor is a rational being, his deed ought to be of a universal character. “If thou despoilest another, thou despoilest thyself! Slayest thou anybody? then thou slayest all and thyself. The act is a law which thou settest up, and in thy deed thou hast recognized its validity.” The actor must be subjected to the same form of treatment that he has given an example of, and in so far the equality that he has violated be again restored: *jus talionis*.

Explanatory.—Restitution implies the rational nature of the wrong-doer; it consists in this, that the unjust act must be reconverted into justice. The wrong deed is an individual irrational act. For the reason that it is carried into effect by a rational being, it is according to form (though not according to content) a universal and rational deed. Furthermore, it is

to be considered as a principle or law. But as such it is valid only for the one who committed it, because he recognized it by his act, while other men do not. He himself (the actor) thus belongs essentially under this principle or law, and it must be carried out upon him. The injustice which he has done should be visited upon him, because through this second act, which he has recognized, a restoration of equality is made: this is merely *formal* right.

§ 21. The retribution, however, ought not to be measured out by the injured one, or by his party, because with them the general features of justice are obscured by the passions of the moment. The act of retribution must be administered by a third party, who merely makes valid and accomplishes the universal right. In so far it is PUNISHMENT.

Explanatory.—Revenge and punishment are to be distinguished from each other through this: Revenge is administered by the injured party; punishment by the judge. Retribution must be administered as punishment, because, in the case of revenge, passion has an influence and the right is dimmed through it. Moreover, revenge has not the form of Right, but of caprice, since the injured party always acts under the impulse of feeling or of subjective motives. On this account, justice administered as revenge constitutes a new offence, and is felt to be only an individual deed, and perpetually provokes reaction without prospect of reconciliation.

CHAPTER II.

Political Society.

§ 22. The idea of Right, as the power which holds sway independent of the motives of the individual, has its actualization only in POLITICAL SOCIETY.

§ 23. The family is the *natural* society whose members are united through love, trust, and natural obedience (*pietas*).

Explanatory.—The family is a *natural* society, first, because one does not belong to the family through his free act, but through nature; and secondly, because the relations and the behavior of the members of a family toward each other do not rest upon reflection and deliberate choice, but upon feeling and impulse. The relations are necessary and rational,

but there is lacking the form of conscious deliberation. It is more akin to instinct. The love of the family circle rests upon the fact that each Ego constitutes a unity with the other Egos. They do not regard each other as independent individuals. The family is an organic whole. The parts are, properly speaking, not parts, but members which have their substance only in the whole, and which lack independence when separated from the whole. The confidence which the different members of the family repose in each other consists in this, that each one has no interest to seek for himself apart from the rest, but only the common interest of the whole. The natural obedience within the family rests upon the circumstance that in this whole only one Will dwells—that, namely, of the head of the family. In so far the family constitutes only one person.

§ 24. The state is human society under legal relations, in which all are persons; it does not rest on particular natural relations which arise from natural inclinations and feelings. This personality is asserted by and through each. If a family has expanded into a nation, and the state and nation [people] coincide, this is a great good fortune.

Explanatory.—A people is combined through language, manners and customs, and culture. This connection, however, is not enough to form a state. Besides these, the morality, religion, prosperity and wealth of its citizens are very important things for the state. It must care for the promotion of these circumstances; but even they do not constitute for it the immediate object of its existence. It is to secure the actualization of Rights that the state exists.

§ 25. The natural condition is the condition of barbarism, of violence and injustice. Man must issue forth from such a condition into that of political society, because in the latter alone the legal relation can have actuality.

Explanatory.—The state of nature is frequently painted as the perfect state of man both as to happiness and ethical development. In the first place, it is to be remarked that innocence as such has no moral value in so far as it consists in mere unconsciousness of evil, and rests upon the absence of those needs and wants which are necessary as the condition for the existence of evil. Secondly, this state of nature is

rather one of violence and injustice, for the precise reason that men act toward each other in this state according to their natures. But in this they are unequal both in regard to bodily power and in mental endowments, and they make these differences felt, one against the other, through brute violence and cunning. Although reason exists in the state of nature, it is there subordinate to nature. Man must, therefore, pass over from this state to one in which the rational will has sway.

§ 26. LAW is the abstract expression of the universal Will that exists in and for itself.

Explanatory.—Law is the universal Will as accordant with Reason. It is not necessary in this that each individual have found this will in himself or be conscious thereof. Moreover, it is not necessary that each individual has declared his will and a general result been collected. In actual history it has not happened that each individual citizen of a people has proposed a law, and then that all have agreed to it by a common vote. Law contains the necessity of the legal relation of justice, one toward another. The law-givers have not given arbitrary prescriptions. They have prescribed, not the product of their particular likes and dislikes, but what they have recognized through their deep-seeing minds as the truth and essence of what is just and right.

§ 27. Government is the individuality of the in-and-for-itself-existing Will. It is the power to make the laws, and to administer or execute them.

Explanatory.—The state has laws. These are the Will in its general abstract being, which is as such inactive; as principles and maxims express or contain at first only the general function of the will and not an actual will. To these generalities government is the only active and actualizing will. Law has indeed an existence as manners and customs, but government is the conscious power of unconscious custom.

§ 28. The general power of the state contains sundry particular powers subsumed under it: (1) the *legislative* as such; (2) the *administrative* and *financial*—the power of creating the means for the actualization of its freedom; (3) the (independent) *judiciary* and *police* [constabulary]; (4) the *military*, and the power to *declare war* and *make peace*.

Explanatory.—The form of the constitution is determined

principally by the question whether these particular powers are exercised directly by the central government; moreover, whether several of them are united in one authority, or are separated: e.g. whether the prince or regent himself administers the laws, or whether peculiar, special courts are established for this purpose; moreover, whether the regency exercises also the ecclesiastical power, &c. It is also an important distinction to note whether in a constitution the highest central power of the government has the financial power in its hands without restriction, so that it can levy taxes and expend them quite arbitrarily; moreover, whether several authorities are combined in one, e.g. whether the judicial and military power are united in one office. The form of a constitution is furthermore essentially determined through the circumstance whether or not all citizens, in so far as they are citizens, have a part in the government. Such a constitution as permits this general participation is called a Democracy. The degenerated form of a democracy is called an Ochlocracy, or the rule of the multitude, when, namely, that part of the people who have no property, and are not disposed to deal justly, obtain mastery over the law-abiding citizens by violence. Only in case of simple, uncorrupted ethical principles, and in states of small territorial extent, can a democracy exist and flourish. Aristocracy is the constitution in which only certain privileged families have the exclusive right to rule. The degenerated form thereof is an *oligarchy*, when, namely, the number of families who belong to the governing class is small. Such a condition of affairs is dangerous, because in an oligarchy all particular powers are immediately carried out by a council [i.e. the same power that legislates also administrates]. Monarchy is the constitution in which the government is in the hands of an individual and remains hereditary in his family. In a hereditary monarchy civil wars and controversies vanish—such as are liable to happen in case of an election when a change of the occupants of the throne takes place—because the ambition of powerful individuals cannot in that case lead them to aspire to the throne. Moreover, the entire power of the government is not vested immediately in the monarch, but a portion of it is vested in the special ministers (bureaus) or also in the states which in the name of the king, under his su-

pervision and direction, exercise the power entrusted to them according to laws. In a monarchy civil freedom is protected to a greater degree than under other forms. The degenerated form of a monarchy is a despotism, wherein, namely, the ruler exercises the government according to his arbitrary caprice. It is essential in a monarchy that the government have a check upon the private interests of the individual, and have power to repress them; but, on the other hand, the citizen must be protected by law in his rights. A despotic government has absolute power, but its defect consists in the fact that the rights of the citizen are sacrificed to it. The despot has the power to use the forces of his realm arbitrarily; herein lies the danger. The form of government of a people is not an indifferent, external affair. A people cannot have one form just as well as another. It depends essentially on the character, manners and customs, degree of culture, occupation of the people, and the territorial extent.

Note by Translator.—'To a citizen of the United States the idea of limiting a Democracy to a "small territorial extent" will seem absurd, unless he reflects that since Hegel's time the railroad and telegraphic systems, made effective through the daily newspaper, have nearly obliterated the significance of such separation of peoples as large empires imply. There is as close communication kept up now between California and Massachusetts, or Missouri and England, as between people living on opposite sides of Attica in the time of Pericles. What is lost in personal contact is made up in the superior quality of the relation—it being filtered through an ideal medium and thereby universalized. Thus in our time the means are actively used to produce a spiritual homogeneity of all peoples, and this, too, with an accelerating rate of progress.

§ 29. The citizens as individuals are subordinate to the power of the state and must obey the same. The content and object of the political power is the actualization of the natural or absolute rights of the citizens. These rights are not any of them renounced or given up to the state, but are rather attained in their full enjoyment and fruition by its means alone.

§ 30. The constitution of the state is the internal political law that fixes the relation of the particular powers not only to the central administration—their highest unity—but to each other, as well as the relation of the citizen to them.

§ 31. The external political law [law of nations] concerns the relation of independent peoples to each other through their governments, and rests principally upon special treaties (*jus gentium*).

Explanatory.—States are found rather in a natural than in a legal relation toward each other. There is, therefore, a continual state of strife between them until they conclude treaties with and thereby enter into a legal relation toward each other. On the other hand, however, they are quite absolute, and independent of each other. The law is, therefore, not in actual force between them. They can, therefore, break treaties in an arbitrary manner, and on this account there always remains a certain degree of distrust between them. As natural beings they stand in relation to each other as external forces, and, in order to maintain their rights, must, if needs be, wage war for the purpose.

Part Second.

SCIENCE OF DUTIES, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

§ 32. Whatever can be demanded on the ground of Rights is a civil OBLIGATION [*Schuldigkeit*]; but, in so far as moral grounds are to be observed, is a DUTY [*Pflicht*].

Explanatory.—The word “duty” [*Pflicht*] is used chiefly of legal relations. The legal duties are defined as “perfect” and the moral duties as “imperfect,” because the former *must* be done and have an external necessity, while the latter depend on a subjective will. But one might with good reason invert this classification inasmuch as the legal duty as such demands only an external necessity, in which the disposition is not taken into account, or in which even a bad motive may have impelled. On the contrary, to a moral disposition both are demanded: the right deed as regards its content, and likewise according to form the subjective side—the good intention.

§ 33. Rights (legal) in general leave the disposition out of consideration. Morality, on the other hand, is concerned directly with the intention, and demands that the deed should be done out of simple regard for duty. So, too, the legally right conduct is moral in so far as its moving principle is the regard for the right.

§ 34. The disposition is the subjective side of the moral deed, or the form of the same. There is in it as yet no content present, but the content is as essential as the actual performance.

Explanatory.—With legally right conduct the moral should be essentially connected. It may, however, be the case that with a legally right conduct there is no sentiment of Right present; nay, more, that an immoral intent may accompany it. The legally right deed is, in so far as it is done out of regard for the law, at the same time moral. The right action, and together with it the moral intent, must be accomplished before there is room for the moral action in which there is no legal command (or legal obligation). Men are very ready to act from a merely moral ground, e. g. to give away with an air of generosity, rather than pay their honest debts; for in a generous deed they congratulate themselves on account of a special perfection, while, on the contrary, in the performance of just deeds they would only practise the perfect universal, which makes them equal with all.

Every actual somewhat contains two sides, the true ideal, [*Begriff*] and the reality of this ideal: e. g. the ideal of the state is the guaranty and actualization of justice. To reality, belong the special regulations of the constitution, the relation of the individual powers to each other, &c. To the actual man belong also, even on his practical side, the ideal and the reality of the ideal. To the former belongs pure personality, or abstract freedom; to the latter, the particular character of concrete Being and concrete Being itself. Although there is in this something more than is contained in the ideal, yet this must be in conformity to the ideal and determined through it. The pure ideal of the practical Being—the Ego—is the object of Rights.

Note by Translator.—I use the term “Ideal” in this paragraph as a rendering for “*Begriff*.” “Concept,” “notion,” “idea” and “comprehension” are severally used by different translators and by myself elsewhere. Whatever term be employed, it is important to hold fast to the meaning: *Begriff* is used by Hegel to signify the totality of an object grasped together in its truth—Plato’s archetype, or logical necessity. The *Begriff* is thus the “ideal totality” the “in-and-for-itself Existent, out of which all its determinations flow.” It is the self-determination, the potential and real self of Actuality, and Actuality must possess this in order to be at all. (See *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. i. p. 236; also p. 239, “What is the true Actual?”—vol. ii. p. 176—vol. iii. p. 278, p. 348 (C.), p. 351.)

§ 35. Moral action refers to man not as an abstract person, but to him according to the universal and necessary determinations of his particular Being. The moral code is, therefore, not merely *prohibitory*—like the legal code, which only or-

dains that the freedom of another must be left inviolate—but it ordains a positive course of action towards another. The prescriptions of Morality refer to individual actuality [i. e. to concrete situations in which the individual may be placed].

§ 36. Human impulse on the side of man's particular existence, as regarded by morality, is directed towards the harmony of the external with his internal determinations—to the production of pleasure and happiness.

Explanatory.—Man has impulses (propensities), i. e. he has internal determinations in his nature, or on that side according to which he is an actual being as such. These determinations are therefore defective (imperfect) inasmuch as they are merely internal. They are impulses (propensities) in so far as they relate to the cancelling of this defect or want; i. e. they demand their realization, which is the harmony of the external and internal. This harmony is pleasure. It presupposes, therefore, reflection: a comparison between the internal and external, whether this proceeds from me or from fortune. Pleasure may spring from the most varied sources. It does not depend upon the content, but concerns only the form; in other words, it is the feeling of something merely formal, namely, of the given harmony. The doctrine which makes pleasure, or rather happiness, its aim, is called *Eudæmonism*. But that doctrine does not decide in what pleasure or happiness consists. Hence there is a coarse, rough Eudæmonism, and a refined one; upon this principle both good and bad actions may be justified.

§ 37. The harmony here considered is, as pleasure, a mere subjective feeling and something contingent which may attach itself to this or that impulse, and in the enjoyment of which I perform only the functions of a natural being, and seek only particular ends and aims.

Explanatory.—Pleasure is something subjective and relates to me as a particular individual. There is in it nothing of an objective, universal, intelligible nature. On this account it is no standard or rule whereby a thing is to be decided or judged. If I say that a thing pleases me, or if I appeal to my pleasure, I only express the relation of the thing to me, and thereby ignore the relation I have to others as a rational being. It is accidental according to its content, because it may attach to

this or that object; and since it does not concern the content, it is something purely formal. Moreover, according to its external being, pleasure is contingent, dependent upon circumstances. The means which I use to attain it are external and do not depend upon my will. But the thing that I have obtained through the use of means, in so far as it is to add to my pleasure, must become *for* me, depend upon me (be assimilated). But this is a contingent affair; the results of what I do, therefore, do not return to me. I have not the enjoyment of them as a necessary consequence. Pleasure thus arises from two different kinds of circumstances: first, from a condition of being which must be sought after and which depends entirely on good fortune, and secondly on a condition of being which I produce myself. Though this condition of things depends, as effect of my deed, upon my will, yet only the act as such belongs to me; hence the result does not necessarily return to me, and accordingly the enjoyment of the act is contingent. In such an act as that of Decius Mus for his native country, the effect of the same could not come back to him as enjoyment. The results cannot be made the principle of action. The results of an action are contingent for the reason that they are an externality which depends upon other circumstances, or may be annulled altogether. Pleasure is a secondary affair, merely a concomitant of an act. When substantial purposes are realized, pleasure accompanies in so far as one recognizes in his work his own subjective self. Whosoever seeks pleasure merely seeks his own self according to its accidental side. Whoever is busied with great works and interests, strives only to bring about the realization of the object itself. He directs his attention to the substantial, and does not think of himself, but forgets himself in the object. Men who perform great services and have charge of great interests, are often [absurdly] commiserated by people for having little pleasure, i.e. for living in the object and not in their own accidentality.

§ 38. Reason annuls that indeterminateness [want of character] which feels pleasure in mere objects, purifies the content of our propensities from what is subjective and contingent, and teaches how to recognize what is Universal and Essential as alone desirable, and, on the other hand, it inculcates the disposition to do worthy actions for their own sake.

Explanatory.—The intellect or reflection transcends in its activity all immediate pleasures [i. e. subordinates them to other ends], but does not, by this, change its aim or guiding principle [but still seeks happiness as the highest end]. It transcends single pleasures only in so far as to compare the impulses one with another and to prefer one over another. Since it aims not at pleasure in detail, but only on the whole, it aims at happiness. This reflection holds fast to the sphere of subjectivity and has pleasure for its end and aim, though in a larger, more comprehensive sense. Since it makes distinctions in pleasures and seeks the Agreeable on all its different sides, it refines the grossness, wildness, and merely animal element of pleasure, and softens the customs and dispositions. In so far, therefore, as the understanding busies itself with the means and needs of gratification, it facilitates its gratification, and attains the possibility of gaining higher ends. On the other hand, this refinement of pleasures weakens man, inasmuch as he dissipates his powers upon so many things and gives himself so many different objects, and these grow more and more insignificant in so far as their different sides are discriminated. Thus his power is weakened and he becomes less capable of the concentration of his mind wholly upon one object. When man makes pleasure his object he annuls with such a resolution his impulse to transcend pleasure and do something higher.

Pleasure is indefinite in regard to content for the reason that it can be found in the pursuit of all sorts of objects. Therefore the difference between pleasures is no objective one, but only a *quantitative* one. The Understanding which takes account of results only, prefers the greater to the less.

Reason, on the contrary, makes a qualitative distinction, i. e. a distinction in regard to content. It prefers the worthy object of pleasure to the unworthy one. It therefore enters upon a comparison of the natures of objects. In so far, it does not regard the Subjective as such, i. e. the pleasant feeling, but rather the Objective. It teaches, therefore, what kind of objects men should desiderate for themselves. On account of the universality of his nature, man has such an infinite variety of sources of pleasure open before him that the path to the agreeable is beset with illusions, and he may be easily

led astray through this infinite variety itself, i. e. diverted from the purpose which he ought to make it his special object to attain.

The desire for what is agreeable may harmonize with Reason, i. e. both may have the same content—Reason may legitimate the content. The form of impulse is that of a subjective feeling, or it has for its object to obtain what is pleasant for the subject. In dealing with a universal object, the object itself is the end and aim. On the other hand, the desire for pleasure is always selfish.

§ 39. Impulses and inclinations are: (1) Considered by themselves, neither good nor evil; i. e. man has them directly from nature. (2) “Good” and “bad” are moral predicates, and pertain to the will. The Good is that which corresponds to Reason. (3) But propensities and inclinations cannot be considered apart from all relation to the will; this relation is not a contingent one, and man is no indifferent, twofold being.

Explanatory.—Morality has for its object man in his particularity. This seems at first to include only a multiplicity of peculiarities, wherein men are unlike and differ from each other. Men differ from each other in what is contingent or dependent on Nature and external circumstances. In the particular, however, dwells something universal. The particularity of man consists in his relation to others. In this relation there are also essential and necessary determinations. These constitute the content of DUTY.

§ 40. (1) The first essential determination of man is his individuality [i. e. he is responsible for his acts]; (2) he belongs to a natural totality, the Family; (3) he is a member of the State; (4) he stands in relation to mankind in general. His duties, consequently, are fourfold: (1) duties to himself; (2) duties to his family; (3) duties to the state; (4) duties toward mankind in general.

I.—Duties of the Individual to himself.

§ 41. Man as individual stands in relation to himself. He has two sides—his individuality and his universal nature. His duty to himself consists partly in his duty to care for his physical preservation; partly in his duty to educate or cul-

ture himself—to elevate his being as individual into conformity with his universal nature.

Explanatory.—Man is, on the one side, a natural being. As such, he stands exposed to caprice and accident as an inconstant, subjective being. He does not distinguish the essential from the unessential. Secondly, he is a spiritual, rational being, and as such he is not by nature what he ought to be. The animal stands in no need of culture, for he is by nature what he is destined to be. He is only a natural being. But man has the task of bringing into harmony his two sides, of making his individuality conform to his rational side, and of causing the latter to become the guiding principle. For instance, it is a lack of culture to give way to anger and to act blindly from passion, because in this he takes an injury or affront for something of infinite importance, and seeks to restore the right by an injury of the transgressor without due measure. It is a lack of culture to attach oneself to an interest which does not concern him, or in which he cannot accomplish anything through his activity. For it is reasonable to engage one's powers upon such an interest as is within the scope of his activity. Moreover, if man becomes impatient under the regular course of events, and refuses to submit to the inevitable, he elevates his special interest to a higher degree of importance than his relation to mankind warrants.

§ 42. To theoretic culture belongs, moreover, variety and definiteness of knowledge, and the ability to see objects under general points of view from which critical judgments are to be formed regarding them. One should have a sense for objects in their free independence without mingling therewith a subjective interest.

Explanatory.—Variety of knowledge in and for itself belongs to culture, for the reason that man through this elevates himself above the particular knowledge of insignificant things that surround him, to a universal knowledge through which he attains to a greater share in the common stock of information valid for other men, and comes into the possession of universally interesting objects. When man goes out beyond his immediate knowledge and experience, he learns that there are better modes of behavior and of treating things than his own,

and that his own are not necessarily the only ones. He separates himself from himself, and comes to the distinction of the Essential from the Unessential. Accuracy of information relates to essential distinctions, those distinctions which appertain to objects under all circumstances. Culture implies the forming an opinion regarding relations and objects of actuality. To this it is requisite that one knows the nature and the purpose of a thing, and what relations it has to other things. These points of view are not immediately gained through sensuous intuition, but through attentive study of the thing, through reflection on its final cause and essence, and on its means of realizing the same. The uncultured man remains in the state of simple sensuous intuition; his eyes are open, but he does not see what lies at his very feet. With him it is all subjective seeing and apprehension; he does not see the essential thing; he knows only approximately the nature of things and never accurately—for it is only the knowledge of general points of view that enables one to decide what is essential, because they (general views) present the important phases of things, and contain the principal categories under which external existences are classified, and thus the work of apprehending them is rendered easier and more accurate.

The result of this want of a knowledge of general views is that one judges rashly concerning all things without understanding them. Such rash judgments are based on partial views, in which one side is seized and the other overlooked, and hence the true idea of the thing is missed. A cultured man knows at once the limits of his capacity for judgment.

Moreover, there belongs to culture the sense for the objective in its freedom. It consists in this, that I do not seek my special subjectivity in the object, but consider and treat the objects as they are in and for themselves in their free idiosyncrasy: that I interest myself in them without looking for any special use for me. Such an unselfish interest lies in the study of the sciences when one cultivates them for themselves. The desire to draw use out of objects of nature involves the destruction of those objects. The interest for the fine arts is also an unselfish one. Art exhibits things in their living independence, and leaves out the imperfect and dwarfed and

what has suffered from external circumstances. The objective treatment consists in this, that it (1) has *the form of the universal*, without caprice, whims or arbitrariness, and is freed from what is strange or peculiar, &c.; (2) that it has for its internal, essential side *the true object itself* for its end and aim, without selfish interest.

§ 43. Practical culture involves that man, in the gratification of his natural wants and impulses, shall exhibit that prudence and temperance which lie in the limits of their necessity, namely, self-preservation. He must (1) be out of and free from the Natural; (2) on the other hand, he must be absorbed in his avocation, the essential, and therefore (3) be able to confine his gratification of the natural wants not only within the limits of necessity, but also to sacrifice the same for higher duties.

Explanatory.—The freedom of man as regards natural impulses consists not in his being rid of such impulses altogether, and thus striving to escape from his nature, but in his recognizing them as a necessity and as something rational, and in realizing them accordingly through his will. He finds himself constrained only in so far as he creates for himself accidental and arbitrary impressions and purposes, in opposition to the Universal. The definite, accurate measure to be followed in the gratification of wants and in the use of physical and spiritual powers cannot be accurately given, but each must learn for himself what is useful or detrimental to him. Temperance in the gratification of natural impulses and in the use of bodily powers is as such necessary to health, and health is an essential condition for the use of mental powers in fulfilling the high vocation of man. If the body is not preserved in its ordinary condition—if it is injured in any one of its functions—then it obliges its possessor to make of it a special object of his care, and by this means it becomes something dangerous, absorbing more than its due share of the attention of the mind. Furthermore, excess in the use or disuse of the physical or mental powers is followed by dullness and debility.

Finally, temperance is closely connected with prudence. The latter consists in deliberating upon what one does, so that one in his enjoyment or labor watches himself with reflection,

and thus is not quite swallowed up in this or that individual condition, but holds himself open for the consideration of others, which may also be necessary. In *prudence* one is out of and above his condition, outside of his feelings or his business, and *within his mind*. This position, in which one is not perfectly absorbed in his condition, is a desirable one, especially toward impulses and aims which though necessary yet are not essential. On the contrary, in the case of a true object or occupation the mind must be present with all its earnestness, and not outside of it. Prudence consists in this, that one has before his eyes all sides and circumstances of his work at the same time.

§ 44. As to what concerns one's definite calling, which seems to be a sort of destiny (or fate), the form of external necessity should be removed from it. It is to be taken up with freedom, and with freedom to be pursued and carried out.

Explanatory.—Man, in regard to the external circumstances of his lot, and all that he is immediately (i. e. from Nature), must so conduct himself as to make them his own [i. e. assimilate them]; he must deprive them of the form of external existence. It makes no difference in what external condition man finds himself through good or bad fortune, provided that he is just and right in what he is and does, i. e. that he fulfils all sides of his calling. The avocation of a man, whatever his condition in life may be, is a manifold substance. It is, as it were, a material or stuff which he must elaborate in all directions until it have nothing alien, brittle and refractory in itself. In so far as he has made it perfectly his own, he is free therein. Man becomes the prey of discontent chiefly through the circumstance that he does not fulfil his calling. He enters a relation which he fails to assimilate thoroughly; at the same time he belongs to the position that he has assumed; he cannot tear himself loose from it. He lives and acts, therefore, in a repugnant relation to himself.

§ 45. To be faithful and obedient in his vocation as well as submissive to his lot and self-denying in his acts—these virtues have their ground in the giving up of vanity, self-conceit and selfishness for things that are in and for themselves necessary.

Explanatory.—The vocation is something universal and necessary, and constitutes a side of the social life of human-

ity. It is, therefore, one of the divisions of human labor. When man has a vocation, he enters into coöperation and participation with the Whole. Through this he becomes objective. The vocation is a particular, limited sphere, yet it constitutes a necessary part of the whole, and, besides this, is in itself a whole. If a man is to become something, he must know how to limit himself, i. e. make some specialty his vocation. Then his work ceases to be an irksome restraint to him. He then comes to be at unity with himself, with his externality, with his sphere. He is a Universal, a whole. Whenever a man makes something trifling (i. e. unessential or nugatory) his object, then the interest lies not in an object as such, but in it as *his* object. The trifling object is of no importance by itself, but has importance only to the person who busies himself with it. One sees in a trifling object only himself; there may be, for example, a moral trifling: when a man thinks on the excellence of his acts, and has more interest in himself than in the cause. The man who does small things faithfully shows himself capable of greater ones, because he has shown his obedience—his self-sacrifice in regard to his wishes, inclinations, and imaginations.

§ 46. Through intellectual and moral culture man attains the capacity of fulfilling duties toward another, which duties may be called *real* duties, since the duties which relate to his own culture are, in comparison, of a *formal* nature.

§ 47. In so far as the performance of duties appears as a subjective attribute of the individual, and to pertain chiefly to his natural character, it is properly called VIRTUE.

§ 48. Inasmuch as Virtue, in part, belongs to the natural character, it appears as a peculiar species of morality, and of great vitality and intensity. It is at the same time not so closely connected with the consciousness of duty as morality proper is.

II.—Duties to the Family.

§ 49. When man is developed by education he has attained capacity for practical action. In so far as he acts he is necessarily brought into relation to other men. The first necessary relation in which the individual stands to others is that of the Family. This has a legal side, but it is subordinated to the side of moral sentiment—that of love and confidence.

Explanatory.—The Family constitutes essentially only one

substance, only one person. The members of the family are not persons in their relation to each other. They enter such a relation first when by some calamity the moral bond is destroyed. Among the ancients, the sentiment of family love and action based thereon was called *pietas*. "Piety" has with us the sense of devoutness or godliness, which has in common with the ancient meaning of the word that both presuppose an absolute bond, the in-and-for-itself-existent unity in a spiritual substance, a bond which is not formed through particular caprice or accident.

§ 50. This sentiment, precisely stated, consists in this, that each member of the Family has not his essence in his own person, but that only the whole of the Family constitutes his personality.

§ 51. The union of persons of opposite sex—Marriage—is essentially a moral union of sentiment [good-will and consent] in reciprocal love and confidence, which constitutes them one person—and not merely a natural, *animal* union—nor, the other extreme, a mere civil contract.

§ 52. The duty of parents towards children is, to care for their support and education; that of the children, to obey their parents until they grow up and become independent, and to honor and respect them through life; that of brothers and sisters, to treat each other with the utmost consideration.

III.—Duties to the State.

§ 53. The natural whole which constitutes the family expands into a people or a state, in which the individuals have for themselves an independent will.

Explanatory.—The state, in one respect, is able to dispense with the good-will and consent of citizens, i.e. in so far as it must be independent of the will of the individual. It prescribes, therefore, to the individual his obligations, namely, the part which he must perform for the whole. It cannot leave him to his good-will, because he may be self-interested and oppose himself to the interest of the state. In this way the state becomes a machine, a system of external dependencies. But in another respect it cannot dispense with the good-will of its citizens. The order issued by the government can contain only what is general. The actual deed, the fulfilment of

the designs of the state, requires a special form of activity. This can come only from individual intelligence, and from the good-will and consent of men.

§ 54. The state holds society not only under legal relations, but mediated as a true, higher, moral commonwealth: the union in customs, culture, and general form of thinking and acting (since each one contemplates and recognizes in the other his universality in a spiritual manner).

§ 55. In the spirit of a people, each individual citizen has his spiritual substance. The preservation of the individual depends not only on the preservation of this living whole, but this living whole is the universal spiritual nature, or the essence of each one as opposed to his individuality. The preservation of the whole takes precedence, therefore, of the preservation of the individual, and all citizens should act on this conviction.

§ 56. Considered according to the merely legal side, in so far as the state protects the private rights of the individual and the individual looks after his own rights, there is indeed possible a sacrifice of a part of his property for the preservation of the rest. Patriotism, however, is not founded on this calculation, but on the consciousness of the absoluteness of the state. This disposition to offer up property and life for the whole is the greater in a people, the more the individuals can act for the whole with their own will and self-activity, and the greater confidence they have in the whole. (Speak here of the beautiful patriotism of the Greeks; also of the distinction between *bourgeois* and *citoyen*.)

§ 57. The disposition to obey the commands of the government, attachment to princes and the constitutional form of government, the feeling of national honor—all these are virtues of the citizen in every well-ordered state.

§ 58. The state rests not on an express contract of one with all or of all with one, or between the individual and the government; the universal will of the whole is not simply the expressed will of the individual, but is the absolute universal will, which is binding on the individual for and by itself.

IV.—Duties toward others.

§ 59. The duties towards others are, first, the legal duties

which must be connected with the disposition to do right for right's sake. The rest of these duties are founded on the disposition to regard others not merely as abstract persons, but also in their particularity as possessing equal rights, and to regard their welfare or evil fortune as one's own concern, and to manifest this feeling by active help.

§ 60. This moral mode of thinking and acting goes further than is demanded by the mere legal right. But Integrity,* the observance of the strict duties towards others, is the first duty and lies at the basis of all others. There may be noble and generous actions which lack integrity. In that case they have their ground in self-love and in the consciousness of having done something particular in its character, whereas that which integrity demands is valid for all and is no arbitrary duty.

§ 61. Among the special duties to others, the first is truthfulness in speech and action. It consists in the identity of that which is and of which one is conscious, with what he utters and shows to others. Untruthfulness is the disagreement and contradiction between what one is in his own consciousness and what he is for others, hence between his internality and his actuality, and is therefore nugatoriness in itself.

§ 62. To untruthfulness belongs, moreover, especially such action as this: when one assumes the air of having a good intention or friendly disposition toward another, and, on the contrary, does really harm to him. (This disagreement between the disposition and the actual deed, as such, would be, in any event, liable to the charge of awkwardness; but in so far as the doer is a responsible person, if he does evil, he is to be regarded as one who means evil.)

§ 63. It implies the existence of a special relation between individuals to give one of them the right to speak truthfully regarding the other's behavior. When one undertakes to do this without the right, he is himself in so far untrue, since he assumes a relation to another which has no existence.

Explanatory.—It is of the first importance to speak the truth in so far as one knows that it is the truth. It is mean not to speak the truth when it is one's duty to speak it, and one debases himself by such action, before himself and others.

* *Rechtschaffenheit.*

But one is not to say the truth when there is no occasion for speaking at all, or in cases wherein he has no right to intermeddle. Whenever one merely says the truth in order to put himself forward as an actor on the scene, and without further result, it is, to say the least, something quite out of place; for truth is not to be spoken for the sake of giving an opportunity to an individual to say it, but rather for its own sake. The word is not the deed or act—the latter is higher. The truth is said at the right place and time when it serves to bring out the thing in its true light. Speech is an astonishingly great means, but it requires still greater understanding to use it rightly.

§ 64. With CALUMNY,* which is an actual lie, malicious gossip stands in close affinity; it is the narration of such things as compromise the honor of a third party, and are not directly known to be truth by the narrator. It is usually accompanied with zealous disapproval of immoral deeds and with the distinct assurance that the narrator cannot vouch for the truth of the story, but only tells it as told him. It is a species of dishonesty that reports stories and pretends to be unwilling to circulate them, while giving circulation to them in point of fact; and the prating against immorality in such cases is a species of hypocrisy: under pretext of speaking in the interest of morality there is an actual immorality enacted.

Explanatory.—Hypocrisy consists in acting wickedly while assuming the appearance of having a good intention—a purpose of doing something good. The external deed is, however, not different from the internal one. In case of a bad deed, the intention is also essentially bad and not good. It may be the case that a man has accomplished something good, or at least not improper; but it is not permissible to make of that which is in-and-for-itself evil, a means with which to reach a good end. *The end or the intention does not sanctify the means.* Moral principle concerns chiefly the disposition or the intention. It is, however, essential that not only the intention, but also the deed, be good. Moreover, a man must not persuade himself that he has excellent and highly important purposes in the common acts of individual life. In that case, it fre-

* Verläumdung.

quently happens, that while he places good intentions under his own deeds, and seeks to make his unimportant deeds great by his reflections, on the other hand, he is apt to attribute a selfish or bad motive to the great or good deeds of others.

§ 65. The disposition to injure others, knowingly and willingly, is wicked. The disposition which permits itself to violate duties to itself and others, from weakness to resist its inclinations, is base.

Explanatory.—Good stands opposed to bad [*boese*], also to base [*schlecht*]. To be bad or wicked involves the resolution of the will; it presupposes *formally* a strength of will, which is also a condition of the good; but baseness, on the contrary, is something devoid of will. The base individual goes according to his inclinations, and neglects his duties. It would be perfectly satisfactory to him to fulfil the duties if he could do so without effort, but he has not the will to master his inclinations or habits.

§ 66. The ability to perform services for other men depends upon the contingent relations in which we happen to stand with them, and upon the special circumstances in which we are situated. When we are in a condition to assist another, we have only to consider two things—that he is a human being, and has need of help.

Explanatory.—The first condition precedent to rendering help to others consists in this: that we have a right to regard them as suffering want and to act toward them as such sufferers. Help must not be given, therefore, without their willingness to receive it. This presupposes a certain degree of acquaintance or confidence. The needy is as such not on the same footing as regards equality with those not needy. It is a matter for him to decide whether or no he will appear as one in want. He consents to this when he is convinced that I regard him as my equal, and treat him as such in spite of this inequality of condition. In the second place, I must have in hand the means with which to help him. Finally, there may happen cases wherein his want is of so evident a character as to render unnecessary an express consent on his part to receive assistance.

§ 67. The duty of the love of humanity in general includes those cases wherein we love those with whom we stand in

relations of acquaintance and friendship. The original unity of mankind must be the basis from which arise voluntarily such closer connections as involve more particular duties. (Friendship rests on likeness of character and especially of interest, engagement in a common work, rather than in liking for the person of another as such. One should cause his friends as little trouble as possible. To require no services of friends is the most delicate way. One should spare no pains to lay others under obligations to him.)

§ 68. The duty of Prudence (Policy) appears at first as a duty towards one's self in his relations to another in so far as the end is a selfish one. The true selfishness is, however, essentially attained only through moral conduct, and this, consequently, is the true prudence (policy). It is a principle of moral conduct that private gain may be a result, but must never constitute the motive.

§ 69. Inasmuch as private gain does not constitute the direct result of moral conduct, but depends rather upon the particular, accidental good will of others, here is found the sphere of mere inclination or favor; and prudence (policy) consists in this, that one does not violate the favor of others, but acts in their interest. But, in this respect, that which proves politic is really that which recommends itself for its own sake, namely: to leave others free where we have neither duty nor right to disturb them, and thus through our correct conduct to win their favor.

§ 70. Courtesy (politeness) is the mark of a well-wishing disposition; also of a readiness to do a service to others, chiefly to those to whom we stand in a nearer relation of acquaintance or friendship. It is empty when this mark is connected with the opposite disposition. True courtesy is, however, to be regarded as a duty, because we ought to have benevolent intentions towards each other in general in order to open by means of polite actions the way to a closer union. (To do a service, an act of politeness, something pleasant to a stranger, is courtesy. The same thing should, however, be done to an acquaintance or friend. Toward strangers and those with whom we stand in no nearer relation, there is the *appearance* of good-will, and this is all that is required. Refinement, delicacy, consists in doing or saying no more than

is allowed by the relation in which one stands to the parties. —Greek humanity and urbanity in the time of Socrates and Plato.)

Part Third.

SCIENCE OF RELIGION.

§ 71. The moral law within us is the eternal law of Reason, which we must respect without reserve, and by which we must feel indissolubly bound. We see, however, the immediate incommensurateness of our individuality with it, and recognize a higher than we are, as a Being independent from us, self-existent and absolute.

§ 72. This absolute Being is present in our pure consciousness and reveals Himself to us therein. The knowing of Him is, as mediated through our pure consciousness, for us immediate, and is called FAITH.

§ 73. The elevation above the sensuous and finite, constitutes in a negative form the mediation of this knowing, but only in so far as having originated from a sensuous and finite the latter is at the same time abandoned (transcended) and recognized in its nugatoriness. But this knowing of the Absolute is itself an absolute and immediate knowing, and cannot have anything finite as its positive ground, or be mediated through anything, not itself, as a proof.

§ 74. This knowing must be defined more closely, and not remain a mere internal feeling, a faith in an undefined Being in general, but become a cognition of it. The cognition of God is not above Reason, for Reason is only God's image and reflection, and is essentially a knowledge of the Absolute; but such cognition is above the understanding—the knowledge of what is finite and relative.

§ 75. Religion itself consists in the occupation (employment or exercise) of feeling and thought in forming an idea or representation of the Absolute Being; with this exercise is connected self-forgetfulness of one's particularity while in this elevation, and as a result the regulation of one's practical life in view of this relation to the absolute Essence.

§ 76. God is the Absolute Spirit, i. e. he is the pure Essence that makes himself his own object and in this contemplates

only himself, or who is in his other-being absolutely returned into himself and self-identical.

§ 77. God is according to the moments of his Being (1) *absolutely Holy*, inasmuch as he is the Being purely universal in himself. He is (2) *Absolute Power*, inasmuch as he actualizes the universal and preserves the individual in the universal—or is the *Eternal Creator of the Universe*. (3) He is *Wisdom* in so far as his power is only holy power; (4) *Goodness*, in so far as he allows to the individual his self-realization [leaves him a free-agent]; and (5) *Justice*, in so far as he eternally brings all back to the universal [i.e. “places everything under the form of Eternity, or applies to it the standard of the universal”].

§ 78. Wickedness is alienation from God in so far as the individual on the side of his freedom separates himself from the universal, and strives to become absolute for himself in opposition to the universal. In so far as it pertains to the nature of the finite free being to reflect itself in this individuality [i.e. to absorb itself in special ends and aims], this nature is to be regarded as evil.

Note by Translator.—Here is found the doctrine of original sin: The form of all finite or natural Being is that of *determination through another*; i.e. every individual in Nature, as such, is made or constituted by external conditions. Its potentiality is larger than its reality. Its whole or universal is a larger totality, including it—the individual, as a transitory phase. Hence such individuality as is found in Nature is perishable and not self-existent. But spirit is self-determined and self-existent, and thus the opposite of Nature. Hence when man “reflects himself in natural individuality” he contradicts his essence as spirit; he puts on the form of a natural individual and is determined from without, as, e.g., by the lusts of the flesh. Such immersion in natural individuality is suicidal to spiritual life. Dante has portrayed it in its different degrees in the “Inferno.”

§ 79. But the freedom of the individual being is at the same time an identity of the divine Being with Himself, or it is in itself [i.e. potentially] the divine nature. This knowledge—that human nature is not essentially alien to the divine nature—is revealed to man by DIVINE GRACE, which allows him to lay hold of this knowledge, and through it the *reconciliation* of God with the world is achieved, or man’s alienation from God disappears.

Note by Translator.—This paragraph is most important. The essence of freedom is self-determination; hence the identity of the self with itself; and this self-identity is the divine nature. Thus human freedom is a reflection (or the image)

of God, the absolute self-determined Being. The fact that the existence of man on this planet is a recent affair, proves the existence of other worlds in indefinite number, as theatres of development for rational beings. God is the creative Idea whose form is that of reflection into Himself in His creation: each highest result of His creation being a self-existent, self-determined individual who by his own will consciously realizes in his life that of his Creator. In the sphere of the Idea "return to itself" or "reflection" does not involve the *absorption* of the individual—as it does in fact in the realm of Nature. The creation is the infinitely manifold genesis of God's reflection in rational, conscious, *free* beings; it always was and always will be, and all stages of the process exist at this moment and forever.—Hence *human* nature is, in essence, divine; while external nature in time and space has the form of evil or determination from without. This knowledge of the Divine Essence, and of the essential or potential identity of human nature with it, Hegel considers the highest. This knowledge, in the language of religion, is attained through DIVINE GRACE, and by it the reconciliation of man with God (and hence of the world with God) is accomplished. (See *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. i. p. 238.)

§ 80. The service of God is the definite occupation of thought and sentiment with Him, and through this occupation the individual strives to effect his union with God and obtain the inward consciousness of this union; and this harmony of his will with the Divine will should be demonstrated by the spirit in which he acts, and by the fruits themselves of his practical life.

REMARKS BY THE TRANSLATOR.

These Outlines of the Science of Rights, Morals, and Religion were written by Hegel for his classes at the Gymnasium at Nürnberg in the year 1808, shortly after the publication of his great work on *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Written to be of service to immature minds, the style of presentation differs essentially from that adopted elsewhere in his works. A certain looseness, descending even to triviality, may occasionally be detected; and one ought to bear constantly in mind the fact, that many sentences are mere memoranda, designed to call to mind topics which were to be elaborately discussed orally.

Of the contents of this exposition, it should be said that Hegel has made a detailed treatment in several volumes:—(1) *The Philosophy of Rights*—a work of 432 pages; (2) *The Philosophy of History*—a work of 547 pages 8vo.; (3) *The Philosophy of Religion*, in two volumes, containing in all over one thousand pages, of which the last two hundred treat of the proofs of God's existence.

Perhaps no work deserves translation into English more than Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. It unfolds completely the relation of Man to the Absolute in his various degrees or stages of self-consciousness, and demonstrates completely the supremacy of the Christian Religion over all others. No dogmatic assertion on this subject has the least weight with Hegel. It is with him a matter of philosophic investigation: What are the facts before us as given in History, and what are their "necessary implications"—what do they signify in the light of thought? Philosophic or scientific thought must be perfectly free, i. e. have no presuppositions, either of dogma or fact, that shall trammel its comprehension. But both dogma and fact stand before it as problems to be solved, and must be exhibited in their universality and necessity by philosophy. Thus it happens that the work of Hegel is interesting alike to the "free-thinker," so called, as well as to the implicit believer. It is the interest of Spirit, that what is seized as dogma shall likewise be comprehended as scientific truth. It is the interest of the individual who holds to the essential through faith, that he transcend that relation and attain the independent attitude of scientific cognition. It is an indispensable thing that the individual shall at least believe the True, but the KNOWLEDGE of the True is a higher goal always to be sought after.

B E T T I N E .

By JOHN ALBEE.

Close to the steps of Nature's kings
Some herald walks to make them known;
The secret of their worth he sings
Or e'er in Fame's great trump 'tis blown.
Ever the wise know not their own;
To simple souls they first are shown.

A woman's heart is more than fate—
It holds the future in its fee;
Great Goethe's name to antedate
A maiden prophet needs must be.
Thus while we wait each other's words,
The verdict some free soul records.

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THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE.*

By FRANCIS A. HENRY.

I.

No one can doubt that metaphysical studies have fallen at the present day to a very low ebb in general regard. The current of intellectual activity sets indeed so strongly in an opposite direction that such studies have become the object of contempt and open slight on the part of leading British writers, most of whom are ready to felicitate themselves with Mr. Froude that metaphysicians are "a class of thinkers which, happily, is rapidly diminishing."† So wide-spread is the opinion of the worthlessness of Metaphysics, and so free, not to say offensive, has been the expression of such opinion not only on the part of eminent men of science, but on that of the undistinguished of their numerous followers, that it becomes interesting to inquire what are the grounds on which the opinion rests. The objections to Metaphysics appear to be mainly two, one directed against its matter and the other against its method. The objection to the subject-matter of speculative inquiry is one which springs from the great reactionary movement of modern thought against the spirit of mediævalism, which began by seeing the corruptions of the Church, and

* THE SECRET OF HEGEL, being the Hegelian system in origin, principle, form, and matter. By James Hutchison Stirling. 2 vols. Svo. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green. 1865.

† "Spinoza," *Westminster Review*, 1854—a paper whose tone of complacent self-assurance contrasts amusingly with the writer's palpable ignorance of his general subject.

has reached in our day a declared antagonism to all the great spiritual interests which alone give to human life its dignity, its value, and its meaning. This objection declares the problems proposed by Metaphysics idle and nonsensical, and the results aimed at empty and worthless.—“Speculations touching the divine attributes, the origin of evil, the foundation of moral obligation, are in a peculiar degree the delight of intelligent children and half civilized men.”—“All your Platos and Socrates’s but fill the world with long beards and long words.”* That is to say, God, Freedom, and Immortality, are puzzles for children; let us turn our back on thought, and eat and drink; civilized man is a sort of human beaver, whose proper concern is with the sensuous material world before him with a view to its direct utilization. Inquiry as to the why, whence, and whither of the universe, and our own position therein, is only unprofitable mental gymnastics and a waste of time. I cannot argue with this extreme materialism—although to show its falsehood and folly would cost less trouble than time—but must content myself with protesting against it as not less irrational than deplorable.

The second objection demands a little more consideration. It says, in effect, that although the matters in which Metaphysics is interested may be serious enough, yet the results attained by that so-called science are so pitiful, that to expect anything of value from it is quite hopeless. And that this must be so from the nature of the case: for the product of such speculation comes not from operation upon solid and tangible realities, but from merely fanciful theorizing, and individual brain-spinning as impotent as it is pretentious. As the poet has it:

“Every worm beneath the moon
Draws different threads, and late and soon
Spins, toiling out his own cocoon.”

This objection, which amounts to this, that Metaphysics cannot attain objective results because it employs a merely subjective process, hinges on this radical error, that Thought is something merely subjective—an attribute of the individual—rather than the constitutive nature of all individuals, that Uni-

* Macaulay.

versal of which you, and I, and he, are only limited particular incarnations. The objection under consideration is generally supposed to point to the superiority of Physics in respect of its claims to the title of a positive science. Here it may be sufficient to apply the *argumentum ad hominem*. Has not Physical science itself recognized that "there is no sensuous objectivity of which intellectual elements do not constitute the essence," and has not its great advance in recent times come from its proceeding upon this recognition? Physics is not satisfied with mud and stone, and tree and flower, just as they *appear* to sense; it inquires what they *are* to thought. It seeks to know the principles, forces, and laws, which govern the natural world. Now, such forces and laws are not matters of experience; the conceptions Force and Law are entirely *a priori* conceptions; they arise within the mind, and there the natural philosopher finds them and projects them upon nature, even while he preaches Phenomena as the be-all and end-all of human science, and perorates against the vanity of subjective theorizing. It is an obvious fact that the farther Physical science advances, the more purely intellectual becomes its subject-matter; and to-day when it sees to what an extent the principles of mind are the principles of matter—when it sees that there are no principles of matter other than the principles of mind—it is in no position to reproach Metaphysics with the pure intellectuality of its field as if that proved the subjectivity of all results of its industry therein. It should have learned that mind is not a *subject* merely, but the *substance* of all that is. If pure thoughts are the pure principles of all things, of what we call material as well as of what we call spiritual; if this outward world of nature exists only by virtue of, only as the representation and realization of, these inward principles, which in their organic system form the warp and woof of the universe; if this universe is as it were "a diamond net of intellect, on which matter, falling and condensing, crassifies into the concrete world of sense"—then the only difference between the naturalist and the metaphysician will be that the former is employed upon what is outward and representative, and the latter upon what is inward and essential, in the same universe; the one upon Existence or Thing, the other upon Being or Thought.

As a single instance to show that this *is* the only difference between them, and that the matter of Physics and of Metaphysics comes to be much the same, consider Darwin's Theory of the Origin of Species. This theory, as all know, asserts that the existing species of plants and animals are not primordial—that is, that all did not originate together at once such as they are now—but that, on the contrary, they are derivative—that is, that the present species have sprung from other and earlier species by a natural development in some sort akin to genealogical descent, and so have become what they now are by slow degrees through the operation of various influences. At first sight, species appear to be successions of individuals running down from the past in straight lines, which neither approach nor diverge from each other, but remain equidistant parallels. But, as the theory asserts, on more careful investigation this parallelism is seen to be only apparent, although the angle of convergence is so small that the approximation of the lines is only perceptible at an immense distance. Tracing them back far enough, however, we see many converge in a common starting-point, and others fall into certain fragments of lines which deflect slightly from the rectilinear, and these again into fainter fragments which tend in a direction still farther away from that in which we started. Hence the theory concludes to “at most three or four primitive species,” and finally to a “single primordial form,” as the ultimate origin of the manifold varieties of Flora and Fauna at present existing, from which all these have evolved themselves by successive transmutations. By means of the struggle for existence, and the victory of the strongest, Nature selects her breeders, and hence the progression from lower to higher forms of life becomes easily intelligible. But it is to be remarked that Progression, as such, is out of place in this theory, for it involves design, or an antecedent idea—a principle antagonistic to the doctrine of the Materialist, who knows only contingent phenomena, which vary according to contingent conditions. The consistent Materialist can speak only of Succession, and is Succession adequate to the facts as he himself presents them, or do not these facts proclaim progression as well? But not to concern ourselves with this inadequacy, nor with the vacillation of the theorist, who cannot make up

his mind either to hold progression or to let it go, nor with the loose fit and general haziness of the application of the theory in detail,—I remark simply that the theory fails to justify its title. It does not lead to an Origin of species, and so does not really take us anywhere. We have a reference up to a common genus, but we have not the extraction and descent from that; we have an exhibition of Succession, but we have no explanation of a Beginning. “A single germ-cell might have been thrown into space, from which all we see might have developed itself.” Indeed! and *how*? Given the single germ-cell, how does it change itself, grow, develop? whence is the transition from such primitive One to the present Many? To this question, How? the theorists give us no answer. This, nevertheless, is their notion of a *principium*—a material atom. But a real Beginning must be really a First and One, and to these requirements the primitive atom is inadequate, for it is already in space and in time, and surrounded by antecedent conditions which are necessary to its development. But, to waive these difficulties, to admit that a “primitive” atom may presuppose Time, Space, and Conditions—which one would think might simplify Cosmogony sufficiently—let us ask of what size shall this primitive atom be? This is a question to give us pause; but after all, since all size is relative, and any size indifferent to infinite space, why consider the question of size at all? why not answer at once, “Any size”? But, observe this, any size is very literally no size; quantity is not only indifferent to the atom, it is a pure nullity as regards it. On the hypothesis of the primitive atom, we cannot tell why there ever should have been any Quantity at all, nor even what such a thing as Quantity is. As far as quantity is concerned, there seems no reason why we should not go back to nothing at once. But, to make another trial, if we cannot ask, “how much?” let us ask, “of what sort” shall the atom be? It must be Something in order to distinguish itself from Space, which is vacancy. Well, *what* is it? If it is anything at all, it must have some character; what is its character? We may ask this question forever, but we shall ask it in vain. It is plain that it is impossible for anything to have definiteness, to make itself distinguishable, except by distinction from something else; but the atom is by supposition alone by itself. It can

have no character, properties, nor attributes, for all these imply relation. Quality, then, is as indifferent to the atom as Quantity, and the atom is as destitute of the one predicate as of the other. Such hypothetical atom is nothing else than pure abstraction, which is equivalent to pure negation.*

But, as I said, I refer to this Darwinian theory chiefly as it instances what I was saying, namely, that the studies of the naturalist and the metaphysician are really of the same subject-matter, only the one is employed upon the Outer, and the other upon the Inner of the universe. At bottom, the sole problem under consideration in Mr. Darwin's book concerns the metaphysics of Identity and Difference, the former of which is approached in the ascent to higher genera, and the latter in the descent to lower species; and the complacency of Science might receive a slight damper from learning that in its treatment of this problem it occupies no very new or commanding position, but as nearly as may be one which was passed by two thousand years ago, that, namely, of Democritus and Leucippus, to whose Atom and Void their Space and Germ-cell quite accurately correspond. Indeed, had the writers in question happened to consult Metaphysics they would have discovered not only that the problem they were somewhat blindly dealing with has been exhaustively treated and finally solved by that science, but that their own special line of investigation has been therein anticipated, and criticised by anticipation. The naturalist labors at a disadvantage because of his determination to look only upon the outward world in order to discover *in it* its principles and laws. Had he been willing to look within before looking without, he might have made the discovery that what is, is a Rational System, of which "Nature" is only the externalization. His mistake is to approach the problem of the universe with his categories of thought ready-formed, and to apply them without examination into their validity. He proposes to determine everything by Identity and Difference, Matter and Form, Force and Law, and the like; and yet it does not occur to him

* The theorists might object to the above that they have not intended to speak of a primitive atom, but rather of a primordial form; but a form demands a substance, and to substitute the latter for the former is only to go back to the logical *prius*, and to state their case correctly. In any case, moreover, whether the object of research be form or substance, the result is the same.

that it will be necessary first to verify these standards, to look closely into them and find out what of truth and what of error they involve. In Kant's *Transcendental Dialectic* he proves the existence of "three laws in the mind imposed by it on the objects of sense, and received by it from and with these objects, as if they (these laws) were part and parcel of these objects themselves, and not a reflection, a color, fallen on them from the faculties to which these objects presented themselves." This is what is meant by transcendental; that is transcendental which in reality is a contribution to objects from the mind, but which appears to belong to the objects themselves. The three laws in question are characterized thus: "Reason, therefore, prepares for understanding its field, I. by a principle of the Homogeneity of the Variety of individuals under higher genera; II. through a principle of the Variety of the Homogeneity of the individuals under lower species; and III.—in order to complete the systematic unity—a law of the Affinity of all notions, which law dictates a continuous transition from every single species to every other through gradual increase of diversity. We may name them the principles of the Homogeneity, of the Variety, and of the Continuity of Forms." Here, then, we have the rationale of Darwinism. Laws not in objects, but projected upon them from the mind, have been taken as belonging to such objects, and supposed capable of yielding empirical results. That is, the theorists have supposed principles to be Constitutive which are only Regulative, and that to be Objective which is only Transcendental. Thus Darwinism as matter of science is at once perfectly certain and utterly impossible. Unity of type, one grand coördinated system—this is demanded by the very constitution of Reason; but then from the very constitution of Experience this can never be found *in* Experience. We assume such an organically connected system, and in reason and truth there *is* such a system, but in nature and fact there is not; Nature has individuals, she has neither genera nor species. Did any one ever see the genus Dog, or the species Mastiff? Still less, then, can the "transmutation of species" be seen in nature; still less can the articulated system be seen in formation and growth. And yet this is just what Darwinians attempt. They seek to come upon Nature unawares, and

as it were catch her in the fact with an individual half *in* and half *out*. They want to see just where Identity ends and Difference begins. But Metaphysics could tell them that this is an idle quest, for the secret of these two is their inseparability.* Do we not see enough in all this to justify the warmth of such language as this?—"We hear much in these days of Metaphysics having crumbled down definitively into ruins—this by misapplication and perversion on the authority of Kant himself—this at the very moment that Hegel claims for himself the completion of the Kantian philosophy into an exact science—this from men more ignorant of what they speak about than any mandarin in China!"

If, then, it is as I have said—if the essence of all things is Reason, and if Nature is only the phenomenon (or showing forth) of this essence, a science of pure reason will be especially valuable, and even indispensable, to a comprehension of the universe; and it seems to me that an abstract consideration of what is contained to thought under the terms Finite and Infinite may be of service as tending to the establishment of both these propositions.

It results from the materialistic mode of thinking at present dominant that the things of time and sense are regarded as what is most certain, positive, and real. In the world of material phenomena men fancy themselves on the solid ground of fact. Here they felicitate themselves that they deal with what they can see and handle; here are unmistakable actual-

* To the anticipation of Darwinism by Kant, I may add the following by Hegel, written many years before Mr. Darwin's book:

"Nature is to be regarded as a system of grades, of which the one rises necessarily out of the other, and is the proximate truth of the one from which it results; but not so that the one were *naturally* generated out of the other, but only in the inner Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature. Metamorphosis accrues only to the Notion as such. The notion, however, is in Nature partly only inner, partly existent as living individual: to this individual alone, then, is *existent* metamorphosis confined.

"It has been an inept conception of earlier Nature-philosophy to regard the progression and transition of one natural form into a higher as an outwardly actual production, which however, to be made clearer, must be relegated into the obscurity of the past. To Nature externality is precisely proper—to let the Differences fall asunder and present themselves as neutral existences; while the dialectic Notion which guides forward the *stages* is the Inner of the same. Thought must deny itself such nebulous and sensuous conceptions as, for example, the so-called *origin* of plants and animals from water, and then the origin of the more highly developed organizations from the lower, and so on."

ities ; here are no cobwebs of the brain, no chasing of the rain-bows, no fleeing from the spectres of fancy. From this taking of the Finite to be the real and the true, it naturally follows that the Infinite, as the negative of that, becomes an unreality and an untruth. The essence of philosophy, as well as of religion, is, on the contrary, the denial of substantiality to the things of sense, and the assertion that the world of finitude exists only as a revelation, as a field of display for an Other ; and that, consequently, it has not a real but merely an ideal being. As a religious writer expresses it, "Nature is the great Sacrament—the outward visible sign of the inward divine Presence." This elevation from the facts of sense to the truths of reason is generally in the measure of a man's intellectual vitality and vigor. There are men who sleep, and rise, and eat, and plod, and idle, and sleep again, contented not to think of aught beyond the familiar routine of their little lives ; contented rather to live without thinking of their life at all, or what it really is. But thus to drift with the current of sensuous existence, while all things pass before us like the shifting sights of a show, arousing no more than the moment's interest, and taking us not out beyond ourselves—this is simply the life of the lower animals, which crop the grass, and bellow at a red rag, and are driven by a dog, and "stumble from particular to particular, as knowing no better and knowing no other." The life of the senses is that of the brutes which perish ; man's life is the life of Reason. "The Spirit is the Idealist proper." For him who thinks, and for him who truly feels—feels, that is, with the soul, and not with the senses—the things of finitude have not veritable being, but are a *representation* to him of Being. That which appears to sense is not, as such, that which is to thought ; it is only the *idea* or image of it. Now let us look at this more closely ; let us examine this thesis of the idealism of the Finite which asserts that the Infinite is the real and the Finite the unreal ; that the Infinite is the true positive, and the Finite, as such, the negative.

What, then, is the Finite ? All will agree that the Finite is that which has an *end*, that which comes to an end. Finitude signifies destination to perish. The world of sense is a world of finitude ; it is that world which is "all a fleeting show" ; a panorama of shifting sights in endless alteration, where the

flower blooms and fades, the fruit ripens and rots, the grain springs up and is cut down. Finite existence is like an islet in a rapid river; it is only a quasi-permanent middle ground between Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be; it is, in fact, only a stage of transition from one of these to the other. Finite things are doomed to death from the hour of their birth, for it is the very character of a thing as a finite that it should perish and pass away. The particular finite thing—every object of sense—has a limit or bound to its being, and when it reaches this limit it ceases to be. But the Limitation is as an other to the Thing; the Thing changes itself therefore into another, and this is *how* it passes away; this is how the transitoriness of finitude is exhibited. The Limitation of each thing, as an existent-so, is its point of contact with other things, or its immanent relativity. Through its Limitation it changes, passing out of its being as a *so*, and becoming an *otherwise*. Through the Limitation, or rather through its transcendence, is realized what was before only potential in the thing, e.g. the flower blossoms into the fruit. In the Limitation, therefore, is manifested the special character of the thing, for the Limitation is just *what* distinguishes it, or *where* it is distinguished, from other things. But the Thing which is determined in its Limitation, just as much therein “sunders itself from itself, and points away over and beyond itself to its non-being, pronouncing this its being, and so passing over into the same.” As a crude illustration of this, we may instance Water. Water is limited by temperature: at freezing-point it passes into ice, and at boiling-point into steam. At either limitation Water points to its non-being, that is, to non-liquidity, and pronounces this its being; for the three states referred to—vaporous, liquid, and solid—are equally states of the same thing, H₂O. The finitude of things, then, consists in this, that their existence is not commensurate with their whole being, for this embraces the whole circle of the thing’s potentialities. What a thing can become, that it *is*, just as truly as it is what at any given moment it is. The actual in it is no more valid than the potential, as is shown by the fact that these change places continually. The potentialities are negative to the actual existence of the thing, and the more numerous they are, the more brief and fluctuating is that existence. If the whole circle of its po-

tentialities were actualized so as to coincide with the notional totality of its being, the thing would be self-related, self-existent, and this would be the existence of the infinite. But, it will here be said, there is no such thing; in all Nature there is not anything that is thus eternal; finitude, perishableness, is the one inseparable quality of all things which cannot be lifted from them. Very true; but what follows from this? All things are and must remain finite; it is impossible that finitude should pass from them. The existence of the finite particular is thus only a passing away, a movement towards dissolution. Existence in general, then, is only a *perpetual* passing away; that is, a Passing away which itself does not pass away; existences perish, but Existence subsists; the Perishableness of things is imperishable; what is in-itself null *is*, and it is *as* in itself null; or Finitude is eternal. Here we seem to have reached a contradiction. The Finite, which was defined to be that which comes to an end, appears to be rather that which cannot be ended. The Finite by its definition is the limited, the transitory; the Finite, in short, is only the Finite; but if "in all Nature there is not anything that is eternal," Finitude must be persisted in as the ultimate; but just thus it is converted into its contrary, just thus the Finite loses its essential character, and becomes in effect the Infinite. The Understanding halts puzzled. It holds tenaciously to the irreconcilability of the Finite and the Infinite as notions absolutely exclusive each of the other, but it is brought face to face with the Fact that Finitude subsists, that Existence does not come to an end, but maintains itself. It was in this manner that Zeno, theorizing on the absolute incompatibility of continuity and discreteness, was confronted by Diogenes with the *fact* of motion. But when the cynic got up and walked before the speaker, this objection was not the *solution* but rather the *expression* of the contradiction. The argument of Diogenes amounted to this: Your logic proves that I cannot walk; I cannot refute it, but I can walk nevertheless. I oppose to your Logic my Fact as *equally* valid. You have made out your case; now I make out my case, and it is just as good a one; who is to settle the question?—Aristotle did settle it by restoring the fact in harmony with the logic, and so bringing a new and single Truth out of the error of discordant half-

truths. So, here, it is no answer to Understanding to assert that if something passes away, it is *equally* true that something remains. The first step towards reaching a real solution is to put away the presupposition of the absolute partedness of the Finite and the Infinite. Com-prehend the two-sided Fact, and the contradiction vanishes; *take together* the whole matter just as it *is*, and there is no longer any puzzle. Let us attempt this.

"Something with its immanent limit established as the contradiction of its own self, by which it is directed and impelled beyond itself, is the Finite as such."* The Finite, as such, is set or posited Being whose nature is a tendency or impulse to transcend itself, to go over into absolute Being, or infinitely to *become*. The truth of the Finite, then, is that it passes over—is nothing but the passing over—into the Infinite: it disappears in the Infinite; what *is*, therefore, is only the Infinite. Now we have found that the Limitation is the transitional point between the So-being of the particular Thing and its Otherwise-being. Through Limitation it passes from what it is in itself to what it is for another. But the generic Finite, the material universe, is the existence of the whole. *It*, therefore, has no "other" without and beyond itself; it cannot, therefore, be limited externally; it cannot consequently go over into a being-for-Other, but it goes *in* into its being-for-Self, that is, Infinitude. "Or, in other words, the finite Generic has no 'other,' because *it is itself* the Other, taken isolatedly: it is the outerness, the utterance, of the Infinite. Matter is the Other of spirit: Thought is what Nature is *in itself*; Thought is the nature of Nature, or 'Nature' just means the nature of Thought."* Finite being is the series of its own finities which returns into its own single, constituent self.

The contradiction posited in the Finite by the Understanding is resolved, therefore, by this, that *not only* is the Finite that which perishes, but something more. The Perishing is not the *last*, but *it* too perishes; the Coming-to-an-end itself comes to an end. "Finitude passes away into its other; but Finitude is a passing away; the passing-away, then, passes away. Or, the Finite negates itself; but the Finite is negation; the Finite, then, negates negation, and affirmatively is."

* Hegel; Logic, Sec. I. Chap. II. B.

This refers to the generic Finite, Finitude in its notional totality. For the sphere of particular finites is *within* the Generic, and subjected to its first or simple negation. They are finites, but not *the* Finite taken universally, any more than the individuals A, B, C and D are the American People. I repeat that in this passing over into Infinitude, the Finite has "gone together with itself"; it has not lost itself in an "other," it has attained its own complete being. Infinitude is its own affirmative character, that which in itself it truly is. The transition is not of the nature of *change*—as is the case with the particular Thing, which goes into another particular thing—but the Finite and the Infinite go each eternally into the other as into its presupposition and its Truth. The Finite, as such, may be called the Appearance of the Infinite: so far as appearance it disappears; but whereas it is the Infinite itself *which* appears, it abides. What results, therefore, is neither the Infinite *nor* the Finite, abstractly, in separation, but the Infinite *and* the Finite; a new concrete unity of which these are the two constituent elements.

In this view, it will be seen that the sadness which accompanies the thought of Finitude falls away from it. The melancholy which attaches to perishableness in general, pertains here only to the abstract or immediate notion of Finitude. Understanding is hopelessly lost in this melancholy because it stands persistently in the abstract Finite. It looks at the destination of things as not further than their end: it concentrates their being in their non-being: it leaves them no affirmative being distinguished from their destination to perish: it looks at the Infinite, if at all, as a Beyond hopelessly inaccessible, and so it is natural it should murmur to itself, Vanity of vanities! But the *whole* notion of Finitude, or its unity with the Infinite, restores peace to the mind. There is no change and no cessation in the universal—its negation falls together into itself. Death is a relative; Understanding errs in viewing it as independently valid. "That thou sowest is not quickened save it die." Death is new-birth; it is a transition external to the concrete, which in passing away passes only into its own self.

Now, in order to make the result just attained more clearly apparent, let us go back and start from the other side. As

we began by asking, What is the Finite? so let us ask now, What is the Infinite? The Infinite, as the word imports, is simply the direct negative of the Finite; it is that which has no end, or which is illimitably continuous. If the Finite is to be defined as that which comes to an end, and whose essential character it is to come to an end, or cease to be, Finitude, as such, is plainly the negation of being. The Infinite, therefore, or the negation of the Finite, is the negation of the Negation; that is, Being reaffirmed, and restored as an absolute positive. In the ordinary view, however, the view of Common Sense, immediate, empirical objects have substantiality. Thus Finitude is for it the sphere of real existence, and the Infinite, as the negation of that positive, is merely a negative abstraction which floats vaguely away off above reality and life. But let us examine this abstract Infinite and we shall find that by the very attempt to keep it pure and apart from the Finite, it is finitised; just as we found that the attempt to hold the abstract Finite aloof from its relativity to the Infinite only converted it itself into an Infinite: in fact, it is precisely the insistence on their irreconcilable difference which reveals the polar attraction that irresistibly draws them together. The Infinite, therefore, we will take for the nonce to be merely the non-Finite, the non-existent, the indeterminate void. The Finite is the Here and Now, and the Infinite as negation or the Finite, is the Beyond—the inaccessible, and unnameable. The Infinite that is, has *no* positive character of its own; it is *merely* the negative of the Finite. We might proceed from this and say, Of what value or validity is such a mere negative? The non-Finite is non-entity: the word Infinite contains no thought other than is contained in the general negative Nothing, and it might as well be dismissed from the language. But this position is modified by even the crudest reflection. What is Finite passes away; but if what passes away were really what we have supposed it, an independent being, *there would remain nothing*, and we might ask, Whither does the Passing-away go? what becomes of it? But the fact is that Finite existence remains. Finitude alone, then, taken abstractly, shows itself to be a relative, declares itself insufficient to itself, and demands its complement. Thus we arrive at the notion of *two* worlds, one of the Finite, the other of the Infinite, but determined in such

wise as to be wholly external to each other, and absolutely opposed. Hence arises an alternation between the two notions which presents itself as the *Progressus ad Infinitum*. The impulse to get beyond the Finite, awakened by the sense of its insufficiency, carries us to an Infinite which was pre-determined as *only* the opposite of the Finite, as only the limitation of that. But by such determination the Infinite has lost its own very character—its infinitude. What was defined as limitless is itself made a Limit, and so we have only reached a new Finite. If this pseudo-infinite be seen to be a Finite, and so be again transcended, it is only to reach a new Limit, which in turn breeds a new Impulse to transcend, and so on *ad infinitum*. Arrived at this “And so on *ad infinitum*,” Understanding supposes itself to have reached the ultimate solution, and rests quite satisfied in a contradiction which is, however, never resolved, but only enunciated as always present. Against the fact of Limit, Understanding asserts the fact of Impulse as *equally* potent, and leaves the two to fight out an endless battle. The transcendence of the Finite is no sooner effected than it has to be repeated; the transcending is a *perpetual* transcending, or rather *there is no transcendence at all*. A “Progress” towards an inaccessible is, as regards its destination, no progress at all; it is a movement which contains no more advance than that of a blind horse in a treadmill. “And so on *ad infinitum*” does not change or add anything to the *quality* of any first step. If that was not transcendence of finitude, “And so on” cannot make it such. A thing, in short, is the *same* thing whether it be said once, or repeated forever, and yet Understanding fancies that to be constant change which is only perpetual repetition. The Infinite Progress is, in fact, only the process of particular finite things, each of which passes over its Limitation into another finite, and that into another, and so on. The seed, for example, becomes plant, the plant flowers, the flower becomes fruit, and the fruit produces new seeds. Now, what does this contradiction of an unprogressive “Progress” show up? Why simply that the assumption of the Finite and the Infinite as two independents, absolutely opposed, is an untruth. The fixed determination of the one as the *Hither* side, and the other as a *Further* side, must be given up. The Finite and the Infinite mutually in-

volve, and so evolve, each other. "In that each is implication of its Other, just *in it*, and from its own determination, they are inseparable. But this their unity is concealed in their qualitative otherness; it is the internal one which only lies at bottom."* This unity is, in fact, the very mainspring of the Infinite Progress itself, but Understanding does not reflect upon what is internal: it stands by the Alternation, which is nothing but the manifestation of the unity at bottom, and, looking only at such externalization, holds fast to its abstract dualism. It persists in regarding their co-reference as *merely* difference, whereas it is just as much their sameness. This co-reference, which Understanding views as a fact somehow external to these ready-made, independent determinations—the Infinite and the Finite—is, on the contrary, their inward and essential being, that in which and by which, only, both are. The truth, then, is already present in the Infinite Progress; all that is necessary is to take up what *is* present: to take up the Infinite and Finite together as they *are*, not apart as they are not. There are the two abstractly; each is itself; but each is just as much as the other; viewed in abstraction, the special character of each becomes converted into its opposite; the *sublation*† of both, therefore, is the true Infinite. Look at it once more. Taken in simple immediacy, the Infinite is the transcendence of the Finite—Impulse; and the Finite is that which is posited to be transcended—Limitation. Each, then, needs the other; each is the determiner of the other; each is what it is only by reason of the other; and yet the Infinite Progress would have them mutually exclusive! The antithesis of correlative determinations is pushed till it reveals their inseparableness, and yet the independent being of each one as against the other is persistently maintained! But, to repeat, if there are two independents, the Infinite is only *one of the two*; it is not the whole, but only one side; it is limited by the Other; it is thus a finitised Infinite, or the Finite over again. In the very attempt to sunder it from the Finite and

* Hegel; *Logic*, Sec. I. Chap. II. C.

† *Sublation* is a term signifying at once *tollere* and *conservare*. It is the process by which two antithetical determinations are merged in a resulting third, or negative unity; that is, a unity which negates the independence of its factors; e. g. acid and alkali are *sublated* in the negative unity, salt. (See *Secret of Hegel*, Vol. I. p. 356.)

place it as a *pure* Infinite, it is reduced to finitude, and so to unity with the Finite again. Like an elastic cord, the further the Infinite is drawn out of the Finite, the closer it springs together into it, that is, into itself. To represent it by a figure, the Progressus is the straight line infinitely producible in both directions, and the Infinite is the *end*, always just beyond wherever the line—Existence—actually is. As the true Infinite, the line *reaches* the ends, and they curve around and meet; it is a circle, closed and complete, without beginning or end, or rather with its beginning and its end in itself. "Their Distinction (that of the Finite and Infinite) is thus the double meaning each has. The Finite has the double meaning to be, first, *only* the Finite—the Finite counter the Infinite—and secondly, to be at once that Finite and its opposite, or the Finite that goes over into absolute being. The Infinite, for its part, has the double meaning to be, first, the abstract Infinite, and secondly the true, or absolute Infinite, which contains both itself and its Other."* As such true Infinite it is Reality; it is that which is in the only complete sense. It is not immediate Being in simple affirmation, like the perishable empirical thing, but it is Being as returned from the negation of finitude, self-mediated, and so self-existent. Consider how thus the thought and fact, Reality, grows upon us; how much wider and grander is the view of the universe we obtain from this height than when we see no Reality but in the shifting scenes of finitude.

Should it be objected to this result, the unity of the Finite and the Infinite, that is merely the issue of subjective reasoning, and for all its logical show may be pure sophistry, the answer is that this is not subjective reasoning in the sense of the objection; it is the objective evolution of what is, *as* it is. We, the subject, take no part in this evolution but to follow and watch it. We are lookers on at what is, and must be, whether or not we are there to look. And if the objector remains unsatisfied, we can only summon him to follow and watch this dialectic of Reality for himself, and behold *in actu* what he has believed impossible; that is, the unity of Identity and Difference, or rather the sublation of these into the one Whole that is.

* Hegel; *Logic*, Sec. I. Chap. II. C.

In another paper this doctrine of the coexistence of the Finite and the Infinite will be considered in its application to various concrete problems.

MEDITATIONS

CONCERNING THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY,

In which are clearly proved the Existence of GOD, and the real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man.

Translated from the French of Descartes, by WM. R. WALKER.

FOURTH MEDITATION.

ON THE TRUE AND THE FALSE.

I have during these past days so accustomed myself to detach my mind from the senses, and have so accurately observed that there are very few things of a corporeal kind which we can know with certainty, that there are many more things known to us relating to the human mind, and yet more relating to God himself, that it will now be easy for me to turn my mind away from the consideration of things sensible and imaginable, and fix it on those which, being disengaged from everything material, are purely intelligible. And, indeed, the idea that I have of the human mind, in so far as it is a thing that thinks, and not extended in length, breadth and depth, and that does not participate in anything belonging to the body, is incomparably more distinct than the idea of anything corporeal; and when I consider that I doubt—that is to say, that I am a thing incomplete and dependent—the idea of a being complete and independent—that is to say, of God—is presented to my mind with much distinctness and clearness; and from the single fact that this idea is in me, or rather that I, who possess this idea, am or exist, the existence of God and that my existence depends entirely on him throughout every moment of my life, are conclusions so evident that I cannot think it possible for the human mind to know anything with more evidence and certainty. And already I seem to discover a way leading from this contempla-

tion of the true God, in whom are contained all the treasures of knowledge and wisdom, to the knowledge of the other things in the universe.

For, in the first place, I perceive it to be impossible that he should ever deceive me, since all fraud and deception imply some kind of imperfection: and although it seems that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the will to deceive testifies, without doubt, of weakness or malice; and therefore that cannot be in God. Further, I know by my own experience that there is in me a certain faculty of judgment, or discernment of the true from the false, which without doubt I have received from God, as well as all the other things that are in me and that I possess; and since it is impossible that he should wish to deceive me, it is also certain that he has not given it to me so that I could ever err in using it as it should be used.

And there would remain no doubt concerning this, if one could not apparently draw from it this conclusion, that in this way I can never be deceived; for, if all that is in me comes from God, and if he has not put within me any faculty for erring, it seems that I ought never to be mistaken. It is equally true that, when I consider myself only as coming from God, and when I am turned altogether towards him, I do not discover in me any cause of error or falsity; but immediately after, returning to myself, experience teaches me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinity of errors, on investigating the cause of which I observe that there is not only presented to my mind a real and positive idea of God, or rather of a being sovereignly perfect, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothingness—that is to say, of that which is infinitely removed from every kind of perfection—and that I am as a mean between God and nothingness—that is, placed in such a fashion between the sovereign being and non-being, that there is not in truth anything in me which can lead me into error in so far as a sovereign Being has produced me; but that, if I regard myself as participating in some way in nothingness or non-being—that is to say, in so far as I myself am not the sovereign Being and have many things wanting in me—I am exposed to an infinity of wants, so that I ought not to be astonished if I am deceived. And

thus I know that error, as such, is not a thing of reality depending on God, but only a defect; and consequently, in order to err, I need no faculty to be given me by God especially for this purpose; but the reason that I am deceived is that the power which God has given me to discern between the true and the false is not infinite within me.

Nevertheless, this does not yet altogether satisfy me; for error is not a pure negation—that is to say, is not the simple defect or want of some perfection which does not belong to me—but is a privation of some knowledge which it appears that I should have. Now, in considering the nature of God, it does not seem possible that he has put in me any faculty which is not perfect of its kind, that is, wanting in any perfection belonging to it: for, if it is true that the more expert the artisan is, the more perfect and complete are the productions of his hands, what thing could have been produced by this sovereign Creator of the universe not perfect and entirely complete in all its parts? And there is not a doubt but that God could have created me so that I should never be deceived; it is also certain that he always wills what is best: is it, then, better that I should be liable to deception than that deception should be a thing impossible to be wrought upon me?

Looking at this attentively, it at once occurs to me that I ought not to be astonished if I am not capable of comprehending wherefore God acts as he does, and that I need not on that account doubt his existence, since perhaps I see by experience many other things which exist without my being able to comprehend the reason of their existence, or how God has made them; for, already knowing that my nature is extremely weak and limited, and that the nature of God is, on the contrary, unlimited, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no longer any difficulty in recognizing that there are an infinity of things in his power whose causes are beyond my comprehension; and that reason is alone sufficient to persuade me that all that kind of causes which we are accustomed to derive from the end is useless in things physical or natural; for it does not seem to me that I can without temerity investigate and attempt to discover the impenetrable ends of God.

Moreover, it further occurs to me that we ought not to consider a single creature separately, when we investigate

whether the works of God are perfect, but generally all creatures together; for the same thing which might perhaps with some show of reason seem very imperfect if it were alone in the world, might come to be very perfect when considered as forming part of this whole universe; and although, since I formed the design of doubting all things, I have as yet known with certainty only my own existence and that of God; yet since I have recognized the infinite power of God, I cannot deny that he has produced many other things, or at least that he can produce them, so that I exist and am placed in the world as making part of the universality of all beings.

Next, coming to look at myself more closely and to consider what are my errors, which of themselves testify that imperfection is in me, I find that they depend upon the concurrence of two causes, namely, the faculty of knowing, which is in me, and the faculty of election, or rather of my free judgment—that is, of my understanding and, together, of my will. For by the understanding alone I neither affirm nor deny anything, but conceive only the ideas of the things which I can affirm or deny. Now, in considering it thus precisely, it may be said that there is never any error in it, provided the word error is taken in its proper signification. And although there may perhaps be an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, it cannot be said that it is therefore deprived of those ideas as of something that is of necessity part of its nature, but only that it has them not, because there is in reality no reason which could prove that God ought to have given me a greater and more ample faculty of knowing than that which he has given me; and however skilful and wise a worker I may imagine him to be, I am not therefore to think that he ought to have put into each of his works all the perfections that he may have put into some. Nor can I complain that God has not given me a free will, or a will sufficiently ample and sufficiently perfect, since in reality I experience it to be so ample and extended as not to be shut up within any limits. And what here appears to me to be very remarkable is, that of all the other things that are in me, there are none so perfect and so great but that I could acknowledge that they might be still greater and more perfect. For, to take an example, if I consider the faculty of

conception within me, I find it to be of very small stretch and greatly limited, and at the same time I represent to myself the idea of another faculty much larger and even infinite; and from the single fact that I can represent to myself its idea, I know without difficulty that it belongs to the nature of God. In the same way, if I examine the memory or the imagination, or any other faculty in me, I do not find any which are not very small and limited, and which in God are not immense and infinite. It is only the volition, only the liberty of free will, which I experience in me to be so great as that I can conceive no idea of any other more ample and extended: so that it is chiefly this which makes known to me that I bear the image and resemblance of God. For, although it be incomparably greater in God than in me, whether by reason of the knowledge and power that are joined with it and render it firmer and more efficacious, or by reason of the object, inasmuch as it moves and stretches towards innumerable more things, yet it does not seem to me greater when considered formally and precisely in itself. For it consists only in this, that we can do or not do a certain thing, that is to say, affirm or deny, pursue or shun, a certain thing; or rather it consists only in this, that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun, the things which the understanding proposes, we should act so that we do not feel any external force constraining us. For, in order that I may be free, it is not necessary for me to be indifferent in choosing one or the other of two contraries; but rather, the more I lean towards one, whether because I know certainly that the good and the true are there, or because God so disposes my inward thought, so much the more freely do I make my choice and embrace it; and, indeed, divine grace and natural knowledge, so far from diminishing my liberty, rather increase and strengthen it, so that this indifference which I feel when not borne by the weight of any reason to one side more than to another, is the lowest degree of liberty, and shows rather a defect of knowledge than a perfection of will: for if I knew always clearly what is true and what is good, I should never have difficulty in determining what judgment and what choice I ought to make, and thus I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent.

From all this, I find that it is neither the power of the will, which I have received from God, that is the cause of my errors, for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind, nor is it the power of the understanding or of the conception; for, not conceiving anything but by means of this power of conception which God has given me, there cannot be a doubt but that what I do conceive, I conceive aright, and it is impossible for me to be deceived in that.

Whence, then, spring my errors? From this alone, that the will being much more ample and more extended than the understanding, I cannot hold it within the same limits, but stretch it to the things which I do not understand; among which things, being of itself indifferent, it goes very easily astray, and chooses the false instead of the true and the evil instead of the good, and hence it is that I am deceived and that I sin.

For example, when I was lately examining whether anything really existed in the world, and concluded, from the single fact that I did examine this question, that it very evidently followed that I myself existed, I could not hinder myself from judging that a thing which I conceived so clearly was true; not that I found myself forced to such a judgment by any external cause, but only because from a great clearness there was in my understanding there followed a great inclination of my will; and, I am inclined to believe, there was all the more liberty that it was with less indifference. On the contrary, I at present know only that I exist in so far as I am something that thinks, but there is also presented to my mind a certain idea of corporeal nature; which leads me to doubt whether this nature which thinks, which is in me, or rather which I myself am, is different from this corporeal nature, or whether both are not one and the same thing; and I suppose here that I do not yet know any reason to persuade me of the one rather than the other; whence it follows that I am entirely indifferent as to denying or affirming it, or even abstaining from giving any judgment in the matter.

And this indifference extends not only to the things of which the understanding has no knowledge, but generally also to all those which it fails to discover with perfect clearness at the moment that the will is in deliberation; for how-

ever probable may be the conjectures which incline me in judging anything, the simple knowledge that these are but conjectures and not certain and indubitable reasons is sufficient to give me occasion to judge the contrary; a course which I have had abundant experience of during these past days when I set down as false all that formerly I had held as very true, for the sole reason that I observed they could in some fashion be called in question. Now, if I withhold my judgment upon a thing when my conception of it is not sufficiently clear and distinct, it is evident that I do well and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm it, then I do not employ my free will as I ought; and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I am deceived, and even although I judge according to the truth, it will be but the result of chance, and I do none the less err and make a wrong use of my free will; for the natural light teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will.

And it is in this wrong use of the free will that lies the privation which constitutes the form of error. The privation, I say, is found in operation in so far as it proceeds from me; but it is not found in the faculty which I have received from God, nor even in its operation in so far as it depends on him; for I have certainly no cause of complaint that God has not given me a more ample intelligence or a natural light more perfect than he has given me, since it is of the nature of a finite understanding not to understand many things, and of the nature of a created understanding to be finite; but I have every reason to render thanks to him in that, while never having owed me anything, he has nevertheless given me what few perfections are in me, and I am far from conceiving sentiments so unjust as to imagine that he has unjustly withheld or deprived me of the other perfections which he has not given me.

Nor have I cause to complain that he has not given me a will more ample than my understanding, because since the will consists but of one object and is thus indivisible, it seems that its nature is such that nothing could be taken from it without destroying it; and, certainly, the greater its extent the more reason have I to acknowledge the goodness of him who gave it me.

And, finally, I have no cause to complain that God concurs with me in producing the acts of this will, that is to say, the judgments in which I am deceived; because those acts are entirely true and absolutely good in so far as they depend on God; and there is in a measure more perfection in my nature from my being able to produce them than if I could not produce them. For privation, in which alone consists the formal reason of error and sin, needs no concurrence of God, because it is not a thing or a being, and because if we refer it to God as its cause, it ought not to be called privation, but only negation, according to the signification given to those words in scholastic philosophy. For, in truth, it is not an imperfection in God that he has bestowed upon me the liberty of giving or not giving my judgment on certain things of which he has not put a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is doubtless an imperfection in me that I do not use this liberty aright, and that I rashly give judgment on things which I conceive but with obscurity and confusion.

I nevertheless see that it were easy for God to bring it about that I should never be deceived although remaining free and with a limited knowledge, namely, if he should give to my understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of everything on which I should ever deliberate, or even only if he should engrave on my memory so deeply that I could never forget it, the resolution of never judging anything without a clear and distinct conception of it. And I may remark that in so far as I consider myself altogether alone, as if there were only myself in the world, I should have been much more perfect than I am if God had so created me that I should never err; but I cannot therefore deny that there is not in some fashion a greater perfection in the universe from some of its parts not being exempt from defect, as others are, than if they all were were alike.

And I have no right to complain that God, having placed me in the world, did not will that I should be ranked among the noblest and most perfect things; I have even cause for contentment that if he has not given me the perfection of being free from error by the first method I have just spoken of, which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the things on which I can deliberate, he has at least left in my

power the other method, which is to hold firm the resolution of never giving judgment on things the truth of which is not clearly known to me: for though I realize my weakness in not being able to fix my mind continually on one thought, I can yet, by a vigilant and oft-reiterated meditation, imprint it so strongly on my memory that I shall never want reminding whenever I shall have need of it, and in this way I may acquire the habit of evading error; and inasmuch as in this consists the greatest and the principal perfection of man, I consider that to-day I have gained not a little by this meditation in having discovered the cause of error and falsity.

And, indeed, there can be no other cause than that which I have just declared: for as often as I so keep my will within the limits of my knowledge that it pronounces no judgment but on things which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, it cannot come to pass that I should be deceived; because every clear and distinct conception is, without doubt, something, and therefore it cannot derive its origin from nothing, but has necessarily God for its author: God, I say, who being sovereignly perfect cannot be the cause of any error; and consequently the necessary conclusion is that such a conception or such a judgment is true. Furthermore, I have not only learned to-day what I ought to shun in order to be no more deceived, but also what course I ought to follow in order to arrive at the knowledge of truth. For I shall certainly arrive thither if I fix my attention sufficiently upon all the things that I conceive perfectly, and separate them from others which I have conceived only with confusion and obscurity: and of this I shall hereafter keep careful watch.

FIFTH MEDITATION.

ON THE ESSENCE OF THINGS MATERIAL, AND AGAIN, OF GOD AND HIS EXISTENCE.

There remain many other things for me to examine concerning the attributes of God, and concerning my own nature, that is to say, the nature of my mind; and of these I shall perhaps at another time make an investigation. For the present, after having observed what must be done or avoided in order to arrive at the knowledge of the truth, what I have

chiefly to do is to attempt to go forth and rid myself of all the doubts into which I have fallen during these past days, and to see if something certain cannot be known concerning things material. But, before examining whether there are such things existing outside of me, I ought to consider their ideas so far as they are in my mind, and see what of them are distinct and what are confused.

In the first place, I distinctly imagine that quantity which philosophers commonly call continuous quantity, or properly the extension in length, breadth and depth which is in this quantity, or rather in the thing to which it is attributed. Moreover, I can discern in it many diverse parts, and attribute to each of those parts all kinds of sizes, shapes, positions, and movements; and, in fine, I can assign to each of those movements all kinds of duration. And I not only know those things with distinctness when I thus consider them in general, but also, however slightly I may fix my attention on them, I recognize an infinitude of particulars concerning the numbers, shapes, movements, and other similar things, whose truth becomes apparent with so much evidence and agrees so well with my nature, that when I begin to discover them it does not seem as if I learn anything new, but rather that I call to mind what I had heretofore already known; in other words, I perceive things which are already in my mind, although I might not have again turned my thoughts towards them. And what I find here of most moment is that there is in me an infinitude of ideas of certain things which cannot be considered as pure nothingness, although perhaps they have no existence outside of my mind, and which are not feigned by me, though I may be free to think them or not think them, but which have their true and immutable natures. As, for example, when I imagine a triangle, although there is perhaps no such figure in the world outside of my mind and may never have been, there is however none the less a certain nature, or form, or determinate essence of this figure, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented, and which in no way depends on my mind,—as is apparent from the fact that we can demonstrate various properties of this triangle, namely, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, that the greatest angle is subtended by the greatest side, and so forth,

which now, whether I will or not, I recognize very clearly and very evidently to be in it, although I may not have before thought of them in any way when I first imagined to myself a triangle; and, therefore, it cannot be said that I either feigned or invented them. And it cannot be here objected that perhaps this idea of the triangle came into my mind by the intervention of my senses from my having sometimes seen bodies of a triangular shape; for I can form in my mind an infinitude of other figures of which there could not be the smallest suspicion that they had ever fallen under the observation of my senses, and yet I can none the less demonstrate various properties concerning their nature as well as that of the triangle; which, certainly, ought to be all true, because I conceive them clearly: and, therefore, they are something and not pure nothingness; for it is very evident that all that is true is something, truth being the same thing as being; and I have already amply above demonstrated that all the things which I know clearly and distinctly are true. And, although I had not demonstrated it, yet the nature of my mind is such that I could not but esteem them as true so long as I conceive them clearly and distinctly; and I remember that, even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense, I counted as among the number of the most constant truths which I conceived clearly and distinctly concerning figures, the numbers and other things belonging to arithmetic and geometry.

But now, if, from the single fact that I can draw from my mind the idea of something, it follows that all that I recognize clearly and distinctly as belonging to that thing in reality belongs to it, can I not draw from this an argument and a proof demonstrative of the existence of God? It is certain that the idea of him is not less in me—that is, the idea of a being sovereignly perfect—than that of any figure or number whatever it may be; and I do not know less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature, than that I know that all which I can demonstrate of any figure or number really belongs to the nature of that figure or number; and therefore, although all that I concluded in the preceding Meditations should not be true, the existence of God ought to be received into my mind with at least as

much certainty as I have until now regarded all the mathematical truths which relate only to numbers and figures, although in truth that may not at first appear entirely manifest, but seem to have some appearance of sophistry. For, being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that thus God might be conceived as not actually existing. But nevertheless, when I regard the matter with more attention, I find it manifest that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can the essence of a rectilinear triangle be separated from the fact that its three angles are equal to two right angles, or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley; so that there is no less repugnance in conceiving a God—that is, a Being sovereignly perfect—to whom existence is wanting—that is, to whom some perfection is wanting—than in conceiving a mountain which has no valley.

But although in truth I cannot conceive a God without existence any more than I can conceive a mountain without a valley, yet, as from the single fact that I conceive a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain in the world; so also, although I may conceive God as existing, it does not follow, it seems to me, that God exists: for my thought does not impose any necessity on things; and as there is no difficulty in my imagining a horse with wings although there may be none having wings, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God although no God did exist. Far from it; there is here a sophism hid under the plausibility of this objection: for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is in the world either mountain or valley, but only that the mountain and the valley, whether they are or are not, are inseparably joined to each other; while from this fact alone, that I cannot conceive God but as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and, therefore, that he truly exists. Not that my thought can effect this, or that it imposes on things any necessity; but, on the contrary, the necessity which is in the thing itself—that is to say, the necessity of the existence of God—determines me to have this

thought: for it is not in my power to conceive a God without existence—that is to say, a Being sovereignly perfect without a sovereign perfection, though it is in my power to imagine a horse without wings or with them.

Nor ought it to be said here that though it is in truth necessary for me to admit that God exists, since I have supposed him to possess all kinds of perfection, and existence is one of them, yet that my first supposition was no more necessary than it is necessary to think that all four-sided figures can be inscribed in a circle, a supposition that if entertained by me would force me to admit that the rhombus can be there inscribed because it is a four-sided figure, and thus I would be obliged to admit a thing that is false. One ought not, I say, to allege that: for although it may not be necessary for me ever to fall a-thinking of God, yet, as often as it does happen that I think of a Being first and sovereign, and to draw, so to speak, his idea from the treasure of my mind, I must attribute to him every kind of perfection, although I may not proceed to number them all, or fix my attention upon each of them in particular. And this necessity suffices to lead me (as soon as I recognize that existence is a perfection) to conclude very strongly that that first and sovereign Being exists, and similarly, though it is not necessary that I should ever imagine any triangle, yet as often as I wish to consider a rectilineal figure composed only of three angles, it is absolutely necessary that I attribute to it everything which goes to prove that those three angles are not greater than two right angles, although perhaps I do not then consider that in particular. But when I examine what figures are capable of being inscribed within a circle, it is in nowise necessary to think that all four-sided figures are of this number; on the contrary, I cannot even feign that to be so as long as I do not wish to receive anything into my thought save what I can clearly and distinctly conceive. And consequently there is here a great difference between false suppositions such as that and the true ideas which were born with me, of which the first and principal is that of God. For in truth I recognize in many ways that this idea is not something feigned or invented, depending only on my thought, but that it is the image of a true and immutable nature: first, because I could not conceive any-

thing but God, to whose essence existence of necessity belongs, and because it is impossible for me to conceive two or more Gods such as he; and admitting that there is one now existing, I see clearly that he must have before this existed from all eternity, and that he will hereafter exist to all eternity; and, finally, because I conceive many other things in God incapable of diminution or change.

Besides, of whatever proof and argument I may avail myself, it is always necessary to return to this: that it is only the things which I conceive clearly and distinctly which have the effect of persuading me entirely. And although among the things which I conceive of this sort there are in truth some which are manifestly known to every one, while there are others which are revealed only to those who consider them more closely and examine them with more exactness, yet, after these are once discovered, they are not esteemed less certain than the others. As, for example, in a right-angled triangle, although it is not at first so apparent that the square of the base is equal to the squares of the two other sides, as it is that the base is opposite to the greatest angle, nevertheless when once recognized we are as much persuaded of the truth of the one as of the other. And as regards God, truly, if my mind were not prepossessed by any prejudices and my thought not diverted by the continual presence of the images of sensible things, there is nothing which I could know more readily or more easily than he. For is there anything of itself clearer or more manifest than the thought that there is a God—that is to say, a Being sovereign and perfect—in the idea of whom alone is necessary or eternal existence included, and who consequently exists? And although, in order rightly to conceive this truth, I have had need of great application of mind, yet at present I am not only as much assured of this as of any of the things which appear to me most certain, but I observe, besides, that the certainty of all the other things depends so absolutely on this, that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly.

For, although I am of such a nature that as soon as I comprehend anything very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but believe it to be true, yet, because I am also of such a nature as to be unable to keep my mind continually fixed upon one

thing, and because I often call to mind my having judged a thing to be true when I had ceased to consider the reasons which led me so to judge it, it may happen during such time that other reasons are presented to me, which would readily change my opinion if I were ignorant that there is a God; and thus I would never have a true and certain knowledge of anything whatever, but only vague and inconstant opinions. As, for example, when I consider the nature of a rectilineal triangle, I know evidently, being a little versed in geometry, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, and this it is impossible for me to disbelieve while I apply my mind to its demonstration; but as soon as I turn away from it, although I remember that I clearly comprehended it, yet I can readily enough doubt of its truth if I do not know there is a God: for I may persuade myself that I was so constituted by nature as to be easily deceived, even in the things which I believe myself to comprehend with the greatest evidence and certainty; especially considering that I remember having often deemed many things to be true and certain, which afterwards other reasons have led me to judge to be absolutely false.

But, after having recognized that there is a God, whereby at the same time I recognized also that all things depend on him and that he is no deceiver, and that consequently I judged that all that I conceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true: although I do not any more think of the reasons which led me to judge that to be true, yet provided only that I remember to have clearly and distinctly comprehended it, there can be no contrary reason produced which would ever bring me to call it in question; and thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it. And this same knowledge extends also to all the other things which I remember having formerly demonstrated as to the truths of geometry and other similar things; for what objection can be brought which would make me call them in question? Will it be that my nature is such that I am greatly subject to error? But I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgments whose reasons are clearly known to me. Will it be that I have formerly deemed many things to be true and certain which I have since recognized to be false? But I did not clearly or

distinctly know any of those things; and, not then knowing this rule by which I assure myself of the truth, I was led to believe them by reasons which I have since recognized to be less strong than I then imagined them to be. What further objection, then, can be made? Will it be that perhaps I am asleep (an objection which I myself formerly made), or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the reveries which we imagine in our sleep? But even when I am asleep, all that is presented to my mind with evidence is absolutely true.

And thus I recognize very clearly that the certainty and the truth of all science depends solely on the knowledge of the true God: so that before knowing him I could not perfectly know any other thing. And now that I know him, I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge concerning an infinitude of things, not only of those which are in him, but also of those which belong to corporeal nature in so far as it can serve as the object of mathematical demonstrations which do not take into consideration his existence.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.

[The following translation includes the whole of the extended notice given to Plato in the second volume of Hegel's History of Philosophy. About two fifths is devoted to the general features of Plato's Philosophy, after which follow special considerations of (1) The Dialectic, (2) Philosophy of Nature, (3) Philosophy of Spirit. The three special treatises are reserved for the next number of this Journal. The Philosophy of Aristotle, treated by the same masterly hand, will form a fitting continuation to this undertaking. In the philosophy of Plato, and especially in that of Aristotle, Hegel finds all speculative philosophy—either in germ or considerably expanded; and he who reads for the first time these notices will be continually surprised by the marvellous accuracy with which those great Greeks have expressed insights that are usually accredited to modern thought. Nothing lends so much to that philosophic calm, which accompanies a feeling of repose in the Truth, as the re-discovery of one's thought in the systems of the ancient masters. "Surely it is no subjective illusion of mine—this speculative thought—for it has been tried in the fire of History for two thousand years, and still remains as the frame-work of all science and all forms of practical life. Dante, who calls Aristotle "the master of those who know" (*Vidi 'l Maestro di color che sanno*), was well acquainted with this secure feeling which a knowledge of Truth gives, and thus gives utterance to it in the fourth canto of the Paradise (a passage Hegel loved to quote):

Jo veggio ben, che giammai non si sazia
 Nostro intelletto, se il ver non lo illustra
 Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia
Posasi in esso come fera in lustra
Tosto che giunto l'ha: e giunger puollo,
 Se non ciascun disio sarebbe frustra.]

I.

The development of philosophic science as science, and, more especially, the development of the Socratic standpoint to a scientific completeness, begins with Plato and ends with Aristotle. For this reason these two men deserve to be called the teachers of the human race—if such a title can be justly applied to any men.

Plato belongs to the followers of Socrates—is the most famous of the friends and auditors of Socrates; he seizes in its truth the Socratic principle that *Consciousness is the essence*; inasmuch as, according to Plato, *Thought is the absolute, and all reality is thought*. By this must not be understood the one-sided [abstract] thought, such as is spoken of in a one-sided idealism, wherein thought is seized as in opposition to reality; not this, but thought which is one with reality, i. e. the COMPREHENSION AND ITS REALITY as they are united in the movement of Science as the Idea of a scientific whole, [The Comprehension (Begriff)—the exhaustive apprehension, i. e. the universal and necessary relations of an object, seized together, making a complete definition of what is essential.] Socrates seized the in-and-for-itself existent thought only as *end and aim for the self-conscious will*; Plato leaves this narrow point of view, and expands the merely abstract right of the self-conscious thinking, which Socrates set up as his principle, to the province of Science; and through this he made possible the process of construing and deduction from principles, although even Plato's exposition, as we shall see, is not quite scientific.

Plato is one of the world-historical personages, and his Philosophy is one of the world-historic existences, and from its origin on through all succeeding times it has had a most significant influence upon the culture and development of spirit. For the peculiarity of the Platonic Philosophy is precisely this direction toward the intellectual, supersensuous world; it seeks the elevation of Consciousness into the realm of Spirit; so that the spiritual, that which belongs to thought,

obtains importance in this shape for Consciousness, and is so revealed to it, that, conversely, Consciousness gets a firm foothold upon this ground. The Christian Religion also has set up this high principle, that the internal spiritual essence of man is his true essence, and has made it the universal principle (although this principle has in Christianity a peculiar form representing man as destined for blessedness). But Plato and his Philosophy has contributed the greatest impulse towards this: to make that idea become this organization of the Rational, this realm of the supersensuous; he had already made a great beginning thereto.

His Life.

We have first to mention the circumstances of his life. Plato was an Athenian; was born in the 3d year of the 87th Olympiad, or according to Dodwell Ol. 87-4 (429 B. C.) at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in the year in which Pericles died. He was, according to this, 39 or 40 years younger than Socrates. His father Ariston traced his pedigree to Codrus; his mother Perictione descended from Solon. His mother's uncle on the father's side was the famous Kritias, who likewise went round with Socrates for a long time, and was the most talented, genial, and therefore also the most dangerous and hated of the thirty tyrants of Athens. Kritias is usually counted with the Cyrenaics, Theodorus and Diagoras of Melos, by the Ancients, as an atheist; Sextus Empiricus has preserved for us a pretty fragment of a poem of his. Plato, born of this illustrious race, lacked not the means for his culture; he received an education at the hands of the most famous Sophists, who practised him in all the arts which were esteemed fitting for an Athenian. He received at a later period, from his teacher, the name of Plato; in his family he was called Aristokles. Some ascribed his name to the breadth of his forehead, others to the wealth of his discourse, others to the fine shape of his figure. In his youth he cultivated poetry and wrote tragedies—just as also with us the young poets begin with tragedies,—dithyrambs, and songs. Of the last, there are several still preserved to us in the Greek Anthology which go to his various loved ones; among others, a well-known epigram on an "Aster," one of his best friends, which

contains a pretty thought, that is found also in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*:

"To the stars thou look'st, my Aster;
O, would that I were the heavens,
So that I could see thee with so many eyes."

For the rest, he thought of nothing else during his youth but of devoting himself to state affairs. In his twentieth year he was brought to Socrates, and had eight years' intercourse with him. It is related that Socrates, on the night before, had dreamed that a young swan sat on his knees, whose wings grew fast, and that he soon flew up into heaven with the loveliest songs. The Ancients mention many such things which indicate the high honor and love in which he was held by his contemporaries and his successors for that silent greatness and sublime simplicity and loveliness which has earned for him the name of "the divine." The society and wisdom of Socrates could not suffice for Plato. He busied himself also with the more ancient Philosophies, principally with that of Heraclitus. Aristotle mentions that already before he came to Socrates he had been in the society of Cratylus, and had been initiated into the Heraclitic doctrines. He studied also the Eleatics and especially the Pythagoreans, and associated with the most famous Sophists. After he thus became absorbed in Philosophy, he lost his interest in Poetry and the affairs of the state, renounced them entirely, and devoted himself wholly to the Sciences. His duty as an Athenian to serve in the time of war, he fulfilled as Socrates had done; he is said to have made three campaigns.

After the execution of Socrates, Plato as well as many other Philosophers, fled from Athens and betook themselves to Euclid at Megara. From thence he soon travelled farther, at first to Cyrene in Africa, where he applied himself especially to Mathematics under the guidance of the famed mathematician Theodorus, whom he introduces into several of his dialogues. Plato himself did something for the perfection of Mathematics. The solution of the Delian or Delphic problem is ascribed to him, which was given out by the oracle and which relates to the cube: namely, to describe a line whose cube is equal to the sum of two given cubes. This demands a construction through two curves. It is worthy of

notice that the oracle at that time gave out such problems: there was then an epidemic, in which when one applied to the oracle, scientific problems were given; it was a very remarkable change in the spirit of the oracle. From Cyrene Plato went to Italy and Egypt. In Magna-Grecia he became acquainted with the Pythagoreans of that time, Archytas of Tarentum, the famed mathematician, Philolaus, and others; and, besides this, he bought up the writings of the older Pythagoreans at heavy prices. In Sicily he formed a friendship with Dion. He returned to Athens and came out as a teacher, conversing with his scholars in the Academy, a grove or promenade laid out in honor of the hero Academus, in which a gymnasium was kept. But Plato became the true hero of the Academy, and has obliterated the old meaning of the name "Academy," and has eclipsed the fame of the hero, in whose place he sat; hence Academus has come down to posterity under the protection of Plato.

His residence and business in Athens, Plato interrupted by a two years' visit to Sicily, to Dionysius the younger, the ruler of Syracuse and Sicily. This connection with Dionysius was the most significant, or rather the *only*, external relation into which Plato entered, but it produced nothing durable. The next of kin to Dionysius, Dion, and other distinguished Syracusans, friends of Dionysius, had the hope that Dionysius—whom his father had allowed to grow up very uncultured, and in whom they had infused the ideas of Philosophy and a respect for it, and had made him very anxious to become acquainted with Plato,—they hoped that Dionysius would gain very much through an acquaintance with Plato, and would be so influenced through Plato's idea of a true state that he would proceed to realize it in Sicily. Plato consented partly through friendship to Dion, partly because he entertained the higher hope of seeing through Dionysius the true form of the state actualized; he was led to take the wrong step and travel to Sicily. Superficially looked at, the notion of a young prince near whom stands a wise man who inspires him by his instruction is quite plausible and forms the basis of a hundred political romances; but it is empty and delusive. Dionysius found indeed much pleasure in Plato, and conceived such a respect for him that he wished, in turn, to win Plato's respect; but

this did not long hold out. Dionysius was one of those moderate natures who in their halfness strive for fame and distinction, but are capable of no depth and no earnestness; but have only the appearance of it, and are without firm characters—a desire without capacity: as in our day Irony brings a person upon the stage who supposes himself apt and excellent, and yet is only a bungler. And such a result is natural, for the halfness allows only itself to guide; but precisely this halfness it is also which, while it lays the plan, at the same time renders it impracticable. The disagreement broke out in a collision of personalities against each other; Dionysius fell into a quarrel with his relative Dion, and Plato became involved in it because he was unwilling to give up his friendship with Dion, and Dionysius was not capable of a friendship which was founded upon respect and an earnest purpose in common; he had only a personal inclination towards Plato, and his vanity was a leading motive in connecting himself with him. Thus Dionysius could not succeed in attaching Plato to himself firmly; he desired to possess him exclusively, and this was a desire which could not be permitted by Plato.

Plato therefore left Dionysius; after the separation, both felt the desire to meet again. Dionysius called him back to bring about a reconciliation; for he could not endure the thought that he had not been able to bind Plato fast to him; he found it especially unendurable that Plato would not give up Dion. Plato gave way to the importunity of his family and of Dion, and principally of Archytas and other Pythagoreans at Tarentum, to whom Dionysius had applied, and who had interested themselves also for the reconciliation of Dionysius with Dion and Plato; nay, they became surety for his safety and freedom to depart again. Dionysius, however, could not endure the presence of Plato any better than his absence; he found his presence a constraint. Through Plato and the others surrounding Dionysius, a respect for science had been kindled in him, but he could not be brought into anything deeper. His participation in the Philosophy was as superficial as his numerous essays in Poetry; and while he desired to be all, poet, philosopher, and statesman, he could not bear to be guided by another. Thus there was esta-

blished no deep relation, but they alternately approached and separated: so that even the third residence in Sicily ended with coolness; after that the relation was not renewed. This time the tension against the relation with Dion grew so strong, that, when Plato wished to leave with Dion, from dissatisfaction at the treatment of Dionysius, the latter prevented him, and would have used violence at last had not the Pythagoreans come from Tarentum and obtained his release, and brought him to Greece. And they were aided by this circumstance: Dionysius feared the scandal of not being able to live on good terms with Plato. Thus Plato's hopes were destroyed; it was a mistake of his to attempt to adapt through Dionysius the constitution of the state to the demands of his philosophical idea.

After this Plato refused other states which expressly applied to him and sent for him (among whom were the inhabitants of Cyrene and Arcadia), and would not become their law-giver. It was a time in which many Greek states did not prosper with their constitutions, and were not able to find anything new as a substitute. In our time [1820], during the last thirty years, there also have been many constitutions made; and any man who has busied himself therewith finds it easy to make such ones. But theoretical labors do not suffice for the making of constitutions; individuals cannot make them; they are of a spiritual, divine nature, and are developed through History. The thought of an individual signifies nothing against this power of the world-spirit; and if such thoughts do signify anything, i. e. can be realized, then they are nothing else than the product of this power of the spirit of the time. The notion to have Plato become a law-giver was an anachronism; Solon and Lycurgus, it is true, were law-givers, but in the time of Plato this office was not possible any longer. Plato refused further concession to the wishes of states because they would not consent to the first condition which he laid down; and this was the abolishing of all private property. We shall consider this principle later with his Practical Philosophy.

Thus honored everywhere, and especially in Athens, Plato lived to the first year of the 108th Olympiad (348 B. C.), and

died on his birth-day, at a wedding feast, in the 81st year of his age.

Plato's Writings.

We have first to speak of the external form in which Plato's Philosophy has come down to us; and this includes the writings that we have of him: they are without doubt one of the fairest heritages which fate has preserved to us from antiquity. To expound his Philosophy however, which is given in these writings in a form not really scientific, is an undertaking not rendered difficult so much through that unscientific form as through the fact that this Philosophy has been understood differently at different epochs; and especially through the fact that it has been manipulated by unskillful hands in modern times. These manipulators have either brought into it their crude conceptions, incapable of seizing what is spiritual in a spiritual manner, or else have considered that as the essential and most remarkable in Plato's Philosophy which does not belong to philosophy at all in fact, but only to the form of conception. But after all it is only ignorance of Philosophy that renders difficult the apprehension of the Platonic Philosophy. The form and content of these works are of like attractiveness and importance. In their study we must however know beforehand what we have a right to seek in them and can expect to find; and, on the other hand, we must not forget that the Platonic standpoint does not admit of some of the ideas familiar to modern times since its time was not ripe for it. Thus it may very well happen that the writings do not satisfy at all the want with which *we* enter Philosophy; it is however always better that they should *not* entirely satisfy us, than that we should look upon them as the *ultimatum*, the last words on the subject. Plato's standpoint is definite, and a necessary one, but we in our time cannot hold implicitly to him, nor can we transplant ourselves back to the spirit of his time; for Reason now makes higher demands. To set him up as our highest thinker, and his standpoint as the one that we must accept—this course belongs to the weaklings of our time, who cannot sustain the great, the really immense demands of the present spirit of humanity, and hence feel oppressed and flee back, faint-hearted, to him.

One must stand above Plato: i. e. know the needs of the thinking spirit in our time, or rather *have* this need. As in the science of Pedagogy the endeavor is to educate men so as to protect them from the external world, i. e. to fit them for special spheres—that of the counting-house, for example—in which special spheres they know nothing of the world without and take no notice of it; thus in Philosophy they go back to religious faith, and thus too to the Platonic Philosophy. Both are phases which have their essential standpoint and position; but they are not the Philosophy of our time. It may be right to go back to Plato in order to learn again from him the idea of Speculative Philosophy; but it is a piece of frivolity to ape the poetic freedom of his style in dialogues concerning Universal Beauty and Excellence. The literary Messrs. Schleiermachers—and that critical discrimination which discusses whether the one or the other Dialogue be genuine (concerning the great ones there can be no doubt, according to the testimony of the Ancients)—these are for Philosophy quite superfluous, and belong to the hypercriticism of our time.

Style.

Secondly, the character of the Platonic works offers to us in their manifoldness different styles of philosophizing; and this becomes the first difficulty which prevents the understanding of the Platonic Philosophy. Did we still possess the oral discourses (*ágrapha dógmata*) of Plato under the title “Upon the Good” (*peri tagathon*) which his disciples mention, and those “On Philosophy,” or “Upon Ideas,” or “Upon the Good” (upon which Brandis has written), which Aristotle cites and seems to have before him when he treats of Platonic Philosophy: then we should have his Philosophy in a simple form, because he treated it systematically in those works. But we have only his dialogues; and this shape makes it difficult for us to obtain a definite notion of his Philosophy. The form of the dialogue contains namely very heterogeneous elements, in which real philosophizing concerning the absolute essence, and the pictured conceptions about it are mixed up promiscuously; and this constitutes precisely the mixture found in the Platonic works.

Esoteric and Exoteric.

Another difficulty is said to be this: that one should distinguish what is exoteric from what is esoteric Philosophy. Tennemann says: "Plato reserves to himself that privilege which is conceded to every thinker, viz., the privilege of imparting of his discoveries only so much as he found good, and only to those to whom he might entrust their reception. Aristotle, too, had an esoteric and exoteric Philosophy, with only this difference, that it was with him a merely *formal* distinction, while with Plato it was also a *material* one." How simple! He speaks as though a philosopher might be in possession of his thoughts just like external things! But the philosophical idea is in reality something quite different—men do not possess it, but, on the contrary, *it* rather possesses the men. When philosophers explain themselves concerning philosophical objects they must be guided by their ideas; they cannot hold them in their pockets; and if one speaks with another in an external manner, the idea is always implied in what they say, if what they say only has content. To the delivery of an external thing there does not belong much, but to the communication of an idea there belongs fitness; this remains always esoteric, and hence one has not to deal with what is merely exoteric in philosophers. These are superficial conceptions.

What Person speaks for Plato?

One need not count among the difficulties of comprehending the real speculations of Plato, the external side, that Plato in his dialogues speaks not *in propria persona*, but introduces Socrates and many others discoursing, of whom one does not always know which one really conveys Plato's opinion. In respect to this historical circumstance which seems to pertain to the many-sidedness of Plato, there has been much said by ancients and moderns; "he has only represented historically the manner and doctrine of Socrates;" "adopted much in his dialogues from this or that sophist, and evidently brought forward many old Philosophemes, principally Pythagorean, Heraclitic and Eleatic, and in the last accordingly the Eleatic form of treatment very much appears"; so that, accord-

ing to these views, these Philosophies would form the entire matter of the works and only the external form would belong to Plato;—it is therefore necessary on this account to distinguish what really belongs to him and what does not, and to see whether those ingredients harmonize with each other. In the Socratic dialogues as Cicero gives them one can easily make out the persons, but with Cicero there is no fundamental interest [i. e. speculative content] in question. With Plato, however, there is no real ambiguity; the difficulty is only apparent. From the dialogues of Plato, his Philosophy comes out quite clearly; for they are not like the dialogues of many writers which consist of a collection of monologues, wherein one person holds this opinion, another that, and each remains of the same opinion finally. But the differences of opinion which occur are examined, and the result is that the true is arrived at; or the entire movement of thought in the dialogue, when the result is a negative one, belongs to Plato. Hence what belongs to Plato or to Socrates in the dialogue is evident without further investigation. It is, however, to be remarked that since the essence of Philosophy is the same, each philosopher must necessarily take up the preceding Philosophies into his own; what properly belongs to him, is how he has carried them out and developed them to a higher degree. Philosophy is therefore not a mere individual affair like a work of art; and even in this it is mostly skill which the artist has acquired from others that gives him success. The invention of the artist is the thought of his whole work [i. e. his IDEAL], and the intelligent application of the previously found and prepared means; the immediate impressions and peculiar inventions may be infinite in number. But Philosophy has one thought, one essence, lying at the basis; and in the place of the earlier true recognition of the same, nothing else can be substituted, but it itself must enter into the later Philosophies with the same necessity as it first appeared. I have therefore already remarked that Plato's dialogues are not to be looked upon as though it was their business to give currency to the systems of different philosophers, nor as though his Philosophy was an Eclectic Philosophy which was formed out of them; they are rather the knots in which these abstract, one-sided principles are now united in a truly concrete manner.

In the general conception of a History of Philosophy we have already seen that such knots occur in the line of progress of philosophic development, and in these it is that the True arrives at concreteness. The Concrete is the unity of different determinations, or principles; these, in order to become developed, in order to come clearly before consciousness, must first be set up for and by themselves [each one as the sole truth]. Through this they receive as a matter of course the shape of one-sided abstractions as compared with the following higher one; the latter, however, does not destroy them, nor let them lie unnoticed, but takes them up as moments of its own higher principle. In the Platonic Philosophy we see, therefore, many Philosophemes which belong to an earlier time, but they are taken up into Plato's deeper principle and therein united. This relation is possible from the fact that the Platonic Philosophy exhibits a totality of the idea: hence, as result, it includes in itself the principles of the previous Philosophies. Plato in many of his works attempts nothing else but an exposition of the more ancient Philosophies; and what there is peculiarly his own in these expositions consists only in the fact that he has expanded them. His *Timæus*, according to all testimony, is the enlargement of a Pythagorean writing which we still possess; and, in the case of the *Parmenides*, Plato's enlargement is of such a kind that its original principle is cancelled in its one-sidedness.

The Form of the Platonic Exposition.

For the removal of these last two difficulties, as a solution of the first, the *form* is to be characterized in which Plato has propounded his ideas; and another point is, to separate it from that which is Philosophy as such with him. The form of the Platonic Philosophy, as is well known, is that of the dialogue. The beauty of this form is especially attractive: yet one must not (as frequently happens) hold that it is the most perfect form of philosophical exposition; it is a peculiarity of Plato's, and as a work of art is worthy of being considered.

First, to the external form belongs the *scenery* and the *dramatic shape*. Plato makes for his dialogues a surrounding of actuality,—in the locality and persons, and begins with

some individual occasion which brings together these persons, all of which is of itself very lovely and open. The chief person is Socrates; among the others are many well known stars, such as Agathon, Zeno, Aristophanes, &c. We come to a place: in *Phædrus* to a Plane-tree, to the clear waters of the *Ilyssus*, through which Socrates and *Phædrus* pass together; in other dialogues the place is at the halls of the *Gymnasia*, at the *Academy*, or at a banquet. For the reason that Plato himself never comes in by name, but puts his thoughts in the mouths of other persons, he clears himself of all that is thetic or dogmatic, perfectly; and we see just as little of the one who manipulates the machinery of the exhibition as we do in the histories of *Thucydides* or in *Homer*. *Xenophon* permits his personality to appear at times, and he exhibits everywhere the desire to justify the life and teachings of Socrates through examples. With Plato, on the contrary, all is quite objective and plastic; and he uses great art in removing far from himself his statements of doctrines, often putting them in the mouth of the third or fourth person.

In the Tone of the exposition as regards the personal behavior of those who take part, there prevails moreover the most noble urbanity of cultivated men; one learns then what refinement of manner is, and sees the man of the world who knows how to demean himself properly. Politeness does not quite express "urbanity," and contains something more, something superfluous, namely, expressions of respect, of preference, and obligation; urbanity is the true politeness, and lies at the basis of it. Urbanity, however, holds fast to this: it concedes to each one with whom one speaks, perfect personal freedom of sentiments and opinions, as well as the right to utter them; so that one even in rejoinder and counterstatement implies in his tone that he holds his own utterance as a subjective one compared with the utterance of the other; for it is a conversation into which persons enter as persons, and not the objective reason speaking with itself. Hence, in all the energy of utterance it is always borne in mind that the other is also a thinking person: one must not speak oracularly, nor browbeat another. This urbanity is, however, not feigned, but rather the greatest frankness and sincerity; and this constitutes the charm of the dialogues of Plato.

The dialogue is, finally, not a conversation in which what one says has and should have a contingent connection so as not to exhaust the subject. If one wishes merely to "converse," then chance and the caprice of fancy guide the discourse. In the introduction, it is true, the dialogues of Plato have at times also this form of conversation, consequently the appearance of proceeding without design; he makes Socrates set out from the particular conceptions of individuals, from their circle of ideas; but later the dialogue comes to the development of the theme and the subjective phase of conversation vanishes, and then begins a fairer and more consequent dialectical progress. Socrates speaks, proceeds by himself in his argument, draws a conclusion, and gives to all this an external turn, putting it in the form of a question; for most of the questions are directed in such a manner that the person interrogated answers only yes or no. The dialogue would seem to be best adapted to exhibit an argument, because it moves alternately to and fro; its different sides are divided up among different persons, so that the theme gets life and animation. But the dialogue has this disadvantage—that the movement of the discussion seems to be guided by caprice; the feeling always remains therefore, at the end of the dialogue, that the subject might have been treated differently and had different results. In the Platonic dialogues, however, this caprice is only apparent; for the unfolding of the dialogue is in fact only a development of the subject-matter, and little is left to the persons conversing. Such persons, as we have seen in the dialogues quoted in our chapter on Socrates, are plastic persons in the dialogue. It is not their business merely to give their opinions, or, as the French express it, *pour placer son mot*. As in the examination in the Catechism the answers are prescribed, so in these dialogues; for the author makes those who answer speak what he chooses. The question is so directed to the point, that only a quite simple answer is possible; and in this consists precisely the beauty and greatness of this dialogic art, and by this means also it gains the appearance of *naïveté*.

Now there is combined with this external side of personality, in the first place, the fact that the Platonic Philosophy does not announce itself as a special field in which is begun some special science in its proper sphere; but it admits the validity of the

ordinary conceptions of the existing culture—those of Socrates, for example, as well as those of the Sophists and also of the earlier Philosophies—and refers likewise in the course of the procedure to examples, and the modes of view prevailing. A systematic exposition of Philosophy we could not expect to find in this form. In this lies the inconvenience for a general survey, since no standard is at hand by which to decide whether the subject is exhausted or not. Notwithstanding this, it is pervaded by one spirit, and one definite standpoint of Philosophy is portrayed in it, though this spirit does not appear in the definite form that our time demands. The philosophical culture of Plato as well as the general culture of his time was not yet ripe for real scientific works; the idea was yet too fresh and new, and it was reserved for Aristotle to be the first to succeed with a scientific, systematic exposition.

Defect of the Philosophic Standpoint.

With this defect on the part of the form in Plato's exposition there is connected also a defect in view of the concrete determination of the idea itself, since there is a mixing up of the different elements of the Platonic Philosophy which are presented in these dialogues, namely, the mere opinions concerning Essence are intermingled with the strict comprehensive statements of the same, in a loose, popular manner, so that especially the former often assume a mythical exposition;—a mingling which is unavoidable in the earliest stages of real science seeking its true form. Plato's sublime mind, which had an intuition or representation of Spirit as such, penetrated its object with the speculative comprehension; but he only *began* this penetration, and did not as yet grasp together the entire reality thereof with the comprehension: or the knowing which appeared in Plato was not yet realized as a complete whole. Here it happens, therefore, that the notion of essence is separated again from its comprehension, and falls into opposition with it, so that he has not distinctly expressed the doctrine that the comprehension alone is the true essence: hence we see Plato speak of "God" and again of the "Absolute essence of things," but isolatedly, or in such a connection that the two seem to be separated, and "God" to be a term

employed by Representation to express the uncomprehended Essence. There enters also into the treatment for the further elaboration and reality of the exposition, the products of fancy; in the place of scientific procedure (in accordance with the comprehension), we have myths—i. e. self-developed movements of phantasy, or stories taken from the realm of sensuous representation, which, though defined by thought, are not thoroughly interpenetrated by it. In general, what is spiritual is determined through the forms of representation; there are taken up, for example, sensuous phenomena of the body, or of nature at large, and thoughts about them are paraded which do not at all exhaust the subject; they are not thoroughly thought out, and the comprehension [i. e. the exhaustive idea of the whole] does not proceed [develop] independently in itself.

From these two causes it happens in the apprehension of the Platonic Philosophy that either too much or too little is found in it. The Ancients, the so-called Neo-Platonists, find too much; they allegorized the Greek Mythology and presented it as an expression of ideas (which myths, of course, always are), and they have likewise found the ideas contained in the Platonic myths and put them into the form of Philosophemes (in this consists solely the merit of Philosophy, that it exhibits the True in the [scientific] form of the Comprehension): so, too, what is found in a scientific form in Plato, is taken by the Neo-Platonists for the expression of the Absolute essence—e. g. the doctrine of essence in Parmenides is taken for “Plato’s Theology”—as though Plato himself had not made a distinction between the two. Even in the Platonic pure thought, representation as such [thinking with images], is not entirely dispensed with: or it is not expressly said that these pure thoughts are in themselves the essence; i. e. they do not have a higher meaning for Plato than representations do, and are not essence itself.—The moderns are apt to find too little; for they cling to the side of representation and see reality in it. What is found in Plato in the form of Comprehension, or as purely speculative, is apt to pass with them for a manipulation of abstract logical conceptions, or, as they express it, for “empty hair-splitting”: and that which is given in the form of representation passes with them for a Philoso-

pheme. Thus we find in Tennemann and others a strict reduction of Platonic philosophy to the forms of our formal Metaphysics; see, for example, his proof of the Being of God.

However famous the mythic exposition of the philosophemes in Plato may be, and although it constitutes the attractive element in his dialogues, yet it gives rise to much misunderstanding; and it is a mistake to hold these myths for the most excellent part of Plato's philosophy. Many philosophemes are indeed brought nearer to intelligibility through the mythical exposition; yet it is not a true form of exposition; philosophemes are thoughts which, in order to be pure, must be stated as thoughts. The myth is an exposition which always employs sensuous pictures which are directed to the faculty of representation and not to the thinking activity; therein lies, however, a weakness of thought which knows that it does not yet hold things firmly, and hence is not yet the free thought. The myth belongs to the pedagogy of the human race, in that it excites and allures one to busy himself with the content; as an impure statement of thought through the use of sensuous forms, it cannot express what the thought intends. When the ability to comprehend is acquired, then the myth is needed no longer. Plato frequently says: it is difficult to express himself on this subject, and hence he will have recourse to a myth; this is easier, of course. And Plato says of simple concepts, that they are dependent transitory moments which have their ultimate truth in God; and as he now speaks of God for the first time [i. e. without defining or deducing the idea of God], it is a mere representation. Thus the style of representation and the genuine speculative intermingle.

Hence in order to derive the philosophy of Plato from his dialogues, it is necessary to separate what belongs to representation (imagination) from the philosophic idea itself, especially in those places where he has recourse to a myth for the exposition of a philosophic idea; only by this precaution can one find out what belongs only to the form of representation, and as such is not essential to the thought. But if the reader does not of himself know what *Comprehension* is, i. e. what the Speculative consists in, then there is great danger that when he is engaged with these myths he will derive a multi-

tude of propositions and theorems from the dialogues, and offer them as Platonic philosophemes, when they are in reality nothing of the kind, but are merely forms of representation. Thus, e. g., Plato in his *Timæus* makes use of the form of expression that God made the world and that dæmons had certain functions to perform in the work; this statement is made quite in the form of representation [i. e. symbolically]. Now, if it is taken for a philosophical dogma of Plato, that God created the world, and that higher creatures of a spiritual kind exist, and have assisted God in the creation, although it must be confessed that this stands literally in Plato, yet it does not belong to his philosophy. When he says in the form of representation [i. e. symbolically] that the soul of man has a rational and an irrational part, this is to be taken without reserve; but Plato adds, not philosophically, that the soul is composed of two kinds of substances, two sorts of things. When he represents knowing and learning as reminiscence, this doctrine can be taken to mean that the soul of man pre-existed before his birth. Likewise when he speaks of the most important elements of his philosophy, of ideas, of the universal, as the abiding and independent, as the models of sensuous things, we could easily be led to think those ideas, after the manner of the modern "categories of the understanding," to be substances which exist in the intellect of God, or exist for themselves as independent beings, e. g. as angels, outside of the real world. In fine, all that is expressed in the form of representation [symbols] the moderns take for philosophy. Platonic philosophy can be construed in this way, and be justified by Plato's own words; but if one knows what philosophy is, he does not trouble himself about such symbolical expressions, and has no difficulty in discovering what Plato intended.

In the exposition of the Platonic philosophy itself which I now enter upon, although these two styles of writing cannot be entirely sundered, yet they must be carefully distinguished and criticised in a very different manner from that which is current in modern times. We have to unfold first Plato's general idea of philosophy and of scientific knowledge, and secondly the special provinces in which he applies this idea.

Plato's Idea of the Value of Philosophy—its place in the State.

As respects the general idea of philosophy, the first point to consider is the view that Plato held with reference to the value of philosophy. We see in him a man quite filled with the importance of the knowledge of philosophy; and he shows an enthusiasm for the thinking of that which is in-and-for-itself. The Cyrenaics set up the doctrine that the relation of existences to the individual consciousness is their essence, and the Cynics (posited) immediate freedom as essence: on the contrary, Plato posits the self-mediating unity of consciousness and essence, or scientific knowing. He expresses everywhere the sublimest views regarding the worth of philosophy, and he manifests the deepest feeling and clearest consciousness that all else is to be regarded as inferior; he speaks of it with the greatest animation, with energy, with all the pride of science; we should not dare to assume his attitude toward philosophy in our day. Of the so-called modesty of science in the presence of other spheres there is no trace to be found in his writings—not even of man toward God. Plato is fully conscious of the nearness and unity of the human reason to God. One is very tolerant when he reads this in Plato, an ancient, for it seems to be a thing entirely of the past; in a modern philosopher, however, it would be taken as very wicked. Philosophy is to Plato the highest possession, the essence, for men: it alone is that which man has to seek. From numerous passages on this subject, I quote one from the *Timæus*: “The knowledge of the most excellent things begins through the eyes. The distinction of the visible day from the night, the lunations and revolutions of the planets, have produced the knowledge of time and given rise to the investigation of the nature of the whole. Whence we have gained philosophy; and a greater good than it, given by God to men, has neither come nor will ever come.”

One of the most famous and at the same time most condemned passages is that in which he expresses himself on this subject in the *Republic*, since it contradicts so much the ordinary notions of men; and it is the more striking inasmuch as it concerns the relation of philosophy to the state, and hence to the actuality. For although one may attribute high value to it in other respects, yet those have merely a

subjective value; here, however, it concerns the constitution and government, the actuality. After Plato has made Socrates expound the true state, he makes Glaucon interrupt this exposition by demanding of Socrates that he show how it is possible for such a state to exist. Socrates talks much round the point, will not come to it, seeks by subterfuges to avoid it, and asserts that he is not bound, when he gives a description of justice, also to explain how it may be established as an actual thing: grant this; yet one must adduce the means through which, if not perfection, at least an approximation thereto, may be made possible. At last, when the question is pressed upon him, he says: "It shall be spoken even if it is to be overwhelmed with a flood of laughter and perfect incredulity. Until philosophers rule in the state, or the now so-called kings and men in power philosophize truly and perfectly, and thus the ruling power and philosophy coincide—until the different dispositions are united which now are isolated, and engaged in these provinces separately for themselves, pursuing the one or the other; until then, oh friend Glaucon, there will be no end of evil for the people, nor, think I, for the human race in general; and this state of which I spoke will not be produced nor see the light of the sun before" this happens. "This it is," adds Socrates, "that I have so long delayed to say because I know that it goes so much against the common view." Plato makes Glaucon answer: "Socrates, you have expressed yourself in such a manner as to imply that you think that there are a multitude, and those not base people, who would throw off their mantles and grasp the nearest best weapons, and, assembled in closed ranks, make a charge upon you; and if you did not know how to appease them with reasons, you would have to repent bitterly."

Plato thus sets up the doctrine of the necessity of this union of philosophy and government. As regards this demand, it may well seem a great piece of presumption on their part to demand that the government of the state should be put into the hands of philosophers; for the basis of History is another than that of Philosophy. In History, the Idea as the absolute ruling power reproduces itself: in other words, God rules the world; yet History is the idea which is realized in the *natural* form and not with consciousness of it at the same

time. There is, of course, much respect paid to universal thoughts of right, ethics, what pleases God, &c.; yet for the most part actions flow from the impulses of the individual incited by special ends and aims. The actualization of the idea, therefore, is brought about through a mingling of thoughts and comprehensions with immediate particular ends; so that this actualization is produced only on one side through thought, but on the other side through circumstances, through human deeds, as means. These means seem often to be opposed to the idea, but this does not matter; all these limited purposes are in fact only means of producing the idea, because the Idea is the absolute power in the world. The idea, consequently, comes to existence in the world, since it has no lack of anything; [note the proof of the existence of God in the *Meditations* of Descartes: the Total and Universal has nothing to resist it;] it is, however, not necessary that political rulers be conscious of the idea.

In order to decide on the merits of this doctrine that the rulers of nations must be philosophers, it is necessary to consider well what is meant by philosophy in the Platonic sense and in the sense that was current in that time. The word "philosophy" has at different times had very different meanings. There was a time when they called a man who did not believe in ghosts, or in the existence of the devil, a philosopher. Notions of that sort are gone by, and it no longer occurs to any one to call a man a philosopher on this account. The English call that province philosophy which is known by us as experimental physics; a philosopher in England is, consequently, any one who makes such experiments, and possesses theoretical acquaintance with chemistry, mechanics, &c. With Plato, on the other hand, philosophy is confounded with the consciousness of the supersensuous which with us is termed religious consciousness; Platonic philosophy is thus the consciousness of what is essentially true and right, the consciousness of universal ends in the state, and their practical validity. In the entire history, from the migration of nations on to the time when Christianity became the universal religion, the business of philosophy has been nothing else but to realize the supersensuous realm which in the first place was for-and-by-itself—to realize this supersensuous

realm—that is to say, to mould the actuality into conformity with what is in-and-for-itself universal and true. This has been the further business of culture generally. A state, a government and constitution, in modern times has therefore quite another basis than a state of ancient times, and especially of the time in which Plato lived. The Greeks generally at that time were utterly discontented with their democratic constitutions and the state of affairs that resulted from them: so also have all philosophers condemned the democracies of the Greek states in which such things happened as the punishment of their generals. [See Grote's History of Greece, chap. LXIV.] Under such a constitution, one is apt to think, the most honorable treatment would be shown toward the best men of the state: in fact, however, arbitrariness and caprice held sway, and only for the moment was it restrained through such preponderating individualities and such geniuses in statesmanship as Aristides, Themistocles, and others;—a condition of affairs which preceded the downfall of this form of constitution. In our states, on the contrary, the end and aim of the state, the universal good, is immanent and powerful in quite a different way from that in ancient time. The legal status of things, the tribunals, the constitution, the will of the people is so firm in itself that it is only for the moment to be disturbed; and the question naturally arises whether anything at all is dependent upon the individual. “To govern” means, with us, to manage affairs in the actual state according to the nature of the circumstances; and this requires the ruler to have a consciousness of the nature of those circumstances; the actuality is to be brought into harmony with the comprehension [i. e. the Ideal], and hence the idea realized in existence. It is clear that when Plato says “Philosophy should govern,” he means that the status of affairs should be directed and controlled through universal principles. This is carried out in modern states much more completely, inasmuch as universal principles are essentially their basis; of course, not in all modern states, but still in the greater part. Some are already upon this stage, others are in the midst of the struggle for it; but it is generally acknowledged that such principles ought to constitute the substantial basis of government and administration.

Thus the demand of Plato has been substantially realized in modern times. But what *we* call Philosophy, the activity of pure thought, concerns the form, which has a peculiar province; but it does not depend upon this form whether or not the Universal, freedom, the right, is made the principle of a state. An example of what a philosopher could accomplish upon a throne would be furnished in Marcus Aurelius; there are, however, only private deeds that can be mentioned of him, and the Roman empire was not bettered by him. Frederic II. is, on the other hand, with justice called the philosophical king. He busied himself with Wolfian metaphysics and French philosophy and made verses, and was thus a philosopher according to the notions of his time; philosophy seems to have been a special private concern of his own individual liking, and to have been distinct from his function as king. But he was also a philosophical king in the sense that he set up for his principle a quite universal end and aim, the welfare, the good of his state, in all his actions and in all directions, in opposition to stipulations with other states, and in opposition to particular rights [privileges] in his own country, which he subordinated to the in-and-for-itself universal end and aim. Later, when it becomes an ethical and customary affair to follow the course marked out, the princes are not any longer called philosophers, although the same principle is extant, and the government and the *institutions* especially are founded on it.

In the Republic, Plato speaks further yet, in an allegory, of the distinctions of condition in philosophic culture and of the necessity for the existence of philosophy; it is a prolix allegory which is remarkable for its brilliancy. He represents it as follows: "They conceive a subterranean dwelling like a cave with a long entrance open towards the light. Its inhabitants are fastened in such a manner that they cannot turn their heads, and thus can only look towards the back of the cave. Far behind their backs there burns a torch on high. In the interval there extends, above, a road, and along it is built a low wall, and behind this wall" (towards the light) "are found men who bear and hold up over it, like the puppets in a marionette-theatre, all sorts of statues of men and beasts, while they alternately converse with each other and

are silent. Those fettered ones are able to see only the shadows of these figures as they fall on the opposite wall, and they take these shadows for the true reality; and they hear what is said by those who are holding the puppets as it reverberates from the wall in front of them and take it for the speech of the shadows. Now if it should so happen that one of them should get loose from his fetters and then was obliged to turn his neck so that he now could see things themselves, he would believe that which he now saw to be essenceless dreams, still thinking those shadows to be the true; and if they drew up anyone into the light out of his prison, he would be blinded by the light and see nothing, and would hate those who drew him up to the light for having deprived him of the truth, and in place thereof prepared only pain and injury for him." This kind of myth belongs to what is peculiarly the province of the Platonic Philosophy, namely, to draw a distinction between the sensuous world in men and the consciousness of the supersensuous.

Inasmuch as we now have to speak more at length of this subject, we must, secondly, proceed to consider *the nature of knowing* as it is according to Plato, and with it begin the exposition of the Platonic Philosophy itself.

The Nature of Cognition.

(a) Plato defines philosophers as those "who have an appetite for looking at the truth" (Republic, Book V., chap. 20). Glaucon: "This is correct; but how do you illustrate it?"—Socrates: "I do not say this to every one; you will, however, agree with me in this."—"In what?"—"That since the beautiful is opposed to the ugly, they are two."—"Why not?"—"With justice and injustice, good and evil, and of every other idea, the same is true; each of them is one, taken for itself, though as to their relation with the actions and bodies and other ideas everywhere appearing, each one seems to be a manifold."—"You say right."—"I distinguish now according to this, on the one hand, the men who love public shows, delight in arts, and practical men; on the other hand, those of whom we are speaking and who alone are correctly called philosophers."—"How do you mean that?"—"Namely, such as delight to see spectacles and hear stories, love fine voices

and colors and shapes, and all that consists of the like ; but the nature of the Beautiful in general their thought is incapable of seeing and loving."—"So it is."—"But those capable of going to the Beautiful itself and seeing it for itself, are these not rare?"—"Yes indeed."—"Now, whoever holds beautiful things for beautiful, but does not know Beauty itself, and when any one leads him to the knowledge of the same is not able to follow, do you suppose that he passes life in a waking or a dreaming state?" (i. e. the non-philosophic are compared to dreamers.) "For, see, to dream, is it not this: when one—be he asleep, or awake even—holds the likeness of a thing not for the likeness but for the thing itself which it resembles?"—"I would, of course, say of him that he dreams."—"The waking man then, on the other hand, is he who holds the Beautiful itself for that which exists and who can recognize it as well as he can recognize that which only participates in it [i. e. sensuous things], and does not confound the two."

In this philosophical exposition we see in some sort what the so much talked of Platonic Ideas are. The Idea is nothing but what is current with us under the name of the Universal, when this word is not taken in the sense of *formal* Universal—which is only a property of things—but as the in-and-for-itself existent, as the essence, as that which alone is true. We translate the Greek word "*eidos*" by "*genus*" or "*species*" (German, *Gattung*, or *Art*), and the idea is of course the *genus*, but in the form in which it is apprehended by thought and exists for it. When "*genus*" or "*species*" is seized as a number of similar determinations collected by reflection from several individuals, to serve as a *mark* for the convenience of the understanding, then we have the Universal in quite an external [superficial] form. The genus [generic element] of the animal is, however, his vitality; this vitality is his substantiality, and if one takes this from him, nothing is left. Philosophy is thus to Plato in general the science of this in-itself Universal, to which he, in opposition to the individual, again and again returns. Diogenes Laertius relates: "When Plato spoke of the *table-ness* and *goblet-ness*, Diogenes the cynic said, 'I see indeed a table and a goblet, but not the *table-ness* nor the *goblet-ness*.' 'Right,' answered Plato ;

'for though you have eyes which serve to see the table and the goblet, yet the wherewith to see table-ness and goblet-ness, i. e. *Reason*, you have not.'—What Socrates began is thus completed by Plato, who recognizes only the Universal, the idea, the good, as the essential. By the exposition of his "Ideas" Plato has revealed the Intellectual-World, which, however, is not a "beyond" to Actuality, i. e. in heaven or some other place outside of existing reality, but the actual world itself. This is also what Lencippus has done: the ideal is brought nearer the actuality and not—metaphysically—placed behind nature. The essence of the doctrine of ideas is accordingly the view, that the True is not the sensuous existence, but that the True is that which is self-determined, in-and-for-itself universal, and that this alone is existent in the world: the intellectual-world is therefore the true, that which alone is worth knowing; it is the eternal, and in-and-for-itself [potential and actual] divine. Differences are not what endures, but what exists only in a state of change; yet the Absolute of Plato as that which is in-itself one and self-identical, is, at the same time, essentially *concrete*, inasmuch as it is a movement which returns into itself and is eternally by itself [i. e. self-contained]. The love for ideas is what Plato calls "enthusiasm."

The misunderstanding which arises concerning the Platonic ideas is twofold. The first springs from that kind of thought which is formal, and holds that to be the true reality which is sensuously represented—what Plato calls mere shadows. When Plato, namely, speaks of the Universal as the Essence, such a habit of thought conceives the Universal only in the form of a property, i. e. as a mere thought [an abstraction made by and existing] in our understanding; or else it conceives that Plato takes this universal as substance, as an essence in itself, which in that case falls outside of us [i. e. has corporeal existence like the things for which it is substituted]. Again, when Plato uses the expression, "Sensuous things—like copies—resemble that which is in-and-for-itself," or "the idea is their model and archetype," these "ideas" if not exactly understood as if they were things, yet are taken for a sort of transcendental beings which lie somewhere outside of us, afar off in an extra-mundane intelligence, and

are pictured conceptions, which are kept out of sight like the model of the artist, according to which he fashions a given material and moulds it into shape. Inasmuch, namely, as they are removed from this sensuously objective actuality which passes for truth, and are separated from the actuality of the individual consciousness, it follows that the Ego which thinks them, and whose original representations they are, must be conceived as outside of consciousness and be represented always as something alien to it.

The second misunderstanding which prevails in respect to ideas, is, not that they lie outside of our consciousness, but that although they pass for necessary ideals of our reason, yet their productions neither have reality now, nor can ever reach it. As in the case just considered, where the "Beyond" was an extra-mundane conception in which the genera or species were regarded as substances, so in this case our *Reason* is taken as such a "beyond" to Reality. When, however, they are taken as the forms of Reality in us, then another misunderstanding arises inasmuch as they are seized as being of an æsthetic nature [i. e. belong to the sensory]; in this way they come to be regarded as "intellectual intuitions," which must be seen through immediate vision, and thus belong either to the fortunate possessor of genius, or to him who attains to a condition of ecstasy and inspiration. Such intellectual intuitions would be only products of imagination or phantasy; but Plato's Ideas are not such products, nor are such products adequate to the knowing of truth. The Ideas are not found in immediate consciousness, but they are to be reached only in and through scientific cognition: and they are immediate intuitions only in so far as they consist of the simple results which scientific cognition arrives at by its processes. In other words, Immediate intuition is only that phase in the process of knowing which seizes the simple result. For this reason, one cannot be said to *have* them (intellectual intuitions), but they are *produced* through the activity of the cognizing mind. Enthusiasm is their first irregular production, but scientific thought brings them first into a rationally developed shape and into the daylight: in it they are likewise real, for they are the only being.

Accordingly, Plato distinguishes, in the first place, *science*,

the knowledge of that which *is* in truth, from opinion (Republic V., chap. XXI. & XXII.): "Such a thinking as cognizes [systematically] we may reasonably call *science*, but the other should be called *opinion*. The scientific thought relates to that which *is*; opinion is opposed to it, but in such a manner that its content is not *nothing*—that would be ignorance—but it is something *opined*. Opinion is hence the middle ground between ignorance and science, and its content is a mingling of being and nought. Sensuous objects, the subject-matter of opinion—in short, *the individual*—only *participates* in the Beautiful, the Good, the Just, i. e. in the Universal; but it participates likewise in the Ugly, the Bad, the Unjust, &c. The twofold is likewise half of each. The individual is not merely *either* great *or* small, light *or* heavy, i. e. merely *one* of these opposites, but every individual is as well the one as the other. Such a mingling of being and non-being is the individual which is the object of opinion";—a mingling in which the oppositions have not been dissolved into the Universal. The latter [i. e. the solving the antitheses in the Universal] would be the speculative idea of science, while the ordinary form of our consciousness belongs to "opinion."

(b) Before we turn to the consideration of the objective, in-itself-existent content of scientific thought, we must first consider more in detail, the subjective existence of knowledge in consciousness, as Plato holds it; and secondly, how the content as soul *is*, or is manifested in Representation; and these two sides constitute the relation of scientific knowledge, as the Universal, to the individual consciousness.

Reminiscence.

(a) The source of our knowledge of the Divine is the same that we mentioned before when speaking of Socrates. The Mind of man contains the very essence [i. e. self-existence] in itself, and in order to acquire a knowledge of the divine, one must develop it in himself and bring it to consciousness. While, however, with the Socratic school this discussion concerning the immanence of science in the Mind of man [i. e. its self-origination] occurs in the form of the question, whether virtue can be taught; and with the sophist Protagoras takes the form of the question, whether sensation is the true—(a

question which touches closely the content of science as well as the distinction of it from opinion): while these views had been advanced before him, Plato went further, and held that the culture for this scientific cognition is not a learning as such, but that what we seem to learn is nothing else than REMINISCENCE. To this subject Plato frequently alludes, but he treats it most at length in the "Meno"; in which place he asserts that there can be nothing really learned, but that learning is rather only a process of recalling that which we possess already, and that the effort which consciousness makes to learn anything is only the excitant to recollection. Plato thus gives a speculative meaning to that question in so far as it relates to the nature of scientific cognition, and not to the empirical view of the process of acquiring knowledge. To *learn*—namely, according to the ordinary notion of it—expresses the taking up of a foreign somewhat into the thinking consciousness: a kind of mechanical combination and filling up of an empty space with things which are themselves of a foreign nature and indifferent to the space which they fill. Such an external state of relation toward that which has come into it—a relation in which the soul appears as *tabula rasa*—belongs to that style of thinking which makes out the growth of a living being to be a mere addition of particles, and is something dead, and unfitting for the nature of Mind, which is subjectivity, unity, being which is by-itself, and eternal in its nature. Plato, however, conceives the true nature of consciousness (in the doctrine of Reminiscence), spirit to be—in which there already exists that which is its object; in other words, spirit is that Being which is *for-itself*. This doctrine contains the comprehension [or exhaustive definition] of the true universal in its movement; the genus, which is in itself its own becoming [or self-generating] since it is already *in itself* [potentially] what it is to become subsequently *for-itself*;—a movement in which it does not proceed beyond itself [but moves in a circle]. This absolute GENUS is spirit, whose movement is only the constant return into itself; so that nothing is *for* it which is not *in* it itself: to learn, according to this, is this movement in which no foreign somewhat is added to it, but instead thereof *its own essence becomes for it*, i. e. it comes to consciousness of itself. That

which is not yet learned is the soul, the consciousness represented as natural being. That which excites mind to science is this appearance (and the confusion caused by it), that the essence of spirit exists as its other, as its negative: a form of appearance [its own appearance as *other* to itself] which contradicts its essence; for mind [spirit] has, or is, the internal certitude that it is all reality. Since it cancels this appearance of the other being [of being objective to itself], it *comprehends* the objective, i. e. arrives at a consciousness of itself, and by so doing reaches science. Images (representations) of individual, temporal, transitory things come, of course, from without; but such is not the case with universal thoughts which, as the True, have their root in the Mind and belong to its nature; through this [universal thought], then, is all external authority rendered superfluous.

Recollection [Ger. *Erinnerung*], in one sense, is an unfitting expression: namely, in this, that it signifies the reproduction of a representation which one has had already at another time. But recollection [*Erinnerung* = internalizing] has also another sense which its etymology gives it, namely, that of [Re-collecting] going into itself: this is the deep meaning of the word [it is scarcely found in English]. In this sense, it can certainly be said that the cognition of the Universal is nothing but a going-into-onesself: that which shows itself at first in an external form [i. e. is sensuously perceived], and is determined as a manifold, is converted by us into something internal, a universal, through the act by which we go into ourselves and recall to mind what is in the depths of our soul. With Plato however, it is not to be denied, the expression "recollection" has chiefly the empirical sense first named. This happens because Plato states the true comprehension (that consciousness is in itself the content of knowing), partly, in the form of representation [i. e. through symbols] and mythically; so that just here the already mentioned mingling of representation and of comprehension enters. In "Meno" Socrates undertakes to show, by questioning a slave who had had no instruction, that learning is a recollection. Socrates asks him questions and lets him answer according to his own opinion, without teaching him anything, or asserting anything to be true; and brings him through this finally

to the expression of a geometrical proposition of the ratio of the diameter [diagonal] of a square to its side. The slave draws out of himself the science, so that it seems as if he only recollected what he already knew but had forgotten. When Plato calls this procedure of drawing out science from consciousness a recollection, it involves the assumption that it already has been once actually in the consciousness: i. e. that the individual consciousness has not only in itself [potentially], according to its essence, the content of knowing, but also has already *been* in possession of it as this individual consciousness, and not in general. But this element of individuality belongs only to the stage of representation; and recollection is not thought [technically speaking], for Recollection has its function in man as a sensuous individual, and not as being Universal. The nature of the production of science is on this account here mixed up with what is individual, i. e. with representation; and cognition here enters in the form of *soul*, as the form of the in-itself [potentially] existing essence, the *one*, since the soul is only a moment [an element] of spirit. Inasmuch as Plato here passes over into the loose style of thinking (i. e. with images), whose content has no longer the pure signification of the Universal but only of the individual, he gives to its further development a mythical shape. He imagines that being-in-itself of spirit in the form of a pre-existence in time, as though the True had existed for us at some former time. But at the same time it is to be remarked that he gives this not as a philosophical doctrine but in the shape of a tradition (*saga*) which he has received from priests and priestesses who are well-informed ["posted up"] in divine things. Similar things are narrated by Pindar and other divine men. According to these traditions, the soul of man is immortal, and that which one calls death ceases to be, but the soul comes [after it] again into existence, and in nowise perishes: "If now the soul is immortal and frequently reappears" (metempsychosis), "and has seen all—that which is in Hades" (in unconsciousness) "just as well as that which is here—then there is no such thing as *learning*; it is only a recalling of that which has been seen elsewhere." This allusion to the Ægyptian doctrine, though it is only a sensuous determinateness, is seized upon by the

historians of philosophy, who tell us that "Plato *has affirmed* that," &c.; but Plato has not "affirmed" these things; it does not belong at all to philosophy, and above all not to his own philosophy; nor is that which we shall find afterwards concerning God to be considered his philosophy.

(*b*) In other dialogues this *mythos* is further and more splendidly developed; he alleges, in the ordinary acceptation of the term "recollection," that the mind of man has seen at a former time that which develops in it its consciousness of the true and in-itself-existent. It is however, in this connection, Plato's chief endeavor to show by this doctrine of reminiscence that Spirit, Soul, Thinking in-and-for-itself, is free; and this has with the ancients, and especially in the Platonic style of representing it, an immediate connection with that which we call the Immortality of the Soul.

(*aa*) In *Phædrus*, Plato speaks of it where he attempts to show that Love (*Eros*) is a divine mania given to us for the greatest happiness. This is an enthusiasm which is a mighty, all-prevailing impulse toward the Idea: but it is no enthusiasm of the breast or of feeling, no intuition, but a consciousness and knowledge of the Ideal. Plato says he must explain the nature of the divine and human soul in order to explain *Eros* [*Phædrus*, 51]: "The first [position] is that the soul is immortal. For that which moves itself is immortal and unchangeable; but whatever has its movement from another is changeable. Whatever moves itself is [a prime mover or] Principle; for it has its origin and beginning in itself and from no other: and just as little can it cease to move itself; for only that ceases which has its movement from another." Plato develops thus at first the simple comprehension of the soul as the self-moving, which [the soul] is in so far a moment [subordinate element] of spirit; but the real life of spirit in-and-for-itself is the consciousness of the absoluteness and freedom of the ego itself. If *we* [moderns] speak of the immortality of the soul, we generally represent it as a physical thing which has properties: and while these may be changed, it [the soul] is so constituted as to be independent of them and not subject to change. Among these properties of the soul, which in that case are represented as independent of the thing [i. e. the soul], there is found that of thinking; and the

thinking activity is here determined as though it were a thing, and as though it could perish and cease to be. In this question, therefore, it is the interest of the doctrine presented in this style to represent the soul as an unchangeable thing that can subsist without having fancy, thought, &c. With Plato, on the contrary, the immortality of the soul depends immediately upon the fact that the soul itself is the thinking activity; so that thought is not a property of the soul, but its substance. It is with the attributes of the soul just as it is with those of a body; gravity is not a quality of a body, but its substance: just as the body would no longer exist if gravity [i. e. all attraction—cohesion and its other forms] were removed, so the soul would not any longer exist if the thinking activity were taken away. Thinking is the activity of the Universal; it, however, is not an abstraction, but that which is reflected into itself, that which posits itself identical with itself, a process which takes place in all representations [i. e. in representing I am conscious that the image or picture in my mind is my own production]; while the thinking activity is unchangeable and remains self-contained throughout all change, the soul itself is that which preserves its identity while in another: e. g. in sensuous intuition it is involved with another, with external material, and yet it preserves its self-identity at the same time. Immortality has, therefore, with Plato not the interest which it has with us in a religious aspect; it is rather connected by Plato with the nature of thinking, i. e. with its internal freedom; and thus it is united to that doctrine which lies at the basis of that which is the chief characteristic of the Platonic philosophy, to wit: this supersensuous foundation which Plato has established; with Plato, therefore, the immortality of the soul is also of the greatest importance.

The Lapse of the Soul.

[Phædrus, 53-55:] “The exposition of the soul,” he continues, “is a long and divine investigation; but a similitude thereof may easily be given in a human mode.” Here follows the allegory, which is, however, somewhat motley and inconsistent. He says: “The soul is likened unto the united power of a chariot and driver.” This image [unfamiliar to our time]

does not speak to us. "The horses," (the impulse) "and the charioteers of the gods are good and from a good source. Our charioteer guides the reins; but only one of the [our] horses is beautiful and good and of such origin, the other is the opposite and of opposite pedigree. On this account the guiding is difficult and troublesome. How the terms mortal and immortal apply to this being we must attempt to explain. Every soul is anxious about that which is inanimate, and wanders through the whole heavens passing from one idea into another. If it is perfect and winged, it soars aloft," i. e. has sublime thoughts, "and regulates the entire world. When, however, its wings sink, the soul impels itself around till it meets with something solid; it then assumes an earthly body which it moves through its own power; and the whole is called an animal, it being a soul and a body joined together, and has the appellation of mortal." The one is thus the soul as a thinking activity, that which is in-and-for-itself; the other is the combination of it with matter. This transition from thinking to corporeal nature is very difficult, and for the ancients too difficult to comprehend; we shall see more concerning it when we come to treat of Aristotle. From what has been said one can see the ground of the view which generally prevails concerning the Platonic philosopheme, that the soul has existed for itself before this life, and from thence has lapsed into matter, united itself with it and thereby polluted itself with it, and that its destination is to abandon matter again. The connection of the two sides which arise in the process by which the spiritual realizes itself from and out of itself is a point that is not discussed in all its depth by the ancients; they have two abstractions, soul and matter, and the connection is expressed only in the form of the LAPSE of the soul.

"But the immortal," continues Plato—"if we do not express it according to scientific thought, but picture it in conformity with the style of representation, which does not discern nor adequately comprehend God,—the immortal life of God is that in which he possesses a body and a soul, but which are united through their essential nature," i. e. made one not in an external manner, but in and for themselves. Soul and body are two abstractions, life is the unity of both; and since God's

nature is defined for the representation [i. e. expressed symbolically] as that whose soul and body are indivisibly in one, he is therefore Reason, whose form and content are inseparably one. This is a great definition of God, a great idea which indeed, for that matter, is no other than the definition of modern times: the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, the inseparableness of the ideal and real,—i. e. of the soul and the body. The mortal, the finite, is on the contrary determined by Plato correctly as that whose existence is not absolutely adequate to the idea, or, in other words, to the form of subjectivity.

Plato now describes further how it comes to pass in the life of the divine essence, what spectacle the soul has before it, and how the loss of its wings happens: "The chariots of the gods travel along in ranks, which the leader Jupiter conducts, driving his winged chariot. The host of other gods and goddesses, arranged in eleven divisions, follow him; and each performing his part, they act the most magnificent and blessed spectacles. The substance, devoid of color, shape, and feeling, allows thought alone, that which guides the soul, to be its spectator: and thus there arises for it true science. [See Kapila, LIX. to LXVI., p. 228, vol. II. Jour. Sp. Phil.] Thus it sees that which IS, and lives in the contemplation of the True since it follows the circle (of ideas) which returns into itself. In this circle" (of gods) "it beholds Justice, Temperance, and Science, not [as qualities] of that which we call 'things,' but as existing in truth in-and-for-itself." This is now expressed after the manner of an occurrence or event. When the soul comes back from this exhibition [spectacle], the charioteer takes his horses to the manger, feeds them with ambrosia, and waters them with nectar. This is the life of the gods. But other souls, fallen into tumult through failure on the part of the charioteer or of the horses, issue with broken wings from that celestial region, cease to see the truth [i. e. mistake appearance for real being], nourish themselves with the food of Opinion, and fall upon the earth; according to its experience—the fact of its having seen more or less—it comes to a higher or lower station here. In this condition, it still has a recollection of that which it saw; and if it spies anything beautiful, just, &c., it is beside itself with enthusi.

asm. The wings again gain power; and the soul, especially of the philosopher, remembers its former condition in which it saw not merely *something* beautiful, *something* just, &c., but Beauty and Justice themselves." Since the life of gods is possible for the soul, when in the presence of the individual Beautiful, it is reminded of the Universal, it follows that there exists in the soul (just as in such existence in-and-for-itself) the idea of the Beautiful, Good, Just, as of existences in-and-for-themselves and which are in-and-for-themselves Universal. This constitutes the general basis of the Platonic theory. When Plato speaks of science as reminiscence, he intends to have this taken only in a symbolical or allegorical sense. He does not take this in the sense that certain theologians have done, who seriously debated the question whether the soul had pre-existed before its birth, and if so, where. It cannot be shown that Plato believed this, and he never spoke of it in the sense that the theologians discuss it; just as little evidence is there that he thought this life to be a lapse from a perfect condition, or an incarceration, &c. But that which Plato expresses as truth is this: that Consciousness is, in its form as Reason, the divine essence and life; that man looks upon it in pure thinking and cognizes it, and this cognition itself is this celestial abode and activity.

(bb) More distinctly, cognition makes its appearance in its form as soul in the passage where Plato in the Phædon has unfolded these notions of the immortality of the soul. What in the Phædrus is stated as a myth, and clearly distinguished from a scientific statement of the truth, is not thus carefully discriminated in the Phædon, that famed dialogue in which Plato makes Socrates speak of the immortality of the soul. That Plato connects this investigation with the history of the death of Socrates, has seemed worthy of admiration in all ages. There seems nothing more fitting than to place the argument in favor of immortality in the mouth of him who is on the point of departure from this life, and to animate that conviction through this scene, as well as such a death reciprocally through the conviction. It is at the same time to be remarked that what is fitting under the circumstances would seem to be this: that it becomes a dying person first to busy himself with his own fate instead of the

Universal—with this certitude of himself as a particular being instead of with truth. We therefore meet here with the least degree of separation between the forms of representation and of the comprehension; but in this exposition the form of representation is far removed from descending to the crude view which conceives the soul as a thing, and, in the style of speaking of a thing, asks after its duration or its subsistence. We find Socrates affirming that the body and what appertains to body is a hindrance to the striving after wisdom and to the exclusive pursuit of philosophy, for the reason that sensuous intuition shows nothing pure as it is in itself, and that what is true is to be known only through removal of the soul from what is corporeal. For Justice, Beauty, and the like generic entities, are alone what truly exists, that to which all change and death is foreign; and it is not through the body, but through the soul alone, that they are contemplated. (*Phædo* 23–38.)

In this separation we see the essence of the soul considered not as if it were a “thing,” but as the Universal: still more is this the case in the following passages, through which Plato proves immortality. One of the principal thoughts in this proof is the one already considered, that the soul has already existed before this life, because learning is only reminiscence (*Phædo* 49–57); which involves that the soul is already in itself [i. e. potentially] what it will become for itself. One ought not, in this connection, to have recourse to the wretched theory of “innate ideas”: an expression which implies a natural being of ideas, as though the thoughts were already in some measure fixed, and had a natural being that did not originate through the activity of spirit. But Plato lays most stress on this argument for immortality: the composite is subject to dissolution and decay; the simple, on the contrary, can be in no manner dissolved and destroyed; what, however, is always like itself, and the same, is simple. This simple—the Beautiful and Good, the self-identical, is incapable of any change; while, on the contrary, those in whom these universals exist—men, things, &c.—are changeable, and perceptible by the senses; but the former is supersensuous. The soul on this account, which exists as a thinking being, and associates with simple essences as with its kindred, must

on this account be held for a simple nature. Here, then, it is clear again that Plato takes simplicity not as simplicity of a thing, e.g. not as the simplicity of a chemical element which can be shown as incapable of further analysis; such simple being as this would be only the empty abstract identity or universality, the simple as a being [or thing].

Finally, however, [in the dialogue referred to—the *Phædo*] the Universal actually makes its appearance in the shape of a thing; this occurs where Plato makes Simmias assert in this respect: a harmony that we hear is nothing else than a universal, a simple which is a unity of different things; this harmony, however, is connected with a sensuous thing, and vanishes with it just as the music of the lyre perishes with the destruction of the lyre. In answer to this, Plato makes Socrates show that the soul is not a harmony of this kind; for this sensuous harmony originates after the things exist and as a result of the same, but the harmony of the soul is in-and-for-itself before all sensuous being. The sensuous harmony has, moreover, different degrees of pitch, while the harmony of the soul has no quantitative distinctions whatever. From this it is clear that Plato holds the essence of the soul to be quite universal, and posits its true being not in its sensuous individuality; accordingly also the immortality of the soul cannot be taken by him in the sense in which we take it, namely, as that of an individual thing. When now, furthermore, the myth comes to treat of the residence of the soul after death in another more splendid and glorious earth, we may readily understand what to make of it.

Education.

(c) As regards the education and culture of the soul, it is connected with the theory just considered. But one must not think the idealism of Plato to be a subjective idealism, or a spurious idealism like that which has become prevalent in modern times, which holds the doctrine that one learns nothing at all from without, and is not in any way externally determined, but generates all its representations from itself as subject. Idealism is frequently defined as the doctrine which represents the individual as creating in himself all his ideas, even the most immediate ones, by his own activity.

This is, however, an unhistorical, quite false notion; in the sense that this crude theory defines idealism, there are no idealists, at least among philosophers [nor outside a lunatic asylum], and certainly the Platonic idealism is very far removed from it. In the seventh book of his *Republic*, Plato speaks—in connection with that which I have already cited [the allegory of the cave]—especially of the manner in which this learning—through which the universal, previously implicit in spirit, is developed out of it—is accomplished: “We must hold this view respecting science and the process of learning, that they are not so constituted as some have given out” (he means thereby the Sophists) “who speak of culture as though knowing is not contained in the soul, but as if one had to introduce science into the soul in the same manner that seeing is placed in blind eyes.” This notion, that knowing comes entirely from without, is found in modern times with very abstract, crude, empirical philosophers, such, e.g., as have asserted that all that man knows of the divine comes in through education and habit, and hence that spirit is only a quite undetermined possibility of knowledge. The extreme phase of this view is the doctrine of revelation, in which all is given from without. In the Protestant Religion this crude view does not occur in its abstract form; in it [i. e. Protestantism] the “testimony of the spirit” is considered as belonging essentially to faith; in other words, it is essential that the individual subjective spirit (in-and-for-itself) shall contain and posit the internal sense of the dogma which is given to it by external authority. Hence Plato speaks against that view, and remarks in relation to the above allegoric myth: “Reason teaches that in each man there dwells, as an immanent faculty of his soul, the organ with which he learns; namely, as if the eye could not turn from darkness to light unless the whole body moved with it; in this manner one must be turned away with the whole soul from the transient occurrences surrounding him” (the contingent sensations and representations) towards the [truly] existent till he is capable of enduring the contemplation of the highest clearness of existence. This existent, however, we term the good. Its art would be the art of instruction how to turn the soul round so as to contemplate existence; and indeed in what manner to turn it around in

the easiest and most effective way, not for the sake of implanting the sight in him, because he has it already, but is not properly turned towards it, and does not see the object which he should see. The other virtues of the soul stand more nearly related to the body; they are not previously contained in the soul, but come into it by degrees through exercise and custom. The thinking activity, on the contrary, as possessing a divine nature, never loses its power, but becomes good or evil through the mode in which it is turned toward existence or its-opposite. This is a close statement of the relation which Plato establishes between the internal and external. With us [moderns] such views as make spirit the source of the determinations of the good, &c., are much more current. Plato, however, was engaged in the task of fixing these doctrines for the first time.

Four Grades of Knowing.

c. Since Plato places the truth in that alone which is produced through thought, while the source of knowledge is at the same time manifold (feeling, sensation, &c.) it becomes necessary for us to mention the different kinds of knowing as classified by him. The view that truth is given through the sensuous Consciousness which has for content the well known [i. e. familiar objects] from which we begin [our knowledge], is a view which Plato opposes everywhere as the doctrine of the Sophists. [Hegel unfolds this fully in treating of Protagoras.] Feeling itself is easily persuaded that it contains all truth, as, e. g., that Platonic "mania for the Beautiful" contains the True in the form of feeling; this is, however, not the true form of the True, for the reason that feeling is a wholly subjective phase of consciousness. Feeling, as such, is exactly the form in which one makes caprice a determination [i. e. a characteristic] of the True, for in feeling there is no true content fixed [i. e. the object of the feeling cannot be given through feeling, but must always be given by the intelligence], for in that [i. e. feeling] any content may have place. Moreover [according to this view], the highest content must be in feeling; to have in the memory, or in the understanding, is for us quite other than to have in the heart, in the feeling, i. e. in our innermost subjectivity, in our Ego;

and in so far as the content is in the heart, we say it is in the true place, because it is then quite identical with our special individuality. The misunderstanding lies in this: a content is not true for the very reason that it is in *our feeling*. It is, therefore, the great doctrine of Plato that the content is supplied only through thought; for it [the content] is the universal, which can be apprehended only through the activity of thinking. This universal content, Plato has defined in a precise manner as *Idea*.

At the end of the sixth book of the *Republic*, Plato gives the distinction between the sensuous and intellectual in our knowing with more detail: he again sets up two phases of consciousness in each province [i.e. making four grades of thinking in all]: "In the sensuous [the visible world], one division is the external phenomena, as for example shadows, images in water, as well as reflections in dense, smooth, shining bodies, and the like. The second kind comprehends those similar to the former: animals, plants (concrete life)," and everything of an artificial nature. In the intelligible there is also a two-fold content: The soul uses those sensuous images which we have just classified, and is necessitated to proceed from hypotheses which point not towards the principle but towards the result. Reflection, which is not by itself sensuous but belongs to the thinking activity, mixes in thought with the objects of sensuous consciousness, but its object is not yet a pure intelligible. "The other species" [of the intelligible] (that which is thought in the soul itself) "is that in which the soul, setting out from an hypothesis, makes its way through the idea itself to an unhypothetical principle without the aid of those images which we use in the former instance. The form of thinking which deals with geometry, arithmetic, and the like sciences, presupposes straight lines and curved lines, figures, three kinds of angles, and the like. And while they proceed from such presuppositions ["hypotheses"] they believe that they are in nowise bound to give any further reason for them—any more than of other well known affairs. Furthermore you know that they make use of visible figures, and speak of them, although they do not really mean these figures, but rather those [general] principles of which they are mere visible copies, since they intend

to make their demonstration apply to the square and its diagonal in general" (the universal one), "and not merely to that" (sensuous) "one which they draw as a diagram; and so it is, too, with other things." This is the place where science, as such, begins according to Plato, inasmuch as it has no more to do with the sensuous as such; this, however, is not yet the true science, which treats of the spiritual Universal, for itself, but it is rather the deductive, argumentative [ratiocinative] cognition which forms itself general laws and definite species from the sensuous. "Those figures which they draw and describe, among which are shadows and images in water, they use only as images and seek to see their original, which one can never see except with the intellect.—Truly spoken!—This, then, is what I have above indicated as that species of thought in whose investigation the soul is obliged to use presuppositions [hypotheses], for the reason that it does not rise to principles, inasmuch as it cannot transcend those presuppositions, but employs these subordinate images as pictures which are made perfectly like those originals, and are by this fact completely defined.—I understand that you speak of that which takes place in geometry and other like sciences.—Learn now to know the other division of the intelligible which attaches to Reason itself inasmuch as it makes use of hypotheses, through the dialectic, not as principles, but as hypotheses ought to be used—as preliminary steps and starting-points; with this they attain to that which has no presuppositions [the unhypothetical], the principle of All," which is in-and-for-itself; "it seizes an object, and, again seizing what was involved in the former [i. e. its presuppositions], ascends to a new result, and all the while it uses for that purpose no sensuous element at all, but only ideas themselves, and thus through them alone it arrives at ideas [i. e. the most comprehensive ones] in the end." To master the science of this is the interest and business of Philosophy; this field is explored by the pure thought in-and-for-itself, which is active only in such pure thoughts.—"I understand it, but not yet quite clearly. You seem to me to wish to assert that what is considered through the science of the dialectic [movement] of existence and thought, is clearer than what is considered in those so-called sciences whose principles are hypothetical,

and that those who consider them are obliged to do so with the intellect and not with the senses. Since, however, in such processes they do not ascend to an absolute principle, but speculate with hypotheses, they seem not to possess thought itself [i. e. pure thought] in considering these objects, though they are *like* thoughts with a principle [at their basis]. You seem with reason to name the course of procedure employed in geometry and the kindred sciences, understanding [Greek = *dianoia*]; and to define it in such a manner that it is found between pure Reason [*Nous*] and the" (sensuous) "representation [*doxa*].—You have correctly understood me. Corresponding to these four distinctions I will name the four affections or faculties of the soul: the comprehending thinking [*Noesis*] is the highest; the understanding is the second; the third is called faith" [*pistis*], a knowledge appertaining to animals and plants, for the reason that they are vital, homogeneous, identical with us—the true sensuous representation; "and the last the pictured conceptions (mental images) [*Eikasia*]," i. e. opinion. Arrange them according to the degree of clearness [comprehensiveness] that each stage has, or [which is the same thing] according to the degree of truth there is in it." This is the distinction which lies at the basis of the teachings of Plato, and it is what he has been chiefly instrumental in bringing to light.

Three Divisions of Philosophy.

If we now proceed from cognition [in general] to its more definite content into which the idea specializes itself and thereby organizes itself into a scientific system: with Plato [for the first time in the history of philosophy] this content begins to fall asunder into three divisions, which we distinguish as Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. The logic was called by the ancients Dialectic, and its addition to philosophy is expressly ascribed to Plato by the ancient historians of philosophy. This is not a dialectic such as was used by the Sophists,—which was used to bring ideas into confusion generally; but this first branch of the Platonic philosophy is the dialectic which is active in pure thoughts, the movement of the speculative logic with which several of the dialogues, e. g. the Parmenides, is en-

gaged. The second division is a kind of Nature-Philosophy whose fundamental principles are to be found chiefly in the *Timæus*. The third is the Philosophy of Spirit, a system of Ethics, and above all his expositions of a perfect State in the *Republic*. To the *Timæus* and the *Republic* should be added the *Critias*, which we cannot now make much use of, since there is only a fragment left of it. These three dialogues Plato gives as the continuation of one connected discourse. With the *Timæus* the *Critias* is so coördinated that while the *Timæus* treats of the speculative origin of man and nature, the *Critias* exhibits the ideal history of human culture, a philosophical history of the human race illustrated by the history of the ancient Athenians as it was preserved by the Ægyptians; of this, however, only the commencement has come down to us. To the *Republic* and the *Timæus* is still to be added the *Parmenides*, and these three make a complete exposition of the Platonic philosophy in each of its three divisions. We will now proceed to consider in detail these three divisions. [To be concluded in the next number.]

GOETHE'S SOCIAL ROMANCES.

REVIEW OF THEIR COMPOSITION.

Translated from the German of Carl Rosenkranz by D. J. SNIDER.

The composition of the three romances which we have just considered according to their ideal signification, is wholly different. In the *Apprenticeship* it changes progressively. At first, the exposition is not at all rapid. From the ordinary tone of narration, it passes with the exhibition of the mode of living of strolling actors, into a dramatic activity. With the society of the noblemen, the style is pervaded by a fine flavor of irony. In the confessions of a fair saint, we admire the untainted, yet still highly cultivated naiveté with which the innermost struggles of a noble soul are laid open to us. Her contemplative tranquillity disperses the actors' bustle, and the frivolities attending it, by unfolding to us the duodrama of a soul struggling with God. After this begins the elegiac tragical vein, in the scenes that describe the death

of Mariana, the fading away of Mignon, the history of Augustino and Sperata, the mournful obsequies of Mignon, and the transition of Wilhelm to Natalia. Mignon's funeral with its magnificent choruses, and the dignity of the decoration, heightens the impression to sublimity. — Wholly different is the inner antithesis of the Apprenticeship, the Elective Affinities. The latter, which introduces us into the hidden workshop of pragmatism, with which the character creates its own fate, has nothing in common with the Apprenticeship, whose tone is comfortable, yielding, and only gradually concentrates itself. The individuals who enter the scene of action are all essentially complete. The genesis of their determination lies beyond the story, and only Ottilia's development is an exception, because she is the pillar of the edifice. But because in her the firmness of natural character rules with simple power, such unsteadiness as is the case with Wilhelm is out of the question. Her growth is a gentle gradation, which is suddenly interrupted, only to be dissolved in a blessed transfiguration. The style of the Elective Affinities is polished, and has a peculiar tranquillity, which has invidiously been called diplomatic. But this transparent, simple style is artistically necessary, because it is the golden circle that encloses angry fate, which under the most comfortable external circumstances destroys the most refined people. The effect of this seeming opposition explains how such fantastic irrepressible natures as Bettina have received such an impression from this romance, as if they suddenly found themselves in a close ravine, in whose crushing narrowness dismal trees, thorns and thistles, fill the mind with the desolation of despair. That the composition of the Elective Affinities is in the form of a novel has often been remarked. The reason lies in the abstraction with which all persons and circumstances are aiming at the generation of the one fatal product. Even after the catastrophe, Goethe causes the outward appearance of life at the castle to progress in the accustomed order, just as if nothing had happened, while really below the exterior everything trembles to the fall, and passion has thrust the dagger into the heart of man. Thus they resemble wax figures, who, with the appearance of the most vigorous life, still stare at us as if without soul. The persons who have lost

love and life wander about only as shadows. If we recollect that Goethe had to describe the most delicate and at the same time the most terrible discordances and errors of the feelings, we comprehend the brevity, yes, even the poverty of style, for this reason, that he with chaste spirit wished to subordinate the sensual element. Let us ask ourselves, whether a genius of a lower order than Goethe's would not be inclined to describe the scene in which the captain carries Charlotte from the skiff to the shore, or furthermore the scene of the unhappy moral double-adultery in the strange night-twilight, in the most glowing, sensual colors; or whether one of the modern French novelists would not have made a whole piquant volume of it?

From the internally scorching sultriness of the *Elective Affinities*, we step with the *Journeyman* into the world, which has the power to dissolve the fate of the individual by change and activity, by resignation and travel. One must have the courage again to alienate himself from his own fatality. The *Journeyman* is in its composition truly epic. The infinitude of the world-bustle is unfolded to us. The scene of action changes continually. The mountain rises aloft; the plain extends in the distance; the garden invites us into its green arches; the lake reflects its crystal surface; hospitable villas, inns, manufactories, festive halls, receive us. Person after person is introduced into the story. One fatality is developed out of another. The most distant elements move together, the most united separate. That the poet with modesty calls himself the editor of reports that have been sent to him, that he breaks off and then takes up the thread again, forces upon us the feeling of the immeasurableness of the life of man. And still this wealth of contrasts and complications would leave behind the impression of a mosaic aggregate, if this thought did not pervade all the details, namely: that the reconciliation with fate can be brought about either through resignation or activity; or rather, as the one does not exclude the other, through both causing us to forget ourselves. *Herrnhut* and *America*, the author teaches us, are everywhere, if we only choose to seek them. The *Journeyman* unites the pedagogic movement of the *Apprenticeship* with the novelistic one of the *Elective Affinities*. The novels in the *Journey-*

manship are usually spoken of as if they were unimportant, and as if Goethe had used Wilhelm's story only as an envelop to infold these narrations. To me this seems unjust. The novels in the *Journeymanship* are master-pieces, especially that one which is usually called the most prosaic, the man of fifty. Had Goethe intended to picture therein only the despicable vanity of an old fop, who with the aid of the arts of the toilet wished to keep up a fresh, youthful appearance, such accusation would be just. This novel is usually looked at in this light. But the real content of it is the collision between father and son, who both love the same Hilaria, and, discovering this, are thrown into the most tragical situations, so that the son, rescuing himself from the passion for the young, coquettish widow—from insanity and death—appears to himself as a miracle, lost, and wandering between heaven and hell. Macaria interferes in this story as the higher ethical mediator. We have in this an example of her activity. All the novels end in resignation or travel, in which respect the novel of the child and the lion, which Goethe simply calls the *Novelle*, might well be added to those of the *Journeymanship*. The pedagogic system and Wilhelm's story are related symmetrically to the cycle of novels. In the *Apprenticeship* the spirit of culture is accumulated in the ideal Natalia; in the *Elective Affinities*, the demon of fate in the angelic Ottilia; in the *Journeymanship*, the secret power of the world-conquering soul in the spiritual Macaria. This dignified, elderly, sickly lady, who is continually chained to her easy-chair, is the ethical, prophetic spirit of her whole family, whom all approach with reverence and unconditioned confidence, and whose decisions are considered as final. Macaria has the diseased fancy that in herself lives the life of our solar system in a peculiar manner. The confused astrology of the seeress of Prevorst is probably a product of Goethe's poesy. What did Goethe intend with this figure which truly borders upon the allegoric? Shall we consider her simply as an oddity, as a didactic whim? I think not; for could we not conjecture that, through her, he intended to illustrate the connection between the earth and the universe? The Earth has a life of her own, but only in a reciprocal relation to all the other heavenly bodies. The light that shines into our room

is undoubtedly light of the sun. Therefore we find ourselves, while in this light, also in the sun, in so far as the peculiar excitation of the eye which we call seeing has its causality in the sun, and takes its origin many millions of miles distant from us. Or, on the other hand, how quiet everything seems here! The chests, the tables, the stove, we ourselves—everything stands straight and fixed;—and still, while we seem to be in the midst of repose, nothing is more certain than that, with the maddest velocity, we roll along in our course in the universe four miles every second. Were this possible—but through the co-operation of all bodies of the universe? Do not all these conspire to bring forth these spirals? Is it not correct in this sense that a change in any one movement of cosmical life will also produce a change in the remaining, throughout space? Macaria's strange accompanying of our planets and suns helps us realize that we are not only wanderers on our own planet, but, being such, we are also world-wanderers, world-citizens. That I have not invented this interpretation of Macaria to make it palatable, but to prove, in this too, the loftiness of our poet, I refer most emphatically to the conversations of the astronomer (who is with Macaria), partly with Wilhelm and partly with Montan. This man, the former Jarno, has turned his attention to tellurism. If Macaria believes in solar siderism, he brings a rhabdomant, a metal-feeler, as a counter-balance, who continually feels downward toward the centre of the earth, while Macaria feels drawn towards the sun's centre. Montan finally agrees with the astronomer thus far, that to real life, to activity, neither intellectual nor material transcendentalism is necessary, but that the earthly reality and spiritual ideality must balance each other. To move these two worlds toward one another, to manifest the qualities of both in the passing life-phenomenon, that is the highest form to which man has to develop himself. To accomplish this, he need not penetrate to the centre of the earth, nor need he soar beyond the boundaries of our solar system. The surface of the earth is the true stage of activity. And hence Macaria's state is specially designated as a diseased one. This union of poesy and prose, of idealism and realism, of spirit and matter, of the word and the flesh, or in whatsoever form this antithesis may be expressed, Wilhelm himself had to

realize in his own life. Gradually he has developed himself to the harmony of culture, but according to the laws of the association he had to master completely a special branch. Man ought to be a virtuoso in some species of knowledge or activity. He ought to be able to make himself useful to himself and others, with trustworthiness. All true culture must lead from the beautiful through the true to the useful, or from the useful through the true to the beautiful. Wilhelm has, in the contemplation of the human body, found the way in which he must go to become useful. He had ample opportunity as an actor to become acquainted with the imperfections of the human form, and the artifices by which they are hidden from the audience. At the same time, he experienced how a handsome man, a beautiful woman, is most important on the stage. If they are there to play the part of the lovers, the director is safe. In a course on Anatomy, he acquired the shocking experience that corpses were torn from their resting-places, and even human beings murdered, in order to hand over their bodies to the anatomical theatre. To correct this abuse, he hails with applause the art which imitates in wax, for the purposes of science, with deceptive naturalness the human members. Nothing endangers so quickly and so greatly the delicate, wonderful structure of the human form and life as sudden wounds, fractures, bruises, etc. Hence the surgeon has at all times and especially in war, as the example of the Homeric Machaon shows, been of the greatest importance. So Wilhelm decides to become a surgeon. His professional skill is to be devoted now to the preservation of life itself. This termination Goethe had before his eyes from the beginning, where Wilhelm is wounded in the skirmish with the marauders, and the amazon Natalia dresses the wound. Surgery is no refuge to provide Wilhelm with a field of usefulness. How is he rewarded by his art! Through bleeding, he saves the life of a youth who was precipitated with his horse into the water. This youth is his son Felix!

BEETHOVEN'S *F* MINOR SONATA.

Translated from the German of A. B. MARX, by A. E. KROEGER.

[The following characteristic of one of Beethoven's most admired sonatas for the pianoforte is taken from MARX's *Life and Works of Beethoven*.]

THE FIRST MOVEMENT, OR ALLEGRO ASSAI.

It is a night picture, sombre, scarcely perceivable, wildly agitated by storms, scarcely for a moment lit up by the pale light of the moon. Until this sonata was written Beethoven had never created anything so ghostly, weird and sphynx-like, nor has he since. It flies away before our mind like a wild tempestuous dream, and yet impresses upon us all its features, never to be forgotten. Was it a dream of the infernal regions into which the earth-ridden soul descended for a moment? Who can say? Perhaps not even Beethoven himself.

The very first theme of the first movement, *allegro assai*, floats weird-like and hollow-sounding upwards as if questioning for something, repeating itself in a still sharper manner on the half-note higher tone. But what are those four tones in the bass—D flat, D flat, D flat, C—that seem to interrupt the question warningly and as if beckoning, until the theme of the question rushes up again like lightning, and plunges down and whirls upward again, repeating the question?

You may take these suggestions, which uncalled for I append to the naked fact of the notes, for chimeras. Of course, I can prove nothing. But the wildest of all chimeras it would be to compose such tone-pictures, unless an internally ruling thought had called them forth. If they were mere play of tones, the most commonplace composition were preferable, for this movement is even technically objectionable, since the first theme finds no counter theme, and since the second *motive*—D flat, D flat, D flat, C—has no warrant in the first. This is neither technically correct, nor in Beethoven's manner.

The same theme is repeated, beginning softly, but immediately attracting a clanging falling in of the harmony, three times interrupted with fury, when quick as lightning all the tones concentrate upon E flat, waiting there upon frightened chords, that nevertheless have a sound of awakening hope in

them, until—it all passes with fearful speed—there arises upon the dimly-lit depth of the tottering world of fog a beautiful chant (36th measure), which, however, soon after its commencement, is interrupted by painful tones. Were those the voices of spirits from Elysium, which the cruel mythology of the Greeks has located so near the Tartarus? Who knows? To the friend of the Greeks such ideas were near enough at hand.

Whatever you may assume, from these sounds the tones rush down to a second, hard-knotted theme, moving anxiously in the depth, then again floating in terror to a higher point, while the bass climbs up and breaks out in those very tones which interrupted the first question in so solemn and threatening a manner. With this second theme—in A flat—the whole movement first gains fixed connection and consistency; the concluding measures end the matter abruptly, the bass having become the ruling voice sinks down to the lowest depth, there dying off under the trembling tones of the treble that echo away in the highest octave.

Such is the first part of the first movement of this Sonata, and here we pause to take a glance at the whole.

There is clearly not a feature in the whole first movement that does not closely correspond with what we have suggested to be characterized in this first part; from the first beginning—where the reposing A flat, changed into G sharp, leads to the milder key of E major, giving the soul a chance to breathe again as if half awakening from a fearful dream—to the painfully winding quintolet passages and thence to those weird four tones which finally in the third part of the first movement, where, under the chief theme, they keep knocking and complaining and threatening, become almost haunting ghosts, shrieking, “*Eternally damned!*”

Let this suffice for those who find therein a trace of the mind that built up the composition. For the others I have already said too much.

But it is certainly allowable—even if we look away from all fixed interpretation—to call this first movement of the Sonata fantastic. Being built upon the chief theme in hollow double octaves, the repetition of the theme in an utterly foreign key (G flat major following F minor) instead of a counter-theme,

the *externally* utterly unjustified mixing up of that quite foreign D flat, D flat, D flat, C, the equally abrupt up and down rushing of the sixteenths'-passages, and the renewed breaking off with a sort of half-conclusion on the dominant, the repetition of the chief theme for a third time without a counter-theme—all this contributes to fix the fantastic character of the movement, at least up to the second theme.

But still more. At first the second theme was quite normal in the parallel of the chief key in A flat major. But the second time it changes this into A flat minor, so that Beethoven, having once resolved to let minor follow minor, went, moreover, and took, instead of the nearest dominant, C minor, a far removed key.

We have called this movement fantastic. Fantastic is whatsoever shows itself to be foreign to the usual connection of our thinking—as, for instance, every notion of a spirit-world, since we can form no definite and accurate conception of it. It indicates one of the highest tensions of the imagination, one of the most important spheres of art, which even here touches the infinite. True, the same line is also the limit of insanity and illusion. Now, it is very remarkable in Beethoven, that no musician had the gift of fantasy to such a degree as he; but no one also has been so able to control and tame that gift, so that, of all forms of composition, he liked least of all the form of a fantasia. This duplicity of the gift and the talent to control it shows itself nowhere clearer than in the F minor sonata. Look at the contents as you will, they appear fantastic. But from the very end of the first part the contents are forced to submit themselves to the tight reins held in the hands of the master, who precisely thereby proves himself master, and they so submit without losing their character. Those fantastic images are given in the first part. Now they live and move after natural laws.

At the conclusion of the first part the chief theme re-enters, but in E major, moving monodically in octaves, and not any more in hollow double-octaves. But the major key cannot be long retained, from the very nature of the composition, and hence changes into E minor, in which key the chief theme is led upward from the bass, accompanied by a trembling treble, and thus accompanied—that is, steadied—for the first

time. Thence the bass amidst those torturing quintolet passages returns back to the depths, whilst the treble leads the theme up to the highest G. Thence both treble and bass move in the same manner, but in other keys, until this whole theme comes to rest on the dominant of D flat major; on which key the second theme of the second part enters. This is a repetition of the second theme of the first part, but in a broadened and changed elaboration. This whole second part may indeed be called a repetition of the first part, but with a thorough change of the elaboration of the contents.

The same thing may be said of the third part of the first movement; which third part indeed, usually, is essentially a repetition of the first part.

But to this third part, or rather to the whole, there follows an appendix. Again the chief theme forms itself in F minor, and rises from the lowest depths, under a treble moving in sixths, upwards, where it changes into D flat major, and receives there the reply of the treble—the same chant, hearing which we ventured to think of the Elysian fields. We follow this movement no further. Everywhere we have seen the firmest, manliest control of the most fantastical contents ever conceived by Beethoven.

THE SECOND MOVEMENT, OR ANDANTE.

The second movement we may call a *De profundis clamavi ad Te*. An earnest, simple chant, scarcely moving, and, like the upward glance of silent devotion, forms itself over a deep, solitary bass—the depth continuing from out of the night vision of the first movement. The repetition of the chant—for there are variations, not of a merely formal character, however, but thoroughly spiritual—sunders both voices still more distinctly—the upper tones chanting hesitatingly and in an interrupted way, the bass tones following falteringly. The next variation lifts the chant mildly and comfortingly upward into clearer regions; and in the following variation the chant, now accompanied by harp-passages, seems to try to ascend even to the most ethereal heights. From these supreme regions the tones suddenly return to the first depth, then move back to the central region, where, as they echo away, a sharp transition hurries us into the finale.

THE THIRD MOVEMENT, OR ALLEGRO AND PRESTO.

This finale, Ries tells us, was conceived by Beethoven on one of those wild rambles when the composer used to forget the world about him and himself in the impetuous storm of his thoughts. And a storm-night it surely is, whirling along without stop, like that wild night wherein King Lear exposed his tortured venerable head to the winds and the lashing rain. Beethoven had returned from his ramble with a tempest raging in his breast, but this finale fixed in his mind in its defiant storm-march movement (*presto*), as the proper, though utterly unexpected, conclusion of his great work, leaving it to work out its storm-movement musically as it might.

Yes, this finale is a storm-night and creates night-visions—as probably everyone who has heard this tempestuous *presto* has experienced within himself—weird as those that came upon the soul of the lonely singer who composed it. The legend says that the cheeks of those who have seen spirits retain forever the paleness of terror. Thus, after the demonic vision of the first movement of the Sonata, peace and gladness could not return. That chant, "From the depths do I call unto Thee," might stretch up to listen unto sounds from heaven, but it could not escape the anxious life of earth and its breathless haste; the unquieted woe of earth grasps it, and with repeated blows fastens itself deep and wounding into the heart.

And now begins that tempest, which had arisen in the consciousness of the singer on that fearful night, high in the treble and quite softly—just as the wind announces its coming in the highest branches of the forest—sweeping down and raging with fury in the bass. It never ceases; but in the twentieth measure it becomes, as is proper, a secondary matter—*symbolic* of the deep-inward ever-restless and stormy soul. And as a true man, in the inner as well as outer storms of life, first takes firm hold of himself and "plants himself down square," so Beethoven, above all, first places himself storm-secure (from twentieth to twenty-ninth measure), and only then begins to breathe forth his chant of the storm into the wild tempest of the night.

It is not of importance *what* he sings, but *that* he sings and

lives and stands firm in unbroken courage is the part that tells. Hence Beethoven soon drops that chant in order to sing the genuine song, that which he held valid throughout his life (from thirty-sixth to fiftieth measure)—“Upwards through tempest and night.” This is the song he sings. The storm never ceases, and his courage never permits itself to be broken, although in the whirl of the tempest the heart at one time threatens to succumb, and complains and sobs; and at one time everything—inner and outer storms—sinks away into breathless quiet.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY.

PREFACE.

In the first and second volumes of this Journal I published in ten chapters an “Introduction to Philosophy,” designing therein to present in the simplest form certain fundamental insights (*aperçues*) which light the way to the purely speculative. These were not given in any strict order, but each chapter endeavored to start *de novo*, and to develop out of some common view the underlying speculative basis.

It is now proposed, in a series of chapters, to unfold a more systematic view of the totality which the speculative insight discloses to us as the truth of the Phenomenal world. This would be a genetic deduction of the categories of Pure Reason such as Hegel has attempted (successfully) in his Logic. In it would appear the frame-work of the *MACROCOSM*; and as the so-called “*Microcosm*” is “made in its image,” or, in other words, since the human mind is potentially the complete manifestation of the Reason which creates the World, it is necessary that a complete statement should show the psychological side to the Ontology which such a Logic furnishes. I shall therefore introduce at the beginning, and at certain stages of the progress, entire chapters devoted exclusively to making clear certain important psychological distinctions.

Besides the subjective aspect which must be removed from pure thought by a careful consideration of Psychology, there is a source of difficulty still more formidable: *historical complication*. It arises from the fact that the form of

exposition in one age or nation uses what seems a peculiar dialect to other nations and ages. Its strange and foreign air repels close study necessary for comprehension. The resolution of this latter difficulty is accomplished through a philosophical treatment of the History of Philosophy, wherein vanishes what is idiomatic and peculiar, letting appear the fundamental harmony that underlies great philosophical systems. Thus the threefold purpose of these chapters may be briefly stated:

I. To exhibit in their systematic connection the categories of Pure Thought.

II. To make careful separation of the psychological phases—distinguishing one stage of the culture of thought from another—and by this process to remove serious obstacles to the comprehension of the speculative solution of problems. This will involve frequent criticism of philosophic writings which confound the different provinces of thought.

III. To clear up the obscurity in different philosophical systems, and their apparent conflict, by a comparative criticism of their *technique*. Much reference will be had to the various translations hitherto published in this Journal, and thus many chapters may be regarded as commentaries on the same.

The strictness of "systematic connection" which I promise is not to prevail in the *style* of the exposition (as it does in Hegel's writings), but only in the results exhibited. Thus the order in which parts of the system are taken up may be irregular, but it (the proper order and genesis of each) must be fully discussed so as to leave no doubt as to the rank of any given term in the series.

PART FIRST.

THINKING *versus* SENSUOUS REPRESENTATION.

Most of the difficulties in the way of what is called "making Philosophy popular," arise from the incapacity of uncultured people to think without having recourse to sensuous representation. Those who must use images of sense on all occasions have not the strength to seize pure relations, and hence cannot find the "constant in the variable"; they seize *this* and *that*, but in the movement of *change*, *phenomenality*,

and *self-relation*, they get utterly lost. From the point of view of Representation a speculative doctrine seems absurd and impossible. But the road is not long that leads from Representation to its self-contradiction.

The first business of the philosophical student is therefore to learn this distinction, and to know when he thinks, and when he merely *represents*. He must strive before all things to gain in himself this power to think—to think *exhaustively*. The child that can walk only by taking hold with its hands, compared with the man who can walk freely, furnishes the type of such as can think only with images. Poetic imagination is not the subject of discussion here: in it Representation comes under control of a higher, spontaneous activity of the Mind.

In the following chapters, this theme is continued in some of its most interesting phases.

CHAPTER I.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

On page 487 of the Lectures on Metaphysics, Hamilton complains of the “vagueness and confusion which are produced by the confounding of objects so different as the *images of sense* and the *unpicturable notions of intelligence*.” He says that “different names are given wherever a philosophical nomenclature of the slightest pretensions to perfection has been found.”

It would surprise us to find a writer, after so explicit a statement, falling systematically into the error he condemns. Such surprise is in store for us; for Hamilton does not by accident, by a slip of the pen, or by a moment of forgetfulness, fall into this error; *he builds on it the corner-stone of his whole philosophy*. He says—Metaphysics, p. 527:

“I lay it down as a law which though not generalized by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to the phenomena: that all that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must.”

Whether these contradictories are the famous “Antinomies” of Kant is a question we will defer for the present. The reader

will remember that Kant holds that "the understanding falls into these antinomies whenever it transcends its proper sphere." Hamilton, however, claims this doctrine as his own discovery (*Meta.* p. 647), in the following words:

"If I have done anything meritorious in Philosophy, it is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of these contradictions; in showing that they arise only when intelligence transcends the limits to which its legitimate exercise is restricted; and that within these bounds (the conditioned) natural thought is neither fallible nor mendacious."

Not only is this position claimed by Hamilton as the corner-stone of his system, but his followers lay stress on it and use it most frequently.

Since he does not attempt a scientific justification of this "law" which "can be easily proved to be true by an application to the phenomena," we must seek out a specimen of this "application"-species-of-proof which seems to be borrowed from the proof by "superposition" used in geometry. He applies it to space.

Meta. p. 527: "It is plain that space must either be bounded or not bounded. These are contradictory alternatives; on the principle of Contradiction, they cannot both be true, and, on the principle of Excluded Middle, one must be true. This cannot be denied without denying the primary laws of intelligence. But though space must be admitted to be necessarily either finite or infinite, we are able to conceive the possibility neither of its finitude nor of its infinity.

"We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded—as finite; that is, as a whole, beyond which there is no further space. Every one is conscious that this is impossible. It contradicts also the supposition of space as a necessary notion; for if we could imagine space as a terminated sphere, and that sphere not itself enclosed in a surrounding space, we should not be obliged to think everything in space; and, on the contrary, if we did imagine this terminated sphere as itself in space, in that case we should not have actually conceived all space as a bounded whole. The one contradictory is thus found inconceivable; we cannot conceive space as positively limited.

"On the other hand, we are equally powerless to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory; we cannot conceive space as infinite, as without limits. You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may transcend in fancy even the universe of matter, and rise from

sphere to sphere in the region of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted;—with all this, what have you done? You have never gone beyond the finite: you have attained, at best, only to the indefinite; and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite. Both contradictions are equally inconceivable, and, could we limit our attention to one alone, we should deem it at once impossible and absurd, and suppose its unknown opposite as necessarily true. But as we not only can but are constrained to consider both, we find that both are equally incomprehensible; and yet, though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher law to admit that one, but one only, is necessary.”

In this remarkable passage, in which Hamilton attempts to show that intelligence contradicts itself in the endeavor to decide upon the extent of space, the assumption must be that the operation of intelligence is the same throughout—otherwise the different results do not necessarily contradict. If I fail to find the bottom of a cistern with one stick while I can easily do it with another, this is no contradiction. But the words used to describe the mental activity in these processes are: *conceive, conscious, supposition, necessary notion, imagine, think, realize, launch out in thought, transcend in fancy, attain, attention, deem, suppose, constrained to consider, view, forced to admit.*

The Scotch philosophers, and especially Hamilton, have won great fame as psychologists. One must seriously doubt the justice of that fame in this instance. According to his own confession, a “philosophical nomenclature of the slightest pretensions to perfection” should discriminate between “images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence,” and yet he builds a “law” on the plainest confounding of such operations as *imagining* and *thinking*.

Let us apply this distinction to the case he considers, and see how completely the contradiction vanishes.

I. Imagination or fancy (sensuous Representation) makes *images* of objects; and as images must have *limits* in order to have *form*, we could not expect to be able to imagine that which is infinite if such object could be found.

II. Thought (using the “unpicturable notions of intelligence”) contemplates the *nature* of an object, and attaches

predicates accordingly. It is no contradiction if its "unpicturable notions" cannot be *imagined*.

III. *Thought of Space.*

1. Space if finite must be limited from without.
2. But such external limitations would require space to exist in.
3. And hence the supposed limits of space *posit* space beyond them instead of *negating* space—they prove space to be continuous and not finite. It appears, therefore, that space is of such a nature that it can end in, or be limited by, itself alone, and thus is universally continuous or INFINITE.

IV. *Representation of Space.*

If the result attained by thought is correct, space is infinite; and if this is so, it cannot be *imagined* or *represented*. Therefore we are prepared to expect what Hamilton states as a result of the attempt to realize an image of space: "The imagination sinks exhausted."

If imagination had succeeded in "realizing" space it would have proved space to be picturable, and hence finite; and *here would have been a true contradiction*.

As it is, however, the impotency of imagination is a negative confirmation of the positive assertion made by thought.

THE BOOK OF JOB CONSIDERED AS AN ART-COMPOSITION.

Translated from the German of J. G. Herder, by A. E. KROEGER.

The book contains a twofold scene, in heaven and on earth. Above, the action takes place; down below, the discussion. The lower knows not the meaning of the above, hence it counsels hither and thither: the daily condition of all philosophies and theodicies of the world.

The book has for its subject a sufferer—nay, an innocent and even bodily afflicted sufferer. Hence we pardon him all his sighs and complaints; for even a hero groans when suffering bodily pain. He sees immediate death before him and prays for it; his life is embittered; why should he not groan?

Job suffers as the glory and pride of God; his plagues are sent on him to prove true the word of honor given by the Creator: is a nobler point of view of human suffering possible? It is this great plan of the book that is the theodicy of the World-monarch—not the one-sided justifications from the mouths of the wise men of the earth; although they also say much that is beautiful.

But all they say brings no comfort; nay, it embitters. Job outvies them in describing the power and wisdom of God, and nevertheless remains miserable—a usual picture of earthly comfort. Their view is too narrow and overclouded; they seek for reasons in the dust, whereas they ought to look for them beyond the stars. Which of them reaches so far? Not a single one even surmises that the reason of Job's suffering is that which the first chapter narrates.*

What honor is heaped upon the unfortunate man sitting in the ashes! He is a spectacle for the angels and for all the hosts of heaven. Job approves his virtue; justifies the word of the Creator; and God holds ready the wreath wherewith to crown him. This double scene, and the invisible spectators who watch how Job may bear his misfortune, render sacred the scene of the whole book.

The man, who is to be an example of human strength and fidelity to the heavens, is upon earth entangled in a conflict of reasoning; and even here he shows himself to be a man like others. The poet has given him a quick character, and a warmth which carries him away at the very first and really mild address of Eliphaz. This leaven is the fermenting element of his virtue, and likewise of these conversations; they would be tedious and uninteresting if in them his friends merely comforted and Job merely complained.

A fine thread pervades them all. The three wise men speak characteristically, and Job overcomes them both as a wise man and as a poet. Eliphaz is the most modest, placing even the very first teaching addressed to Job in the mouth of an oracle;† Bildad attacks Job rather more; Zophar chiefly exaggerates what Bildad has said—he is also the first one to leave the scene.

* Chap. 1: 8-12. Chap. 2: 3-6.

† Chap. 5: 12.

There are three attacks of the men.* At the end of the first, matters have already progressed so far that Job makes a judicial appeal from them, his accusers, to God.† In the second attack the thread is knotted most, and it is indeed the climax of the conversation, for at the end of it Job goes so far as to assert against Zophar that it is precisely the wicked who have the best lot in this world;‡ an assertion to which he is led altogether by the heat of the discussion. Eliphaz tries to smooth matters by a fine turn; but the discussion has grown too bitter. Job maintains his statement;§ Bildad knows little to object,§ Zophar nothing at all,¶ and Job is the victor. He stalks like a lion amongst his succumbed enemies, takes back what he has uttered in the heat of the argument, and pours forth, in three rhapsodies, sentences that are the crowning glory of the book.**

Monotonously as all these speeches sound to us, they yet are planned with light and shade, and the thread or rather the confusion of the matter increases from speech to speech, till Job collects himself and softens his assertions. He who does not follow this thread does not observe how Job always twists the arrow out of his opponent's hand, and either says better what has been said or uses his opponent's arguments for his own case, has failed to perceive the life, the growth, and, in short, the soul of the book.

Job begins with a beautiful elegy,†† and generally concludes his sayings with one of these touching lamentations. They are like the choruses of ancient tragedy, making the subject-matter universal and human.

When Job has overcome the wise men, a young prophet enters upon the scene.‡‡ Like most of the God-inspired men of this kind, he is assuming, bold, alone wise, and makes grand images without end or purpose; hence no one replies to him. He stands there like a mere shadow between the speech of Job and that of God. God refutes *him* only by the fact of His appearance; he vanishes at once like a shadow. His appearance has been wisely and instructively arranged in the composition of the whole.

* Chap. 4-14; chap. 15-21; chap. 22-26.

† Chap. 13.

‡ Chap. 21.

§ Chap. 24.

§ Chap. 26.

¶ Chap. 27.

** Chap. 28-31.

†† Chap. 3.

‡‡ Chap. 32-37.

God appears unexpectedly and gloriously. He interrupts the prophet, who, without knowing it, had pictured his appearance and pronounced it impossible. He turns away from the wise men, his defenders, and speaks to Job. Him he addresses at first also as a wise man and not as a judge.* He propounds to him, who has overthrown all their wise arguments, and exhausted all the wit of heaven and earth, certain riddles and questions. They relate to the secrets of creation and world-government. The earthly-wise Job stands dumb.

He brings before his mind seven wild-animal forms and finally the monsters of the deep,† all of whom he, the father of the world, has created, and for all of whom, as for his favorites, he daily takes care. "Why do these creatures exist? They exist not for man, for the most of them are hurtful to man." The earthly-wise Job stands dumb and shamed.

Hence submission to the infinite understanding, to the ungraspable plan and the evident goodness of the great father, who takes care of the crocodile and the raven: such is the solution of the question concerning world-government and fate from the lips of the world-governor himself, speaking as he does out the whirlwind and with facts of all creation. The true theodicy of man is the study of the power, wisdom and goodness of God in all nature, and humble recognition that his plan and his understanding exceed ours.

Hence God also does not teach Job why he has tried him. He restores to him what he had lost, and this is all a mortal could claim. The commonplaces of the so-called representatives of God are so little honored and rewarded, that they must rather first be reconciled to God by a sacrifice from the hand of Job.

O high and wondrous plan of the book, of which I have been able to sketch only a few weak features! If a prince did not write it, it is worthy of a prince, for his way of thinking is kingly and godly. Throughout the whole book God acts as king, father, and wise ruler of creation. Angel and man, raven and behemoth, are equal in his eyes. The most beautiful descriptions of God's qualities and his world-government, the

* Chap. 38.

† Chap. 39-41.

most eloquent grounds of comfort, and all that can be said for and against providence and the fate of man, are scattered throughout the work. But the highest glory and doctrine is the plan itself of the book: epopee of mankind, theodicy of God, and not in words but in fate, in His quiet deed. *Ecce spectaculum dignum ad quod respiciat intentus operi suo Deus. Ecce par Deo dignum vir fortis cum mala fortuna compositus.*

And where is thy grave, thou early man of wisdom, who didst ponder out this epopee and theodicy, gathering it together into this quiet deed, the fate of a sufferer upon his heap of ashes, and who didst illumine and festoon it with winged words of wisdom as well as with the sparks of thy quick soul? Where is thy grave, thou high poet, the confidant of divine counsel and of the souls of angels and men, who didst gather heaven and earth into one glance, and didst waft thy spirit, thy heart, thy poetry, and thy passion, from the complaint of the tortured wretch in the region of shadows up to the stars and even beyond them? Does an evergreen cypress bloom upon thy resting-place? Or liest thou hidden, like thy unknown name, leaving thy book to testify, and singest—high over our great heap of ashes, the abode of so many tortured wretches—with morning-stars around the throne of the Ruler of the world? Or wast thou the historian of thy own sufferings and thy triumph, of thy overcoming and overcome wisdom—wast thou thyself the happy unhappy one, the tortured and the rewarded? Then hast thou for the second time given vent to the complaints of thy heart, and established thy victory for thousands of years and all parts of the world. From thy ashes there has arisen with this book a phoenix, a rejuvenated palm-tree, whose roots drink water; its incense wafts around, and has refreshed many a fainting soul, and will so refresh till the end of all time. Thou drawest heaven down to earth; thou encampest the heavenly hosts invisibly round the bed of the sick—his sufferings become a spectacle for the angels, God approving himself in his creature, upon which his glance reposes searchingly as if to justify his own case. “Behold, we count them happy which endure. Ye have heard of the patience of Job and have seen the end of the Lord; that the Lord is very pitiful, and of tender mercy.”

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THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE.*

By FRANCIS A. HENRY.

II.

As we have seen in the last paper, the "Infinite Progress" is the holding to the dualism of co-referent determinations as *equally* valid with their unity, and the failure to see that the dualism is in fact *sublated* by the unity. Thus the Understanding is thrown in a ceaseless alternation back and forth from the dualism to the unity, and from the unity to the dualism. The Progress may be specifically stated thus: The Finite and the Infinite are taken to be a single unity; this position requires to be corrected by the opposite one that they are direct contraries; and this again by the reiteration of the first statement, and so on *ad infinitum*. The resolution of the contradiction lying, as has been said, in the fact that the unity *and* the difference are themselves inseparable. Thus the notion of Causality is one which brings up the Infinite Progress. Cause and effect are inseparable correlatives. Something is determined as Cause; as such it is not for itself, but for its effect, or, each determination is as one-sided as the other: if not self-existent, it is not its own cause, but is caused by another; that is, it is itself an effect—*unity of Cause and Effect*. Again, the Cause which is itself an effect, has its own cause in another—that is, the *cause*, as such, is a *different* something—*separation of Cause and Effect*; this new cause again is itself only an effect—*unity*; it has another for its cause—*separation*; and so on *ad infinitum*. In seeking

* The Secret of Hegel, by J. H. Stirling.

a First Cause we are travelling around the circumference of a circle, and we sagely remark that if we could go on far enough we should come to the beginning. Hamilton is right, then, when he calls the phrase Absolute Cause a contradiction in terms. Causality is a category of the Understanding. It implies succession, it *is* relation; it falls out of the thinking of Reason, which is a thinking "under the form of eternity"; it falls out of the notion of the Absolute. For The Absolute is that which is without relation to any Other—e. g. the effect—but which is related only to itself. But is the question still asked, Well, *how* does the Absolute come into being? If it was not caused by another, what was its beginning? Such a question is best answered by considering what is contained in the notion *beginning*.

A Beginning is simply a becoming, a coming to be of that which was not before. *The* beginning, then, the beginning of the All, could have had nothing else. Now observe, the absolute Beginning—that *first* origination before which there was absolutely nothing—implies as its necessary logical antecedent a power to originate, and, since there was nothing *before* the Beginning, a power to originate from nothing; or, in other words, it follows that Nothing is an originaive principle. Does this sound like a mere play on words? Let us look at it. Let us try to conceive the universe abolished; let us ask ourselves how it would be if there never had been anything at all—no time, no space, no matter, no mind. What would there be if existence were not? Why there would be simply nothing. There would be *nothing*; nothing, *that* is what would *be*. The truth of positive and negative comes out irrepressibly in this common language. The very annihilation of All to nothing only converts Nothing into Being; only shows that the Be subsists and must subsist eternally. Existence we may annihilate in thought by abstracting its predicates, but Being, the universal, or "all-common," predicate, we cannot so annihilate, because it is the essential constituent of thought. There is no possible destruction of Being, then. The Not is impotent against it, for—and this is the wonderful result of complete analysis—the Not that is set as its contrary falls into it; Being and Nothing melt together into the same conception.

Whatever exists has a certain character or nature, and it exists only by virtue of such nature which constitutes it what it is; that is, a thing only exists in so far as it is a *This* or *That*. Its existence absolutely without any qualification is impossible and inconceivable. What, then, is its Existence *in itself*—the ultimate underlying universal—the one common property and predicate of all things? It is a pure abstraction. Its only characteristic is to have absolutely no characteristic. It *is*, and that is all about it; it is, but it is not any thing (no *thing*, nothing); it is *IS* without as yet being any *how*; it is an utterly predicateless vacuity. Now if abstract Nothing be realized to thought, it will be seen to signify precisely the same vacuity. What is *meant* by each term is the same thing, namely, absence of determinateness, definiteness; but each term expresses this conception with a slightly different accentuation. Being *states* only the positive phase, and *implies* the negative; conversely, Nothing states only the negative phase, and implies the positive. Each of these phases looked at steadily is seen to vanish in the other. Being—abstract affirmation, or affirmation that affirms nothing—disappears into a negative; and Nothing—abstract negation, or negation that denies nothing—changes into a positive. Or, the Being that disappears in negation reappears again as before; for the negation, being purely abstract, detracts nothing from its positiveness. This disappearing of each in the other generates a kind of alternation between them in which their whole truth emerges. Being and Nothing are the same, yet not the same; the truth of the matter is not that both *are*, independently, but that each passes into the other. This Passing is, in the abstract, Becoming. The movement from Nothing to Being is Beginning, or Origin; that from Being to Nothing is Ending, or Decease. It is not quite exact, then, to speak of Being and Nothing as identical; for Becoming *is* only so far as they are different; but Becoming, which manifests their difference, manifests also their unity, in which this difference is eliminated. Now the logical inconsistency of common conception appears in this, that while Being and Nothing are regarded as mere antitheticals, and their union as a contradiction—Beginning and Ending are, nevertheless, held to be valid predicates. But on the supposition of the

absolute partedness of Being and Nothing, any Becoming is absolutely incomprehensible. On this supposition there cannot anything begin: for, it either is already, or is not: so far as it is, it does not begin; and so far as it is not, it does not begin. The Eleatic Pantheists, therefore, whose principle was the absolute opposition of Being and Nothing, were only consistently holding to that principle when they denied the possibility of motion, change, production, &c., or the Becoming in general. A thing either *is* or is *not*, said they, for there is no middle state between Being and non-Being; but, if by these are meant absolute being and absolute non-being, the truth is rather that there is nothing whatever in all existence which is not precisely in this middle state, or transitional condition. The question, then, as to the beginning of the Absolute is answered by this, that the unity, or rather the *together-ness*, of Being and Nothing makes a Beginning of Being impossible; it is its own beginning. That is, the Beginning, like Cause, is merely a logical Category. It applies itself really to succession and relativity, but only abstractly to the eternal and absolute. In the notion of the circle, a beginning is merely a constitutive point which is everywhere in general, but nowhere in particular. So in the eternal IS of the universe the Beginning is simply a logical *prius* factually immanent.

The foregoing may furnish an answer to what has been a sort of *quæstio vexata* in philosophy, which indeed is only another form of the question we have been considering: How does the Finite come out of the Infinite? or, How does the Infinite come out of itself into finitude? At pages 80-81 of Mr. Mansell's "Limits of Religious Thought," it may be seen how the Understanding struggles with this question. "Since," says Mr. Mansell, "the idea of the Absolute is irreconcilable with the idea of Cause, we can do nothing toward explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite." After groping about in the dark for this explanation, only to his own increasing confusion, he makes up his mind that there is no explanation to be had, and remarks:

"The whole of this web of contradictions is woven from one original warp and woof—namely, the impossibility of conceiving the co-existence of the finite and the infinite, and the

cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered us according as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the infinite."

Upon this Mr. Mansell disposes in turn of both of these solutions as incomplete, and comes out himself upon the not very satisfactory conclusion that since the last result is a contradiction complete and thorough-going, "it tells with equal force against all belief and all unbelief, and therefore necessitates the conclusion that belief cannot be determined solely by reason." Thus "it sufficiently shows the impotence of human reason, while it is not in itself inconsistent with any form of religious belief." It would seem hardly likely that a contradiction which showed itself so little particular as to the form of our religious belief, should not be obliging enough to dispense us from holding any religious belief at all. But this question, How does the Infinite come out of itself? proceeds, it will be seen, from that abstract conception of the Infinite which has been shown up as a false conception. The question, How does the Infinite become finite? is answered by this, that "there is no such thing as an Infinite which is *first of all* Infinite, and which is afterwards under a necessity to become finite, to go out into the Finite, but it *is*, in itself, already, just as much finite as infinite. The question assumes that the Infinite *per se* is on one side, and that the Finite which has gone out from it—or which has come from somewhere, one knows not how—is, separated from it, truly real. Here, rather, it is to be said that just this *separation is incomprehensible*, and that neither such Finite nor such Infinite has truth." "So far as one recognizes the untruth of these abstractions he may answer the question directly, and say that the Infinite goes *out* into the Finite just because as an abstract unity it has no principle of subsistence or consistence in itself; and conversely, for the same reason of its nullity, the Finite goes *in* into the Infinite. In other words, the Infinite is eternally gone out into the Finite, be-

cause no more than pure being, *is* it, by itself, alone, without having its Other in itself.”*

But, it may be exclaimed, this co-existence of the Finite and the Infinite makes the Finite eternal, and so overthrows the doctrine of the Creation. Not at all; it only requires us to understand that doctrine. If the Creation of the universe be regarded as an effect of a creative fiat in time—an eternity anterior to this is presupposed. Some persons who perceive this, and who, reluctant to admit a God eternally inactive, and a universe eternally non-existent, think to solve the difficulty by asserting that God is eternally creative—that He creates from eternity to eternity. But this only removes the difficulty by a single step. If Creation proceed from creative fiat, at some time or other that fiat must have been spoken, and the question recurs, How was it *before*? The attempt to answer this question brings up the Infinite Progress again. Back of the creative act lies an eternity; at the beginning of this eternity we set another creative act; but then there arises a new eternity, to be antedated by a new creative act, and so on *ad infinitum*. It is the same thing with the future as with the past. God “creative to eternity” is God creating in succession; not creating the universe in one act, but working from world to world; and because space and time are endless, He can go on doing so forever. The creation of the universe cannot, then, be an act in time, unless we are to suppose an eternity when the universe was not, and when God was alone in the infinite void. Such a God may answer for Buddhism, but such is not the God of Christianity. What, then, is Creation? It is the objectivation of God’s thought to Himself. As such it is certainly “from eternity,” but not in the sense that you cannot reach the time when it began; for I must repeat once more that Eternity does not mean endless time, but *no* time; not progress towards an unreachable future, but rest in a perpetual present. God the Creator is, in that as in every aspect, God the Spirit; and the act of a spirit is thought. God creates like an Artist, not like a stone-mason. In the rare old Greek tongue only the Artist is called Creator, for he alone creates that

* Hegel’s Logic, sec. I, chap. II., C., Stirling’s translation.

which is spiritual—which, as St. John says, “abideth forever.” The creation of the universe is co-incident and co-eternal with God’s thought, and as to creation of particulars that is an affair of time, and as such it is continuous, and was by no means finished up as regards this planet six thousand years ago. As then the waters were gathered together, and the dry land appeared; as the earth brought forth grass, and herb, and fruit-tree; as the waters brought forth the moving creature that hath life, and the air was filled with the fowls that fly above the earth, and the earth with cattle, and creeping things, and beasts,—just so it is now: the rocks go on forming day by day, the minerals concrete, the waters work new ways, the forests spring up and are cut down, and all living creatures continue to be born and die. This emerging from and sinking in the vast billows of an ever-flowing sea is the very story of existence. So far, then, from the Finite being made eternal, it appears to be that which has no permanence, whose being is altogether in succession.

Here it may be objected that this is to make the Creation a matter of necessity, which view savors of Pantheism. But if by creation be understood God’s thought, no one need hesitate about its necessity. With Spirit, to think is to be, and you can as little relieve it from this “necessity” as you can a quadruped from the necessity of having four feet. On the other hand, if you suppose Creation an accidental circumstance—an exertion of arbitrary volition—you tolerate the supposition that God might just as well have been entirely solitary and entirely inactive; and such a God is simply no God at all. To conceive that existence only *happens* to be, to conceive it all superfluous, and that there might just as well have been nothing at all, is to overlook this fact: in that God created the world, He demonstrated that abstract self-identity was not alone what constituted Him. As to Pantheism, so far from considering creation necessary, Pantheism declares it impossible. For the Pantheist there is nothing but the abstract Absolute, and the world of time and sense is not its immanent “otherness,” but a *Maya* or delusion of the brain. The fact is that just this making Creation an indifferent thing—this making God the First and one of the universe, sufficient to Himself without the universe—may seem like

piety, but *is* the essential principle of Pantheism. To stand by the abstract Infinite, or by the abstract Finite—to stand by the *one* to the exclusion of the *other*—this, as Mr. Mansell correctly describes it (*supra*), is the position taken by Pantheism and by Atheism. The Universal by itself, without particulars, is Pure Being, or the Universal void; and Particulars by themselves, without the including Universal, are only Dependents cut from what they depend upon, which shrivel up and perish in our hands. The truth as against Pantheism and Atheism is *neither* the one *nor* the other, separately, but *both* sublated in each other. The true Absolute-Infinite contains the finite and relative; it is the Universal, and it is in the very notion of the universal that it involve the particular; that it be the All, and therefore every Each. To such as may fancy that this “unity of the finite and infinite” savors of Pantheism, I will say that, as matter of fact, Pantheism never came near enough to catch the faintest glimpse of this thought, and, further, that this thought overthrows Pantheism and treads it underfoot forever. But does the reader still shake his head dubiously and say: “Your doctrine nevertheless looks Pantheistical, or Atheistical, to me, for you make the Universe—the unity of Finite and Infinite—a self-existent, sufficient to itself; and you take the Beginning—the first cause of the universe—to be abstract Being, which you say is convertible with pure Nothing”? The explanation is very simple. This cannot be Pantheism, nor Atheism, for in all this there is no question of God. The Universe has the *form* of God, it is not God; it is thought, not the thinker; it is IS, not I AM. God is not The Infinite, but the Infinite one; He is not self-existence in general, but the self-existent Singular. The dialectical evolution of Being through Negation after bringing us to the abstract Universal—the Infinite and the Finite, or Self and its Other—leads beyond this to Spirit or Personality—the concrete Universal—as the absolute thought and fact. The Universe is the equality of the Finite and the Infinite: so far as there is definite Being there is Infinite Being; or, there is only one Reality, the singleness of self-existence. But this is rather a single manifold than a single one; the extension and intension are coincident, but just *from this coincidence and equality* it

results that there is a self-identical Many rather than a self-identical One. What is present is, therefore, Otherness in general, or a universal Being-for-Other, which, because it is *a single* Being-for-Other, is more properly Being-for-One. That is, the Singleness of the determination sublates the Otherness. "The Universal is necessarily *for-One*, but it is not *for-Another*; the One for which it is, is only itself." That is, the One is *for-itself* just because that which is *for-it* is nothing other than itself. To try another statement, Thought, or Reason, is the *implicit* or In-Itself of Nature; or, if one chooses, Nature is the *explicit* or Out-of-Itself of Thought; for the Universal is just this Inward-and-Outward, and as much one as the other. Thought, then, is Existence *in-itself*, Nature is existence *for-itself*, or objectivated to Thought, and Spirit is the whole truth of existence, at once *in-itself* and *for-itself*. This is the way, and the only way, that Nature can lead to Nature's God. No so-called arguments from design to prove an intelligent Creator of the universe have been worth the paper they were written on. Impersonal thought is all that Nature evidences to the sense-understanding; and seed-thought is scarcely a higher principle than seed-matter. Abstract Idealism and abstract Materialism are only the two forms of Pantheism—that is, of direct and indirect Atheism. Now just as Nature is the Out-being of Thought, so the unity of these two—the absolute Universal—is the Out-being of the absolute Spirit, which is thus absolute Subject and absolute Object. This may be stated thus: the Ego is, *first*, self-relation, simple identity, or In-Itself; *secondly*, the Ego discerns itself, distinguishes itself, others itself; this Otherness is, as contrasted with the first phase, its being Out-of-Itself, and, since the Othering is a making itself an object to itself, it is also its being For-Itself; *thirdly*, the Ego returns from Otherness, returns from the distinction in which it was set as a For-Itself to be discerned, back to the In-Itself, the discerner; but it carries back with it and retains this explication of itself; it is now Identity *and* Diversity, the Universal *and* the Particular, at once *in* and *for* itself. This is, of course, only logical analysis of an immanent process. There is no such thing as an Ego which is first of all *in* itself, then *for* itself,

and then *in and for* itself, but it is *always* in this last or complete state of being.*

As to the difficulty about the Beginning, Pure Being is merely the *logical prius* of the universe, not the *actual prius*. The Immediate is the first in the order of abstract thought, but the Self-mediating is the first in the order of reality. The true Beginning of the universe is the self-thinking of Spirit, and this is also the end, or, more truly, there is neither beginning nor ending to the eternal Thought of God, the eternal IS of the eternal I AM. If this be Pantheism, it is such as is taught by St. John. "In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made." *In* the beginning was the Word; there never was even a beginning when the Word was not. That is, the absolute Voice was and is *always* a speaking Voice. And not only is the Word *with* the Voice, but the Word *is* the Voice. For what is a voice which does not utter itself? And what is the vocalization but the voice itself?

As I have said, the subject-matter of philosophy and of religion is the same; the sole question involved in each is

* Thoroughly to think is to think God, for to think is to seek an explanation, and *the* explanation of all, however we name it, is God. Thus the history of philosophy is only a history of the explication of the Divine Idea. Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, are all concerned with the One, the absolute as such, Substantiality, or the In-Itself of Spirit; Hume considers the transition to Many, Causality, or the For-Itself of Spirit; Kant establishes the truth of this interrogative suggestion by adding the notion of Reciprocity to the other two; and lastly Hegel takes up this tritheism into the trinity-in-unity of Self-determination. This is the most general statement of Hegel's derivation from Kant. Kant altered the relative positions of Subject and Object by showing that the Subject is necessary to the Object, that the Objective is in fact conditioned by the Subjective—for this was Kant's notion of the Categories. The Category, then, the essential form of Thought, is the middle ground between Subject and Object, and the truth of these is their necessary relation. Hegel carries out and completes this view. It is an error, he says, to regard this reciprocity as a relation somehow external to the Subject and Object, a view which would leave these standing by themselves as separable and independent, for this relation is rather their organic movement, and in it alone they have their being. In fact, the distinction into Subject and Object is a purely logical or formal one. What we have to do with is not two separates and their relation—Subject, Object, Reciprocity—but One inseparable in its immanent distinction—Spirit, Self-determination.

that of the spiritual interests of man, and philosophy has value only as it clarifies our faith and strengthens our convictions in the truths of religion. That is the spirit which searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. Nor is such achievement a small matter, or its value trifling. Christianity is the revelation of the Infinite and Divine, not as an abstract ideal but as the veritable concrete truth, the great and only reality. But the profession of faith in this reality which we make by calling ourselves Christians is virtually belied to-day by the general acceptance of a theory diametrically opposed to it, supposed to be established by philosophy and science, in which the Finite as such is viewed as the only real, and the Infinite as a "merely negative notion." How many calling themselves at once Christians and Philosophers stumble against imaginary "limits of religious thought," and ask doubtfully, What is Truth? and then, shaking their heads, answer very wisely, Lo! we cannot tell what it is. What is the common idea of God but a vague abstraction? The phrases Supreme Being and First Cause have a grand sound, but what definite idea do they convey to the mind? Even while filling ourselves with these windy words do we not find ourselves reaching up longingly, striving to grasp some more solid and satisfactory conception of the Divine? Nay, do we not sometimes whisper to ourselves, *Whence, where, and how*, is this Supreme Being, after all? What does First Cause mean, and what was the *beginning to that*? We seek the Absolute, but we tire of the quest, or we have been taught that it is impious to attempt to be wise above what is written; so we answer ourselves, "The Absolute? oh, that is God." And God? The answer comes not quite so confidently, "God? why God is the Supreme Being, the First Cause"—in fact, the Absolute. And so Infidelity comes up with the pace of a conqueror. Thus many honest men are placed in an anomalous and embarrassing position, and their efforts to make themselves comfortable in it—not entirely to reject the old faith while they embrace the new science, and so to hang on to both sides of a contradiction—are a spectacle at once painful and ludicrous. The question, "What is Truth?" is the question, What is the Absolute?—and this is the question which is to-day supposed unanswer-

able. It was not strange that Pilate in the darkness of that day could look It in the face and ask despairingly, What is Truth? but what excuse shall we Christians have who shut our eyes to it, and then say we cannot see? In this matter Mr. Mansell would have us walk by Faith, and not by sight. He would carry us to the Absolute by a flying leap in the dark. He finds the Infinite and Absolute "encompassed with contradictions," and this "teaches us that it is our duty to believe that which we cannot conceive." If, he says, there is an object of which the mind is unable to form a clear and distinct conception, this inability disqualifies us for holding any given doctrine concerning that object. Thus if we can form no positive notion of the nature of God as an Infinite Being, we can neither explain the dogma of the Trinity, nor are we entitled to reject it as inconsistent with that nature which is thus unknown to us. Such mysteries belong not to Reason but to Faith, and the inquiry concerning a belief must be directed not to its reasonableness or unreasonableness, but to the nature of the authority on which it rests as revealed or unrevealed.* In Mr. Mansell's view, that is, Faith, which is contrasted with Reason, is simply acceptance of a given doctrine without any inquiry into its reasonableness. The "inquiry" he speaks of into the nature of the authority for the doctrine, as revealed or unrevealed, does precisely nothing to substantiate this bare acceptance; for the "revelation" itself comes from that same unknown which was in question in the first instance. The "inquiry," therefore, is only a vicious circle. Mr. Mansell has been compared to a man sitting on the end of a plank that projects over an abyss, and deliberately sawing off his seat. How easily and immediately such a bastard faith would lead to infidelity, one would think might have been foreseen. My good friend, answers the Spencerian, if this is the best thing you can say for your faith

* "Priestcraft reappears under many forms. This warning off the field of the supernatural which is uttered in the supposed interests of Religion, is echoed with even greater earnestness in the real interests of—the Positive Philosophy. 'Whatever,' says Mr. Lewes, 'is inaccessible to reason should be strictly interdicted to research.' Here we have the true ring of the old sacerdotal interdicts! Who is to define beforehand what is and what is not 'accessible to reason'? The strong presumption is that every philosophy which assumes to issue such an interdict must have reason to fear inquiry."—*Duke of Argyll*.

—that its object is something of which you can form no clear and distinct conception, and consequently you are as well entitled to accept as to reject it, because at least it can never be disproved—you must pardon me if I do not embrace your creed. You forget that the burden of proof rests with the affirmative, and here on your own showing is nothing advanced for the proposition God exists, except that, as it contains no idea at all, it cannot be contradicted; it must require a truly Tapleyan cheerfulness to content oneself with such meagre spiritual sustenance. You believe, you say, but you can't say why, and you don't know what; I think we can dispense with your belief at least till you can give us some answer to these not unnatural questions. Our rational convictions with regard to Divine things, Mr. Mansell says, must be regarded not as certainty, but as probability; and he remarks with perfect truth, "A single infallible criterion of all religious truth can be obtained only by the possession of a perfect philosophy of the Infinite," and then proceeds, "if such a philosophy is unattainable"—and that it is, is Mr. Mansell's fundamental position—"there is always room for error, etc." But not only is there room for error, there is no room for anything else; if this philosophy is unattainable, Truth is absolutely unattainable. But is this philosophy unattainable? What are the Infinite and the Absolute? Are they not the eternal All of things, the actual Universe which *is*? Why fancy them off in a vague Beyond, a dim unreachable unknown? But Thought, you say, is conditioned, and can never understand the unconditioned; "all, in short, that is not finite, relative, and phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of our knowledge." And are you so sure of this? Why do you say Thought is finite? how do you know that Thought is not infinite? But Thought is held in by limits which it cannot transcend. And what if these "limits" are pure fictions and fancies? Nay—if you force me to say it—what if it is your own individual incapacity which you thus complacently generalize into limits of human thought? What if your Absolute is an untruth, and so quite naturally unattainable? Here you will open "certain boys' puzzle-boxes of Time and Space," and hasten to "impale me on the horns of certain infantile dilemmas."—

But what if you are shown the simple secret of these logical labyrinths—what if you are brought to blush that you could have found them difficulties? Consider a moment. What is the difficulty about the Absolute? Is it not the explanation of the Relative? Is it not, therefore, given *in* and *with* the notion of the Relative, not outside and apart from that? Every explanation of a given thing is a finding of the Absolute of that thing. “Thought, when it asked why an apple fell, sought the Absolute and found it, so far at least as Matter is concerned.” The Absolute is only the final explanation, the principle of principles, and therefore it is *in them*, and *in* the things to be explained—that is, just where we are thinking, not off somewhere where we cannot think. We grope in the darkness of the inane “if haply we may feel after and find” the Absolute, though all the time “it is not far from every one of us.” We stumble over the Absolute lying on our own threshold, and then wander off in a vain search for it into the trackless wastes of the desert. We hunt high and low, as it were, clamoring for the spectacles which all the while rest quietly astride our nose.

But, in fact, to the assumption of Hamilton, Mansell, and the rest, that, in general, the fact of Limitation implies its impassability, it is to be objected that rather the direct contrary is implied by this. In that something is determined as limited, there is left over against the Limitation that which this restrains. The Limitation is only such in antithesis to the unlimited part, which by such antithesis is determined as Impulse. The Limitation and the Impulse are both *in* the Something, or the Something is simply the unity of both;

* The ultimate result of logic is always an unresolved contradiction in thought and in terms. The Understanding is the faculty of seeing things in relation, and consequently its last result is a dualism which is pushed to an antithesis of contradictories. But the eye of Reason sees the last result as unity—what is truly last cannot be two, it must be one. Reason has insight into the *sublation* of the contradiction. It sees the dualism resolved into unity, at the same time that the two terms are *conserved*, in so far as necessary factors of that unity—which is only *out of* their difference—but *not conserved* as independents whose combination is contingent and external to their being. To reach the speculative view we must *think ourselves loose* from the abstractions of the understanding which entangle thought in their tough, fibrous “web of contradictions,” and “shut it in with “Limits” and keep it down with “Laws,” so that it cannot rise to a comprehension of Self-diremption in Self-conservation, which is the Truth of the universe.

one side, therefore, is just as valid as the other, for each side *is* only by reason of, and in consequence of, the other. Therefore to stick at Limitation as a finality, and not to see that in fact this is so determined *only in order to be transcended*—that in fact its meaning simply is that the Something in its inner nature has not *as yet* passed the bound, but only *is to* do so—this comes from inability to place oneself in the whole notion, or to see more than a one-sided, abstract, half-truth. Not to argue the matter further, the assertion of the impassability of Limitation may be met by a simple reference to the Actual. What takes place constantly around us is nothing else than transcendence of limitation. Change is Something, through its potentiality, passing over the limits of its present being into a new state of being. The oak, for instance, is the transcendence of a limitation to be an acorn. Or, temperament, disposition, our whole inherited or given moral nature, is the Limitation of our character: this is what we are; but against this is free-will, the Impulse, the power to become otherwise. Possibility of transcendence is admitted by all who believe in moral responsibility, that is, by all mankind except a few abstract theorists. The will and the idiosyncratic moral total are the two constituent elements of character, which is simply what results from the action and counteraction of these two. Now this given nature is precisely our finitude, this is the sphere of the negative for human Spirit; and in this moral sphere the Limitation, though never impassable, is often not passed. But Thought, Reason, on the other hand, is what is universal in us as opposed to our particularity; it is *the* Universal which is without and beyond all limitation, which, not potentially, but actually, is absolutely free.

In conclusion, I can only say that I believe that there might be found in the full comprehension of these two thoughts, Finite and Infinite in their ultimate unity and truth, a clue to many tangled puzzles of modern life, and a light to break through the cloud which shadows our future. The principles of Christianity are to-day in great measure discarded or forgotten; man is fast losing his hold on that Infinite and Divine which is the truth of his being, fast slipping backward into the condition of misery and darkness from which Christ came

to rescue him eighteen centuries ago. As of old the Truth spoke to the simple and unlearned, saying, Arise and follow me, so to-day he gives the same summons to men of intellect. It is high time that earnest thinking men should know that the "riddle of the painful earth" is not insoluble, is not unsolved; time they should know that "the secret of the universe is powerless to resist the might of thought"; time they should bring something else than "infantile cryings," and "stretchings of lame hands of faith that gather only dust and chaff," to meet the present need. To-day as in the First Century the world's great need is the need of Principles—Principles social, political, economical, religious—Principles to guide man's every walk in life. The principles which moulded the life of a former time are fallen from their thrones, and mankind is in open rebellion against the past. The task before us, then, is no less a one than to lay the foundations of a better era in the ruins of the old world. To bring this task to a successful issue Philosophy alone is competent; amid perplexity, confusion, and the strife of many tongues, it is the utterance and acceptance of philosophic truth which alone can bring peace in our time—peace to the unquiet hearts of men, peace to the unquiet hearts of nations.

MEDITATIONS

CONCERNING THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY,

In which are clearly proved the Existence of GOD, and the real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man.

Translated from the French of Descartes, by WM. R. WALKER.

SIXTH MEDITATION.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS MATERIAL, AND THE REAL DISTINCTION WHICH THERE IS BETWEEN THE SOUL AND BODY OF MAN.

It now remains to me only to examine whether there are things material: and, indeed, I already know at least that they may exist in so far as they are regarded as the object of the demonstrations of geometry, since in this fashion I

conceive them very clearly and very distinctly. For there is no doubt but that God has the power of producing all the things which I am capable of conceiving with distinctness; and I have never judged it impossible for him to do anything except what was in contradiction to the power to conceive aright. Moreover, the faculty of imagination which is in me, and of which I see by experience I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of things material, is capable of persuading me of their existence; for when I attentively consider what this imagination is, I find that it is nothing but a certain application of the faculty which knows, to the body which is intimately present with it, and which therefore exists.

And in order to render this very manifest, I remark, first, the difference which there is between imagination and pure intellection or conception. For example, when I imagine a triangle, I not only conceive that it is a figure composed of three lines, but in addition I regard these three lines as presented by the force and the internal application of my mind; and this is properly what I call imagination. But if I wish to think of a chiliagon, I conceive in truth that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides, as easily as I conceive that a triangle is a figure composed of three sides only; but I cannot imagine the thousand sides of a chiliagon as I can the three sides of a triangle, or regard them, so to speak, with the eyes of my mind as present. And though, knowing the custom I have of always using my imagination when I think of things corporeal, it happens that in conceiving a chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure, yet it is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon, since it in nowise differs from what I should represent to myself were I to think of a myriagon or of any other many-sided figure, and does not in any way aid in discovering the properties which constitute the difference between the chiliagon and other polygons. But if the consideration of a pentagon comes in question, it is very true that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon without the aid of the imagination; but I can also imagine it in applying the attention of my mind to each of its five sides, and at the same time to the area or space which they enclose. Thus I know clearly that I have need of a particu-

lar effort of the mind in order to imagine, an effort of which I make no use in order to conceive or to understand; and this particular effort of the mind shows evidently the difference which lies between imagination and intellection or pure conception. I observe, besides, that this power of imagination which is in me, in so far as it differs from the power of conception, is in no fashion necessary to my nature or essence, that is, to the essence of my mind; for, although I should not have it, there is not a doubt but that I would always remain the same as I now am: whence it seems that we may conclude that it depends on something that is different from my mind. And I easily conceive that if any body exists to which my mind is so joined and united that it can be applied to its consideration when it pleases, it can in this way imagine corporeal things: so that this fashion of thinking differs only from pure intellection in this, that the mind in conception is turned in some way towards itself, and regards some one of its ideas as it is in itself; but in imagination it is turned towards the body, and regards in it something conforming to the idea which it has itself formed, or which it has received through the senses. I easily conceive, I say, that the imagination may act in this manner if it is true that there is a body: and because I can find no other way of explaining how it does act, I thence conjecture that it is probably in this way, but only probably; and although I carefully examine everything, I cannot find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature which I have in my imagination, I can draw any argument which necessarily concludes the existence of any body.

But I am accustomed to imagine many other things besides this corporeal nature which is the object of geometry, namely, colors, sounds, flavors, pain, and other such things, although less distinctly; and since I much better perceive those things by the senses, by the mediation of which and of the memory they seem to reach my imagination, I believe that, in order to examine them more conveniently, it would be well to examine at the same time what feeling is, and to see whether from those ideas which I receive in my mind by this fashion of thinking which I call feeling, I cannot draw some certain proof of the existence of things corporeal.

And, in the first place, I shall trace back in my memory what are the things which I formerly accounted true, as having received them by the senses, and upon what foundations my belief rested; next, I shall examine the reasons which have since obliged me to call them in question; and, finally, I shall consider what I ought now to believe.

First, then, I felt that I had a head, hands, feet, and all the other members composing this body, which I considered as a part of myself, or perhaps also as the whole; moreover, I felt that this body was placed among many others, from which it was capable of receiving comforts and discomforts of various kinds; and I observed these comforts by a certain feeling of pleasure or luxury, and the discomforts by a feeling of pain. And, besides this pleasure and this pain, I also felt within me hunger, thirst, and other similar appetites; as also certain corporeal tendencies towards joy, sadness, anger, and other similar passions. And, externally, besides the extension, the figures, the motions of bodies, I observed in them hardness, heat, and all the other qualities which fall under the touch; moreover, I there observed light, colors, odors, tastes, and sounds, the variety of which gave me the means of distinguishing the sky, the earth, the sea, and generally all other bodies the one from the other. And indeed, considering the ideas of all these qualities which were presented to my thought, and which alone I felt properly and immediately, it was not without reason that I believed I felt things entirely different from my thought, namely, bodies from which these ideas proceeded; for I experienced that they were presented to them without my consent being required, so that I could not feel any object, however willing I might have been, if it were not present at the organ of one of my senses; and it was not at all in my power not to feel it when it was present. And because the ideas which I received by the senses were much more lively, more positive, and even in their own fashion more distinct, than any of those which I could of myself feign in meditating, or which were imprinted on my memory, it seemed that they could not proceed from my mind; so that they were necessarily caused in me by other things. Of which things having no knowledge, save that they gave me these same idea, it could not occur to my

mind but these things were similar to the ideas which they caused. And since I remember also that I was more quickly served by the senses than by my reason, and that I recognized that the ideas which I of myself formed were not so positive as those which I received by the senses, and even that they were made up of parts of those very ideas received by the senses, I easily persuaded myself that I had not any idea in my mind which had not before passed into it through my senses. Nor was it without reason that I believed that this body, which by a certain peculiar right I called my own, belonged to me more properly and more strictly than another; for, in effect, I could not be separated from it as from other bodies: I felt in it and for it all my appetites and all my affections, and, in fine, I was touched with the feelings of pleasure and of pain in its parts, and not in those of other bodies separated from it. But when I examined why, from a vague feeling of pain, there followed sadness in the mind, and from the feeling of pleasure there arose joy, or why, from an unknown disturbance of the stomach, called hunger, we have the desire to eat, and from the dryness of the throat we have the desire to drink, and so on, I could not render any reason, except that nature thus taught me; for there is certainly no affinity or relation, at least in my comprehension, between this disturbance of the stomach and the desire to eat, or between the feeling of the thing which causes the pain and the thought of sadness which this feeling creates. And, in the same way, it seems to me that I have learned of nature all the other things which I judged concerning the objects of my senses; because I observed that the judgments which I was accustomed to make of these objects were formed in me before I had the leisure to weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make them.

But, thereafter, many experiences gradually destroyed all the credit I had attached to my senses: for I have often observed that the towers which at a distance seemed to me round, appeared, when near, to be square, and that the colossal figures raised upon the highest summits of these towers appeared to me when regarding them from below as little statues; and also, from an infinity of other occasions, I have discovered error in the judgments founded upon the external

senses; and not only upon the external senses, but even upon the internal; for is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain? and yet I at one time learned from several persons whose arms and legs had been amputated that they still sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which they no longer had; which led me to think that I also could not be entirely assured that I was ill in one of my members although I should feel pain in it. And to these reasons for doubt, I have recently added two others of a very general kind: the first is, that I have never believed myself to feel, when awake, anything which I could not sometimes also believe myself to feel when asleep; and as I do not believe that the things which I seem to feel when asleep proceed from any objects outside of me, I do not see why I should rather have this belief concerning those which I seem to feel when awake; and the second is, that, not yet knowing, or rather feigning not to know the author of my being, I see nothing preventing me from having been so made by nature as to deceive myself even in the things which appear to me the most veritable. And as for the reasons which before persuaded me of the truth of things sensible, I had not much difficulty in answering them; for nature seeming to carry me to many things from which reason turned me aside, I did not believe it my duty to trust much in the teachings of this nature. And although the ideas which I receive by the senses do not depend upon my will, I did not think I ought therefore to conclude that they proceed from things different from me, since perhaps there might be discovered in me some faculty, hitherto unknown to me, which may be the cause of them and produce them.

But now that I begin to know myself better and to discover more clearly the author of my origin, I do not in truth think that I ought rashly to admit everything which the senses appear to teach us, nor, on the other hand, do I think that I ought altogether generally to call them in question.

And in the first place, since I know that all the things which I conceive clearly and distinctly may be produced by God, such as I conceive them, it is sufficient that I can conceive clearly and distinctly one thing without another in order to be certain that the one is distinct or different from the other,

because they can be placed separately, at least by the omnipotence of God; and we are obliged to judge them to be different, no matter by what power this separation was accomplished: and therefore, from the very fact that I know with certainty that I exist, and yet that I do not observe that anything else necessarily belongs to my nature, or to my essence, than that I am a thing that thinks, I very properly conclude that my essence consists in this only, that I am a thing that thinks, or a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think. And although perhaps, or rather certainly, as I would almost say, I may have a body to which I am very closely joined, yet, since on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a thing that thinks and not extended, and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of the body in so far as it is only a thing extended and that does not think, it is certain that I—that is to say, my soul, by which I am what I am—am entirely and really distinct from my body, and that I can be or exist without it.

Moreover, I find in me various faculties of thinking which have each their peculiar manner: for example, there are in me the faculties of imagination and feeling, without which I can well conceive myself clearly and distinctly as altogether complete; but I cannot so conceive, reciprocally, those faculties without me, that is, without an intelligent substance to which they are attached or to which they belong; for, in our notion of these faculties—or, to use scholastic terms, in their formal concept—they comprise some kind of intellection; whence I conceive that they are distinct from me as modes are distinct from things. I know also some other faculties, such as the changing of place, the taking various situations, and the like, which cannot any more than the former be conceived without some substance to which they are attached, and without which they consequently could not exist; but it is very evident that these faculties, if it is true that they exist, must belong to some corporeal or extended substance, and not to an intelligent substance, because in the clear and distinct concept of them there is contained some kind of extension, but of intelligence none. Besides, I cannot doubt but that there is in me a certain passive faculty of feeling, that

is, of receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible things; but it would be useless to me, and would in nowise be serviceable to me, if there were not also in me, or in some other thing, another active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas. But this active faculty cannot be in me in so far as I am only a thing that thinks, since it does not presuppose my thought, and also since these ideas are often represented to me without my in any way contributing thereto, and even often against my will; it is necessary, therefore, that it should be in some substance different from me, in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas produced by this faculty is formally or eminently contained, as I have formerly observed: and this substance is either a body—that is, a corporeal nature—in which is formally and in reality contained all which is objectively and by representation in these ideas, or it is God himself, or some other creature more noble than the body in which it itself is eminently contained. Now, God not being a deceiver, it is very manifest that he will not transmit these ideas immediately through himself, or by the mediation of any creature in which their reality is not formally contained, but only eminently. For, not having given me any faculty to know what that is, but, on the contrary, a very great inclination to believe that they proceed from corporeal things, I do not see how one can acquit him of deception if in reality these ideas proceed from elsewhere, or are produced by other causes than things corporeal: and, therefore, we must conclude that it is from corporeal things which exist. Yet they may not be altogether such as we perceive them by the senses to be, for there are many things which render this perception of the senses very obscure and confused; but it must at least be admitted that all the things which I conceive clearly and distinctly—that is, all the things, generally speaking, which are comprised in the object of speculative geometry, are really there.

But as regards other things which are either only particular—for example, that the sun is of such a size and of such a shape, etc.—or are conceived less clearly and less distinctly, as light, sound, pain, and the like, it is certain that though they are more doubtful and uncertain, yet, from the single fact that God is no deceiver, and that consequently he does

not allow any falsity in my opinions which he has not given me some faculty capable of correcting, I believe myself able to conclude assuredly that I have in me the means of knowing them with certainty. And, first, there is not a doubt but that all which nature teaches me contains some truth: for by nature, considered in general, I do not now understand anything but God himself, or rather the order and disposition which God has established in created things, and by my nature in particular I do not understand anything but the constitution or assemblage of all the things which God has given me.

Now there is nothing which this nature teaches me more positively or more sensibly, than that I have a body which is ill-affected when I feel pain, which needs to eat or drink when I have the feelings of hunger or thirst, etc. And therefore I ought not in anywise to doubt that there is in that some truth.

Nature teaches me also by these feelings of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body, as a pilot in his ship, but am besides very closely united and so blended and mixed with it that I make up with it a single whole. For, if it were not so, when my body is wounded I should not feel any pain on that account, since I am only a thing that thinks; but I should perceive this wound by the understanding alone, as a pilot perceives by sight if anything breaks in his vessel; and when my body has need of drinking or of eating, I should only know that, without being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst: for in reality all these sentiments of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are only certain confused fashions of thinking which proceed from and depend upon the union and almost the mixture of the mind and body.

Besides this, nature teaches me that many other bodies exist around me, of which I have to pursue some and to shun others. And indeed, from the fact that I feel different kinds of colors, odors, tastes, sounds, heat, hardness, etc., I very properly conclude that there are, in the bodies from which proceed all these various perceptions of the senses, certain varieties corresponding to them, although perhaps these varieties are not in reality similar to them; and from the fact

that among these various perceptions of the senses some are agreeable to me and others disagreeable, there is no doubt but that my body, or rather myself altogether, in so far as I am composed of body and soul, is capable of experiencing various comforts or discomforts from the other bodies which surround it.

But there are many other things which it seems nature had taught me, which however I have not really learned from her, but which were introduced into my mind by a certain custom which I have of making inconsiderate judgments of things; and thus it may easily happen that they contain some falsity; as, for example, my opinion that every space in which there is no thing which moves and makes impressions on my senses is void; that in a body which is warm there is something similar to the idea of heat which is in me; that in a white or black body there is the same whiteness or blackness which I feel; that in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste or the same savor, and so on; that stars, towers, and all other distant bodies, are of the same figure and size as they appear to our eyes at a distance, etc. But in order that there may not be in this anything which I do not distinctly conceive, I ought to define precisely what is my proper meaning when I say that nature teaches me anything. For I here use nature in a more strict signification than when I call it an assemblage or collection of all the things which God has given me; since this assemblage or collection comprises many things which belong to the mind alone, to which things I do not here refer in speaking of nature, as, for example, the notion which I have of this truth, that what has been done once cannot have been done again, and an infinity of others similar which I know by the natural light without the aid of the body; and since there are also comprised in it many others which belong to the body alone, and are not now included here under the term nature, such as the quality of weight, and many other such things of which also I do not speak, but only of the things which God has given me as being composed of mind and body. Now this nature teaches me to shun the things which cause in me the feeling of pain, and to incline towards those which give me any feeling of pleasure; but I do not see that

beyond this it has taught me that from these various perceptions of the senses we ought ever to conclude anything concerning the things which are outside of us until the mind has carefully and maturely examined them: for it seems to me to belong to the mind alone, and not to the compound of mind and body, to know the truth of these things. Thus, although a star should make no more impression on my eye than the light of a candle, there is however within me no real or natural faculty that would lead me to believe that the star is larger than the light of the candle, but I have so judged it from my first years without any reasonable foundation. And although in approaching the fire I feel heat, and in approaching a little nearer I feel pain, there is yet no reason to persuade me that there is in the fire anything similar to this heat or to this pain: but I have only reason for believing there is something in it, whatever it may be, which excites in me these feelings of heat or pain. Besides, although there may be spaces in which there is nothing which excites and moves my senses, I ought not therefore to conclude that these spaces do not contain in them any body; but I see that, as much in this as in many other similar things, I have been accustomed to pervert and confound the order of nature, because these feelings or perceptions of the senses having been put within me by nature only for the purpose of signifying to my mind what things are suitable or injurious to the compound of which it is a part, and being for that purpose sufficiently clear and distinct, I nevertheless make use of them as if they were very certain rules by which I could know immediately the essence and nature of the bodies which are outside of me, of which however they can teach me nothing which is not very obscure and confused.

But I have already before sufficiently examined how, notwithstanding the sovereign goodness of God, it happens that there should be falsity in the judgments which I thus make. Only one difficulty here presents itself concerning the things which nature teaches me should be followed or avoided, and also concerning the internal feelings it has put within me; for it seems to me that I have here sometimes observed error, and thus that I am directly deceived by my nature: as, for example, the agreeable taste of some viand in which poison

has been mixed may invite me to take this poison, and thus deceive me. It is true, however, that in this nature may be excused, for it leads me only to desire the viand, which has an agreeable taste, and not to desire the poison, which is unknown to it; so that I can only conclude from this that my nature does not entirely and universally know all things: a conclusion that need not give rise to any astonishment, since man being of a finite nature his knowledge can thus have only a limited perfection.

But we are also as often deceived even in the things to which we are directly inclined by nature, as happens to sick persons when they desire to drink or to eat things injurious to them. It may, perhaps, here be said that the cause of the deception is that their nature is corrupted; but that does not remove the difficulty, for a sick man is not less truly the creature of God than a man in full health, and it is therefore as much repugnant to the goodness of God that there should be one deceitful and faulty nature as that there should be another; and as a clock, composed of wheels and counterweights, observes not less exactly all the laws of nature when badly made and when it does not keep good time, than when it entirely satisfies the maker's desire, so also, if I consider the body of man as a machine so formed and composed of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood, and skin, that while there would be no mind in it, it should not at all cease to move in the same way as it now does when not moved by the direction of its will and consequently by the aid of the mind, but only by the disposition of its organs, I easily recognize that it would be as natural to this body—being, for example, dropsical—to suffer from dryness of the throat, which generally conveys to the mind the feeling of thirst, and to be disposed by this dryness to move its nerves and other parts in the manner requisite for drinking, and thus to augment its malady and injure itself just as naturally as when it has no indisposition it is by a similar dryness of the throat inclined to drink for its benefit; and although, considering the use to which a clock is destined by its maker, I may say that it is turned from its nature when it does not properly mark the hours, and that in the same way, considering the machine of the human body as having been formed by God to have in

itself all the movements which are generally there, I should have occasion to think that it does not follow the order of its nature when its throat being dry drinking injures its preservation, I yet recognize that this last way of explaining nature is very different from the other; for this is only but a certain external denomination, which depends entirely on my thought, which compares a sick man and a clock badly made with the idea which I have of a healthy man and of a well-made clock, and which betokens nothing which is in reality in the thing referred to; whereas, by the other way of explaining nature, I understand something which is really in the things, and which therefore is not without some truth.

But indeed, with respect to a dropsical body, it is but an external denomination to say that its nature is corrupted when, without having the need to drink, it has yet a dry and arid throat; yet, with respect to the whole compound—that is, to the mind or soul united to the body—it is not a pure denomination, but rather a veritable error of nature, since it is thirsty when to drink is very injurious to it; and therefore there yet remains to be examined how the goodness of God does not prevent the nature of man, taken in this way, from being faulty and deceitful.

Commencing then this examination, I here remark, first, that there is a great difference between the mind and the body in this, that the body, by its nature, is always divisible, and that the mind is entirely indivisible; for, in truth, when I consider it—that is, when I consider myself in so far as I am only a thing that thinks—I cannot distinguish in me any parts, but I know and conceive very clearly that I am a thing absolutely one and entire; and although all the mind seems to be united to all the body, yet when a foot or an arm or some other part is separated from it, I know very well that nothing has thereby been cut off from my mind: and the faculties of will, feeling, conception, etc., cannot any more be properly called its parts, for it is the same mind which is employed *all entire* in willing, and all entire in feeling and in conceiving, etc.; but it is altogether the contrary with things corporeal or extended, for I cannot imagine any of them, however small, which I could not easily in thought take to pieces, or which my mind could not very easily

divide into several parts, and which consequently I know to be divisible. And this would suffice to teach me that the mind or the soul of man is entirely different from the body, even if I had not already otherwise sufficiently learned it.

I observe also that the mind does not receive immediately the impression of all parts of the body, but only of the brain, or perhaps rather of one of its smallest parts, namely, that where is exercised that faculty called the common sense, which, as often as it is affected in the same way, causes the same thing to be felt in the mind although in the meantime the other parts of the body may be variously affected, as an infinity of experiences testify, which there is no need of here relating.

I observe, besides, that the nature of the body is such that not any one of its parts can be moved by another part a little distant, otherwise than it can in the same way be moved by each of the intermediate parts without the part most distant being moved. As, for example, in the cord A B C D, which is completely tense, if we draw and move the last part (D), the first (A) will not be moved in anywise differently than it would be if we drew one of the middle parts (B or C), and the last (D) were to remain motionless. And, in the same way, when I feel pain in my foot, physics teaches me that this feeling is communicated by means of nerves dispersed through the foot, which, being stretched like cords from there to the brain, and which when drawn in the foot draw also at the same time the place of the brain from which they come and in which they terminate, and there excite a certain movement which nature has instituted to make pain felt in the mind as if this pain were in the foot; but because these nerves must pass through the leg, the thigh, the loins, the back, and the neck, in order to reach from the foot to the brain, it may happen that although their extremities which are in the foot are not moved, but only some of their parts which pass through the loins or the neck, this may nevertheless excite the same movements in the brain which would be excited there by a wound received in the foot, in consequence of which the mind would necessarily feel in the foot the same pain as if it had there received a wound; and we must judge similarly concerning all the other perceptions of our senses.

Finally, I observe that, since each movement made in the part of the brain from which the mind receives immediately the impression produces but one single feeling, we cannot, as concerns this matter, wish or imagine anything better than that this movement should produce in the mind that one of all the impressions it is capable of causing, which is the most proper and the most generally useful in the preservation of the human body when in full health: but experience reveals to us that all the feelings which nature has given us are such as I have just described: and there is, therefore, nothing in them which does not make apparent the power and the goodness of God. Thus, for example, when the nerves which are in the foot are much, and more than usually, moved, their movement, passing through the marrow of the dorsal spine to the brain, makes there an impression on the mind which causes it to feel something, namely, pain, as being in the foot, whereby the mind is warned and excited to do its best to remove the cause, as very dangerous and injurious to the foot. It is true that God might establish the nature of man so that this same movement in the brain should produce in the mind an impression altogether different: for example, that it should make itself feel directly according as it is in the brain, or in the foot, or in any other place between the foot and the brain, or, in short, any other part whatever; but nothing in all this would so well contribute to the preservation of the body as that which it actually feels. Moreover, when we require to drink, there is thereby created a certain dryness in the throat which moves its nerves, and by their means the internal parts of the brain; and this movement produces in the mind the feeling of thirst, because on such an occasion there is nothing more useful to us to know than that we need to drink for the preservation of our health, and so of our other needs.

Wherefore it is altogether manifest that, notwithstanding the sovereign goodness of God, the nature of man in so far as it is composed of mind and body cannot but sometimes be faulty and deceitful. For if there is any cause which excites, not in the foot, but in some one of the parts of the nerve which stretches from the foot to the brain, or even in the brain, the same movement which generally takes place when the foot is hurt, we will feel the pain as if it were in the foot, and the sense

will naturally be deceived; because the same movement in the brain could cause in the mind only the same feeling, and this feeling being much oftener excited by a cause which hurts the foot than by another which is elsewhere, it is much more reasonable that it should convey to the mind the feeling of pain in the foot than in any other part. And if it happen that sometimes the dryness of the throat does not come as it generally does from its being necessary for the health of the body to drink, but from some cause altogether contrary, as happens to those who are dropsical, yet it is much better that it should deceive in such circumstances than if, on the contrary, it always deceived when the body is in good health, and so of the other things.

And indeed this consideration is greatly serviceable to me not only for the purpose of recognizing all the errors to which my nature is subject, but also of avoiding or correcting them more easily: for knowing that all my senses more commonly point out to me the true than the false as regards the things relating to the comforts and discomforts of the body, and being nearly always able to make use of several of them to examine any one thing, and being able, besides, to make use of my memory in uniting and joining present knowledge to past, and also to make use of my understanding which has already discovered all the causes of my errors, I ought no longer to complain of there being falsity in the things which are most commonly represented to me by my senses. And I ought to throw aside all the doubts of these past days as hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly the so general uncertainty regarding sleep, which I could not distinguish from waking: for now I find here a very notable difference, in this, that our memory can never unite and join our dreams to one another and to the whole course of our life, as it generally does in regard to the things which happen to us when awake. And, in fact, if any one, while I am awake, should very suddenly appear before me and as suddenly disappear, as do the images I see when asleep, so that I could not observe whence he came or whither he went, I would not unreasonably deem it a spectre or phantom formed in my brain, and similar to those which are formed there during my sleep, rather than a real man. But when I perceive things which I know distinct-

ly, and the place whence they come, and where they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without any interruption, I can unite the feeling which I have of them with the course of the rest of my life, I am fully assured that I perceive them while awake and not in my sleep. And I ought not in any way to doubt the truth of these things, if, after having invoked all my senses, my memory, and my understanding, for their examination, there is nothing communicated to me by any of them repugnant to what is communicated to me by the others. For from this fact that God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am not in that deceived. But, because the necessity of affairs often obliges us to decide for ourselves before we have had leisure to examine them so carefully, it must be admitted that the life of man is subject to very frequent deception in particular things, and finally we must recognize the infirmity and the weakness of our nature.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.

II.—DIALECTIC.

We have already remarked that the province of the true dialectic is to show up the necessary movement of the pure concepts [or categories of pure thought]—not as a movement wherein they are reduced to naught—but the result should be that the pure thought concepts prove to be this movement and that the Universal is seen to be the unity of such antithetic concepts. It is true that we do not find in Plato a clear consciousness of this nature of the dialectic, but still we find in his writings the true dialectic itself: we find the Absolute essence recognized in the form of pure ideas, and we find also the exposition of the movement of these ideas. That which makes the study of the Platonic dialectic difficult is this development and the demonstration of the Universal from the notions of common consciousness. This beginning [with ordinary notions] which it would seem ought to facilitate the arrival at science, proves rather to make the difficulty greater,

since it leads into a field in which something prevails that is quite different from what possesses validity in Reason, and it brings us face to face with sensuous objects; while in the sphere of Reason, on the contrary, one enters the movement of pure ideas alone, and he is not reminded at all of the former [sensuous] sphere. But through this very contrast the ideas gain greater truth. For the pure logical movement is quite apt to be conceived as existing for itself, like a separate province which has another province [sensuous consciousness] lying beside it which possesses equal validity. But when the two are brought together as in Plato, the Speculative manifests itself first in its truth: it appears, namely, as the *only* truth, and this is demonstrated through the [dialectic] change of the sensuous state of *opinion* into thought. In our common consciousness, for example, there is in the first place the immediate individual, the sensuous reality; moreover, these are determinations of the understanding, and they pass with us as ultimate truths. In opposition to external reality, however, the Ideal is to be considered rather as the most real of all; and that it is the only Real, is the insight of Plato, who defines the Universal or Thought to be the True, and the Sensuous to be the converse of this.

The purpose of many of Plato's dialogues, which end without any affirmative content, is therefore to show: that immediate existence, including the many things which appear to us, even granting that we have quite correct notions about them, are yet not in themselves true in an objective sense, for the reason that they change, and are determined [or made to be what they are] through their relation to other things and not through themselves; hence one must even in sensuous individuals pay attention to the Universal alone; and this is called by Plato "the Idea." The sensuous, limited, finite, is in fact not only itself but likewise another, which also possesses existence; and hence it is an unsolved contradiction, since in it its other holds sway. [In a thing of space, dependence upon other things is its characteristic; and thus its real self is a totality transcending it.] It has already been mentioned that the Platonic dialectic is employed for the purpose of confusing and annulling the finite notions of men in order to bring them to realize their want of scientific knowledge, and to direct

them to the search for that which *is*. Through the fact that the Dialectic is directed against the form of the Finite, its first effect is to confound the Particular; and this is accomplished through the activity by which the negation contained in it is shown up; so that it proves to be not what it seemed to be, but passes over into its opposite through its limit which is essential to it. If, however, this latter is held fast, in its turn it too ceases, and is found to be another than that for which it was assumed. From the point of view of formal philosophizing the dialectic may seem to be nothing else but an art whose function is to throw into confusion not only the notions of common consciousness but also the pure ideas of Reason, and thereby exhibit their nothingness; in this, its result is held to be a merely negative one. With this phase of it in view, Plato also, in his Republic (Book VII.), advises that citizens be initiated into the dialectic only on completing their thirtieth year, alleging as the reason that through its means one is able to change the beautiful doctrines which he has heard from his teachers into ugly ones. This form of the dialectic we see chiefly in those dialogues of Plato that are peculiarly Socratic—moral dialogues,—and also in those numerous dialogues that refer to views of the Sophists upon Science.

With this is connected also the second side of the dialectic, which aims before all to bring to consciousness the Universal; and this, as already remarked [in speaking of Socrates], was one of the chief ends of the Socratic teaching. This we may look upon henceforth as settled, and only remark that, besides these, several other dialogues of Plato have the aim only to bring to consciousness a general view which *we* possess without special effort on our part; on this account the prolixity of Plato often proves tedious to us. Although this dialectic is an activity of thought, yet it is essentially only an external form of it, and necessary for the reflecting stage of consciousness in order that it may arrive at the knowledge of the Universal which is in-and-for-itself, unchangeable, and immortal. These two preliminary sides of the dialectic whose purpose is to cancel the particular and thus to produce the universal, are not the true form of the dialectic; it constitutes a form of the dialectic which Plato used in common with

the Sophists, who understood very well how to annul what was merely particular in its nature. A content which Plato often treated with this purpose in view is that in which he shows virtue to be but one; and by this process he derives the universal good from the particular virtues.

Inasmuch as the Universal (i. e. the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—that which is genus for itself) derived through the confusion [negating] of the Particular, was at first yet undetermined and abstract, it is, *thirdly*, the chief aim in the labors of Plato to define the Universal in itself more definitely. This defining (determining) is the relation which the dialectical movement in thought has to the Universal; for through this movement the idea arrives at such thoughts as contain in themselves the antitheses involved in what is finite. The idea is then, as the self-determining, the unity of these antithetically opposed sides; and hence is the *determined* idea. The universal is therefore the determined Universal which solves and has solved the contradictions in it, and consequently that which is in itself concrete; so that the canceling of the contradiction is affirmation. The dialectic in this higher function is the Platonic dialectic proper: as speculative, it does not end with a negative result, but it presents the union of antithetic sides which have annulled each other. At this point the difficulty for the Understanding begins. Since the form of the method as used by Plato is not as yet purely developed for itself, his dialectic is frequently mere ratiocination, proceeding from individual points of view, and often ending without results. On the other hand, Plato himself has condemned this merely ratiocinative dialectic; it is, however, easy to see that it troubles him to draw the proper distinction between it and the true dialectic. This speculative dialectic which begins with him is hence the most interesting feature of his works, but at the same time the most difficult to understand; and for this reason it is not often learned when one studies Platonic writings. Thus Tennemann, for example, has allowed the most important things in the Platonic Philosophy to escape him entirely, and has brought together only a few thoughts from it in the shape of dry ontological determinations; namely, such as served his turn. It is, however, an indication of the highest degree of defi-

ciency in the proper spirit on the part of an historian of Philosophy to find in a great philosopher only what goes to serve his particular ends.

What Plato seeks in the dialectic is the pure thought of the Reason, from which he very carefully discriminates the Understanding (*dianoia*). One can have thoughts concerning many things, if he has thought at all; but Plato does not mean this sort of thoughts. The true speculative greatness of Plato, that through which he makes an epoch in the history of Philosophy, and consequently in the world-history in general, is the more definite comprehension of the Idea: an insight which some centuries later constitutes the fundamental element in the ferment of the world-history and in the new organic form of the human spirit. This closer comprehension can be understood from what has preceded: Plato in the first place apprehended the absolute as the "Being" of Parmenides, but as the universal which, as *genus* is, *final cause* (i. e. rules the special, the manifold—penetrates and produces it): but Plato did not fully develop this thought of a self-producing activity; hence he falls at times into external teleology. As the union of principles held by philosophers before him, Plato moreover proceeded from this "Being" to determinateness and distinction (as it is contained in the trinity of the Pythagorean determinations of numbers), and expressed these distinctions in the form of thought; in short, he apprehended the Absolute as unity of being and not-being (as Heraclitus says), in the becoming—the unity of the one and many, &c. Furthermore, he took up the Eleatic dialectic, which is the mere external act of the subject—the mere showing up of a contradiction—and elevated this into the objective dialectic of Heraclitus in such a way, that, in place of the external changeability of things, there appears their internal transition, i. e. of their ideas, or, in other words, of their categories, from and through themselves. Finally, while Socrates used the thinking activity only for the purpose of the moral reflection of the subject, Plato has established it as objective, as the IDEA, which is not only the universal thought, but also that which is true existence. Hence the earlier Philosophies do not perish for the reason that Plato has refuted them, but they vanish only in something higher—in his philosophy.

Such pure thoughts—in the consideration of which the Platonic Philosophy busies itself wholly—are, besides being and not being, *the one* and *the many* and such others as, e. g., the *Finite* and the *Infinite*. The purely logical, quite abstruse treatment of such objects contrasts very strongly with the activity of imagination exercised upon the beautiful, charming, humorous content of Plato's writings. The consideration of these pure thoughts is to him the highest function of Philosophy, and that which he everywhere expresses as the true philosophical and scientific cognition of truth; in this he places the distinction between Philosophers and Sophists. The Sophists, in contrast to the former, treat only of the phenomenal, which they hold fast in opinion: hence although they have thoughts too, yet these are not *pure* thoughts, or thoughts of that which is in-and-for-itself. This is a side which causes many to go away from Plato unsatisfied by the study of his works. When one begins a dialogue he finds, in this free form of Platonic exposition, beautiful natural scenery, a magnificent introduction which promises to lead us through flowery fields into Philosophy, and that too into the highest Philosophy, the Platonic. One encounters in it that exalting element which especially appeals to youth; but it all disappears soon. If one has allowed himself to be allured by those pleasant scenes at first, he must now renounce them; and coming to the really dialectical and speculative portions, he must enter on toilsome paths, and allow himself to be pricked by the thorns and thistles of metaphysics. For look, there follow next, as the highest, the investigations concerning the ONE and MANY, BEING and NOUGHT; this was not to be expected, and the reader lays down the book silently, wondering how Plato could seek in such places for knowledge. From the deepest dialectical investigations Plato then passes over again to pictures and images for the fancy, to the painting of scenes of conversation between men of genius: thus it happens, e. g., in the *Phædon*, which Mendelssohn has modernized and changed into Wolfian metaphysic; the beginning and end are exalting, beautiful; the middle portion contains the dialectic. Thus Plato's dialogues require very different tones of mind in reading them. Hence their study demands in some sort an *indifference* toward the vari-

ous interests. If one reads with interest the speculative, he skips what is considered the most beautiful; if one has interest in the exalting, edifying portion, he skips the speculative and finds it uninteresting. It goes with him as with the youth in the Bible, who had done this and that, and now asked Christ what course he should still take to follow him. But when the Lord commanded him, "Sell your goods and give to the poor, then the youth went away sorrowing"; it was more than he expected. So—in our day—many, who meant well with Philosophy, have studied Fries and I know not what other philosopher. Their bosoms swell with aspiration for the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; they fain would know and see what ought to be done; but in their bosoms there is only the good-will to do—there is no *actual endeavor* corresponding to that good-will.

While Socrates holds fast to the good, universal, in-itself-concrete thought, without fully developing it, and hence without exhibiting it systematically, Plato proceeds to the fully determined IDEA [the definite exposition of it]; but *his* incompleteness lies in the fact that this determinateness and that universality are not united. Through the reduction of the dialectic movement to its final result, the determined [well-defined] idea can be obtained, and that is the chief object of Science. When Plato, however, speaks of Justice, the Beautiful, the Good, the True, nothing is shown as to their origin; they appear, therefore, not as results, but as direct assumptions—as mere presuppositions. Although consciousness has the unwavering conviction that they are the highest objects, yet what is asserted of them is nowhere proved. This dialectic of pure thoughts (since the dogmatic expositions of Plato on ideas are lost), is given to us only in the dialogues on this subject, which precisely because they deal with pure thoughts are among the most difficult ones: these are the Sophist, the Philebus, and, more especially, the Parmenides. Those dialogues which contain only negative dialectic and Socratic conversation we here omit, since they treat only of concrete notions and do not contain the dialectic in that higher sense; they do not satisfy our demands, for the reason that their ultimate purpose is only to confound the opinions of the individual, or else to awaken in him a desire for knowledge. But

the three dialogues mentioned express the abstract speculative idea in its pure comprehension. The bringing together of the antithetic positions into one and the expression of this unity is lacking in *Parmenides*; and this dialogue therefore, like those others mentioned, has in some respects a merely negative result. In the *Sophist*, however, and also in the *Philebus*, Plato expresses this unity.

The Parmenides.

a. The elaborated dialectic, the proper dialectic, is contained in the *Parmenides*—that most famous masterpiece of the Platonic dialectic. *Parmenides* and *Zeno* are there represented as meeting *Socrates* in *Athens*; but the chief matter is the dialectic placed in the mouths of *Parmenides* and *Zeno*. At the beginning, the nature of this dialectic is brought out in detail in the following manner. Plato makes *Parmenides* praise *Socrates* thus: "I noticed that you, with *Aristotle*"—(one of the persons present at the dialogue; he has been taken for the philosopher, but the latter was born sixteen years after *Socrates*' death)—"that you, conversing with *Aristotle*, exercised yourself in determining in what the nature of the Beautiful, the Just, the Good, and each of these ideas, lay. This ardor of yours is beautiful and divine. But practise yourself still more in this apparently useless exercise, which is called by the multitude 'mere idle talk,' while you are yet young; otherwise the truth will escape you."—"In what," asks *Socrates*, "consists this kind of exercise?"—"You pleased me in that you said just now that one must not hold fast to the consideration of the sensuous and its illusions, but consider that which is only to be seized by thought, and which alone IS." I have already remarked [see *Hegel's Works*, Vol. VI., Part I., p. 8] that men have in all times believed that the True could be found only through reflection; for in reflection one finds thoughts, and through reflection he changes that which he has before him in the form of representation, or what he receives upon faith, into thoughts. *Socrates* replies in the present instance to *Parmenides*: "In this way I believed the *like* and *unlike*, and the other universal determinations of things, would be best understood." *Parmenides* answers: "Well! But you must, when you begin with such a deter-

mination, not only consider that which follows from assuming it, you must also add this which follows when you assume the *opposite* of such a determination. For example, in the assumption—*the many is*—you have to examine: what happens to the *many* in relation to *itself* and in relation to the *one*; and likewise, what happens to the *one* in relation to *itself* and in relation to the *many*.” This is precisely the wonderful thing which one encounters in thinking, when he takes such determinations for and by themselves; they each go over into its opposite. But again it is to be considered, if the many is not, what happens then to the *one* and to the *many*, both for themselves and for each other? Precisely such considerations are to be instituted in relation to *identity* and *non-identity*, *rest* and *movement*, *beginning* and *ceasing*, and likewise in respect to *being* itself and *non-being*; what is each for itself, and what is their relation when one or the other is assumed. In this, by exercising yourself perfectly, you will learn to know the essential truth.” Such great stress as this Plato lays upon the dialectical consideration—which is no consideration of what is merely external, but a vital consideration, whose content consists in pure thoughts only; and their movement is precisely this, that they make themselves the other of themselves; and hence show that only their unity is the truly justified result.

Concerning the meaning of the unity of one and many, Plato makes Socrates say: “When one proves to me that I am one and many, I am not surprised. Since namely he shows to me that I am a *manifold* by exhibiting to me my right and left sides, my upper and lower extremities, my anterior and posterior: and again he proves me to be *one* by pointing out that I am one of us seven. Just in this manner stone, wood, &c., can be shown to be one and many. But I should be surprised if one defined the ideas, such as *likeness* and *unlikeness*, *multiplicity* and *unity*, *rest* and *movement*, and the like, in the first place each as determined for itself, and then showed how they were *identical* and *different* in themselves.” The dialectic of Plato, however, is not to be acknowledged as perfect in every respect. If it is his special object to show merely that in each determination its opposite is contained, even then one cannot say that in all his dialectic

movements this strict form is preserved; but there often occur external considerations which have influence in his dialectic. For example, Parmenides says: "Will the two parts of the *existent one*—the *one* and the *existent*—ever cease, the *one* to be a part of the *existent*, and the *existent*, to be a part of the *one*? Hence, each part contains again the *one* and the *existent*, and the smallest part consists always of these two parts." In other words: the *one* IS; from this it follows that the *one* is not synonymous with *is*, and hence *one* and *is* are distinct. Thus there is in the proposition: *the one is*, a distinction; hence the *many* is in it, and hence I assert the *many* when I say *the one is*." This dialectic is correct but not quite pure, since it *begins* with a combination of two determinations [i. e. presupposes them]. The entire result of such investigation in the Parmenides is thus summed up at the end: "that the *one*, whether it is or is not, is the *many as well as itself*, and in relation to *another* as well as *for-itself*—all throughout is *not*, as well as *is*; it *appears* and *does not appear*." This result may appear strange. We are, according to our ordinary views, very far removed from taking these quite abstract determinations—the *one*, *being*, *not-being*, *appearance*, *rest*, *movement*, and the like—for ideas; but these entirely universal somewhats Plato takes as ideas, and this dialogue is therefore his science of pure ideas. He shows of the One that it, if it is, just as well as if it is not, as self-identical or not self-identical, whether in movement or at rest, beginning or ceasing, *is and is not*; or, in other words, that the unity as well as all these pure ideas in their multiplicity are and are not; hence that the one is the many as well as the one. In the proposition, "*The one is*," there is also involved, "The one is not one, but many"; and conversely, "The many is" involves "The many is not many, but one." These abstractions are shown in the dialectic to be essentially the identity with their others; and this is what is true. An example of this is found in the Becoming: in the Becoming, Being and not-being are contained in inseparable unity, and yet they are in this also distinct; for Becoming consists only in the *passage* of one into the other.

Perhaps this result in Parmenides may not satisfy us, for it has the appearance of having a negative character instead

of being the *negation of negation*, which expresses the true affirmation. In this latter sense the New Platonists take it especially Proclus, hence they look upon this exposition in the Parmenides as the true Theology, as the true revelation of all the mysteries of the divine Essence. And they may well be taken for this, however improbable this may at first appear (indeed Tiedemann, *Platon. Argumenta*, p. 350, pronounces such assertions to be mere Neoplatonic extravagance). In fact, however we apply the name *God* to the Absolute essence of all things, which is in its simple comprehension the unity and movement of these pure essentialities, the ideas of the *one* and *many*, &c. The divine essence is the idea in general, as it is either for the sensuous consciousness or for thought. In so far as the divine idea is the absolute Self-thinking activity, the dialectic is nothing else than this activity of the self-thinking in itself; this connection the New Platonists look upon only as *metaphysical*, and they have excogitated from it Theology—the development of the mysteries of the divine essence. But here enters the already mentioned ambiguity, which must now be explained more definitely: under the terms “God” and “The essence of things” two different contents may be understood. When namely it is asserted, on the one hand, that the essence of things is the unity of opposites, it seems as though only the immediate essence of these immediately objective things is defined by this, and such a doctrine of Essence—or such Ontology—may seem to be different from the knowledge of God, or Theology. These simple essences and their relation and movement seem to express only moments of the Objective, and not Spirit itself, for the reason that they still lack one moment (namely, that of *reflection into itself*) which we demand for the being of the divine essence. For spirit, the true Absolute Essence, is not only the simple and immediate in general, but it is that which is reflected into itself [i. e. self-conscious], for which there exists, even in its self-opposition, the unity of itself and its opposite; as such however those moments and their movement do not exhibit it, but they appear as simple abstractions. Upon the other hand, they may also be taken as pure ideas belonging to the pure reflection-into-itself. Thus there is wanting to them Being, which we demand for the

reflection-into-itself of the divine essence; and, besides, their movement passes for an empty play with empty abstractions which belong only to Reflection, but have no reality. To solve this antithesis [antinomy] we must learn to know the nature of scientific cognition and knowledge so as to have in the form of idea all which is therein. In this way we shall become conscious that the idea in truth is neither the mere immediate (though it is simple), nor is it merely that which reflects itself into itself, the "thing" of consciousness; but it possesses *spiritual* simplicity, hence is essentially the thought which has returned into itself, and is moreover in itself, i. e. objective essence, and consequently all reality. This consciousness concerning the nature of the comprehension, Plato has not expressed so definitely, and hence also has not said that this essence of things is the same as the divine essence. It is, however, only an omission on his part to say so in direct words, for the thing itself is certainly there; and there is here only such a difference of expression as there is between the form of representation and that of comprehension. In one respect, therefore, this reflection-into-itself, the spiritual, the idea, is present in the speculations of Plato; for the unity of the one and the many, &c., is just this individuality in the difference, this being-turned-into-itself in its opposite, this opposite which is in itself; the essence of the world is essentially the into-itself-returning movement of that which has returned into-itself. In another respect, however, Plato still holds fast to this reflection-into-itself as separate from it—that is, as God according to the form of ordinary consciousness; and in his exposition of the becoming of Nature in the *Timæus*, they appear thus as distinct from each other: God, AND the essence of things.

The Sophist.

b. In the *Sophist*, Plato investigates the pure concepts or ideas of *movement* and *rest*, *self-identity* and *other-being*, *being* and *not-being*. He proves here against Parmenides that the not-being *is*, likewise that the simple and self-identical participates in other-being, unity in multiplicity. Of the Sophists, he says that they hold fast to the not-being; and he refutes their entire standpoint, which is that of the *not-*

being, sensation, or the many. Plato has, therefore, defined the true Universal as the unity of such ideas as the *one* and *many*, or of *being* and *non-being*; but at the same time he has avoided—or it lay in his intention to avoid—the ambiguity which lies therein when we speak of the “unity of Being and naught,” &c. With this expression namely we lay the chief accent on the unity, and then the difference vanishes, as if we only abstracted from it. Plato has sought to preserve also the distinction. The Sophist is a more complete treatment of being and non-being, both of which belong to all things; for since things are different—each the other of the other—in them there lies the determination of the negative. First of all, however, Plato expresses in the Sophist this more definite insight concerning ideas as abstract universalities: that they are not to be held as fixed and unchangeable, for this would be to oppose the unity of the idea with itself. Plato therefore refutes, first, the sensuous, and, secondly, the [isolated validity of the] ideas themselves. The first of these views [the sensuous] is the later so-called Materialism: that matter alone is the substantial, and that nothing has reality except what can be felt by the hands, like rocks and oak trees. “Now,” says Plato, secondly [in the Sophist], “we will go to the others, the friends of ideas.” Their notion is that the substantial is incorporeal, intelligible; and they separate the field of the Becoming, of Change, in which the sensuous falls, from the Universal, which is for-itself. They represent ideas as immovable somewhats to which belongs neither activity nor passivity. Plato brings against this doctrine the argument that one cannot deny motion, life, soul, and thought, to the truly existent, and that the Divine Reason could exist nowhere, nor in anyone, if it were unmoved. Plato has thus a clear consciousness that he has gone beyond Parmenides when the latter says:

“Never shalt thou explore for the whereabouts of non-being,
But from a search like this, turn away the soul speculative.”

Plato says, therefore: the existent participates in the not-being as well as in the Being; the participating is, however, different from Being and not-being as such.

This dialectic is directed chiefly against two other kinds of dialectic.

First, against the dialectic in the ordinary acceptation of that term, of which we have also spoken. Examples of this false dialectic, to which Plato recurs frequently, are found especially in the Sophists; and yet he has not treated with sufficient clearness their difference from the pure dialectic cognition, according to the idea. Plato explains himself [in the Sophist], for example, in this style, in reply to the assertion of Protagoras and others, "that there is no determination in-and-for-itself": bitter is not an objective existence, since what tastes *bitter* to one person is for another person *sweet*; likewise great and small, more and less, &c., are relative determinations, since the great, in one case, is, under other circumstances, small; the small, in the same way, is great. In other words, the unity of opposites hovers before every consciousness; but the common mode of view, which does not arrive at a consciousness of what appertains to REASON, always holds asunder the opposites, as if they were only opposed in a particular respect. Just as we show in each thing the unity as well as the multiplicity, since it has many parts and properties. In the Parmenides, also, we saw that Plato criticised this form of the unity of opposites, because in it something is held to be *one* in quite a different respect from that in which it is held to be *many*. In such a unity we do not bring these thoughts [i. e. the different sides of the antithesis] together, but the imagination (or *argument*) passes to and fro from one to the other. If this passing backwards and forwards is consciously employed, it is the empty dialectic which does not unite the opposites truly. Plato says on this subject: "If anyone takes pleasure in this as though he had found something difficult—because he is able to move his thought from one determination to another—he has no occasion for self-congratulation; for that is a feat that is neither difficult nor excellent." That dialectic which cancels a determination by showing up its defect [i. e. its dependence on other-being], and then goes about establishing another, is incorrect. "The difficult and true way is this, to show that the somewhat and its other are the same [whole], and that the identity of the somewhat involves an other: and indeed in the same respect, and according to the same point of view that the one determination is found in them, the other determina-

tion also is to be shown in them. On the contrary, to show that the same being is in *some form or other* an other, and the converse of this—for instance, that the great is *also* the small” (e. g. Protagoras’s dice), “and the similar is *also* dissimilar—to relish such a procedure as this, which always produces the opposites from their grounds,—this belongs to no true insight, but is evidently the production of a novice” in thought “who begins to deal with Entity for the first time. To separate all things, each from the other, is the awkward method of the consciousness uncultured in philosophic procedure. It is a perfect abandoning of all thought to let everything rest in complete isolation; for thought consists precisely in the uniting of ideas.” Thus Plato speaks directly against this species of dialectic which knows only how to refute something according to some particular point of view, &c. We see that Plato, in regard to the content, expresses nothing else than what has been termed “the indifference in the difference”: the difference of absolute opposites and their unity. In contrast to this speculative cognition he portrays the common thought, positive as well as negative: the former [the positive common thinking], not bringing together these thoughts, allows first one and then another to pass as valid separately; the latter [the negative species of common thinking], although conscious of the unity of these opposites, knows only a superficial unity—a divisible unity, or a unity in which the two moments are in reality still held asunder, being united only in some one respect and separate in others.

The second species of dialectic against which Plato directs his own dialectic, is that of the Eleatics and their proposition, which in its kind is also similar to that of the Sophists, namely: that Being only is, and not-being is not at all. This means with the Sophists (as Plato shows): “Since the negative does not exist at all, but only Being exists, it follows that there is nothing untrue or false in the world; all that *exists*, all that is for us, is for that reason [i. e. because it exists] necessarily true, and what does not exist we cannot know or perceive. Plato, therefore, reproaches the Sophists with having cancelled the distinction of the true and false. Arrived upon this stage of the dialectic consciousness (and the whole matter is only a distinction of different stages), “the Sophists could

not give what they promised: this was, namely, to show that whatever the individual believed to be his interest, and made it his object to attain, was affirmative and correct [i. e. individual opinion made the true and right: "Man is the measure of all things"]. According to this view, one could not say of a deed: This is wrong, wicked, or a crime; for this would imply that the principle on which it is done is a false one. No more could one say: This opinion is illusive; for, according to the doctrine of the Sophists, whatever I feel, or whatever opinion I may have, in so far as it is my own, is an affirmative content, and consequently is true and correct. The proposition looks quite abstract and innocent in itself; but one notices first what such abstractions contain when he sees them in their concrete shape. According to this innocent proposition, it follows logically that there is no such thing as sin, or crime, &c. The Platonic dialectic is essentially different from this kind of dialectic.

The more special meaning of Plato is that the IDEA—the in-and-for-itself Universal, Good, True, or Beautiful—is to be taken as existing for itself, and not simply as a subjective affair. The myth [of the Cave] which I have already mentioned goes so far as to set up the doctrine that one must not consider a good deed, a beautiful man—not the *subject* of which such determinations are the predicates: but that that which appears in such representations or intuitions as *predicates* must be taken for-and-by-itself, and that this is the true essence. This is connected with the form of the dialectic which has been discussed. An action taken according to the empirical representation may be said to be just; according to another side, one could point out also opposite characteristics. But the Good, the True, is to be taken without such individualities, without such empirical concrete material, but as for-itself-existent; and this is alone what IS. The soul, in the divine drama, having lapsed into matter, yet rejoices over a beautiful or just object; but the only true Being is Virtue, Justice, Beauty in-and-for-itself. It is, therefore, the Universal for-itself which is more definitely determined through the Platonic dialectic; of this dialectic there occur several forms, but these forms are still very general and abstract. The highest form with Plato is the identity of Being and Non-

being; the true is the existent, but this existent is not without negation. Plato undertakes in this to show that non-being is an essential determination of the existent, and that the simple, self-identical, participates in Other-being. This unity of being and non-being is also found in the doctrine of the Sophists; but in the shape taught by them it is not as yet completely expressed. But the further examination which Plato gives it comes to this result, that non-being, more accurately defined, is the nature of the OTHER: "The ideas mingle, and being and *the other* run through all and through each other; *the other* for the reason that it participates in being, through this indwelling of being will BE, but [will be] not the same as that which dwells in it, but a different: and as the other of Being, it is necessarily the Non-being. Since, however, Being likewise participates in other-being, it is therefore different from the other ideas and is not one of the same; so that it, in ten thousand different ways, IS NOT; and so also the others, as well individually as generally, ARE in a manifold form, and ARE NOT in manifold ways." Plato in this expresses that the OTHER as the negative, non-identical in general is at the same time, in one and the same respect, the with-itself identical; i. e. these are not different sides which remain in contradiction to each other.

This is the chief conclusion of Plato's own dialectic. That the Idea of the Divine, the Eternal, the Beautiful, is that which exists *in-and-for-itself*, [the knowledge of this] is the first step in the elevation of consciousness into Spiritual insight, namely, into the conviction that the Universal is true [i. e. that Truth *is* the Universal]. As for the imagination, it is well enough to arouse it and animate it with representations of the Beautiful and the Good; but the thinking cognition asks after a definite statement regarding the nature of this Eternal and Divine. And the Nature of this Eternal and Divine is, essentially, free determination alone, and the being *determined* does not in any way interfere with its universality;—a limitation (for every determination is limitation) which nevertheless leaves the Universal in its infinitude free by itself. Freedom exists only in the Return-into-itself, the undistinguished [pure identity] is lifeless; the active, living, concrete Universal is, therefore, that which distinguishes

itself within itself [i. e. defines, limits itself], but remains free in this process. This determinateness consists only in this : that the ONE is self-identical in its other, in the Many, the Different. This constitutes the only true point of interest for science in what is called Platonic Philosophy ; and if one does not know this, he is ignorant of the most important thing. In the already quoted passage, in which Socrates shows himself to be one and many, the two thoughts fall asunder [i. e. One and Many are taken as “different respects”]: yet the speculative thought is reached only through bringing together these thoughts : and this bringing together of different ones — of Being and Not-being, of the One and Many, &c. — without explaining them by a mere transition from the one to the other, is the innermost and the true greatness of the Platonic Philosophy. This feature is the “Esoteric” of the Platonic Philosophy, all else is exoteric. (This, indeed, is a wretched distinction, when it is taken as though Plato had two philosophies—one for the world, for the people; the other the internal, reserved for his disciples. The Esoteric I speak of is, however, the Speculative, which, though written and printed, without any secrecy, remains a sealed book for those who have not interest enough to exert themselves in its study.) To this Esoteric belong the two dialogues already considered, and to them the *Philebus* is to be added as the third.

The Philebus.

c. In the *Philebus*, Plato investigates the nature of pleasure ; and in that dialogue is treated especially the antithetic of the finite and infinite, or, of the unlimited and the limited.

If we bring this before our minds, we do not at first see how the nature of Pleasure is to be decided by the metaphysical knowledge of the nature of the infinite and undetermined ; but these pure thoughts are the Substantial, through which all questions are to be decided, be they ever so concrete or ever so far off. When Plato treats of pleasure, and of wisdom as its opposite, it is the antithetic of finite and infinite. Under pleasure we represent what is immediate and individual—the sensuous ; but it is the undetermined in that it is the merely elementary, just as fire or water is ; it is

not the self-determining. Only the idea is the self-determining, the identity with itself. To our reflection the limited seems inferior in comparison with the unlimited, and the unlimited, on the contrary, seems to be something preferable, the highest; and the oldest philosophers looked upon this relation in the same way. By Plato, on the contrary, it is proved that the limiting is the true taken in the form of the *self-determining*, while the unlimited is the merely abstract; it [the abstract undetermined] may indeed be determined in a manifold way, but this determined result is in that case only the individual [or finite]. The infinite [in the sense of unlimited] is the formless; the free form as activity is the finite, which in the infinite finds the matter with which to realize itself. Sensuous pleasure Plato thus defines as the unlimited, which does not determine itself; only Reason is the active determiner. The infinite is, however, this potentiality to pass over to the finite: the perfected good is thus, according to Plato, to be sought neither in Pleasure nor in Reason, but it is in a life mingled of both. Wisdom, however, as the limit, should be the true cause whence proceeds what is of a preferable nature. As that which establishes the measure and limit, it is that which in-and-for-itself determines the final cause of its activity: the immanent determination with which and in which freedom at the same time gives itself existence.

Plato considers this—that the true is the identity of opposites—further: the infinite [or unlimited] is, as the undetermined, capable of more or less; it can have more or less intensity; it may be colder and warmer, dryer and moister, quicker and slower, &c. Now the limited is the equal, the double, and every other equilibrium through which the opposites cease to be related unequally, and become symmetrical and harmonious. Through the unity of those opposites, e.g. of the cold and warm, dry and moist, arises health: likewise the harmony in music arises through the mutual limitation of high and low tones, of quick and slow movements; in general, everything beautiful and perfect arises through the union of such opposites. Health, happiness, beauty, &c., appear thus as results produced by the combining of opposites: and thus as a mingling of them. (Instead of the expres-

sion "individuality," the ancients use chiefly the expressions "*mixing*" or "*mingling*," "*participation*," &c.; for us these are indefinite and unsatisfactory expressions.) But Plato says: the third, which is the resultant thus produced, presupposes a somewhat through which it is made, namely, a cause; and *this* [cause] is more excellent than those [contraries] through whose efficacy that third somewhat arises. Thus Plato has four determinations: *first*, the unlimited, the undetermined; *second*, the limited, measure, proportion, (to which wisdom belongs); the third is the mixture resulting from the two former—that which has only originated; the fourth is the Cause. The latter [the cause] is in it precisely the unity of the different ones: subjectivity, might and control over the opposites, that which has power to support in itself opposites; only the Spiritual, however, is so powerful that it can endure or sustain the antithesis, and the highest contradiction within itself: all weak, corporeal substance perishes as soon as it feels the approach of another. This Cause is found to be the divine Reason, the overseeing providence of the world; whatever is beautiful in the world, whether in air, fire or water, or, generally, in the realm of living beings, has originated through it. The absolute is hence that which is finite and infinite in one unity.

When Plato speaks thus of the Beautiful and Good, these are concrete ideas; or, rather, there is only one IDEA. But to such concrete ideas it is still a long road if one begins with such abstractions as *being*, *non-being*, *unity*, *multiplicity*. Although Plato has not accomplished the development and condensation of these abstract thoughts into [the concrete idea of] beauty, truth, and morality, yet in the science of those abstract determinations is found at least the criterion and the source of the Concrete. In the *Philebus* this transition to the concrete is made, inasmuch as the principle of sensation, or pleasure, is there considered. The ancient philosophers knew quite well what value these abstract thoughts possessed for the concrete. In the Atomistic principle of multiplicity we find thus the source of a construction of the state; for the ultimate thought of such "state-principles" is no less than a logical one. The ancients had in such pure philosophizing not the end and aim which we have: in general, the end

proposed lay before their minds not so much as a metaphysical consequence as a problem for solution. We, on the contrary, have before us a concrete formation, and wish to bring our pure thinking into agreement with this concrete material. In Plato, philosophy gives the direction which the individual should pursue in order to cognize this or that scientifically; but in general Plato sets up the doctrine that absolute happiness itself—the blessed life—consists in continual employment in the consideration of those divine objects [i. e. IDEAS].

This contemplative life seems to be without definite purpose for the reason that all interests have vanished in it. To live in the realm of free thought is, however, the highest, most essential object for the ancients; and they knew well that only in thought is freedom.

III.—NATURE PHILOSOPHY.

The Timæus.

With Plato, moreover, begins the endeavor on the part of Philosophy to extend its science to more concrete and special spheres; and thus the general material of knowledge [i. e. the objects of scientific study] began to specialize and to isolate itself more and more. In the *Timæus* the IDEA makes its appearance expressed in its concrete determinateness, and the Platonic Philosophy of Nature teaches us, therefore, to know more closely this essence of the world; but we cannot go into details as there is little interest in its elaboration. Especially where Plato goes into Physiology, what he says has no correspondence with our scientific data, though we must admire occasionally his excellent glances which have been only too much ignored by the moderns. Plato has adopted much from the Pythagoreans; how much belongs to them is not accurately determined. We have already remarked that the *Timæus* is really the revision [by Plato] of a work by a Pythagorean author: others however, hypercritical people, have said that the latter is only a selection which some Pythagorean made from a greater work of Plato; but the first is the likelier opinion. The *Timæus* has in all times passed for the most difficult and obscure of the Platonic Dialogues. The difficulty lies partly in the

external mingling of the comprehending cognition and imagination already remarked upon, an example of which we shall see in the passage where the Pythagorean numbers are introduced; secondly, however, the difficulty lies especially in the nature of the philosophical treatment of the subject itself, concerning which Plato had as yet no clear consciousness. This latter difficulty is the arrangement of the whole; namely, Plato in his exposition digresses frequently, and often seems to turn back and begin again at the beginning. This has moved critics, e.g. August Wolf and others, who did not know how to take it philosophically, to take the *Timæus* for an aggregate or a collection of fragments, or of several works, combined in an external manner, in which the Platonic element was united with much else. Wolf thought that he recognized in it its origin from oral conversations much in the same manner as his Homer. But, although the connection seems to be without method, Plato himself makes frequent excuses for its confused state; and we shall yet see on the whole how the subject necessitates a fragmentary treatment, and how a deeper internal ground renders necessary the repeated return to the beginning.

The exposition of the essence of nature, or of the becoming of the world, Plato introduces in the following manner: "God is the Good." (The Good stands also—in that oral discourse which Aristotle cites from——on the summit of the Platonic ideas); "the Good has, however, in nowise any envy in itself, and on this account it has made the world most similar to itself." *Good* is here introduced without previous definition, and hence is a mere name quite empty as regards thought. When Plato begins again in the *Timæus*, he has a more definite notion of God. That God has no envy is, above all, a great, beautiful, true, though naive, thought. With the more ancient philosophers, on the other hand, Nemesis, Dike, destiny, envy, are the sole attributes of the gods; accordingly, they abase the great and make them insignificant, and cannot endure the presence of the worthy and sublime. The later nobler philosophers strive against such notions of Divinity. For in the mere conception of Nemesis there is contained no ethical determination, since the punishment consists only in an abasement of what exceeds due measure; but this measure

is not yet conceived as an ethical one, and punishment therefore is not yet a making valid of the ethical against the non-ethical. Plato's thought is likewise far higher than the view of very many moderns, who also ascribe envy to God when they assert that "God is a hidden God, who has not revealed himself, and of whom one can therefore know nothing." For why should He not reveal Himself to us if we earnestly apply ourselves to gain a knowledge of Him? A light loses nothing when another is lit by it; for this reason it was made a crime in Athens not to allow this to be done. If the knowledge of God is denied us so that we can know only the finite, and cannot attain to the infinite, then He is envious, or else *God* is a mere empty word. This assertion, that God is not revealed, means nothing else than this: that which is higher and divine we wish to leave alone by itself, and give our exclusive attention to our own petty interests, projects, &c. Such humility as this is an impiety and the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Plato continues: "God found the *visible*"—a mythical expression which arises from the necessity to begin with something immediate, which, however, one must not take literally just as it stands—"not in a quiescent state, but moved about fortuitously and in disorder; and he brought it from disorder to order since he regarded the latter as more excellent than the former." According to this passage, it looks as though Plato had assumed God to be only the *Demiurgus*, i. e. the disposer of matter, and matter to be eternal, independent, already existent, as Chaos; this is, however, according to what we have seen, not Plato's idea. These relations are philosophical dogmas of Plato with which he was in earnest; but from the fact that he has used the form of expression adapted to the style of the pure representation, such expressions as this passage contains have no philosophical value. It is only the introduction of the object for the purpose of showing up what determinations matter possesses. Plato then comes, in course, to further determinations, and these first constitute the concrete idea; to this latter speculative procedure we must hold fast, and not to the former representation. And so when he says, "God regarded order as more excellent," this is a naive mode of expression. With us one would

demand that the existence of God be first proved ; just as little would one introduce the visible in this abrupt manner. What Plato shows in this naive manner is the first definition of the true character of the absolute IDEA which after him takes its place in Philosophy. He says further : " God, considering that of visible things those not endowed with reason could not be more beautiful than Reason itself, and that nothing could partake in Reason without soul, resolved to place Reason in the soul, and placed the soul in the body, and united them in such a manner that the world became an animated rational animal." We have here Reality and Reason opposed to each other, and the soul as the bond that connects these two extremes, without which Reason could not be participant in the visible body ; in a style similar to this we saw in the *Phædrus* the true Real apprehended by Plato. " There is, however, only *one* such animal ; for if there were two or more, these would be only parts of the one, and [hence still there would be] only one."

Now Plato proceeds at first to the idea of the corporeal entity : " For the reason that the world is to have bodily, visible and tangible existence, but cannot be seen without fire, nor touched without something solid, i. e. without earth, God made in the beginning fire and earth." In this childish way Plato introduces these extremes—the solid and the animated. " But two cannot be united without a third ; there must be a bond between them that holds them together"—this is one of the pure expressions of Plato—" that bond, however, is the fairest which makes itself, and that which is united by it, in the highest degree, *one* [i. e. which is the unity of itself and the other]. This is a deep utterance in which is contained the concrete idea ; the bond is subjectivity, individuality [i. e. consciousness], the power which prevails over the other and makes it identical with it. " This is realized most beautifully by a constant ratio ; if, namely, of three numbers, masses, or powers, that which is the middle one is to the last as the first is to the middle ; and conversely, as the last to the middle term so is that to the first" ($a : b :: b : c$). " When this middle term becomes the extremes and the extremes become in turn the means, it results from necessity that all are the same ; and if they are all the same, all are one." That is

excellent, and we retain it in philosophy even now ; it is the distinction which at the same time is none. This diremption from which Plato sets out is the syllogism well known in logic ; it appears in the form of the ordinary syllogism, in which therefore the entire rationality of the idea is contained at least externally. The differences are the extremes, and the middle term is the identity "which makes them, in the highest degree, one": hence the syllogism is the Speculative, which in its conclusion unites the extremes with itself, since each place may be occupied by any one of the terms. It is, therefore, wrong to speak disparagingly of the syllogism and not to acknowledge it to be the highest and absolute form ; but the syllogism as a form of the Understanding, on the other hand, is justly open to contempt. This has no such middle term. Each of the terms passes in that syllogism for a different one in its own independent form, and as possessing its own peculiar determination in contradistinction to others. This is set aside in the Platonic Philosophy ; and the speculative constitutes the real true form of the syllogism whenever the extremes remain neither independent towards each other nor towards the middle term. In the syllogism of the Understanding, on the contrary, the unity which is produced, is only the unity of extremes that are held asunder and so remain ; for here one subject is joined by inference to *another* through the middle term, or "one concept is united to another." In the syllogism of Reason, however, the chief point of its speculative grasp is the *identity* of the extremes which are joined by inference ; and this involves that the subject conceived in the middle term is some content or other which is joined not merely *to* another, but *through* and *in* the other, is self-identical. This is, in other words, the nature of God, which, when He is spoken of as subject, takes the form of this dogma, that He has begotten His son, the world ; but in this reality which manifests itself as another and at the same time remains identical with itself—which negates the lapse and unites itself in the other with itself—in this alone He is spirit. If one places the immediate above the mediated, and says God's operation is immediate, his assertion has a good ground ; but the concrete [whole truth] is that God's being is [or has the form of] a syllogism that unites itself to itself as a result through an act of

self-distinction, and is restored to immediateness through the annulment of mediation. The highest is thus contained in the Platonic Philosophy: they are only pure thoughts it is true, but they contain all; for all concrete forms depend solely on thought-determinations. The Church fathers have thus found in Plato the Trinity which they were seeking to seize in thought and to prove; in fact, the True as Plato defines it has the same determination as the Trinity. These forms, however, have remained unused for two thousand years after Plato, for they did not pass into the Christian Religion as [in the form of] thoughts; nay, it has been considered wrong to admit them in Theology at all, until in modern times men have begun to comprehend that the concrete idea is contained in these determinations, and therefore that Nature and Spirit can be cognized through them.

Plato continues: "Since the solid needs two middle terms, for the reason that it has not only depth but breadth also, God has placed between fire and earth, *air* and *water*; and according to such a proportion that fire is to air as air to water, and moreover air to water as water to earth." In the same way we have properly four elements of space; since the *point* is connected with the *solid* through the *line* and *surface*. This broken middle term which we find here is another important thought, having logical depth; and the number four which occurs here is in Nature a fundamental one. Being the Different [i. e. in two respects, being related to two extremes] which is turned towards both extremes, the middle term must contain a distinction in itself. In the syllogism in which God is the first, the Son the second (the mediating), and the Spirit the third, the middle is simple [there are *three* terms instead of *four*]. The cause, however, why that which is only *triune* in the rational syllogism, in Nature becomes a *fourfold* relation, lies in the constitution of Nature, since that which is immediately one in thought, in Nature falls asunder [into a dualism]. Therefore in Nature the antithetic exists as actual antithesis, and must be a Twofold; thus we have *four*, if we count. This takes place also in the conception of God; for when we apply it to the world we have as middle term Nature *and* existing Spirit as the form of Return from Nature, and the *returned* being is the Absolute Spirit [i. e. the *returned*

Being is the Being which has reached perfection, or exists in its absoluteness—and this is not *after* time as though it required time, and hence was a finite process. The return “was in the beginning with God, and it was God”]. This living process, this distinguishing, this positing as identical of the distinct ones, is the living God.

Plato says further: “Through this unity, the visible and tangible world has been made. Through the fact that God has given to it these elements whole and undivided, it is perfect, and does not grow old or suffer from disease. For old age and sickness arise only through the circumstance that such elements work upon a body in excess and from without. This, however, is here not the case; for the world contains those elements wholly within itself, and nothing can come to it from without. The shape of the world is globular” (the doctrine held by the Pythagoreans and Parmenides), “as the most perfect, which contains all others in itself; it is perfectly smooth, for there is nothing for it existing outside, and hence it needs no limbs.” Finitude consists in this, that a distinction [difference] from something else exists—an externality—for an object. In the IDEA there is also determination, limitation, distinction, other-being, but it is contained, at the same time, as dissolved or subordinated—held in the one; thus it is a distinction through which no finitude arises, but it [the distinction] is at the same time cancelled. Finitude is thus in the infinite itself; this is a great thought. “God has now given to the world the most appropriate of the seven movements, namely, that which is most befitting understanding and consciousness, the circular movement; the six others he has isolated from it and freed it from their irregularity” (forward and backward movements). This is said only in a general way.

It goes on thus: “Since God wished to make the world into a God, he therefore endowed it with *soul*, and placed it in the midst, and diffused it through the whole, and with it enveloped it from without; and in this way he brought into existence this self-sufficing entity, which needs no other one, but is to itself well-known and friendly. And thus has God by all these things begotten the world as a blessed God.” We may say: here where the world is [conceived as] a totality

through the World-soul, there is extant for the first time the knowledge of the IDEA; this "*begotten*" God, as the *middle term* and identity, is the true in-and-for-itself existing. That formerly mentioned God, who was only the Good, is on the contrary a mere presupposition, and therefore neither determined nor self-determining. "Now though we have spoken *last* concerning the soul, yet," says Plato, "it must not for this reason be thought to be the last itself, for this only pertains to our mode of speaking; it [the soul] is the ruling, the regal: the corporeal, on the other hand, is that which is obedient to it." This is the *naïveté* of Plato, to ascribe this inversion to the mode of speech; hence what in one place appears contingent is afterwards found to be necessary: namely, to begin with the immediate, and then to come by degrees to the concrete. We also must take this course, but with the consciousness that if we begin in Philosophy with such determinations as *being*, or God, Space, Time, &c., we speak of them also in an immediate manner, and this content itself, according to its nature, is at first immediate, but hence is at the same time undetermined. God, e. g. assumed at the beginning as an immediate [or well-known], is only truly proved at the end of the exposition, but still he is shown by the proof to be the *true* FIRST. One can thus, as has already been remarked, point out in such expositions Plato's confusion; but the only point at issue is, what he arrives at as the True.

More in detail, Plato shows us the nature of the absolute Idea in one of the most famous and profound passages, in which he recognizes in the essence of the soul really the same idea which he had already expressed as the essence of the corporeal. He says, namely: "The soul was created in the following manner. From the undivided essence which is eternally the same, and from the divided entity which is in bodies, God has formed a third species of existence by uniting the two, and the mixture partakes of the nature of the *self-identical* and of the nature of the *other*." (The divided means in Plato, the *other* as such or *in-itself* [i. e. other of itself], and not of any particular somewhat,) "and, according to this, God has made the soul the middle term between the undivided and divided." There come in again the abstract deter-

minations of the *one* which is the identity, and of the *many* or non-identical which is the antithetic, the distinction. If we were to say: "God, the absolute, is the identity of the identical and non-identical," many people would cry out, "Barbarism and scholasticism"; and yet these same people be all the while great admirers of Plato notwithstanding he has defined the True in the same way. "And taking these three entities as posited differently, God has united all in one IDEA, in that He has by force adjusted the nature of the *other* which is difficult to mix in with others to the self-identical." The force of the absolute IDEA is here alluded to, which posits the *many*—that which exists asunder—as *ideal*; and that is precisely also the force which has to be used against the understanding when anyone proposes anything of this sort to it.

Plato now describes how the self-identical as one moment, and the *other* or matter as the second moment, and the third moment which manifests itself as the cancelling of the first two and not as a union of moments which return into the first unity,—how these three that were distinct at first are now reduced to moments in the simple reflection into itself and the withdrawal of the former beginning: "Mingling the identical [1st] and the other [2d] with the essence" [3d] (i.e. with the third moment), "and, making *one* out of the three, God has again distributed this whole into parts—so many as seemed good to him." Since this substance of the soul is the same as that of the visible world, the result is that this one Whole now, for the first time, becomes the systematized substance, the true matter, the absolute stuff (material) which is sundered in itself, as an abiding and indivisible unity of one and many; and all further search for an essence must be abandoned. The mode and manner of division of this subjectivity contains the famous Platonic numbers, which without doubt belonged originally to the Pythagoreans; and they—ancients and moderns (even Kepler in his *Harmonia Mundi*)—have given themselves much trouble to explain these numbers, but as yet no one has really understood them. To understand them implies two things: In the first place, to recognize their speculative significance, their *concrete idea*. But, as already remarked in speaking of the Pythagoreans [in vol. I. of this History], these numerical distinctions express

in an indefinite way only, the forms of the concrete idea of *Distinction*, and even so much only in the first few numbers: when [in the higher numbers], however, the relations become more involved, they are entirely incapable of indicating them with any degree of precision. In the second place, numbers—since they relate to magnitudes—express only distinctions in sensuous things. The system of phenomenal magnitudes—and the sidereal system is that in which magnitudes manifest themselves in the purest and freest manner, without being subordinated to the qualitative—must therefore correspond to them [i.e. to numerical relations]. But these living numerical spheres are systems containing many subordinate moments: e.g. their distances, their velocity, and their masses. No individual of these moments can be compared with the system of sidereal spheres, or exhibited as a series of simple numbers; for the series corresponding to this can contain for its members only the system of these entire moments. Now if the Platonic numbers were also elements of each one of such systems, then any particular element could not be seized definitely and individualized in relation to the general series; but the relation of the moments which are distinguished in the movement, is that which is to be comprehended as *whole*, and this phase is the truly interesting and rational one. We have briefly to adduce the chief points historically; the most thoroughgoing treatise on this point is by Boeckh, “On the Formation of the World-soul in the *Timæus* of Plato,” in the third volume of *The Studies of Daub and Creutzer* (p. 26 *et seq.*)

The fundamental series is very simple: “First, God took a part from the whole; and then a second part double the size of the first; the third is one and a half times as much as the second, or thrice the size of the first; the next one (the fourth) is double the second; the fifth threefold the third; the sixth eightfold the first; the seventh [and last] is twenty-six times greater than the first.” The series is therefore: 1; 2; 3; $4=2^2$; $9=3^2$; $8=2^3$; $27=3^3$. “In the second place, God filled out the twofold and threefold intervals” (the relations 1:2 and 1:3) “by cutting off parts of the whole again. These parts he so arranged in the intervals that there are two middle terms in each, one of which is in the same ratio larger

than one and smaller than the other of the extremes, while the other [middle term] exceeds by a given sum one extreme and by the same sum is exceeded by the other extreme"—i. e. the first is a constant *geometrical* ratio, the other an *arithmetical* one. The first middle term [mean term] arises through the square and is hence, e. g., in the ratio $1 : 2$, the proportion $1 : \sqrt{2} : 2$; the other mean term is by the same [arithmetical] ratio the number $1\frac{1}{2}$. Through this arise in the next place new ratios, which again are interpolated into those first ones in a definitely given but more difficult form: so, however, that everywhere something is omitted and the last ratio of number to number is $256 : 243$ or $2^8 : 3^5$.—These numerical ratios, however, do not help one much, for they present nothing for the speculative comprehension. The ratios and laws of Nature cannot be expressed by such barren numbers; they form only an empirical relation which does not constitute the fundamental basis of the proportions in Nature. Plato says further: "This whole series God divided lengthwise into two parts, and laid them upon one another crosswise like the letter X, and bent round their ends into a circle and closed them with a uniform movement; forming an inner circle and an outer one, the outer one as the revolution of the self-identical, the inner one as that of the *other-being* or of *self-distinction*, the former having the superiority as the undivided. Again, he has divided the internal, according to the mentioned ratios, into seven different circles, three of which revolve with equal velocity and four with unequal velocity as respects each other and the first three. This is the system of the soul, within which everything corporeal is shaped; it is the middle term, penetrates the whole, and envelopes it externally, and moves itself within itself; and has, therefore the divine basis for a ceaseless and rational life in itself." This is not entirely without confusion, and hence is to be taken only in a general sense, to wit: that since Plato finds the soul to be the all-including Simple in the idea of the corporeal universe, to him the essence of the corporeal and of the soul is that of the Unity in the Difference. This twofold Essence, posited *in-and-for-itself* in the Difference, systematizes itself within the One into many moments, which however are *movements*; so that this reality and the mentioned essence are—taken

together—this whole in the antithesis of soul and body, and the antithetic sides are again one. Spirit is the all-penetrating to which the corporeal is opposed, though the former (spirit) is in fact this extension itself [i. e. spirit is the ground of extension].

This is the general description of the soul which is placed in the world and rules it; and in so far as the substantial which is in matter resembles it, its identity is asserted [or confirmed] in itself. That the same moments are contained in it that constitute its reality means this: God, as absolute substance, sees nought but Himself alone. Plato describes, therefore, the relation of the soul to the Objective Essence, and makes it out that it (the soul), when it comes in contact with one of the moments of the same [i. e. the objective essence]—either the divisible [i. e. mutable] or indivisible substance—reflecting itself into itself [i. e. by its own spontaneity], and distinguishes both, it predicates of it what is identical in it and what is non-identical, and in what manner, place and time the individual relates to another and to the Universal. “Now if the circle of Sensuous things, running regularly on in its course, reveals its entire soul to scientific cognition” (if the different circles of the system of the world show themselves harmonious with the being-in-itself of spirit), “then arise true opinions and correct convictions. If, however, the soul applies itself to the Reasonable and the circle of the Self-identical yields to investigation, then thought becomes completed into science.” This is the essence of the world as the blessed God; in this is completed the absolute IDEA of the whole, and in accordance with this IDEA the world makes its appearance. Hitherto there had appeared only the *essence* of the sensuous, but not the *world* as sensuous; for though Plato had before spoken of fire, &c., yet in that place he gave only the essence of the sensuous; he would have done better, therefore, to omit those expressions. In this lies the reason why it appears as though Plato began anew to consider what he had already treated of. For the reason, namely, that one must begin with the abstract in order to know the true and concrete which makes its appearance only at a later stage, it follows that this (True and Concrete), when found, has the appearance and form of a new

beginning, and this happens especially in Plato's loose manner of exposition.

Plato now goes on to call this divine world also the model which exists alone in thought and is in eternal self-identity: This Totality, however, enters again into antithesis in such a manner that a *second* (the *copy* of that first one)—*the world* originates and becomes visible. This second one is the system of sidereal motion, but the former is the Life eternal. That which has origination and becoming in it, it is not possible to make perfectly like that first—the eternal IDEA. But it is made a self-moving image of the eternal which remains in the unity; and this eternal image which is moved according to number [numerical relations], is what we call time. Plato says of it: We usually call the *Was* and *Will be* parts of Time, and carry into the essence of Time these distinctions of the self-moving change in Time. The true time, however, is eternal, or the PRESENT. For substance is neither new nor old; and Time, as the immediate image of the Eternal is not divisible into Past and Future. Time is ideal like Space, and is not a [mere] sensuous existence, but rather the immediate form in which Spirit becomes objective—and thus is sensuous and not-sensuous. The real moments of the principle of the in-and-for-itself existent motion in time are those which undergo changes: "From the divine decree and will that created Time arose the Sun, the Moon, and the five other stars called Planets: they serve to fix and preserve the numerical relations of time." For these numbers of time are realized in them. Thus the celestial [sidereal] motion, as the true time, is the image of the eternal that abides in its unity, i. e. a realization on the part of the Eternal of its self-identity. For all exists in time; i. e. in a negative unity which allows nothing to take free root in itself and thus move or be moved by chance.

But this Eternal is also in the form of the other Essentiality—in the idea of the self-changing and erring principle whose Universal is MATTER. The eternal world has its copy in the world that belongs to time [i. e. pure time]; but standing in opposition to this is a second world that dwells essentially in the realm of change. The Self-identical and the Other are the abstract antithesis that we were lately considering. The

eternal world as posited in time has, therefore, two forms: the form of the Self-identical, and the form of the Self-changing and wandering. The three moments as they make their appearance in this last sphere are: *first*, the simple essence which is created—the produced or determined matter; *second*, the Place in which it is created; *third*, that which is the archetype of what is created. Or, as Plato gives them: “*Essence, Place, and Generation.*” Hence we have the syllogism in which Space is the middle term between individual production and the Universal. If we posit this principle in opposition to time, according to its negativity, then the middle term is this principle of *otherness* as general principle—“a receptive medium like a nurse”;—an entity that receives all, makes it self-subsistent and self-protecting. This principle is the Formless, which however is receptive of all forms, the general essence of all varieties of phenomena. Crude, passive matter is meant by such expressions; that which is *relatively* substantial and subsisting only in general, but as external existence and mere abstract being-for-itself. In our style of reflection we distinguish it from its *form*, and, according to Plato, this is brought into being through the “nurse.” In this principle is found that which we call *Phenomenon*; for matter is nothing but this persistence of the act of individual production in which diremption is posited. But that which is manifested in this is not to be posited as an individual, earthly existence, but is to be apprehended as universal in its determinateness. Since matter, inasmuch as it is the Universal, is the essence of every individual, Plato in the first place calls attention to the fact that one is not permitted to speak of these sensuous things: fire, water, earth, air, &c. (which here again make their appearance); for by this a fixed determinateness would be attributed to them—i.e. a permanent determinateness—but in fact that which abides is only their universality, these elements as universal: the fiery, the earthy, &c.

Plato makes a further exposition of the definite nature of these sensuous things or of their simple determinateness. In this world of change, spatial configuration is the universal form; in that world which is the immediate image of the Eternal, time was the absolute principle. Here, on the other

hand, the absolute ideal principle is pure matter as such, and this is only another expression for the continuity of space. Space is the ideal essence of this phenomenal world, the middle term which unites positivity and negativity; but the determinatenesses of space are its configurations. Among the dimensions of space, the surface must be taken as the truly essential one for the reason that it forms the middle term between the line and the point, and in their first real limitation it is three-fold; so that the triangle is the first of [really limited] figures, while the circle, on the other hand, does not possess the limit as such. Here Plato comes to the treatment of configurations, all of which are formed from the triangle as the simple element; therefore the triangle is the essence of sensuous things. Hence he says, using a Pythagorean form of expression, that the connection and combination of this triangle (as its idea belonging to the middle term) constitute the elements of the sensuous world according to the original numerical relations. This is the basis from which he proceeds. I will, however, omit his derivation of the figures of the elements, and the combinations of the triangle.

From this, Plato passes on to Physics and Physiology, and we have little desire to follow him into these fields. It is to be looked upon as a first, childish attempt to comprehend the sensuous phenomenon in its multiplicity; but it is still superficial and confused—a method of seizing the sensuous phenomenon, e.g. the limbs and members of the body, and a description of the same in which there are thoughts intermingled; in fact, it reminds one of the formal explanations current in our time, in which all trace of the logical Idea vanishes. It is our interest to hold fast to the logical Idea; to it belongs what is excellent in Plato's treatment. But the realization of the Idea is not attained—Plato has felt and expressed only the need of this. The speculative thought is often discernible here and there, but for the most part the treatment deals with quite external forms, such as conformity to end, &c. We treat Physics in quite another way; with Plato there is a great lack of empirical information, while in modern Physics there is an equal lack of the knowledge of the Idea. Although he discovers a great want of conformity to our system of Physics—a system which does not hold

fast the idea of vitality; and although he discourses in a childish manner, using external analogies, yet he presents us very deep glances into individual departments, glances well worthy of our consideration if our physicists were in the habit of looking at nature from the point of view of vitality. Equally worthy of our attention would seem his account of the relation of the Physiological to the Psychological. Some portions of his exposition contain what is universally valid, e. g. his treatment of colors. From this he branches off again into general considerations. When Plato comes to speak of this subject, he says with reference to the difficulty of distinguishing and knowing the individual, that in the consideration of nature "two causes are to be distinguished, the *necessary* and the *divine*; the divine must be sought in everything in order to attain a blessed life." (This occupation is end and aim in-and-for-itself, and in it lies blessedness) "so far as our nature is susceptible of it: the necessary causes are to be sought only in those things that we cannot know without them" (i. e. as conditions of knowledge). The consideration of necessary causes is an external one touching the connection, relation, &c., of objects. "Of the divine causes, God himself is the author"; the divine appertains to that first "eternal" world not as a "Beyond" but as a "Present." "The production and regulation of mortal things God committed to his assistants." This is an easy mode of transition from the divine to the finite, the earthly. "These now imitating the divine, for the reason that they received into themselves the soul as an immortal principle made a mortal body, and in it placed a mortal idea of the soul. This mortal idea contains the violent and necessary passions: pleasure, the greatest lure to evil; secondly, pain, the hindrance of the good; besides also rashness and fear (the unreasonable counsellor); anger, hope, &c. These affections all belong to the mortal soul, and in order that this shall not pollute the divine where it is not unavoidably necessary the subordinate gods separated this mortal part from the seat of the divine, making it dwell in a different part of the body, and formed an isthmus and separation between the head and the breast, placing the neck between." The feelings, passions, &c., dwell in the breast, in the heart. (The moderns place the immortal soul

in the heart;) the spiritual is in the head, but in order to make it as perfect as possible they, e. g., "inflamed the heart with anger, but placed near it, as a compensation, the lungs, soft and bloodless, pierced with many tubes like a sponge, in order that by taking in air and fluids they may cool off the heart and bring relief to its heat."

Especially remarkable is that passage concerning the liver: "Since the irrational part of the soul possesses the appetite for eating and drinking, and does not obey reason, God created the liver so that the multitude of thoughts falling on it from the intellect, as upon a mirror that receives and presents images to view, may terrify it; then when this part of the soul is again quieted, it becomes in sleep a participant of visions; for, mindful of the eternal decree to make the race of mortals as good as possible, they have formed even the inferior part of us in some degree cognizant of truth by establishing within it the faculty of divination." Plato thus ascribes prophecy to the irrational, corporeal side of man: and although the belief prevails that revelation, &c., is ascribed by him to reason, it is nevertheless a mistake. He holds it to be a species of reason appertaining to the irrational. "That God gave prophecy to the irrational part of man, is a striking proof that no man powerful in his reason is participant in a true and divine prophecy, except when in sleep his power of wakeful discernment is fettered, or when by sickness or enthusiasm he is beside himself." Clairvoyance is thus explained by Plato as something inferior to conscious reason. "The man in his senses, however, has to analyze and interpret such revelations, for he who is still in the trance cannot discern their purport. Hence it was well said by the ancients: 'to act and to recognize one's own and himself belongs only to the man in his senses.'" Plato is sometimes appealed to as the authority for mere enthusiasm, but this passage shows the error of such a view. This closes our consideration of Plato's Philosophy of Nature.

IV.—PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT.

We have to some extent on the theoretical side already called attention to the speculative essence of mind, which is, however, still without its realization [in Plato]; and we have

pointed out the very important distinctions which he makes between the different species of knowing. But, after all, we find in Plato as yet no complete consciousness concerning the organism of the theoretical mind, although feeling, memory, &c., are discriminated from Reason; but these moments are neither distinguished with sufficient exactness, nor treated of in the connection in which they stand through necessary relation. Therefore, the only portion of this that will prove interesting in his doctrine of the Mind is his idea concerning the ethical nature of man; and this real, *practical* side of consciousness is preeminently the brilliant one in Plato's treatment, and it lies now before us. Plato, in this investigation, is not trying to find a "supreme moral principle," as it is called, and in which one has only an empty word while he believes that he has everything; nor is it a search for a natural principle of Right—that trivial abstraction from the real, practical essence, the RIGHT; but he unfolds his idea of that "ethical nature" in his books on the Republic. The ethical nature of man seems to us [moderns] to be an entirely different thing from the state; Plato, however, found the reality of spirit—i. e. of Spirit [or Mind] in so far as it is opposed to Nature—in its highest truth and perfection in the State-organization, which as such is essentially ethical; and he recognized the truth that the ethical nature of man (the free will in its rationality) finds its legal rights, its actuality, only in a true nation [or state].

Moreover, it is to be remarked that Plato, in the books of the Republic, introduces the treatment of his subject by showing what justice consists in. After much discursive talk, and many negative considerations with regard to its definitions, Plato finally says in his simple style: "This investigation should be made in the same manner as if one were to have given him the task of reading small print at a great distance; then if he discovers this same type nearer at hand and larger, he would first read the latter, and then he could proceed more easily with the smaller. In such a manner he would now deal with the subject of Justice. Justice is to be found not only in the individual but also in the state, and in the latter to a greater degree than in the former; hence it can be traced in broader characters and be more

easily recognized in the state." (This is different from the Stoical doctrine of "The Wise Man.") "He will on this account prefer to consider, first, what Justice is as it exists in the state." Plato in this manner, through the comparison of these modes of inquiring into the nature of Justice, passes to the consideration of the State; it is a very naive, agreeable transition, and seemingly arbitrary. The great [good] sense of the ancients, however, led them to the True: and what Plato gives here merely as a piece of pleasantry, is in fact rather the nature of the thing itself. It is, therefore, not a mere matter of convenience that conducts him to this theme; but it is the fact that the consummation of Justice is only possible in so far as man is a member of a state; for Justice, in its reality and truth, is to be found only in the state. Right as SPIRIT, not in its phase as Cognition, but in so far as it [spirit] wishes to give itself reality, is the Existence of freedom, the actuality of self-consciousness, the spiritual Being-in-itself and by-itself [independence] which is active: as in property, for example, I posit my freedom in some external thing. The essence of the State is, moreover, the objective actuality of Right: the reality in which exists Spirit as a totality, and not merely my subjective knowing as a particular individual. For when the free rational will determines itself, there arise laws of freedom; but these laws exist likewise as laws of states, since it is precisely the ideal purpose of the state that the rational will shall exist. In the state, therefore, those laws gain validity and become habit and ethical custom: since, however, arbitrariness and caprice likewise prevail, law is not mere ethical custom, but must at the same time be a power against caprice, just as it appears, and hence arise courts of justice and governments. Hence it happens that Plato, in order to recognize the lineaments of Justice, turns with the instinct of reason to the STATE for an exhibition of it.

The Just in itself is commonly conceived by us in the form of natural rights, of Right in a "state of nature"; such a "state of nature" is however an ethical impossibility. Whatever is in-itself [potential], is held by those who do not grasp the universal to be something "natural," just as the necessary moments of spirit are called "*innate ideas*." The natu-

ral is rather that which spirit must negate or annul, and the right of natural condition can make its appearance only as the absolute wrong of spirit. Against the state as spirit in its reality, spirit in its simple ideality not yet realized, is abstract Potentiality; this ideality [*Begriff*] must, of course, precede the construction of its reality, and it is this which has been apprehended as "natural condition." We are accustomed to set out in our theories from the fiction of a *natural condition*, which of course is no condition of spirit, of the rational will, but rather that which exists among animals; for this reason even Hobbes has correctly remarked that the true state of nature is a state of war of all against all. This "in-itself" [potentiality] of spirit is the individual man [taken in his isolation]; for sensuous conception [*Vorstellung*] takes the universal as existing separate from the individual—as though the individual were in-and-for-himself in his exclusiveness, and the universal did not constitute his essential truth: according to this, the universal would not be his essence, but the most important would be what he possessed in himself as a specialty. The fiction of the "state of nature" begins with the individuality of the person, his free will and the relation of this free will to other persons. What should be right by nature has also been considered to be that which is right in the individual and for the individual; and society and the state have been held to be means existing for the individual person who forms the ultimate purpose of their existence. Plato, in opposition to these views, lays down the Universal, the Substantial, as the basis, and, in accordance with this, holds that the individual as such has this Universal for his end and aim, and that the individual subject exercises volition for the state—acts, lives, and enjoys, for it—so that the state becomes his second nature, his ethical custom and habit. This ethical substance, which constitutes the spirit, life and the essence of individuality, and is the basis thereof, systematizes itself to a vital organic whole, inasmuch as it separates itself essentially into members whose activity is no other than the production of the whole.

This relation of the idea [the ideal whole] to its reality had not yet come to consciousness in Plato; and hence we find

with him no philosophical construction that exhibits first the idea in-and-for-itself, and then the necessity of its realization, and then this itself. As regards the Platonic Republic, it has become an established conclusion that Plato has given therein a so-called "*ideal*" of a constitution; this view has become trite in pretty much the following shape: that this notion of an "ideal state" is a chimera, which though it can be thought in one's head just as Plato has described it, and is in itself excellent and true, and that it is also practical, but only under the condition that men are excellent, as they perhaps are in the moon; but that it is not practicable for men just now as they are here on the earth. Since one is obliged to take men as he finds them, he therefore cannot bring this ideal into existence on account of their (men's) depravity; and hence it would be very idle to set up such an ideal.

As to the first point, it is to be remarked that in the Christian world an ideal of a perfect man is current, though indeed it cannot exist as the mass of a people. If we find it realized in monks or Quakers, or the like pious people, yet a crowd of such sorrowful creatures could form no real nation, as little as lice or parasitical plants could exist for themselves and not upon an organized body. If such men should constitute a nation, this lamb-like soft disposition, this vanity which busies itself with the particular person, providing shelter and sustenance for it, and always assumes the image and consciousness of peculiar excellence, would go to destruction. For the life in the universal and for the universal does not require that lame and cowardly mildness, but rather an energetic one; not an occupation with itself and its sins, but with the universal and that which has to do with it. Now if that spurious ideal hovers before one, he, of course, finds mankind always affected with weakness and depravity, and that ideal not realized; for it sets a value upon trifles that no rational man sees, and it takes for granted that such weakness and errors are there even though they are not visible. But this is not to be considered as greatness of mind on their part; we must rather attribute what they call weakness and error to the fact that they see things through their own corruption. The man who has weakness and error is immediately absolved from it through himself in so far as he makes

nothing out of it [i. e. does not make it his function]. Vice is vice only if it is essential to the individual, and depravity consists in this: to hold it for somewhat essential. The mentioned ideal must, therefore, not stand in our way whatever be its form, even if it is not exactly that of the monks or Quakers: for instance, as this principle of the inadequacy of sensuous things and the deficiency of energy in performance that must let much fail which deserves success. To preserve all relations is contradictory; there is always a side in them that gives offence though they are otherwise right and proper. Moreover, what has been said in another place concerning the relation of Philosophy to the state, has shown that the Platonic ideal is not to be taken in this sense. If an ideal as such has truth through its conformity to the concrete idea, then it is no chimera precisely because it is true; for the truth is no chimera: such an ideal is, therefore, nothing idle and powerless, but rather the Actual. To indulge in wishes is a quite innocent occupation; if, however, one gets no further than pious wishes for the realization of what is great and true, he is godless: and the man who can do nothing [change nothing] because all is holy and inviolable [as it is], and will not be anything determinate [i. e. will not take up any speciality] for the reason that all determined things have their deficiency. The TRUE IDEAL is not something that merely *ought* to be actual, but it IS actual, and is *alone* the Actual; if an idea were too good for existence, then the defect would be in the idea itself, and actuality would likewise be too good for it. The Platonic Republic would be a chimera, not for the reason that humanity lacked excellence, but that its excellence was of too inferior a quality for humanity. FOR THAT WHICH IS ACTUAL IS REASONABLE. But one must know what is *in fact* actual [i. e. know the difference between Seeming and True Being]; in common life everything is regarded as actual; but there is a distinction to be made between the phenomenal world and that of actuality. The actual has also an external finite side which exhibits caprice and contingency, as happens in nature when a tree, a house, and a plant come together [i. e. a connection exists between things not essentially connected]. The surface of the Ethical—the deeds of men—has much that is bad, and much that could be

done better; men will always be vicious and depraved, but this is not the IDEA. If one would recognize the actuality of substance he must look through the surface on which the passions contend for mastery. The temporal, the perishable, exists, it is true, and it can make needs and wants enough for any one; but nevertheless it is no true actuality, no more than is the particularity of the subject, his wishes and inclinations. In this connection we must refer again to the distinction made in speaking of the Platonic nature of philosophy: The eternal world, as the in-himself blessed God, is the actuality; not a "*beyond*" the "other side," but the present world *considered in its truth*, not as it appears to the ear and eye, &c., *sensuously*. If we consider the content of the Platonic Idea, we shall see that Plato has portrayed in the Republic the Greek ethical culture in its substantial form; the Greek national life is what constitutes the true content of this work. Plato is not the man to busy himself with abstract theories and principles; his true spirit has recognized and unfolded the True: and this could be nothing else than the True in the world in which he lived, this one spirit which was vital in him as well as in Greece. No one can transcend his time; the spirit of his time is also his spirit; but he must see to it that he does not fail to recognize it according to its content.

In the second place, a perfect constitution must be made with special reference to a given people, for no constitution is adapted to all nations. Thus if it be said that a true constitution is not adapted to men as they are, it is to be replied that the constitution of a nation is the more excellent, the more excellent it renders the nation; but then, on the other hand, since the ethics of the people constitutes the real living constitution, the constitution in its abstraction is really nothing taken for and by itself, but must be related to the former, and the living spirit of the people must fill it. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is one true constitution which is adapted for each and every nation; and it is, of course, the actual fact that for men as they are, e. g. the Iroquois, the Russians, the French, no one constitution is good for all; for the nation belongs to History. But in the same manner that the individual man is educated in the state, i. e. is ele-

vated from individuality into universality, and from a child becomes a man, so is each nation educated; it passes from its condition of childhood, or its barbaric state, over into a rational condition. Men do not merely stand still as they are, they become something else; and so it is with their constitutions. And it is here the question, "What is that true form which the nation must move towards?" just as it is the question, "What is the true science of mathematics, or any other subject?" but not whether children or boys are to possess this science; they must first be educated up to the capacity of acquiring it. Hence the true constitution stands before the Historical people as a form that the latter gradually approach. Every people must in the course of time make such changes in its existing constitution as will bring it nearer and nearer to the true one. Its spirit issues forth from the leading-strings of childhood; and the constitution is the nation's consciousness concerning that which it is in itself the form of its truth and of the knowledge of itself. If its internal being is no longer what its constitution expresses as the True—if its consciousness or its ideal being and its reality are different,—then the national spirit is a sundered, divided existence. There are two cases of this kind: first, the nation may through an internal, more powerful eruption strike down the existing form of lawful order; or it may change the existing law (which has lost its ethical hold on the people) quietly and slowly, and substitute for it the law which is more in accordance with its true ethical status. Secondly, it may not have the intelligence and strength for this change, and for that reason remain standing under the sway of the inferior laws belonging to the ethical condition outgrown; or it may be that another people which has already reached the higher status, and is for this reason more perfect, subdues the former nation, and it loses its separate existence. On this account it is of essential importance to know what the true constitution is; for what opposes it has no abiding validity, no truth, and is self-destructive. It may have a temporal existence, but it cannot preserve it; it may have possessed validity, but it can no longer continue to do so. That it must be abolished, lies in the idea of its constitution. This insight [into the development of national idea as em-

bodied in a constitution] can be attained only through philosophy [i. e. through an investigation of historical data in the light of the pure IDEA]. National changes happen without violent revolutions if the insight [reached by the thinkers of the nation] has become universal [i.e. it has penetrated the masses]; regulations fall away and are lost, one knows not how, and each citizen submits in this to his loss of rights. Whether the time is ripe for this change or not is a matter that the governing power should know; if it adopts mere temporal regulations, not conscious of what is in truth the need of the time—if it takes under its protection the Unessential and gives it validity as against the Essential (and what this Essential is, is contained in and determined by the national Idea),—then it itself gets overthrown before the growing national spirit, and the dissolution of the government is followed by that of the nation itself; or else, on the other hand, the government and the Unessential retain the upper hand.

The chief thought that lies at the basis of Plato's Republic is precisely that which is to be viewed as the principle of Greek Ethics; that, namely, the Ethical is the Substantial as related to the other elements, and hence is to be held fast as the Divine. This is, of course, the fundamental principle. That which conflicts with this substantial relation of the individual to the ethical status is the subjective arbitrary will of the individual, the *moral* standpoint, to wit: that the individual does not act from respect or reverence for the institutions of the state or of the country, but from *his own conviction*, adopting his resolutions upon moral considerations, and determining himself accordingly. This principle of subjective freedom is a later one, and is the principle of the culture of modern times, and it appears in the Greek world as the principle of destruction to the Greek state-life. It was its destruction for the reason that the Greek spirit had not adapted and could not adapt its laws and constitution to this principle grown up in it. Since the two were not homogeneous, the Grecian ethical and conventional status must perish. Plato recognized and comprehended the true spirit of his world, and set out with the definite intention of making this new principle impossible in his Republic. Plato has, therefore, placed himself upon a substantial standpoint, for

the substantial element of his time lies at the basis of it; but it is only relatively so, since it is only a Greek standpoint, and the latter principle is intentionally proscribed. This is the general element of the Platonic ideal of the State, and from this point of view it must be considered; investigations into the question whether such a state is possible or the best one, questions discussed in the light of modern standpoints, lead only to shallow views. In modern states freedom of conscience exists, and through that freedom each individual can demand the privilege of caring for his own interests; this, however, is all excluded from the Platonic Idea.

a. *Plato's Idea of a State.*

I will now bring up in a more definite manner the chief points in so far as they have philosophic interest. Though Plato presents the state as it is in truth, yet the Platonic state has a defect which we shall learn: that, namely, the individual does not, in formal rights, stand in opposition to this general element as he does in the dead constitutions of the States founded on a legal basis. The content is only the total; though this is the *nature* of the individual, yet it is that only as reflecting itself into the universal, and not as unyielding, or as something possessing value in and for itself; so that the practical essence of the state and individual are the same. Hence while Plato sets out with the idea of Justice that takes for granted that only just individuals exist as ethical members of the state, yet he undertakes to show in the course of the treatment how this actuality of the substantial spirit is realized; i.e. in the first place, the organism of the ethical community as it exists in the distinctions or differences which lie in the idea of the ethical substance [the articulation into castes, or the division of labor]. Through the unfolding of these moments [or distinctions] they become vital and existent; these moments, however, are not independent, but exist only in a unity. Plato considers these moments of the ethical organism in three shapes: first, as they exist as conditions or employments in the state; secondly, as duties or moments of the ethical; thirdly, as moments of the individual subject — of the empirical actuality of the will. Plato

preaches not *morality* but Ethics; he shows how the Ethical is a vital self-movement, and he exhibits its functions as it were its viscera; for inward systematic movement as found in the organic body, in contradistinction to the solid, dead unity of metallic bodies, arises only from distinct visceral functions which are essential to a vital self-moving unity.

a. Without ranks and stations [differences of vocation], without this division into great masses, the state has no organism; these great distinctions are grounded in the Substantial. The first antithesis which we meet with in the state is that of the *universal* (as occupation in the business of the state, and life devoted to the state) and the *individual* (as life and labor for the individual self); the two Employments are so divided that one station is assigned to this person and the other to that person. More in detail, Plato makes three systems of actuality belonging to the Ethical: (1) the functions of legislation—the activity and provision for the Universal, for the interest of the whole as such; (2) the defence of the commonwealth against enemies from without; (3) provision for the individual, for his wants, through agriculture, grazing, production of clothing, houses, utensils, &c. This treatment is in general quite correct, yet it seems too much as if derived from an external necessity, because such “wants” are taken for granted without being deduced from the idea [or Essential Nature] of spirit. These different functions are next distributed into various systems, being shared each by a mass of individuals who are specially fitted thereto; and thus arise the different ranks and stations in the state; for Plato is also opposed to that superficial notion that all people must be one and the same [in respect to rank and station; i.e. abstract equality is not Plato’s idea]. He accordingly makes three ranks: (1) that of the rulers, learned men, scholars; (2) that of the military; (3) of those who provide the necessities of life—agriculturists and mechanics. The first he also calls the state guardians (*phulakas*), the essentially philosophically cultured statesmen, who possess true science; they have the military to assist them, but in such a form that the military and civil ranks do not exclude each other but are conjoined, and the oldest ones are to be the state guar-

dians.* Although Plato has not deduced this division of ranks, yet in this manner is formed the constitution of the Platonic state; and every state is necessarily a system containing these systems within itself. Plato proceeds from this point to individual determinations which are in part trivial and are better dispensed with: e. g. he defines special titularies for the first rank, and discourses on such subjects as show how the nurses should demean themselves, &c. (Rep. Bk. V.)

b. In the next place, Plato shows the moments which are here realized in the several ranks and orders as ethical properties which are present in the individual and constitute his essence: the simple ethical IDEA divided into its general determinatenesses. For as result of this division into ranks and orders, he proves that through such an organism all virtues may be vitally present in the commonwealth; he distinguishes four of these, and they have been called *the cardinal virtues*.

(1) As the first virtue appear WISDOM (*sophia*) and science: such a state will be wisely and well governed—not for the reason that there are many arts known there by the multitude which relate to special employments—as smithing, agriculture (sciences relating to industry and wealth we should call them); but on account of TRUE SCIENCE, which has its reality in the existence of the rank or order of overseer and regent, which deliberates concerning the general interest, as well what is best for it in itself as in its relation to other states. This insight is properly the possession of the few only. (Rep. Bk. IV.)

(2) The second virtue is BRAVERY [“fortitude” or moral courage] (*andria*), which Plato defines as the firm assertion of what is just, and a preservation of the opinion which the laws have founded, that there are certain things to be dreaded, and bravery [fortitude], steadfast in spirit, does not yield to these though impelled by appetite or lured by pleasure.

* Note by German Editors.—“In accordance with these Notes on Plato, Hegel united these two vocations, in an early Essay on the Philosophy of Rights (Works, 2d ed., vol. I. p. 380-1), which he at a later period (vol. VIII. p. 267) called the General Order (rank or class) of citizens; the “other” rank (as Hegel expresses himself in the first passage) mentioned by Plato, Hegel divided into two, in both expositions; the second (trades) and third (agriculture).”

This virtue belongs to the vocation of the warrior. (Rep. Bk. IV.)

(3) The third virtue is TEMPERANCE (*sophrosune*), the power to control appetites and passions, which preserves the whole as a harmony; so that the weaker and the stronger—whether in mind or body, in numbers or wealth, or in whatever respect—work together for one common result and are harmonious. This virtue is, therefore, not (like wisdom and bravery) limited to parts of the state, but is prescribed for both rulers and ruled as a harmony, a virtue for all ranks. (Rep. Bk. IV.) Notwithstanding this virtue of temperance is the harmony in which all work towards a common end, yet it is peculiarly the virtue of the third class, to whom belongs the labor of supplying bodily wants and necessities, though at first glance it would not seem thus. But this virtue consists precisely in preventing any moment, determinateness, or individuality, from isolating itself; in its more limited moral signification it takes care that no want or necessity is allowed to become essential and thereby become a vice. Labor [industry] is the moment of human activity, which is limited to the individual, but returns to the Universal and is for it [i. e. since the individual through his industry elaborates products which supply the wants of *all*, and thereby *relieve* all from the tyranny of those wants, Hegel says that industry is the phase of human activity through which a return is made or begun from the extreme depth of specialization. The individual enslaves himself to emancipate himself; for each works for all, and therefore all for each]. Hence though this virtue is common to all classes, yet it pertains specially to the third class to bring it into harmony, for it lacks the absolute harmony which the other conditions have in themselves.

(3) The fourth virtue, finally, is JUSTICE, and this is treated of from the beginning to the end. This is found in the state (as integrity) in this: that each individual busies himself only about such concerns as relate to the state, and for which his nature has best adapted him; so that each one does not pursue a variety of vocations, but confines himself to that for which he is fitted: young and old, boys, women, freemen, slaves, mechanics, rulers and ruled. We must remark concerning this, in the first place, that Plato places Justice here

side by side with the other moments, and it appears as one of the four determinations. But he withdraws from this position so far as to make Justice that which first gives to the others—Temperance, Bravery, and Wisdom—the power to become, and, when they exist, to preserve them. On this account, he says that Justice will also be found where those other virtues are found. (Rep. Bk. IV.) This means, when explained, that the IDEA of Justice is the basis, the idea of the Totality that is thus divided organically, and that each part is in the Totality only as moment, and the Totality is only through each part; so that in this virtue those [social] classes or properties [of the individual] are only moments. Justice alone is this universal, all-pervading substance: but it is at the same time the for-itself-being [independence] of each part which the state permits to exist for and by itself.

It is evident therefore, in the second place, that Plato has understood by the term Justice, not the right of property—as is commonly done in sciences of Right—but this: that Justice is the Spirit attaining in its totality to its rights as the real existence of its freedom. In property my personality exists very abstractly, my abstract freedom. Plato holds particular treatment of the duties of this science of Rights to be on the whole superfluous. (Rep. Bk. IV.) We find, it is true, laws concerning property, policy, &c.; “But,” says he, “to enounce laws on this subject to noble and beautiful men is not worth the pains.” Really, how will one be able to discover divine laws for that whose material contains only contingency? Also, in the books on “The Laws,” Plato considers chiefly the ethical phase; yet he goes somewhat more at length into the former [i. e. civil rights]. Since however Justice, according to Plato, is the entire essence, which is so related to the individual that through it each one may accomplish in the best manner that for which he was born; therefore the individual comes to his rights only in the form of definite [special] individuality: only in this way does he belong to the universal spirit of the state, and in it attain his Universal as a particular person. While the right is the Universal with a definite [limited] content, and consequently is only *formal* universality; yet this content is the definite *total* individuality, not this or that thing belonging to me through.

accidental possession; but my *real* ownership consists in the developed possession and use of my nature. Justice allows in general each special trait of character to have its rights, and thus leads it back into the whole; through this, that the particularity of an individual must be developed and come to existence, each one occupies his place and fulfils his vocation. Justice, therefore, means—according to its true idea as we seize it—freedom, in the subjective sense; and this because it is that which obtains rational existence; and since this right—that freedom shall become existent—is universal, Plato places Justice above all as the vocation of the whole in the sense that rational freedom obtains existence through the organism of the state—an existence which becomes through its inherent necessity a form of nature.

c. The individual subject [or Ego], as subject, has likewise these properties belonging to him; and these moments of the subject correspond to the three real moments of the state. That in this way there is a rhythm in the idea of the state—is the great and beautiful basis of the Platonic State. This third form, in which those moments appear, Plato describes as follows: There are shown in the subject, in the first place, *wants*, appetites like hunger and thirst, each of which relates to something definite and to this only. The labor for the [gratification of] the appetite corresponds to the vocation of the third rank [or class]. At the same time, however, there is found, secondly, in the individual consciousness something else which restrains and hinders the gratification of this appetite, and holds control over its incitement; this is the Rational (*logos*). To this corresponds the position of guardian, the wisdom of the state. Besides these two ideas of the soul, there is a third, *Anger* (*thumos*), which is in part akin to appetite, but likewise also contends against appetite and assists Reason. “When one has done an unjust deed and it causes him to undergo hunger and cold, which he believes he suffers justly; then the nobler he is, the less anger he will feel against the inflieter: on the other hand, when he suffers injustice, it ferments and boils within him, and he allies himself to that side which is just, and endures and vanquishes hunger and frost and other miseries which are inimical to his appetites, till he carries his point or dies, or is pacified through

reasons just as a dog is called off and pacified by the shepherd." Anger corresponds to the vocation of the brave defender of the state: just as he takes up his weapons in behalf of the reason of the state, so Anger when it is not corrupted through bad education stands by Reason. Just as the wisdom of the state is the same as that of the individual, so also is the bravery; and so in the case of the rest, temperance, and harmony of the individual moments of the Natural: and justice, as it is in external acts where each works out his own part, so too in the Internal each moment of spirit obtains its rights, and mingles not in the business of the others, but allows them freedom. (Rep. Bk. IV.) We have thus a syllogism of three moments, in which the middle term between universality and individuality is anger; it is the for-itself-existing [independent] moment, and is directed against the objective, constitutes the middle term as freedom returning into itself, and conducting itself negatively in relation to itself. This is always present to Plato—this internal truth—even when he has no consciousness of its abstract idea—as in the *Timæus*, for example; and everything [in Plato's works] develops from it. This is the manner in which Plato makes disposition for the whole; the carrying out is a matter of details which has no further interest here.

b. *The Means of Preserving a State.*

Then, secondly, Plato gives the means of preserving the state. Since now the whole community rests upon Ethics as the spirit which has become [by use and habit] the [second] nature of individuals, the question arises: how does he manage to give to each the business which is his vocation so that it becomes his peculiar being and exists as the ethical act and desire of the individual,—so that each with temperance shall subordinate himself to his [proper] rank and position? The chief point is to EDUCATE the individual for this. Plato desires to produce this ethical result directly on the individual, first and chiefly in the guardians, whose culture is the most important part of the whole and constitutes the foundation. For since to the guardians is left the care of producing this ethical status through the preservation of the laws, it is necessary [in the laws] to have special regard paid to their

education; so also to that of the warriors. How it is in the trades, the state cares not so much; "for if the cobbler is wretched and corrupt, and only seems to be what he should be, that is no misfortune to the state." (Rep. Bk. IV.) The culture of the guardian should, however, be perfected through science and philosophy, which is the knowledge of the Universal—of the existent in-and-for-itself. Plato mentions as the means of culture: Religion, Art, Science. In detail, he describes how far music and gymnastics should be admitted as means. But the poets Homer and Hesiod he banishes from his state, because he finds their representations of God unworthy. (Rep. Bks. II., III., V., VII.) For in that time it began to become an earnest business with the consideration of the faith in Jupiter and the Homeric histories, since such individual narrations were taken as universal maxims and divine laws. In a certain stage of culture childish stories are innocent; if, however, they should be set up as the basis of the truth of ethics as law for the present time (as, for example, in the Scriptures of the Israelites—the Old Testament—the extirpation of nations has been used as a rule in the rights of nations; and the innumerable turpitudes which David, the man of God, committed, and the cruelties of the priesthood through Samuel against Saul, have been used as justifications of the like in our time), then the time has come to reduce them to something merely historical, a thing of the past. Plato, besides this, desires to prepare introductions to the laws, in which citizens are exhorted to their duties, and convinced of the importance of the choice of the most excellent, &c.—in short, of ethical culture.

Here, however, there is a circle: the public state-life is founded on ethics, and conversely ethics is founded on the institutions of the state. Ethics must not be independent of institutions: i. e. institutions must not be founded simply on ethics through forms of education as, e. g., Religion. Moreover, institutions must be regarded as the first condition for the existence of ethics and as presupposed by it, for this [ethics] is the form in which institutions have their subjective side. Plato himself gives us to understand how much contradiction he expected to find. And yet it is the custom to blame him for being too idealistic; but the defect lies rather in the fact that

he is not idealistic enough. For though Reason is set up as the universal [all-prevailing] power, this [power] is essentially spiritual; but subjective freedom belongs to the spiritual—and this is the very thing that Socrates had set up as his principle. While the Rational should be the basis of law, and *is* on the whole, yet, on the other hand, conscience—one's own conviction—(all forms of subjective freedom) are essentially contained therein. At first this subjectivity stands opposed to the laws—which form the rational groundwork of the state-organism—and which are the absolute power whose function is to assimilate the individual member of the family [i. e. digest him] through an external system of wants, in which Reason, however, exists as the essential object. It begins with the subjectivity of the free arbitrary will, joins itself to the whole, chooses a vocation, and raises itself to the rank of an ethical being. But this moment [or element] in general, this movement of the individual, this principle of subjective freedom, partly escapes Plato's attention, and in part is intentionally neglected because it proved by its fruits to be the principle that wrought the ruin of Greece; and his sole aim is to discover how the organization of the state should be best secured, and not how subjective individuality is to be attained. Instead of transcending the principle of Greek ethical culture, which was not able to permit the growth and development of subjective freedom within its substantial freedom, the Platonic philosophy seized that principle [of ethical culture] and unfolded it.

c. *The Exclusion of Subjective Freedom.*

As regards this aim—to exclude the principle of subjective freedom—it is one of the chief objects sought in the Platonic Republic. The spirit of it consists essentially in this, that all sides in which the individuality as such is fixed, are to be dissolved in the Universal—all individuals shall attain recognition only as *universal* men.

a. This purpose to exclude the principle of subjectivity renders it extremely proper that Plato should deny to the individual the privilege of choosing his vocation; a privilege which we consider to be necessary for freedom. It is, however, not birth which separates the ranks, and destines the

individual for his vocation; each one is examined by the regents of the state (the elders of the first rank, to whom is assigned the function of educating the rest), and according to natural fitness and capacity displayed, the choice of occupation is made and the individual assigned a definite sphere by those regents. This would seem, according to our modern principles, thoroughly contradictory. For although it is obvious that there is a special capacity and fitness desirable in every vocation, yet individual inclination should not be ignored in determining what sphere of activity a man shall fill; and this inclination, as a seeming free choice, is necessary to make his vocation truly his own. It is not for one man to prescribe for another individual, and say, e. g.: "Since you are good for nothing better, you shall become a cobbler." Each may attempt for himself; he must be allowed to decide for himself in a subjective manner since he is a subject, and he may settle his course through his own caprice without regard to external circumstances; and no one shall say "nay" to him if, e. g., he says, "I will apply myself to study."

b. Furthermore, it follows from this purpose in view [the subjective in subjective caprice], that Plato (Rep. Bk. III.) in his State has also done away with the principle of private property. For in that [private property] individuality, the individual consciousness, becomes absolute; in other words, the person [as property-owner] is viewed as independent without content in any form. In Rights as such, I am a particular individual in and for myself. All are such, and I am thus only because all are; i. e. I am a universal [or the whole finds its realization in each]; but the content of this universality is fixed individuality. Whenever in Rights the question is concerning what justice is as such, the judges do not lay stress on whether this or that man possesses this house, nor do the parties lay stress on the possession of this particular thing about which they are contending, but they contend for justice for its own sake (as morality lays stress on duty for its own sake); and thus this abstraction is held fast and separated from the content of reality. But the essence is not held by Philosophy to be an abstraction, but it is found to be the unity of this universal and the reality (or its content). The content, therefore, is retained only in so far as it is posited

negatively in the universal [i. e. only as food for the action of the universal]: therefore only as returning—not in and for itself [as having independent validity]. In so far as I *use* things—not in so far as I merely *possess* them as property, not in so far as they are to me fixed things existing for me, who am also a fixed somewhat—do they stand in living relation to me. Plato makes the other ranks, the laborers, tradesmen, agriculturists, produce the necessities of life for all, without acquiring property for themselves through their labor; but the whole is only one family in which each one has his prescribed business, the product of the labor being common to all, and the producer too, like the rest, uses from the common store whatever he needs. Property is a possession which belongs to me as this particular person, and it (my person as such) comes to existence, to reality; on this ground Plato excludes it. It remains an unsolved question, however, how there can be found in the development of the trades, where the hope of private property is lacking, a stimulant to activity, for the fact that I am an active person depends chiefly on my ability to acquire property thereby. That by such an arrangement as Plato supposes (Rep. Bk. V.) all strife, dissensions, hatred, avarice, &c., are to be prevented, can indeed be imagined; but all this would be only a subordinate result in comparison to the higher and more rational principle of the right of property: and freedom has external existence only in so far as the person comes to possession of property. This is the form in which we see subjective freedom intentionally banished by Plato from his state.

c. On the same ground, Plato does away with marriage, because it is a bond in which a person of one sex belongs to a person of the other sex reciprocally and permanently—a bond outside of the merely natural relation. Plato does not allow the family life to arise in his state—possessing as it does an exclusiveness peculiar to itself, and by which it [the family] constitutes a whole for itself—because it [the family] is only an extended personality; i. e. a relation, set up within the natural ethical culture, that excludes others, and, though the family principle is an ethical one, it is however such a one as pertains to the individual as a special individuality. According to the idea of subjective freedom, the family is

just as necessary—nay, sacred—to the individual, as property is. Plato, on the contrary, has the children taken away from their mothers directly after birth, placed together in an institution for the purpose, and brought up by wet-nurses chosen from the mothers, and educated in common: and this is carried out in such a manner that no mother shall be able to recognize her child afterward. Though there were to be marriages and each man was to have his own wife, yet the union of men and women was not to presuppose a personal inclination, nor was it to be a special liking which determined individuals for each other. The women were to bear from the twentieth to the fortieth year, the men have wives from the thirtieth to the fifty-fifth year. In order to prevent incest, the children who were born after the marriage of a man were all to be known as his children. (Rep. Bk. V.) Women, whose essential vocation is the family life, are deprived of this their province. In the Platonic republic, therefore, this results: since the family is dissolved and women cannot preside over the home, that they are no longer private persons, and therefore have to assume the vocations of man as the universal individual in the state, and Plato on this account has the women, like the men, share in all masculine employments—nay, even in that of war. Thus he sets them upon nearly the same footing as men, but has no remarkable confidence in their bravery, since he places them only in the rear, although not as a reserve but as an *arrière garde*, in order at least to cause fear in the enemy by numbers, and in case of necessity to render assistance. (Rep. Bk. V.)

These constitute the chief features of the Platonic Republic, which has in it this essential thing, to wit, the suppression of individuality; and it seems that the IDEA makes this demand, and that precisely in this lies the opposition of Philosophy to the method of sensuous representation which regards the individual as the self-existent, and thus it sees in the state as the real spirit, right of property, protection of person and property to be the basis of the whole. In this is found precisely the limit of the Platonic Idea—it only makes its appearance as abstract idea. But, in fact, the true idea is precisely this, that each moment realizes itself perfectly, embodies itself and becomes independent, and yet in its inde-

pendence is annulled [subordinated] for spirit. In accordance with this idea it is necessary that the individuality perfectly realize itself, have its field and realm in the state, and yet be dissolved in it. The element of the state is the family: i. e. the family is the natural, irrational state: this element must as such be extant. Then, too, the Idea of the rational state has to realize the moments of its ideal being so that they become classes of citizens, and the ethical substance is thereby sundered into masses, just as the corporeal substance is divided into viscera and organs, each of which carries on vitality in a special function, and yet all constitute together only one life. The state in general, the total, must pervade each and all. The formal principle of right also—as abstract universality of personality with the undivided as its existing content—must run through all; and yet a particular rank or station belongs to it. Thus, also, there must be a rank or station in which the immediately permanent property, like the possession of the body, is vested as a territorial possession; and then a rank or station in which there is acquired continually not such an immediate possession, but an estate which is ever changing and wavering. These two ranks or stations expose the nation partially to the principle of individuality, and allow here the right to rule; to seek a perpetuity, the universal, the *in itself*, in this principle, which is rather that of movability. This principle must possess its quite perfect reality, and must also exist as property. This is the first appearance of the true real spirit in which each moment preserves its own perfect independence, and at the same time allows its other-being to possess the perfect indifference of being; this, Nature is not adequate to—it cannot exhibit independent life in its parts, except in great systems. This is, as we shall see elsewhere, the great superiority which the modern world has over the ancient—in it the Objective obtains greater, nay, absolute independence, which therefore renders it so much the more difficult to return to the unity of the idea.

The deficiency of subjectivity is the deficiency of the Greek ethical idea itself. The principle which Socrates originated was hitherto extant only in a subordinate form; it must now become also an absolute principle, a necessary moment of the

Idea itself. Through the exclusion of property and of family life, through the cancelling of arbitrary will in the choice of occupation—i. e. the doing away with all determinations which relate to the principle of subjective freedom—Plato believes that he has shut the door against all passions; he had clearly recognized the fact that the destruction of Greek life was immanent when individuals sought to make valid their aims, inclinations and interests as such, and were allowing these to get the mastery over the common spirit. Inasmuch as this principle is rendered necessary by the Christian Religion—in which the soul of the individual is the absolute end and aim, and thus has entered into the world as necessary in the idea of spirit—it is easy to see that the Platonic constitution cannot fulfil the higher demands made upon an ethical organism. Plato did not recognize the knowing, willing, and resolving of the individual and its repose on itself, nor did he know how to unite it with its idea; justice, however, demands likewise for this its rights—that it attain the higher solution and harmony with the universal. The opposite of Plato's principle is the principle of the conscious free will of the individual which in later times has been set up, especially by Rousseau: that the caprice of the individual as individual, the self-expression of the individual is necessary. In that statement, therefore, the principle has gone over into the opposite extreme and appears in its complete one-sidedness. In opposition to this caprice and individual culture, the Universal in-and-for-itself must exist—the thought, not as wise ruler and ethical system, but as *law*, and at the same time as my essence and my thought, i. e. as subjectivity and individuality. Man must produce the rational itself out of his own interests and passions; just as it enters into actuality through the pressure of necessity, opportunity, and occasion.

Æsthetics.

There still remains to be considered briefly a famous side of the Platonic Philosophy, namely, the *Æsthetic*, the science of the Beautiful. Upon this subject, likewise, Plato has seized the only true thought: that the essence of the Beautiful is the intellectual, the idea of Reason. When he speaks of a

spiritual beauty, he is not to be understood as saying, that beauty as sensuous is beauty which is to be thought as in some place one knows not where; but that which is beautiful in the sensuous is spiritual beauty. Just as the essence and the truth of the phenomenal is the idea, so is also the truth of phenomenal beauty likewise the idea. The relation to the corporeal as a relation between appetite, or the Agreeable and the Useful, is no relation to it as beautiful; it is a relation to it as merely sensuous, or a relation of the individual to the individual. The essence of the Beautiful, however, is only the simple idea of Reason existing in a sensuous manner as a thing; the content of this thing is nothing else than the idea. (Plato: Hippias Major.) The beautiful is essentially of a spiritual nature; it is, therefore, not merely a sensuous thing, but the actuality subordinated to the form of universality, of truth. But this universal retains not the *form* of universality although the Universal is its *content*, but its form is the sensuous; and in this, lies the determinateness of the Beautiful. In science, on the other hand, the Universal has also the *form* of the Universal, or of the Idea; the beautiful, however, enters as actual thing,—or in language as representation (the shape that the *thing* takes in the spirit). The nature, essence and content of the Beautiful is alone to be recognized and criticised through the Reason, since it is the same content that philosophy has. Since Reason appears in the Beautiful in the form of a *thing*, the Beautiful remains subordinate to Science; and Plato has on this account placed its [Reason's] true appearance—where it has the form of the spiritual—in scientific knowledge.

Conclusion.

This may be given as the chief content of the Platonic Philosophy: *first*, the accidental form of discourse in which noble free men converse without other interests than that of the spiritual life of Theory; *secondly*, they come, led only by the content, to the deepest ideas and most beautiful thoughts like precious stones which one finds, if not exactly on a desert, yet upon a dry journey; *thirdly*, there is found no systematic connection, though all flows from one common interest; *fourthly*, the subjectivity of the idea is everywhere

lacking; but, *fifthly*, the substantial idea forms the foundation. Plato's Philosophy has two stages on which it must expand and be elaborated into a higher principle. The Universal, which is in the Reason, must *first* be dirempted into the strongest, infinite antithesis, into the independence of personal consciousness which is for itself: therefore, in the New Academy, the self-consciousness returns into itself and becomes a form of scepticism; it is the negative Reason which is turned against all forms of the Universal, and knows not how to find the unity of the self-consciousness and the Universal, and hence remains in the former [i.e. holds by self-consciousness]. *Secondly*, the New Platonists make the return by finding this unity of self-consciousness and the absolute essence: to them God is immediately present in the Reason, which is the rational cognition of the divine spirit, and the content of this cognition is the essence of God. We shall consider these themes hereafter.

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